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THE DISASTER OF DARIEN

PROCLAMATION OFFERING £500 REWARD FOR THE APPREHENSION OF THE AUTHOR AND PRINTER OF A BOOK CONSIDERED LIBELLOUS BY THE ENGLISH

The book was burned by the hangman

Much has been written of the Scottish venture in colonizing on the Isthmus of Darien at the close of the seventeenth century. The many contemporaneous accounts were devoted to the defence of the expedition or to attempts to fix the blame for its failure. The survivors of these small books, pamphlets, and broadsides have drifted almost wholly onto the shelves of a few large libraries and collectors. The more recent accounts by Bannister and by Barbour are concerned with the affairs of the Darien Company and its connection with William Paterson. Under the able editorship of J. H. Burton, the Bannatyne Club printed privately in 1849, under the title of Darien Papers, a valuable collection of letters and papers deposited in what was then the Advocates Library in Edinburgh, since become the National Library of Scotland. Quite recently the Scottish Historical Society, under the discriminating direction of Dr. G. P. Insh, has printed a selection of important manuscripts entitled Darien Shipping Papers. In the Journal of the same society, the publication of the results of painstaking research into certain phases of the venture by Miss Theodora Keith, Professor Hiram Bingham, and others has encouraged a wider study of the Darien undertaking and this has been furthered by the timely issue by The Hispanic Society of America of Mr. Cundall’s book containing matter previously unpublished.

To this wealth of material the author ventures to add a selection of letters and documents drawn from Spanish sources, largely but not wholly, found in the Archives of the Indies at Seville. An attempt has been made to outline the whole affair of the Darien venture, the reasons which led to the formation of the company, the conditions in Europe and the New World at the time, and the causes and results of its failure.

The author wishes to express his thanks to Dr. Worthington Chauncey Ford, LL.D., F. R. Hist. S., of the Massachusetts Historical Society; Mr. Frank Cundall, secretary of the Institute of Jamaica; Sr. don Cristóbal Bermúdez Plata, Jefe del Archivo General de Indias, Seville; Miss I. A. Wright, F. R. Hist. S., Seville; and Major I. H. Mackay Scobie, F. S. A. Scot., of Edinburgh, for valuable help.

The end-paper map is a portion of a chart of the West Indies issued by J. Seller and C. Price, Hydrographers, London, 1703, and published in Harris’s Voyages, London, 1705.

The history of the inception of the settlement by the Scots on the Isthmus of Darien at the end of the seventeenth century and the facts concerning the colony furnish an interesting subject of study. The causes which led to the complete collapse of the undertaking and the return home of those who survived gave disputatious matter for a decade to Scotsmen, and added fuel to the existing quarrels with England.

It is not successful ventures alone which have left their mark and influence on the Americas. The Darien venture had an importance which warrants examination and analysis. Nor was the failure at Darien the only disaster of its kind; the misfortunes and failures of Spanish undertakings were numerous, although now forgotten. The wonder is that the Spanish adventurers had enthusiasm and courage enough to continue the struggle for conquest.

It is necessary to consider first the state of affairs in both Europe and in the New World towards the close of the seventeenth century. When the death of King Charles II in 1685 put James, Duke of York, nominally on the throne and the series of events began which shortly afterwards put William of Orange on the throne, the situation of England’s trade with both the East and West Indies was bound to attract the attention of the Scottish merchants, up to then hardly more than bystanders in the rush to the New World.

In addition to her Northern American colonies, England was in possession of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, Nevis, Montserrat, Bermuda, and a part of St. Kitts. France, in addition to New France (later to become Canada) and Louisiana, had the French Caribbees, including Guadaloupe, Martinique, and a settlement on St. Kitts; by the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) she came formally into possession of the Haytian end of Hispaniola. Spain had her firm grip on Cuba, Porto Rico, all of Central America, Panama, New Granada (now Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador), and presumptively all of South America south of these countries except Brazil, which belonged to the Portuguese. The Dutch were strongly established in Curaçoa, St. Eustatius, Aruba, Bonaire, and on the mainland at Surinam. The Danes had a trading foothold at St. Thomas. In general, the English colonies were more concerned with agriculture than with other pursuits; the Spanish and Portuguese had devoted less time to raising crops than to working the rich mines, included by selection rather than by chance, in their possessions. The Dutch and the Danes were not then nor later considered as of consequence as proprietors in the New World, but had importance as traders and were obtaining generous rewards. The French were engaged to some extent by the nature of their settlements in agriculture, mining, and trade.

It did not need the quarrels in Europe to arouse antagonisms in the Caribbean; the situation itself was fitted to breed jealousies, disputes, raids, and reprisals. The stakes, however, were high and no country seems to have lacked an ample supply of men adventurous with either their capital, or their lives, or both. The political situation in the Caribbean was intimately related to the political situation in Europe—not only in the changing relations between the chief colonizing countries but also in the individual prejudices of the reigning sovereigns. The call of William of Orange in 1688 to the throne of England, after the birth of a son to James, had a strong influence, at first favourable and subsequently adverse, to the aspirations of the Scots for their place under the tropical sun. The long war with France begun in 1689 was ended in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick. This treaty, although affecting little more than a truce, seemed to the English merchant the end of a long struggle and the beginning of a new political and commercial era. The fear that France and the Stuarts could make a Catholic country of England was ended. The war had left England with lessened business and with burdensome taxes. Any policy likely to bring on new quarrels was repugnant to the great merchant class, and William found it no easy task to press his own strong views as to the Spanish succession and yet keep the precarious peace unbroken. Trade conditions in a maritime nation are a measure of prosperity; during the long war exports had dropped about one-third and the losses at sea had been enormous.

In the five years following the Treaty of Ryswick exports had doubled. Even an ambitious King had to yield to the pressure of a parliament pledged to peace. The closing years of the century were favourable to the promotion of undertakings designed to increase trade. In England those who were not sharing in the rich returns from the trade of the great East India Company were anxious to find a way to secure some portion of the trade with the East in addition to a participation in the more open field in the West Indies. In Scotland no spark was needed to fire the enthusiasm for a Scottish venture into the trade with and colonization of the New World. Previous failures, or more fairly stated, previous lack of permanence and prosperity, had been due more to the relatively disadvantageous position of Scotland politically and commercially, and to the state of wars with other nations, than to any particular unfitness of the Scots.

As early as January, 1618, King James considered the expediency of sending to Virginia not only some of his unruly English subjects but also those turbulent Scots who made the border a broad zone of discomfort.^[1] It was not these troublesome borderers, however, but a body of voluntary Scottish pioneers who joined the settlement in Newfoundland some time before the Pilgrims founded Plymouth Colony. The charter for the Newfoundland plantations had been granted in 1611 to the “Company of adventurers and planters of the cittie of London and Bristol for the colony or plantation in Newfoundland.” The Scots had joined the first formed settlement at Cupid’s Cove at the head of Harbour Grace, and through the capacity and resourcefulness of one of their number, Captain Mason, who became Governor, the influence of Scotsmen was strengthened in the colony. The return of Mason to England in 1621 increased the interest of Scotland in colonial schemes,^[2] although lessening their influence in the Newfoundland settlements.

To the enthusiasm and plans of Sir William Alexander, the romantic and versatile poet and colonizer from Menstrie, Stirling, who had an acquaintance with Mason,^[3] is due the attempt to found a New Scotland. In regard to this undertaking Sir William says that he “is much encouraged hereunto by Sir Ferdinando Gorge and some others of the undertakers for New England, I shew them that my countriemen would never adventure in such an Enterprise, unlesse it were as there was a New France, a New Spaine, and a New England, that they might likewise have a New Scotland, and that for that effect they might have bounds with a correspondencie in proportion (as others had) with the Countrey whereof it should beare the name, which they might hold of their owne Crowne, and where they might bee governed by their owne Lawes.”^[4]

By direction of King James a charter was granted at Edinburgh in September, 1621, for the proposed colony of New Scotland, described in the Latin charter as Nova Scotia, and covering a territory which for this purpose was surrendered by the Council of New England; it included what is now Nova Scotia and New Brunswick with the land extending down to the St. Lawrence. Over this great new province Sir William Alexander was given almost complete power.^[5]

The peaceful translation to the New World of the spirit of Scotland with its curious mixture of feudalism and independence was not, however, to be so easy as Sir William hoped. As has been indicated, the chief contestants for dominant position in the colonization of the Americas were Spain, France, and England. Spain claimed the continent. She endeavoured to make this technical claim to a long stretch of the Atlantic seaboard more certain by settlements on the Florida coast, whilst Cartier and others were strengthening the claims of France to the St. Lawrence. The two outposts of Britain were the settlement at Jamestown in the south and Nova Scotia in the north, which had now assumed the responsibilities of a northern bulwark previously carried by the Plymouth Colony and in lesser degree by the Newfoundland settlements. France was not prepared to recognize the claim of England that the discoveries of Cabot gave that country title to the northern shores and the country behind; on the contrary, France claimed as its own the very territory assigned to Nova Scotia, by virtue of their original settlements there in 1604-1605. France had in fact given the territory the name of Acadie and appointed a governor in 1603.^[6]

For a successful colonization of this great tract lying between the settlements of New England and Newfoundland the situation in England and Scotland was propitious; but success did not come quickly. The first two expeditions fared badly and the Scots Privy Council considered the expediency of having associated in the conduct of affairs of the venture some Englishmen experienced in such undertakings. In 1627 war broke out between England and France. The struggles for supremacy as between the settlements affected by this open state of war were severe and prolonged. The conditions did not make the territory of Nova Scotia a happy place for the Scottish venture in colonization. When peace came in 1631 the chief settlement of the Scots colony at Port Royal became an important item in certain reciprocal exchanges and in July of that year it was as part of the agreement abandoned and turned over to the French.

Sir William, now Earl of Stirling, continued his connection with the American Colonies as a councillor of the New England Company; but from that time no exclusively Scottish company played any important part in the northern settlements. A settlement of Scots at Cape Breton, founded by Lord Ochiltree and fitted out by the Anglo-Scottish Company in 1629, had been of short life, as it had been the subject of immediate attack by the French.

During the fifty years following 1631 the desire for a part in the colonization of the New World had little opportunity for effective expression; but between 1680 and 1685 a small Quaker-Scottish settlement was established in East New Jersey and a Scottish-Presbyterian one at Stuart’s Town in South Carolina. Migration to these colonies was induced not solely by the natural inclination of many of the emigrants but also by orders from Cromwell, who thus disposed of many of his prisoners.^[7] During the Commonwealth about two thousand Scotsmen were forced to join the English settlements in North America, Bermuda, Barbadoes, and Jamaica.^[8] Even after the Restoration it was found not inconvenient by the Scots Privy Council to banish annoying Presbyterians to the Colonies.^[9]

Although in large measure both of these settlements were too intimately associated with already existing colonies to be considered as exclusively Scottish ventures, it is interesting to note that the Scots were again an outpost of the English occupation of the Atlantic coast. The South Carolina settlements and that at Port Royal were open to and received the attack of the Spaniards from St. Augustine, who destroyed the settlement in September, 1686.

The state of mind of a people is largely the result of prosperity or distress. To place in proper perspective the efforts of the Scots to secure at the end of the seventeenth century an important place in the trade of the world, it is necessary to bear in mind the industrial, financial, and social condition of Scotland during the last half of the seventeenth century.

Although the greater part of the fighting took place in England during the civil wars, Scotland was invaded by the English army in 1650 and the people suffered severely. Cromwell’s invasion and the Dunbar campaign laid waste the southern part of the country and all trade was interrupted. Nicoll in his Diary^[10] wrote: “So, to end this yeir of God 1650, this Kingdome was for the moist pairte spoyled and overrun with the enymie, evin from Berwik to the town of Air, their being Inglische garisounes in all quarteris of these boundis; and land murning, languisching and fading, and left desolat.” In 1651 the same writer says: “. . . this pure land wes brocht to oppin confusioun and schame, the Inglische airmy ramping throw the kingdome without oppositioun destroying our cornes, and raising money quhairevir they went for maintenance of thair airmy and garisoune . . .”

All commerce between the two countries was prohibited by Act of Parliament^[11] from the time of the invasion until 1654. Scottish ships with their cargoes were seized and treated as prizes.

General Monk estimated that, by reason of the destruction by the invaders and the laying waste of the country by each side to deprive the other of sustenance, the people were two hundred thousand pounds poorer than before. England had suffered grievously for a long period and was the powerful member of a forced partnership; it was not unnatural that she should attempt to relieve her own tax burden by throwing so far as possible on Scotland the weight of supporting the army of occupation. Scotland, at her best, in these days was comparatively poor, and so definite was the evidence as to her poverty that the English Government found itself compelled to make various reductions in the assessment.^[12] The burden of taxes and extreme poverty continued through the Protectorate, and Robert Baillie, a Presbyterian clergyman writing in 1656,^[13] describes how “deep poverty keeps all ranks exceedingly under.”

Lack of capital made it impossible to start new industries, and in 1661 efforts were made to attract money from outside to assist in their development. Acts were passed by the Scottish Parliament granting special privileges,^[14] and in 1681 restrictions were placed on the exportation of raw materials, especially wool and yarn. Some impetus was given to the manufacture of cloth by protection against importation, with the result that cloth made in Scotland cost so much more than that made in England that in 1685 smuggling had become common.^[15]

For many years prior to the Commonwealth, Scotland had enjoyed practically free trade with England and the Colonies. By the enforcement of an effectual union, Cromwell legally recognized this freedom of trade; the Restoration, returning, as it did, to Scotland her coveted nationality, strictly enforced the Navigation Act of 1660, which forbade the transportation of goods from His Majesty’s possessions in Asia, Africa, or America except in ships belonging to England, Ireland, Wales, Berwick-upon-Tweed, or the Plantations, of which the master and three quarters of the crew were to be English. No goods from English possessions could enter England except in English or colonial ships, and no foreign goods, except in English ships or ships of the country from which the goods came.^[16] As this limited the trade of Scottish shipping to commerce with Scotland itself, retaliation was to be expected. An Act of Parliament of Scotland was passed in June, 1661, forbidding the import of goods into Scotland except in Scottish ships or in those of the country whence the goods came, until such time as the restrictions of the English Act were revoked.^[17]

Improvement of conditions was very slow. Industrial conditions were unstable and the Scottish Government wavered in its policy of protection. Difficulties in securing capital continued and under James II there was suspicion in Scotland of the policy of his ministry. The Revolution gave a great impetus to Scottish industry and a large number of manufacturing companies were organized from 1690 to 1695. This was also a period of extensive industrial development in England, and capital, attracted by the generous privileges granted to companies organized in Scotland, with the advantage of skilled Huguenot workmen, flowed over the border into Scotland. For four or five years the impoverished country tasted the beginnings of what appeared to be a coming prosperity; but the promotion of manufacturing in England had been overdone and in 1696 the boom on both sides of the border collapsed. Money, however, had been in circulation amongst a people to whom its sight was unfamiliar. The savings, small and widely distributed, of a thrifty people were awaiting the call of the genius who should point out the road to affluence for the individual, and to greatness for the country.

The company which undertook the Darien venture was not in its earlier stages designed for that purpose. Actually it was the outgrowth of trade aspirations originally English, rather than Scottish. An attempt had been made as early as 1618, under authority from James I, to establish a joint stock company to trade on the African coast; immediate profits were not shown and the undertaking was given up. A similar exclusive charter covering the same territory was granted by Charles I to a company of London merchants in 1631, but the associates made no headway. In 1662 a third company was incorporated with similar privileges and the added right to supply negroes to the English colonies in the West Indies. This company, because of the inclusion amongst its shareholders of persons of high rank as well as merchants, reached further than its predecessors in actual accomplishment.

In 1672 this company surrendered its charter and the Royal African Company was formed, which took over to some extent the business of its predecessor. Until the revolution of 1688 altered conditions, this company did a fairly lively business. Under William and Mary trading became less exclusive in character, and special privileges largely disappeared except in the East Indian trade. The profits of the trade with the East Indies were an incentive to English as well as to Scottish merchants to find similar opportunities elsewhere. The East India Company had been formed at the end of the sixteenth century to compete with the Dutch in the rich trade with the Indies. The Royal Charter from Queen Elizabeth^[18] (31st December, 1600) gave to the company sole trading rights beyond the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan. Its original capital was £72,000, subscribed by one hundred and twenty-five shareholders. At the beginning, the profits on single voyages usually equalled one hundred per centum and an accounting to the shareholders was made at the end of each voyage; after 1612 the company became a joint stock undertaking and broadened its operations. Quarrels and friction with the Dutch continued through many years and nearly a century passed before a real monopoly was established. During the reign of Charles II, from a simple trading company the undertaking grew into a great chartered company with right to acquire territory, coin money, make war and peace, and exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction. By the last decade of the seventeenth century the company’s importance and power were so great that its history became the history of British India. The company’s monopoly, occasionally questioned by some interloper, was confirmed in 1683 by Judge Jeffreys, who sustained the royal prerogative on which the rights of the company rested. Attempts to enter the trade continued, however, and by 1691 an actual association of traders had been formed, determined to break into the profitable trade. Pressure was brought by these merchants on the House of Commons, which declared in 1694 that “all the subjects of England have equal rights to trade to the East Indies, unless prohibited by act of parliament.” The East India Company dealt skillfully with the new situation; by Act of Parliament a new East India Company was formed in which the old company had an important place; the consideration given was help in a loan of £2,000,000 to the state. The two companies were, however, sufficiently distinct to encourage rivalry and in 1702 they were amalgamated with the consent of the Crown.^[19] With peace, enlarged opportunities and increasing prosperity at home, and a new King, apparently desirous to encourage the trade and colonization by Scotland as well as by England, the stage was well set in the last decade of the seventeenth century to give the adventurous of the northern country an opportunity to gain both associates and backers.

A wish or inclination common or widespread in a community invariably finds expression in an individual. The occasion breeds the leader. The dormant desire of the Scots for an expansion of their trade horizon would have offered a fertile field for an unscrupulous promoter; but the man whose enthusiasm and capacity crystallized unformed wishes into an ambitious undertaking was of quite a contrary type.

William Paterson, the son of a Skimmyre farmer, was born in the parish of Tinwald, Dumfriesshire, about 1658.^[20] Little is known of his early life; but that either in the local parish schools or in some other wise he was given a thorough elementary education is to be inferred from his later accomplishments rather than from any more positive evidence. It appears certain that Scotland saw little of him after his earliest years. In fact, but for the certain knowledge that he was for a time in the West Indies, not much is known of him until his return to England in his early twenties.

WILLIAM PATERSON

(British Museum, Ad. MS. 10,403)

In the West Indies he acquired not only knowledge of trade conditions and some business experience, but also enough fortune to gain the ear and attention of people of influence on his return home. Whether he actually made the acquaintance of Dampier and of Wafer in Jamaica, as is generally stated, is of little consequence. It is known that he was acquainted with Wafer later in England and that the latter helped to interest others in the West Indian venture.^[21] He became intimately acquainted with the settlements, trade, and problems of the West Indies and the adjoining mainland as they were then viewed, though he may not have seen personally more than the English possessions. It is credibly asserted that Paterson contributed to a work written by Sir Dalby Thomas and published in 1690, and designed to stimulate increased interest in the importance of the West Indies to English trade.^[22] There is evidence to show that he was a careful student of the existing political and trade conditions and that he looked forward to future developments not only in the Caribbean but beyond its limits into the Pacific, or, as it was then called, the great Southern Sea. Some slight evidence of his activities as a merchant are indicated by the application in October, 1688, of four merchants, of whom Paterson was one, to the Elector of Brandenburg for privileges for a new company to trade with America, but this particular undertaking appears to have fallen through.

On his return to England Paterson had, for one so young, a position of extraordinary influence. He had formed business friendships not only with his own countrymen but amongst merchants of the highest rank in London. Especially was he drawn to that powerful group, which he joined, and which was attempting to resist the monopoly of the East India Company. At this time^[23] (1691) there was much discussion on the means of maintaining a uniform standard of the coin of the realm. Into this discussion, with his clear analytic mind and native talent for argument, Paterson entered with zest and an enlightened determination to accomplish a real purpose. It was not, however, until the years 1694 and 1695 that his hopes were realized and the actual founding of the Bank of England took place. It is perhaps as the accredited founder of that notable institution that Paterson is best known and will deservedly have a more enduring fame, than as the promoter of the great effort of his life, the unfortunate colony of Darien.

Paterson clearly possessed intellectual power and was, for the period, of unusual tolerance. Daniel Defoe^[24] said that Paterson, living in the period of “a great crisis of our political history—a time when our commercial character was struggling out of feudal corruption, and when it was assuming its just equality with legitimate property in the soil, was one of the boldest advocates of free trade, without undervaluing fair territorial claims.”

Paterson outspokenly advocated universal education. He emphatically denounced inconvertible paper money. Neither these, nor his views as to religious liberality, were popular at the time. He had himself experienced the persecution of the Presbyterians under the Stuarts; the intolerance of the Puritans in New England was well known; the expulsion of the Huguenots from France had exiled thousands. Mixed with the dreams of the great merchant were those of the liberal-minded tolerant thinker who longed for a new country where his spiritual as well as his material aspirations might come true.

In June, 1693, the Parliament of Scotland passed a general act permitting the formation of joint-stock companies to trade with countries not at war with the British Crown, and allowing such companies to combine colonizing with their commercial operations. This act gave Paterson the opportunity he no doubt had impatiently waited. There is reason to believe that Paterson had much to do with the drafting of the act of the Scottish Parliament of 1695 establishing “The Company for trading from Scotland to Africa and the Indies.”^[25]

That act, which later came to be called the “Darien Act,” did not name Darien specifically, nor is there reason to believe that any public agreement or understanding existed as to exactly where the contemplated activities of the company should be turned, whatever may have been in the minds of Paterson and his particular friends. The act of 1693 itself specified “any country not at war with us—to the East and West Indies, the Straits and Mediterranean, Africa and the northern parts,” and the act constituting the company names somewhat vaguely Africa and the Indies. Although subsequently known as “The Darien Company,” it was in its first years generally referred to as “The African Company.” The Act received the approval of the King in the manner usual at the time, that is, through His Majesty’s Commissioner for Scotland, then Lord Tweeddale, who is supposed to have been influenced in his decision by the desire to divert the mind of the nation from the unfortunate Glencoe massacre;^[26] but William, then on the continent, was far from pleased with the action taken in his absence. Large powers were conferred on the company, and by a somewhat extraordinary omission, no limit was placed on the amount of capital which might be raised. For thirty-one years the company was to enjoy a monopoly of the trade of Scotland with Asia, Africa, and America and for twenty-one years all goods imported into Scotland, except foreign sugar and tobacco, were to be free of duty; for ten years the company was granted the right to equip and navigate ships in warlike or other manner, whether such ships were owned or hired by the company; the company’s members and servants were free from impressment and arrest, and its officers and members freed from all taxes for twenty-one years; the capital stock of members was made free from attachment except as to profits; the company was authorized to take possession of uninhabited territories in any part of Asia, Africa, or America, or in any other place, provided it was not possessed by any European sovereign, and there permitted to establish colonies, impose taxes, erect fortifications, wage war, and to conclude treaties of peace and commerce.^[27]

The capital must be subscribed by the 1st August, 1696, and at least half must be set aside for Scotsmen living within the Kingdom, to be transferable only to other similarly qualified Scotsmen. It was provided, however, that if there should be some unsubscribed remainder of the Scottish moiety, non-resident Scotsmen and foreigners could be permitted to take it up. No person could hold an interest of less than £100 nor more than £3000 in the company. A capital of £360,000 of which £180,000 was to be for Scotland, was at first proposed^[28] by Paterson and his London associates, subsequently increased to £600,000, one half of which as provided was reserved for Scottish subscribers and the remaining £300,000 to be placed by Paterson in London. Paterson in letters^[29] from London to the Lord Provost in Edinburgh written in July, 1696, makes the following interesting comments:

The delays mentioned in these letters were disastrous to the success of the English subscription. There was sound philosophy in the reasonings and warnings of Paterson and it is interesting to note that the intelligent and successful banking house of to-day is guided by a similar knowledge of both the weaknesses and wisdom of those who have money to invest.

In his letter to the Lord Provost of the 3d September, Paterson wrote: “It’s also absolutely necessary that you would with all expedition gett the Act of Parliament past the Seals lett the charge be less or more of the several Coppies to be signed by my Lord Register,” and to his letter appended the following postscript: “It is not fitt for us to write the Reasons for passing the Seal and therefore it ought not be delayed a day longer.” He undoubtedly had in mind the importance to have it done before the English Parliament met. The cat was out of the bag; the able merchants interested in the East India Company were alarmed too early as to the dangerously wide scope of the privileges of the new company, and were prompt to seek the aid of a complaisant English Parliament.

The Commissioners of the Customs expressed to the Treasury their apprehension that the diversion of the trade of the Colonies from English ports would be disastrous to the revenues,^[30] and a committee of both houses waited upon the King to protest against the Scottish Act. Tweeddale was dismissed, but the Act stood. As a counter-stroke, however, the English Parliament enacted a law prohibiting any but natural-born subjects of England from holding official posts in the Colonies.^[A]

At a meeting on the 11th November, 1695, the East India Company adopted a resolution “That if any Adventurer in the present Generall Joynt Stocke Shall Subscribe to, or be concerned in the Stocke of the Scotch East India Company, or with any Interloper He shall be accounted acting contrary to his Oath, and to the Interest of this Company.”^[31] The East India Company was concerned in preventing injurious competition in the trade to the East Indies and feared the development in the West Indies of sources of the commodities then brought only from the Eastern Tropics.

The London subscription books opened on the 13th November, 1695, and closed on the 22d. The whole English allotment of £300,000 was subscribed and £75,000 paid down by the subscribers. The active opposition of Parliament, however, and the fear of legal and business reprisals frightened the subscribers, nearly all of whom withdrew their subscriptions.

Charges and counter-charges reflecting upon the intentions and methods of both those opposing and those supporting the company were rife in London. The nature of these is indicated in a somewhat scurrilous and lively broadside purporting to be a letter written by an “Impartial Hand,” dated at the Admiralty Coffee-House at Charing Cross the 14th December, 1695, and entitled “Caveto Cavetote.” This contains some nineteen or twenty paragraphs each beginning “Some say,” of which the most interesting are, perhaps, the following:

The English Parliament acted promptly. On the 3d December, 1695, the House of Lords resolved^[32] to consider the Act establishing the Scots Company and shortly thereafter memorials from the East India Company and from private merchants were presented.^[33] From Loo the King wrote: “I have been ill-served in Scotland; but I hope some Remedies may be found, to prevent the inconveniences which may arise from this Act.”^[34]

The actual immediate action of the Government was little more than to send orders to the various governors in America and the West Indies strictly to enforce the navigation laws; but the strong boxes of the London merchant and investor were tightly closed against Paterson and he realized that it would be a waste of time to remain there. A Committee of the House of Commons^[35] on 20th December, 1695 recommended the enactment of a law putting penalties on any subject of England who took stock in or service in the Scottish Company or built ships for its service. If the original design of a company in which experienced English merchants would have had a substantial stake had been carried out, the Scots Company might have made a less lamentable failure; though actual success would not have been more likely had the Darien settlement been an important part of the project.

Whilst there is good reason to believe that Paterson had ever present in his mind the expectation to concentrate the company’s trading on the West Indies, it is equally certain that many of his English supporters^[B] had in mind an attack upon the East India business.

James Chiesly, one of the London merchants concerned in efforts to get into the East India trade, had conferred with Paterson in May as to the possibility of establishing a company in Scotland to trade with the East Indies and that such expectations were held by his English associates are confirmed by Paterson’s testimony before the English Parliamentary Committee in December, 1695.^[36] From whatever point of view the project was considered neither money nor other support could be had in London. Paterson, always resourceful, turned quickly to Hamburg; but there encountered the opposition of Sir Paul Rycaut, the English Resident,^[37] and other English officials, so that certain promised support to raise £200,000 was withdrawn. The Dutch East India Company was able to frustrate an attempt to procure subscriptions in Amsterdam.^[38]

Paterson with a few of his friends now went to Scotland where the hostility shown in England had increased rather than lessened enthusiasm for the project. The pride of the Scots was at stake. The financial plan was redrafted with a total capital of £400,000, two thirds of the original amount, but £100,000 more than had been allotted previously to Scotland.

The subscription lists opened in Edinburgh on the 26th February, 1696, but could not be closed with the celerity suggested by Paterson to the Lord Provost at an earlier date. Yet neither subscriptions nor enthusiasm were lacking. The methods of London did not apply to Scotland, where investors and capital were not concentrated to the same extent in one chief town. On the first day the sum of £50,400 was subscribed and the list filled up steadily. The desire to support the company was widespread; no part of Scotland escaped the fever. A special book in Glasgow received subscriptions of more than £56,000. An inspection of the subscription books shows that in other places lists were prepared and an attorney or deputy authorized to proceed to Edinburgh and enter subscriptions covering the local contingent.^[C]

By the end of the fifth week about £300,000 had been subscribed; this grew slowly to the sum of £375,000 and the full amount of £400,000 was finally reached by leaving the books open until the last day fixed by the Act (1st August, 1696). Perhaps no other great popular subscription for a purpose not connected with the support of government in time of war has ever called out such a high percentage of national loyalty. Macaulay says that £400,000 probably bore as great a ratio to the wealth of Scotland in 1696 as £40,000,000 would at the time he wrote in 1848.^[39]

The relative purchasing power and importance of money at different periods are not easy to determine. It is not enough to compare the relative amounts of certain staple commodities to be had at different dates with a stated weight of gold. Money, as such, is rarely needed by a family or clan which raises its own food and clothing. In communities where (or at those periods when) wants are rigorously restricted to necessities, money values cannot be measured by the same standard used in a highly organized sophisticated society, not given to barter and with artificial wants. Civilization progressively converts luxuries into necessities, diluting beyond recognition the relative value of really needed things.

There can be no approximately accurate estimate of what £400,000 in Scotland at the end of the seventeenth century would mean to-day. Public and private expenditures, expressed in materials and performance, were meagre in comparison with to-day. Standards of comfort were harshly low. Of actual money small amounts were seen. Banks and banking were still in swaddling clothes. That such an enormous sum was raised is so startling as to justify examination of the state of the soil which permitted the chance seed escaped from the London merchants to take root in Scotland. Seed does not germinate in a barren soil and circumstances had made of Scotland a fertile field. The plan was born of the desire of London merchants to compete with the great East India Company. The psychological outweighs the material interest.

The Darien adventure is an amazing and yet a natural product of that curious blend of cold, thrifty common-sense and poetic idealism found in Scotsmen. No historian, however, can describe as dramatically the extent of the enthusiasm amongst all classes capable to subscribe as is shown by the subscription books themselves.

The shareholders numbered about fourteen hundred, ranging from eight of £3000 each, the maximum allowed from one subscriber, to about six hundred and forty of £100 each, the smallest amount permitted. The average subscription was for approximately £285. All walks in life were well represented as well as all parts of Scotland. Scottish peers were down for substantial sums, amongst them the Duchess of Hamilton, the Duke of Queensberry, and Lord Belhaven signed the list for £3000 each. The list names nearly two score more Scottish peers, some sixty baronets and knights, nearly half a hundred doctors and surgeon-apothecaries, several hundred merchants, and shows that goodly sums were put down by the merchant-companies, guilds and wrights, as such. Many of the richer city corporations subscribed officially—Edinburgh and Glasgow for £3000 each, Perth £2000 and Dumfries, £500. The distribution of subscriptions to lesser amounts is widespread amongst the professions and trades—advocates, ministers, professors, writers, suiters, clerks, tutors, booksellers, goldsmiths, tailors, glovers, servitors, soap-boilers, brewers, maltmen, felt makers, and periwig makers—all are represented. The imaginative side of the Scottish character, not always adequately recognized, overcame its natural wariness. Whatever views the London subscribers may have had as to the purposes of the new company in the way of trade, there can have been little illusion amongst Paterson’s associates in Scotland as to the Darien objective. With their courage and confidence stimulated by the vision of a great colonial establishment it would be a matter of surprise if many of the subscribers did not put down their names for more shares than they could pay for.

Dependence was placed upon the securing of credit as well as actual cash. It is doubtful if the available floating capital of Scotland could have met an immediate call for the whole sum subscribed. An early success of the venture might have made credits available; but the delays in starting and the lack of sufficiently reassuring reports, even before the actual misfortunes were known, made difficult the collection of the full amount called upon the shares.

The record book of the company^[40] shows that a call was made for payment of 25 per cent in June, 1696, followed by smaller calls of from 2½ per cent to 5 per cent in November, 1698, Candlemas, 1699, May, 1699, November, 1699, and February, 1700, a total of 42½ per cent, which on the basis of the full subscription of £400,000 should have yielded £170,000. The books show that the first call of 25 per cent was collected very nearly in full, the actual amount entered being £98,223, 17s., 2-2/3d. out of a possible £100,000. The whole sum paid, however, on all the calls was a few shillings in excess of £153,448, showing something over £16,000 in default. Under the terms of the subscriptions interest was to be credited from the various dates and the books show a total of over £65,000 so credited, making a total sum of £219,094, 8s., 7-1/3d. as the “precise extent of the pecuniary sacrifice incurred by Scotland in the Great Darien scheme.”^[41]

Information on trade and colonies obtainable at the time, if given even casual study by usually intelligent and cool-headed Scotsmen, would have deterred them from the venture. With such knowledge at hand it seems incredible that confidence in Paterson or a desire for “a place in the sun” of the West Indies should have so completely closed the minds of such eminently thoughtful men as were many of these subscribers. Such was the fact and as such it stands as a record and measure of the capacity of the Scots for passionate enthusiasm.

It must be remembered, however, that news travelled slowly and almost solely through personal communications and correspondence. The occasional pamphlet and broadside appeared, but was the offspring of some particular event or proposal and not the purveyor of general information. The London Gazette during those years contained regularly letters from correspondents at the principal continental capitals, but news from Edinburgh was infrequent and unimportant, a fact which suggests a greater meagreness of London news in Scotland. It is perhaps evidence of the aloofness of Scottish peers and merchants from the better informed men of similar station in London that adequate enquiry was not made upon the trade conditions and geography of the Caribbean Sea.

Since his return to England, Paterson had been too intimately concerned with finance not to include banking in his scheme for the Darien Company. Instead, however, of waiting until the operations of his trading and colonizing company developed banking as a necessary corollary, he conceived the organization of a banking business by the company as a means of promoting it. It is not certain whether his ideas were stimulated by resentment that he may not have been asked to coöperate in the organization of the Bank of Scotland, then in process of organization by John Holland, who became its first Governor.^[D]

An Act establishing the Bank of Scotland had been passed in July, 1695; this Act gave the bank a monopoly in Scotland. As the Darien Company possessed no express statutory authority on banking, Paterson devised what he called a Fund of Credit. An organization of considerable size, comprising a secretary, five accountants, two cashiers, three tellers, and various clerks, messengers, etc., was established by the company to conduct a banking business under this title. A copper plate was engraved and notes of various values from £5 to £100 were printed and circulated by issuing them to those who borrowed on personal bonds, collaterals or discounted bills. The great popularity of the Darien Company deterred the directors of the Bank of Scotland, not then firmly established, from contesting this invasion of its rights.

It does not appear that the purpose of the “Fund of Credit” or banking business of the Darien Company was to lend money on the security of its own shares, but such loans were made until the practice was found undesirable and it was discontinued.^[42] In due course the working needs of the company itself demanded more than its available funds, which led to the discontinuance of its banking activities. All notes in circulation were retired in June, 1701. It is difficult to find justification for this banking venture nor did it help the company. On the contrary, the loans made on insufficient security reflected unfavourably upon the Darien stock itself. This banking episode certainly did not quicken the preparations for the main operations of the company, even if to it cannot be wholly attributed the long delay which took place before any expedition started.

The first necessity was a definite plan of operations, and the next to secure the necessary ships, supplies, and men to carry out that plan. The time had come for Paterson to unfold the full details of what he designed to secure for Scotland. In masterly fashion Paterson had conceived a great scheme—the product of superior intelligence, broad vision, and his own personal observations and information obtained in the West Indies. Its faults were not those made by the ordinary promoter; they were rather his failure properly to weigh the strength of the opposition his projects would evoke. He treated too casually the claims of Spain to Darien and his geographical concepts of the Pacific were distorted. No doubt appears of his sincerity and honesty of purpose.

Even before the deposition of James II Paterson had given thought to the advantages of Darien as a great trading centre. In his own words it was “the key of the Indies and door of the world.” He had pointed out to James that to take possession of Darien and establish a settlement there would accomplish the treble purpose of furnishing a base for operations against Spain, a storehouse and market for the West Indian trade, and an important post which, he asserted, would become the trade route to India and the Far East. A discussion of Spain’s title to dominion over all Darien, to which title Paterson should have given weight at the time, appears elsewhere in this account. It seems probable that he was badly informed as to the distances across the Pacific Ocean and underestimated the difficulties of transport over the Isthmus of Panama; but much that he foresaw is in the way of accomplishment something over two centuries after his failure.

It was a noble conception. Possibly he exaggerated his own convictions in the closing words of his address to the King, although in general it must be said of Paterson that he was a full convert to his own enthusiasms. He wrote:

These suggestions received scant attention from James II, who was otherwise fully occupied; but Paterson kept his plans continually in mind and apparently had little difficulty to persuade the court of directors of the new company to adopt his ideas. It must not be assumed that no voice was raised in Scotland against the project; but opposition was unpopular and consequently generally confined to private correspondence. A categorical denunciation of the whole undertaking ably presented, is given in a letter of Robert Douglas, a Scottish merchant, under date of 5th September, 1696.^[43]

The fact that Paterson was the only director conversant either with the foreign trade or with the countries described by him made him the leader in the meetings of the company directors. At a meeting on the 23d July, 1696, he presented memoranda, memoirs, maps, and trading plans in considerable detail. Resolutions were adopted as to ships, supplies, cargoes, etc., needed for a trade with “Africa and the East and West Indies.” Paterson was requested unanimously to reduce to writing his general scheme and to deliver it to the company’s secretary in a sealed packet. It was at this meeting that interest finally waned in the relatively safer and better known trade with the East Indies, and that the Darien project appears to have become the definite aim of the company. The collection of stores to go out with the contemplated expedition began in advance of the acquirement of ships. From August, 1696, the purchase and storage of supplies went on continuously to the great advantages of the merchants concerned. Medical supplies for the use of 1500 men for two years were authorized, and biscuits, beef, pork, prunes, brandy, claret, tobacco, pipes, pistols, billies, etc., were accumulated and stored in Edinburgh warehouses. Contracts were made for hats and even for wigs.^[44] It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the influence of subscribers and of those whose coöperation was needed for the furtherance of the company’s plans caused the purchase of much unsuitable material.

Meanwhile agents of the company had been sent to Hamburg and Amsterdam to contract for the building of ships, as Scotland was then without shipyards and the English yards were closed against the company. Paterson with other directors visited Holland to secure shipstores more cheaply there than in Scotland.

Now occurred the unfortunate event which hurt the reputation of Paterson and undoubtedly resulted in greater misfortunes to the company than would otherwise have happened. The handling of the funds of the company naturally fell to him. Of a sum of £25,000 set aside for shipbuilding Paterson, desirous to obtain for the company the benefits of its employment until needed, and anticipating a rise in the rate of exchange, deposited with, or lent to, a merchant friend of his in London, James Smyth, the sum of £17,000. With this Smyth was to honour bills drawn upon him by the company’s agents on the Continent. But for the fact that Smyth turned out to be untrustworthy and decamped with the funds, it would have been an ordinary business transaction, although one which more properly should have been done with an accredited banker.

Nine thousand pounds was recovered from the defaulter, and, smarting under criticism, although completely exonerated by a committee of the directors, Paterson assumed personal liability for the balance. But his personal fortune had suffered by his leaving London for Scotland and, except by assignment of a large portion of his salary from the company, he had no means to pay the debt. Paterson was greatly blamed and, in spite of the committee’s exoneration of him and his assumption of liability for the net loss, many of the directors had lost confidence in him.

It had been planned that Paterson, who had been the chief counsellor of the directors, should accompany the expedition in an important official capacity. The board could unite on one plan only, and that was that Paterson might go with the expedition if he chose to do so, but only as a supernumerary volunteer and not as an official of the company.

In November, 1697, three ships for the expedition, built at Hamburg and Amsterdam, arrived in Leith, with complements of men on board, and were transferred to the Firth for the winter. Actual sailing for the West Indies was postponed until the next year.

As colonization was an important part of the scheme, much consideration was given to plans to secure desirable members of the expedition as settlers. An advertisement, in form of a folio broadside, was issued as follows:

Changes were afterwards made in these conditions by which each planter was subjected to a three-year indenture, during which he would be maintained at the company’s expense; at the end of this period he was to receive his allotment of land. Councillors were to be allowed a maximum of one hundred and fifty acres and officers up to one hundred acres. The applicants exceeded the number possible to take, which gave the directors an opportunity for selection. Three hundred young men of some of the best Scottish families were chosen, some sixty military officers, and the balance (making a total of twelve hundred) were drawn from those occupations deemed best suited to make the settlement successful. July, 1698, was fixed for the time of sailing, the exact destination to be contained in sealed orders to be opened under instructions. On the 8th July, the directors adopted resolutions as to the government of the intended colony. A council of seven was vested with supreme power and with the right to fill vacancies in its own body. Unhappily no provision was made as to the tenure, permanent or otherwise, of a President of the Council, which details were left to the Council itself. Regulations also were adopted fixing the financial relations of the colony with the home office of the company. These regulations contemplated the early arrival on a profit earning basis of the Colony, which was to compensate the company for its expenditures for ships, stores, etc., by an annual payment of £7000 until such time as the total sum of £70,000 spent on the ships had been repaid.

At Leith on the 12th July, 1698, the seven councillors signed an oath of fealty to the company and shortly after the middle of the month the fleet set sail from Leith. To the fleet of three ships built for the company had been added two smaller boats laden with stores and serving as tenders. Of this embarkation Sir John Dalrymple has written as follows: “the whole city of Edinburgh poured down upon Leith to see the Colony depart, amidst the tears and prayers and praises of relations and friends, and of their countrymen. Many seamen and soldiers whose services had been refused, because more had offered themselves than were needed, were found hid in the ships, and, when ordered ashore, clung to the ropes and timbers, imploring to go, without reward, with their companions. Twelve hundred men sailed in five stout ships.”

The fleet which thus auspiciously set sail was made up as follows: St. Andrew, Captain Robert Pennicook (Commodore); Unicorn, Captain Robert Pinkerton; Caledonia, Captain Robert Drummond; Endeavour (pink); Dolphin (snow). The three ships, mounting between them about 175 guns, carried the greater part of the expedition; the pink and snow, designed to be used as tenders and dispatch-boats, carried additional stores.

The records as to the exact size and armament of these vessels are not precise. What appears to be the builders’ specifications of one of the three larger vessels are amongst the Darien manuscripts in the National Library, Edinburgh,^[45] and represent a vessel of about 550 tons.^[E] It is fair to estimate the aggregate tonnage of the three larger ships as between 1200 and 1400 tons burthen, as then measured. The general descriptive title of “snow” was used for small vessels, of a rig similar to a brig, but with an additional small mast close to and aft the mainmast, carrying a trisail. The name “pink” was given to small fore-and-aft rigged vessels of somewhat shallow draft, suited rather more for near-shore and fishing work than for long voyages, except when under convoy.

LEITH HARBOUR ABOUT 1700

Reproduced from a painting, by permission of the Master and Members of Trinity House, Leith

Reference is occasionally made in the dispatches or journals to the number of guns carried by one or the other of the larger ships^[46] and it is upon these references that the estimate of 175 is based; the commander of the Spanish windward fleet, writing from Portobello,^[47] 16th January, 1699, to the Conde de Canillas, President of the Audiencia of Panama, acknowledges the receipt of advices concerning five Scottish vessels at Darien with an armament of 70, 70, 50, 30 and 24 guns. This was undoubtedly an overestimate. In an enclosure accompanying a letter of the Governor of Virginia^[48] to the Council of Trade and Plantations, dated 1st July, 1699, appears a list of the vessels, assigning 56 guns each to the three large ships, 14 to the Dolphin and none to the pink, a total of 182. From the descriptions given, and from the specifications of the one, the ships appear to have resembled closely those of the same size then employed by the East India Company, although with less costly carvings and decorations.

Paterson’s suggestion that the ship commanders should examine carefully the stores before sailing in order that the deficiencies which obviously he suspected might be repaired before sailing, had been disregarded. After a few days at sea, however, the councillors convened on board the St. Andrew to take account of the provisions;^[49] they found that the supplies of food were so badly chosen, ill-balanced, and the quantities of many things so much less than the needed amounts, that it was expedient to put everyone on short allowance at the very outset of the voyage.

Madeira, which had been fixed as the rendezvous of the fleet and the place where the sealed orders were to be opened, was reached on the 29th August, 1698. This gave the first opportunity to send dispatches to the directors reporting the deficiency in provisions and the necessity of sending further supplies, which would be urgently needed by the time of arrival at their final destination. It is noteworthy that the Council rather than expend the ships’ monies for more solid necessities, for obtaining which they placed reliance upon their dispatches, used these funds to buy twenty-seven pipes of wine, which it had been planned to take on there, and small quantities only of other supplies. At Madeira the sealed sailing orders were opened; these directed them to proceed to Crab Island, near Porto Rico, and then to be governed by the further sealed instructions which they carried. The records of this voyage appear in the journal,^[F] apparently an official record kept for the Council, by Hugh Rose, who acted as its secretary.

The fleet weighed anchor on 2d September, 1698. On the 10th they crossed the Tropic of Cancer and members of the ships’ crews who had not previously passed it were given the customary ducking by a tackle from the main yard-arm. On the 30th, Antigua and Montserrat were sighted and on the following day the Western end of St. Christophers. The second sealed orders^[50] directed that possession should be taken of Crab Island, if found free, in the name of the company, and that from thence they should proceed to Golden Island in the Bay of Darien. In furtherance of these orders the Council met on board the flagship on the 1st October and agreed to dispatch Captain Pinkerton in the Unicorn with the Dolphin, with Mr. Paterson accompanying, to the free port of the Danes at St. Thomas, to secure pilots for the Spanish Main and information as to the actual state of affairs at Darien. This was done. On the 3d October a landing was made on Crab Island and formal possession taken. Some men were left on shore for the night whilst the fleet, uncertain as to the weather, stood off to sea returning the next forenoon and taking the men on board. The same afternoon, bearing to leeward, searching for safe anchorage, they found at the island in Frenchman’s Bay a sloop flying Danish colours. This proved to have been sent to the island by the Governor of St. Thomas, conveying a Danish Governor and fifteen men to claim the right of the King of Denmark to the island. This sloop had been dispatched after the arrival of Captain Pinkerton at St. Thomas in search of pilots, for the purpose of protesting the right of the Scots Company to claim possession. The Danish sloop had arrived about six hours after the landing of the company’s men. The protest, however, was friendly, and according to Mr. Rose not more than half-hearted, as the Danes would have welcomed a protecting settlement between their own islands and the Spanish at Porto Rico.

SHIPS OF THE BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY

Early eighteenth century

On the following day, Captain Pinkerton returned and brought as pilot a Captain Allison, an elderly privateersman, who had sailed with Captain Sharp^[51] and had been present at the takings of Panama, Portobello, Chagres, and Cartagena. He is said to have remained at Golden Island with one Captain Macket, guarding the English buccaneer fleet, when Sharp made his march across the Isthmus of Panama in 1680. Sixty men from the St. Andrew were kept on shore in tents whilst the ships remained; and water, which later was found to be unwholesome, was taken on board. That the sovereignty of this rather small and relatively unimportant island was at this time a potential bone of contention has been pointed out by Mr. Frank Cundall,^[52] Secretary of the Institute of Jamaica, who quotes as follows the report of William Blathwayt, Esq., to the Lords Commissioners of H. M. Treasury, in regard to a petition of Richard Frith for a grant of Crab Island, which had been referred to Blathwayt for an opinion:

In 1697, the island was included in the charter of the Danish West India Company. At this time it was claimed also by the Spaniards, Brandenburgers, and French, as well as by the English. It eventually became Danish and recently passed with the Virgin Islands to the United States.

Paterson was ever alive to the need of supplies, both for the voyage and for the use of the settlers until such time as their own products and trading should make the projected settlement self-supporting. When at St. Thomas aboard the Unicorn with Captain Pinkerton, he met with a Captain Moon of Jamaica, who was in command of an eighty-ton sloop bound from New York to Curaçoa with provisions. Paterson had previously known Moon in Jamaica, and now persuaded him to accompany the Unicorn with his sloop to Crab Island, with the intention to obtain some of Moon’s provisions through fair barter from the cargo of the ships; but terms could not be reached, although it was agreed that Moon should later send, or himself come with, provisions from Jamaica to Darien, where the ship’s cargoes would be more conveniently displayed for trade. By early morning on the 7th October the fleet had sailed,^[53] and except for rains, squally weather, illness, and deaths caused by the bad water, little of moment happened until anchors were dropped at nightfall of the 30th in a sandy bay some three leagues west of the Gulf of Darien. Here the Scots had friendly intercourse with several Indians who came aboard in canoes. After two days of feeling their way along the coast, on 1st November, 1698, the ships cast anchor within half a mile of Golden Island, and took soundings from their boats in order to find convenient and safe room for the fleet.

Mangrove swamps and the absence of fresh water made the surrounding shores unattractive. Whilst the Scots were sounding, about a score of Indians, armed with bows and lances but waving a flag of truce, appeared on the shore. When spoken to these Indians professed friendship and it was arranged that one of their head men should come on board the next day. In the morning intercourse was established, and the Indians, pleased with the presents given them and finding the invaders were not Spanish, appeared in no wise disturbed.

On the 2d November a bay about four miles to the eastward of Golden Island was sounded, and found to contain an excellent harbour on the protected side of the bay, formed by a point of land and Golden Island. This place, settled by Gabriel de Rojas in 1514 and called Acla on the old Spanish maps, was chosen as the site for a settlement, and named Caledonia, a name given also to the bay. Selecting a flat sandy peninsula for the principal settlement or capital of Caledonia, the settlers named it New Edinburgh. The site chosen had apparent advantages for the immediate purposes of the expedition. The anchorage was good. Within a cable’s length of the shore three fathoms of water gave ample depth and from no direction could dangerous winds or seas disturb the ships. By digging a ditch at one end of the somewhat narrow strip selected for New Edinburgh it could be, and shortly was, made effectively an island. The building of a fort, supplied with a battery of sixteen guns taken from the ships, at the opposite, or westward, end of the town, gave protection to both the settlement and harbour there. The land on the peninsula, although sandy, was found to be good, and to have many and useful trees. The neighbouring country appeared well watered.^[H]

CONTEMPORANEOUS MAP OF GOLDEN ISLAND AND CALEDONIA

On the 3d November a party landed and took formal possession. The next day the ships were got into the harbour with no mishap except that the Unicorn hit a sunken rock. There were so many sick men on the ships that the first work undertaken was the building of huts to house them, forty men from each vessel being sent on shore for this purpose.

The first impressions of the new land must have gone far to allay any fears caused by the misfortunes and discomforts of the voyage. The account given by one of the company on the pink Endeavour in his journal of the voyage is superior in clearness of detail to that of Rose. Under date of 4th November, 1698, he describes Caledonia as follows:

The first weeks were busy ones; not only were the large number of sick to be housed, land cleared, defences erected, etc., but there was no lack of company to entertain. “Captain” Andreas, as one of the native caciques or chiefs, was called, with one or another of his wives appears to have been more or less continually in conference or negotiation with the Councillors;^[I] occasionally the other two chieftains, Ambrosio and Pedro, came by boat from the westward.

The belief of the writer of the journal just quoted that the harbour had been hitherto undiscovered is not borne out by the facts; but he appears to have been correct in his assumption that the coming of the expedition as well as its destination was very generally known throughout the Caribbean. Within no more than ten days of the landing there arrived Captain Richard Long of Jamaica, in command of a small English man-of-war, Rupert Prize, who showed apparently small pleasure in finding the colonists already arrived. The lack of harmony at home between the Scots and the King concerning the Darien Company had been transferred with disastrous speed to the West Indies.

Although the belief that Captain Long had been actually instructed by the English Government to forestall the Darien Company in their occupation is supported by some of the evidence, Captain Long’s report^[54] to the Council of Trade in England tends to confirm his own statements to the colonists that he was in search of certain wrecked plate ships; his report makes it certain, however, that he had been expected at least to discover and report upon the exact proceedings, conditions, and intentions of the Scots Colony. It appears to have been immediately after the receipt of Captain Long’s report that the English Government sent instructions to the various colonial Governors resulting in proclamations against trading with or giving assistance to the Darien colony. The work of creating a settlement, unloading and overhauling the ships, and exploring the neighbouring country, was much hindered by the rains and high winds.

The explorations and to some extent soundings covered a fairly extended coast line including that of the Isle of Pines. Whilst these surveys were in progress Captain Long left somewhat suddenly, and the Council, meeting on the 26th November, apparently disturbed by the uncertainties in regard to the actual intentions of Captain Long, resolved to send the pink home to Scotland with all possible speed.^[55] The negotiations with Andreas, who appears to have been playing the ingenious but uncertain rôle of a friend to both the Spanish and the Scots, had resulted in an agreement on the part of the Darien Company to give him a commission and to protect him and his people; on his part he conveyed to the company his rights to the country. On the 4th December, 1698, formal ratifications of this pact were exchanged.^[56] Shortly afterwards (24th February, 1699)^[57] a similar undertaking was made with one of the other native chiefs, Diego.

With so much rain, so much discomfort for both the sick and the well on shore, and a lack of contentment amongst the large numbers who, of course, had to continue to live on board, it is not strange to find that on the 30th of November, ten of the prospective planters secured fire-arms and deserted from the Unicorn. These were caught, returned to the ship, and put in irons on the following day. In addition to the men engaged in constructing shelters a gang was put at work cutting cedar logs with which to load the pink for her return cargo. Visitors continued to arrive. On the 11th December, barely six weeks after the first landing there came a French and a Dutch ship, the first an armed merchantman (St. Anthony, of forty-two guns) and the second a coast trader carrying twenty-two guns.

The French captain, who had sought the harbour to stop certain leaks, gave information that the Scots’ arrival was known to the President^[J] of the Audiencia of Panama and by him advices had been sent to the Governors of Cartagena and Portobello. He reported the Spaniards all along the coast as greatly disturbed; and owing to local civil disturbances, in poor condition to assert their old supremacy, but that the Windward fleet consisting of three ships was then at Cartagena. A few days later Captain Long returned in his ship and reported that the Windward fleet consisted of seven large ships and other vessels carrying soldiers and was taking in provisions in preparation for an attack on the settlement. This news made all haste necessary to complete the batteries and put the company’s ships in position to defend the harbour.

Desertions continued and on the 16th December seven settlers got away. On the same day word came from Andreas that a large number of men had been sent from Panama to Portobello to attack the settlement by land, whilst the naval forces from Cartagena and Portobello attacked by sea. Confronted by these difficulties the idea of sending the pink with dispatches was abandoned and it was decided to send one of the company, Mr. Hamilton, home by the French ship, with letters and information.

On the 19th December news was brought in that Captain Long had been persuading the Indians that the Scots were a worthless lot and unworthy of protection. The source of this story, one of Long’s men who had been left behind along the coast, throws doubt upon its truth. On the 19th the Commodore, Captain Pennicook, in his journal reports somewhat truculently that “This day the battery was finished, sixteen twelve pounders being mounted on it, and we are now in such condition that we wish nothing more than that the Spaniards would attack us.” Rose uses nearly the same words.

Good news and bad news came in rapid sequence to the settlers. On the 22d a friendly chief at Carret Bay exhibited gold said to have come from mines no more than two miles away, which he promised to show them. On the 23d a small sloop, sent from Jamaica by Captain Moon and consigned to the old pilot Captain Allison, came in loaded with flour, beef, and other provisions. The same day, however, brought Ambrosio, one of the neighbouring friendly chiefs, with news that six hundred Spanish soldiers and two hundred south-coast Indians were marching to make an attack on the settlement by night. To get dispatches home grew daily more important and it must have been with some satisfaction that the French ship was seen to get under sail on the 24th December. Unhappily the combination of a heavy north wind and brains soggy with the farewell celebrations of the previous night brought quick disaster. The ship went on the rocks and in half an hour had gone to pieces, drowning twenty-two out of her crew of fifty-six.

Mr. Hamilton and Major Cunningham were directed to return to Jamaica in the small sloop, the cargo of which had been purchased, and from thence to proceed home with all possible speed. With the dispatches was included a list of those who had died from the day of sailing to the 25th December, 1698, a period of six months. On the voyage there had been forty-four deaths and during the seven weeks at Darien thirty-two deaths, the total representing about six per centum of the total number of persons aboard the five ships. Almost invariably these deaths were attributed to either flux or fever. The deaths were not confined to any age or class, but appear to have been distributed proportionately. They included Captain Fullerton, commander of the Dolphin, Paterson’s wife and also his clerk, Thomas Fenner, both of whom had accompanied him.

The letter of the Council to the directors at home is an interesting document. It seems probable, in fact almost certain, that Paterson had an active hand in its preparation. Its spirit of optimism in the face of many obvious disheartening conditions is characteristic; yet the absence of reference to the absurd and threatening inefficiency of the governing organization, which his later reports give evidence had worried him from the start, shows that for one or another reason the letter is more noteworthy for its suppressions than for its revelations. It may be supposed that Paterson realized the futility of making suggestions reflecting unfavourably upon them to which his associates would not agree. Furthermore the immediate necessity was for prompt coöperation of those at home, and for support unclouded by misgivings. Although the Council was not informed on the extent and official character of the antagonism against the settlement in the English West Indian and American colonies, they were sufficiently advised as to the difficulties which confronted the settlement to make the letter, however charitably it be viewed, unduly enthusiastic and hopeful. The letter was accompanied by the journal of Mr. Hugh Rose and by a list of those who had died. It was delivered by Mr. Hamilton upon his arrival in Edinburgh on the 25th March, 1699, and reads as follows:

This letter, supplemented by Hamilton’s oral reports, is reported to have given “abundance of satisfaction” to the directors.

TITLE-PAGE OF ‘THE HISTORY OF CALEDONIA,’ 1699

Simultaneously with the preparation of this letter, believing it important for their relations with all of their neighbours, English as well as the other nations, that the principles upon which the colony was to act should be known and understood, the Council at Darien issued a proclamation^[58] dated 28th December, 1698.

This proclamation recites the powers and immunities granted the company by His Majesty, the King of England, the company’s right to take territory not possessed by friendly nations, and how the “chief Captains and Supreme Leaders of the people of Darien in compliance with former agreements having now in most kind and obliging manner received us into their friendship and country, with promise and contract to assist and join in defence thereof against such as shall be their or our Enemies in any time to come.” This is followed by a declaration that “all manner of people soever” should be equally free in the Colony and that the ships and merchants of all nations could trade freely in its ports without restraint or prohibition. Complete liberty of conscience in matters of religion was guaranteed. In this proclamation the hand of Paterson is discerned unmistakably, as it is in the “Rules and Ordinances for the Government of the Colony,” adopted a few months later.^[59]

Of the events in Caledonia during the next few months, up to the 20th June, 1699, when the surviving settlers left Darien, there is an overabundance, rather than a scarcity of accounts. This abundance, however, is one of quantity and devoid of much of the quality which makes for historical accuracy. Prejudices and inaccuracies, self-revealed by many of the scores of pamphlets issued during the decade following 1698, make it not too difficult to separate the significant from the spurious and no great doubt is thrown upon the substantial accuracy, so far as events are concerned, of the report of Paterson, made after his return to Scotland at the end of 1699.

The colonists were informed frequently by the native chiefs that the Spaniards were making preparations to attack them. By February, 1699, the certainty of an early attack was reported by these chiefs, who urged that the offensive be taken by the Scots as the sure method of maintaining their position. The colonists, however, remained steadfast in their determination not to be the aggressors. They asserted that their country being at peace with Spain and the occupied land not being Spanish territory, no arm should be raised against the Spaniards except in self-defence, which if occasion offered would be energetic and, they believed, successful. However, on the 6th February, when it was definitely reported that the Spaniards were actually attacking Pedro, a friendly ally of the Scots, within his territory, a body of one hundred men, consisting of twenty drawn from each ship’s company, was dispatched under command of one of the Councillors, Captain Montgomerie. A minor skirmish took place in which two of the colonists were killed and a number, including Montgomerie, wounded. There is no evidence that the Spaniards actually engaged were other than a small scouting party. Preparations had been made by the Spaniards for an attack in force if conditions were favourable; but the alliance of the Scotsmen with the neighbouring Indian tribes and the difficulties of moving troops and guns by land deterred them from any serious land attack whilst waiting adequate coöperation by the sea-forces, or some fortunate turn of events giving them strategic advantage.

This engagement was the result of a larger operation on the part of the Spanish than appeared from the relatively unimportant skirmish with the Scots.

It was the beginning on the part of the Spanish of a really determined effort to rid the land of those they considered as unlawful invaders.^[60] Reference will be made to the incident in the chapter dealing with the activities of the Spanish during this period.

In subsequent explanations of the failure of the undertaking much stress is put upon the restrictions of trade with the other colonies. Although undoubtedly contributory to the failure, too much should not be attributed to this cause. News travelled slowly and it is certain that the Spanish authorities not only had no knowledge of the lack of support to be expected from the neighbouring English possessions, but, on the contrary, considered the Scotsmen as an English outpost designed for the purposes of conquest.

The protestations of the King of England, although made in good faith, that the Darien undertaking did not have his approval were not accepted at face value in Madrid or in New Spain. The council of the Indies,^[61] on the 16th May, 1699, gave consideration to the English envoy’s communication that the Scots settlement did not have his master’s sanction, that the promoters in Scotland had been dismissed from office, and English coöperation forbidden. The communication appears to have increased rather than calmed the rising indignation of the Spanish. The Council in a formal communication to the King says that it “is of the opinion that it would be well to give the British King to understand that if this is true, and that they (the Scots) are proceeding contrary to his intention, it is his obligation to apply the remedy suitable to correct and punish their aggressions and drive them out of your Majesty’s dominions; and that when your Majesty sees this done, and observe that he prevents relief from being sent to them, then your Majesty will feel less disinclination to believe that he desires to maintain amity and good relations between the two crowns.”

The restrictive regulations were not enforced with sufficient rigour actually to close the opportunities for trade so far as the purchase of provisions was concerned. The trade appears to have been limited more by the inability or unwillingness of the Scotsmen to pay for the goods rather than to any reluctance on the part of merchants to violate the regulations in Jamaica or elsewhere.^[K]

Unhappily a large proportion of the goods brought out was unsuitable for sale or barter in the tropics. The linens were good, but the warm coarse serges, tweeds, cloth caps, and heavy stockings were more suited to the trade with the New England colonies than for the West Indies. Captain Moon brought supplies from Jamaica, as did Captains Sand and Pilkington, all of which were bought by the Council. The adventurous traders of New York needed small encouragement to risk trouble with the authorities provided a profitable trade was the reward.^[L]

The opportunities for successful barter with the goods brought out from Scotland for the purpose were less available, but not chiefly because of the restrictions. Captain Pilkington with his small vessel was sent on a trading cruise along the Spanish Main. Misfortunes attended the venture, including a brief imprisonment of himself and crew at Cartagena and the loss of the Dolphin. The Endeavour, with a trading cargo of some value, was forced by heavy weather to give up a contemplated voyage to Jamaica and New York and to put back in a leaky condition. Discontent, discomfort, and distrust amongst the colonists were not lessened by detailed news of the loss of the Dolphin. The vessel had struck a rock near Cartagena and had been beached to save her from sinking. The vessel and cargo had been seized and Captain Pilkington and his crew imprisoned as pirates. In answer to the written protests of the Darien Council the Governor of Cartagena was reported to have torn the communication in pieces before the eyes of the messenger and to have told him that the Spaniards would shortly clear the country of the Scots. It required the intervention of King William to secure the freedom of the officers of the vessel, who had been sent as prisoners to Spain and were well on the road to be hanged as pirates.

The daily life of the common settler cannot have been cheerful. No vessels, and only in rare instances letters, came to them from home. Each waking day seemed certain to bring a new misfortune. There appears to have been lacking any of those robust happy persons whose humorous optimism often successfully carries their less stalwart companions over rough places. The dour ministers of the gospel who accompanied the expedition were for the most part a saddening rather than a brightening influence. The Reverend Francis Borland,^[62] who went as one of the ministers of the second expedition, says of two ministers with the original settlers, “they had small comfort among them, while they were in their company; so it pleased the Lord soon to remove them from among those that despised them and their work: For Mr. James died at sea, before their arrival, and Mr. Scot died shortly after their arrival.”

Disheartening gossip of a kind to breed discontent was part of the daily fare. Many wished to leave the place even before the extent of their actual misfortunes was known. Stories that some of their leading men had made private gains from the wreck of the French ship were given more credence from the fact that the leaders were at odds amongst themselves.

There was no inspiriting leader to preserve through his own indomitable courage the morale of the discouraged men.

Discontent and alarm amongst the colonists were increased by the known dissensions of the Council and the lack of a continuous policy and administration. The accumulation of troubles, very real and oppressing, and fears both justified and fancied, brought the colony into a state of panic. Certain forms of supplies actually were exhausted, a shortage of others was expected. Peaceful trade relations along the coast had failed. Friendly trade with the English colonies was prohibited. The colonists were dubbed pirates by the Spaniards and an attack by them momentarily expected. Paterson was ill, and by the early days of June seriously so, with fever. Adequate leadership was lacking and there was no certainty if or when reënforcements of material and men would come from Scotland. It is not a matter of wonderment that the colonists were in no mood to protest when the Councillors in the middle of June, 1699, decided on abandonment. The only protestant against this proceeding was Paterson and he was too ill to make more than a gesture of refusal. On the 16th June, he was carried on board the Unicorn, and two days later she and the Caledonia set sail. On the 19th the St. Andrew followed. The plan agreed upon was to rendezvous at Boston or Salem in New England^[M] and there to sell the remainders of the cargoes on board the ships, reprovision and sail for Scotland.

These vessels were small in size, the largest probably not exceeding five hundred and fifty tons. They had been either at sea or anchored in tropical salt water for over ten months and were obviously in need of a thorough overhauling. This could have been done if adequate supplies had been on hand and if the vessels after lightening had been careened at Golden Island; but there is no evidence that this had been attempted and the vessels were in unsatisfactory condition. The Unicorn leaked badly and in a few days her plight was such that the St. Andrew was signalled for help. The latter stood by for a time; but her commander, either not convinced of the reality of the danger to the Unicorn or impatient and heartless, sailed away, as also did the small trading sloop of Captain Patton, which had been intercepted on its return voyage from Jamaica to Caledonia after an unsuccessful errand for provisions.

That one of the larger ships, in need of supplies, made the port of Matanzas in Cuba is recorded in the report^[63] of Diego de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega to the Crown, dated 25th September, 1699, communicating the deposition extracted from Benjamin Spenser, one of the Scots Company, who was left behind when the vessel’s commander, in doubt as to the intentions of the Spanish, ordered immediate flight.

Notwithstanding dangers, distress, and suffering, the Unicorn arrived in New York on the 14th August, 1699, but with one hundred and fifty only of the two hundred and fifty persons who sailed upon her. The Caledonia had arrived ten days earlier after an unhappy but somewhat less unfortunate voyage. The St. Andrew reached Port Royal, Jamaica, unfit to proceed further, and was abandoned there. The Endeavour had been abandoned at sea in a sinking condition shortly after the evacuation of Darien. The condition of the Unicorn at New York made her abandonment necessary, leaving the Caledonia the only vessel fit to be overhauled preparatory to going again to sea.

The Caledonia, although safely arrived at New York, had experienced suffering of the severest kind; her commander, Captain Robert Drummond in a letter from New York^[64] writes as follows: “In our passage from Caledonia hither our sickness being so universal aboard, and mortality so great that I have hove overboard 105 Corps. The Sickness and Mortality continues still aboard. I have buried eleven since I came heire already. . . . I am afraid I shall have a hard pull to gett the Ship home for my people are still Dying, being all weak: and men is very Scarce heire to be had. . . . With Gods healp ffourteen days or three weeks hence I designe to putt to sea. . . . I am not capable by wryting to give Yow ane account of the Miserable condition we have undergone ffirst before we came off Caledonia, being Starved and abandoned by the World. As also the great difficulty of getting the ship to this place.”

A request was made to the Lieutenant-Governor at New York, the Honourable John Nanfan, and at a meeting of the Council, on the 5th August, 1699, authority to purchase provisions was granted. A letter of Lieutenant-Governor Nanfan to the Earl of Bellomont, dated 7th August, 1699, and the reports of the latter dated at Boston, 24th August and 26th October, to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, furnish interesting comments on the plight of the Scotsmen and the treatment accorded them. The Earl of Bellomont, smarting under suggestions that he had not prevented five New England ships from carrying provisions to Darien, stated that he was assured by the officers of the Custom House that instead of five vessels it “was only one Briganteen belonging to one Steel, a Marchand in this town, that went to Nevis with provisions, but not finding a market there to his liking, he went from thence to Caledonia, but this was before my coming hither and before the King’s pleasure was known in this matter.”^[65] If the distress of the Scots had not been so extreme, mutual suspicions would undoubtedly have converted an uncomfortable situation into an open quarrel. As it was, the Earl of Bellomont in the dispatch from which a quotation has been made, writes: “Your Lordships will see that I have been Cautious enough in my orders to the Lt. Governor of N. York, not to suffer the Scotch to buy more provisions than would serve to Carry them home to Scotland.” The correspondence^[66] in August and September between the Earl of Bellomont and the Lieutenant-Governor makes it clear that the former, not having the plight of the Scots displayed under his eye, was more apprehensive than was the latter that the Caledonia might sail back to Darien, “especially,” as the Earl of Bellomont writes in one letter, “upon the Newes of the Recruits sent them from Scotland of men, armes, and all other provisions.”

That the Earl of Bellomont’s suspicion was not wholly without basis is borne out by the determination of Thomas Drummond, a brother of Captain Robert Drummond, to return to Caledonia, as in fact he did in a small sloop, acquired and equipped presumably without official sanction of Mr. Nanfan.^[67] Notwithstanding all difficulties, newly provisioned and to some extent overhauled, the Caledonia sailed from New York on the 12th October, arriving home on the 20th November, 1699, the only vessel of the first expedition to return to Scotland.

Amidst cheers and enthusiasm unparalleled in the history of Scotland twelve hundred men had sailed from Leith on these ships. Within sixteen months seven hundred and forty-four of them had died either on the voyage out, at Darien or between there and Port Royal or New York. Of the remainder many who became refugees in Jamaica lost their lives there or in Cuba; many cast themselves adrift in America during the refitting in New York and a small proportion of the original band of hopeful fortune seekers landed from the Caledonia that late November day in 1699.

The actual contacts of the Darien settlers of the first expedition with the Spanish had been few. Except for the relatively unimportant engagement between small scouting parties already described no armed conflict had occurred. Yet the fears of an attack by the Spaniards and preparations to withstand it were continually in the minds of the Councillors. Nor were the stories of the Spanish preparations to attack the Scots’ settlement, brought to the Councillors by the friendly native chiefs, materially inaccurate. Such exaggeration as there was appears to have been in the minds of the Spaniards who believed the resistance which could be offered them to be greater than was actually encountered.

Although singularly well informed as to the coming of the first expedition,^[68] the number of the ships, complement of men and equipment, they did not know the extent of the alienation of English support and coöperation from the undertaking. Whether they knew of Paterson’s ambition to make of Darien the great trading-post of the New World, holding the key to the Pacific route to Asia and the Far East, is not certain; but it was in terms of such a purpose that the Spanish viewed the colonization plans of the Scots. They saw too the rich trade with Peru threatened and Roman Catholicism attacked.

Those high in command both in the New World and at home pictured a well-equipped military expedition of one or two thousand stalwart Scotsmen,^[69] secure in the certainty of reënforcements both of armed ships and soldiers from Jamaica, and covertly, if not openly, directed by the King of England to open a fortified pathway to the Pacific. Not only did news move slowly, but rumours of every kind confused the significance of official dispatches.

The peaceful plans and intentions of the Scots’ Colony and the less than meagre support given the expedition by the King were not known, or at least not accepted as true by the Spaniards.^[69] A desire to cleanse the coast of these “pirates” and to do it so effectually that no temporary defeat or reprisal should endanger the complete victory, made adequate strength rather than quickness a moderating factor in the Spanish behaviour.

Other causes, not complimentary to that capacity for coördination necessary for well-conducted military operations, caused delays, as will be noted in the orders and correspondence from which translated abstracts will be made. In view of the length of time required for an exchange of communication between the King of Spain and his Viceroys, a period measured in months, not weeks, it is perhaps not strange that orders to dislodge the Scots from Darien were not dispatched by the King until the 18th March, 1699, and did not reach General don Martin de Zavala, in command of one of the fleets, until nearly ten months after the landing of the Scots at Golden Island^[N] and over two months after the evacuation by the first expedition.

A communication^[70] from the Council of the Indies at Madrid to His Majesty some weeks earlier had informed him of the sailing of the expedition from Scotland, of the stop at St. Thomas, and of its reported arrival at its destination. The Council recommended that orders be given to the Governors of Cartagena and Darien and to the commander of the ships patrolling the Cartagena coast to “exercise the care and vigilance demanded by the most important end of preventing the Scots from establishing a footing in those parts.” The King is reminded of the potential danger to Darien, its mines, and further advances which the Scots when reënforced might make. It is suggested that the fleet under General Zavala, sent out to help fortify Pensacola Bay, can in the present contingency be directed against the Scots.

The dispatch to Zavala translated and paraphrased was as follows:^[71]

The action taken by Zavala upon receiving these instructions from the King is reported in a fairly comprehensive dispatch to His Majesty written in the July following^[72] and in a later one written on board his ship off Cadiz on the nth January, 1700. Zavala reports in his July dispatch that on his arrival at Vera Cruz 25th November, 1698, the viceroy conveyed to him the orders for the proposed expedition to Santa Maria de Galue (Pensacola) and directed him to call a council of his captains to determine whether to set out for that port at once or to await advices. Reports that the Spanish already had possession of the Florida port decided the matter and the ships were careened in order to prepare them for a return voyage to Spain. Shortly afterwards dispatches from the Governor of Havana^[73] conveyed news from Jamaica that five Scottish ships of from forty to sixty guns each and two thousand men, with implements and colonizing equipment, had passed by that island bound for a point at Darien called Rancho Viejo or Isla de Oro. Then, receiving orders to join the Windward fleet for the purpose of attacking these interlopers, Zavala had called his captains together in council and related all the facts. The news from Havana had meanwhile been confirmed by the President of the Audiencia of Panama, who had asked help to oust the invaders “before the enemy became more firmly rooted fortifying themselves on land and endeavouring to penetrate it with the reënforcements (of which it is affirmed they have assurance) which they await and which followed after them from Saint Thomas.” He reports, however, that the captains of the merchant ships were unwilling to join with his war vessels in any such expedition, that information in regard to crews, etc., was difficult to obtain, and he intimates that the Viceroy caused delays. He adds that when peremptory orders for the Darien expedition came his ships were crippled by an epidemic, but after a third order to hurry, he finally set out, shorthanded, for Havana on the 28th of July, 1699. The dispatch of Zavala of the following January^[74] reports his arrival at Havana the 26th August, 1699, where he received the royal order of the 18th March, already quoted, directing him to proceed against the Scots at Darien.

A consideration of these dates illustrates the powerful influence exerted on events by the delays and difficulties of communication, and the dependence upon the initiative and authority of those in command in the Indies. At the time of receiving the King’s orders Zavala also “learnt the news (which the Governor had obtained from the testimony of Benjamin Spencer, a Jew and one of the deserters from Darien) that the Scots had abandoned their settlement and fortifications, and that although this testimony stood alone, and was not confirmed, it was of importance and (during the few days in which I re-victualled and reconditioned my vessels) was confirmed by two ships arriving from Cartagena, one bearing a letter from the Commander of the Windward fleet certifying to the same thing and, a little later, by a letter from the Governor of Cartagena.” He then explains that the necessity having ended, His Majesty’s orders were considered no longer effective.

As General Zavala did not receive the King’s dispatches of the 18th March, 1699, until the following August, the more peremptory orders of the King dated 13th May^[75] are of interest chiefly as showing the state of knowledge and intentions of the Spanish Government at home. In this later dispatch the King summarizes the information sent earlier, refers to a probable French attack on Santa Maria de Galue (Pensacola), and orders the latter to be put in a state of defence. He directs Zavala to proceed without loss of a moment to Cartagena to execute the earlier orders, that the Scots may be dislodged “before they fortify further and the task becomes more difficult.” For his further aid he advises him of orders sent to the Viceroy in regard to other and coöperative fleet movements.

Additional light is thrown on the Spanish attitude and preparations by the contemporaneous letters and orders of the Viceroy^[76] of New Spain and by the reports and recommendations made to the King.^[77] These show clearly the seriousness with which the venture of the Scots was viewed and how strong would have been the resistance offered by the Spaniards if the Scots Colony had remained long enough to have been obliged eventually to protect themselves by force of arms. In a long letter^[78] to General Zavala, dated 28th March, 1699, the Viceroy refers to Council meetings of officers which had been called by him and to the conclusion that it is “imperative to give the aid asked by the President of Panama to drive away the Scots” and to his resolve “that the ships under your command and all others which you may think convenient or necessary for either of the two campaigns be with the greatest speed made ready, careened, manned, ammunitioned, and outfitted to execute the orders which I shall send you (unless fresh intelligence alter them) and which will be to exterminate the Scottish pirates for reasons which are justifiable; the greatest one being to exterminate the heresy which may be introduced by reason of the weakness of the Indians.” He then points out how by maliciously playing upon the ignorance of the natives, the Scots may, by enlisting their friendship, actually acquire strength to bring about “pernicious consequences which might follow such as being able to take Portobello, Panama, and to pass to the South Sea” [Pacific Ocean] and, by seizing numerous defenceless pirogues and larger vessels, actually endanger the towns and settlements on that coast. He mentions the serious results of previous piratical raids by comparatively small numbers of men and conjectures that the settlement of Darien consisted of four thousand veteran soldiers. He suggests that the Scots may also be reënforced from Jamaica and that their harbour on the Isle of Pines “is shown by maps and judged by experts to be capable to hold ships of full broadside and deep draught and to furnish a base to prevent supplies reaching Portobello, and for the seizure of vessels sent from Cartagena, Cuba, and Panama and to interrupt traffic in the River Chagres.”

The state of panic of the Viceroy was increased by the memory of the raids by the Englishman, Morgan, and others, and he points out that, with this possible control of the coast all roads and rivers will be available to the Scotsman who can “pass to the mines near Rancho Viejo, descend down the rivers to the South Sea, and land at all the islands where the ships of Peru go, seize them as well as the large merchant ships, as did the pirate in the many years when he haunted those coasts.” That he knew of Paterson’s dream of a path by way of Darien to Asia and the East Indies is improbable, but in his lugubrious picture he does not fail to refer to the risks to the Philippines. He concludes his letter “although in view of the reasons given my resolution is firm that all before mentioned precautions be taken for the ejectment and extermination and that no instant be lost in the execution of my orders, I direct you to call a council in my name of all the commanders previously attending, including the General and Admiral of the Fleet.” This is followed by directions that attendance shall be compulsory, that all must recognize Zavala as the superior officer in command, and that all personal quarrels must be laid aside to the end that the decision of the Council shall be for the best interests of the King. He intimates that he is himself without practical knowledge and that whilst he holds the view that what he has ordered is consistent with the general orders of the King not to permit foreigners in the ports and waters of New Spain, members of the Council will wish to consider whether there are at one time sufficient forces to overcome both the French (at Pensacola) and the Scots of Darien. Also he points out the inconvenience of an infraction of the peace with England.

Another letter, or postscript to this letter, of the same date, gives added instructions, suggestions, and information.

The proceedings of this Council have been already described in the report of General Zavala to the King. The Viceroy himself also wrote to the King under dates of Mexico the 12th and 14th July, 1699.^[79] In this letter he reports compliance with the Royal order of 19th April, 1698, in respect to Santa Maria de Galue and the arrival on 18th November, 1698, of the fleet under General Zavala with additional orders. As to Darien, he has received confirmatory dispatches from the Governors of Havana and Caracas and the President of Panama “that there were at Playon and Isla de Oro [Golden Island] at Darien four Scottish ships with four thousand men with intentions of colonizing that place, and that there were to come six other ships with six thousand men to reënforce their undertaking.” He describes the Council meetings held and gives details of the information in his possession and the orders given General Zavala, laying much emphasis on the gravity of the situation. He reports that the opinion of the majority at the first Council meeting was first to dispose of the French at Pensacola before dealing with the Scots at Darien. Although not himself satisfied, he had reluctantly come to the opinion that it was desirable to rely on the greater experience of the military chiefs and to yield to their judgment. He relates that subsequent to that decision there arrived by way of Guatemala messages from the commander of the Windward fleet that he had been called upon by the President of Panama for aid against the Scots, who had stated that without aid and additional help to be sent by the Viceroy the extermination of the Scots could not be accomplished. At another Council meeting, called to consider the new information regarding Darien, it was resolved first to dislodge the Scots before attacking the French expedition and that orders had consequently been given General Zavala to prepare for departure with all possible speed. The later news received from the Commander of the Windward fleet that “the body of the enemy consisted of 900 men and 3 women, and that the ship which they had sent for the supplies which they lacked had been lost near Cartagena, and that consequently to get what they needed from Scotland would mean a six months’ delay, so that we must trust in the mercy of God who will aid our arms, as they are now undoubtedly superior, to eject them from their settlements and to seize the ships which they have at the Isle of Pines.” This news caused the Viceroy to call together another general council on 19th May, at which it was reported that the available forces at hand to attack the Scots “consisted of three ships under General Zavala, two fire ketches, two light pataches well manned and armed which were capable of transporting ammunition and supplies, and other war-vessels of eighteen guns he [Zavala] should chose for this action, and which were detained in port by my orders.” The report refers to the necessity of getting men to man the ships, even by press-gangs if necessary, and how that method had been found impracticable. The difficulties experienced by Zavala in getting ready to sail are reported from a somewhat different viewpoint, but with no differences in the resulting facts. Sickness had broken out on his ships, troops were lacking, Zavala himself was ill, etc.

On the margin of this letter is written an interesting memorandum showing that the dispatch was received in Spain 25th January, 1700, and submitted to the Council on the 4th February, and gives a summary by the Ministry of the facts with the recommendation that Zavala be punished for failing to set out immediately on receiving orders from the Viceroy. Six charges are set forth, the third of which is “if he had departed on time and made the voyage to Cartagena there is no doubt that if the expedition could not be used to dislodge them [the Scots] as the enemy did not remain there, yet the forces would have been very useful (with the supplies and ammunition they carried) to occupy the place and fortify it for ourselves.”

The formal instructions and orders prepared by the Viceroy for the guidance of General Zavala and dated at Mexico the 26th July, 1699,^[80] reflect the state of the Viceroy’s mind and furnish an approximate picture of the state of New Spain at the time. The details given in these instructions indicate that the Viceroy was not unduly discouraged by the failure to follow previous orders. The date of those instructions, taken in connection with the known condition of Zavala’s fleet, forces the conclusion that the Viceroy, who was less to blame for the delays than was Zavala, was determined to make a clear record for his own protection at home rather than to expect that necessarily his orders would be carried out.

It is probable, too, that the orders were actually prepared before the news of the evacuation of Darien reached the Viceroy, although the information had been in Zavala’s hands many days before the date of the instructions. Reference has already been made to the almost continuous confusion due to the slowness and uncertainties affecting communications. The Viceroy sent copies of correspondence with General Zavala, in a communication reflecting some discredit on the latter, in a long dispatch to the King dated 24th September, 1699,^[81] and recorded as received in Spain the 22d March, 1700.^[82] The opinion expressed by the Government at home that Zavala should have proceeded to Darien and occupied the places evacuated by the Scots was also held in New Spain. The Governor of Cartagena^[O] in dispatches to the King dated 5th October, 1699,^[83] says, “it would be good for Your Majesty’s service to occupy the place these people abandoned for it is possible (having mapped it as they did during the time they inhabited it) that they may return with greater strength.”^[84]

On the 22d September, 1699,^[85] the President of Panama wrote to General Pimienta, the Governor of Cartagena, reminding him that “. . . evils will follow the return of the Scots to the place they had settled, they finding it in the same condition in which they had left it notwithstanding the repeated requests that my clear duty and solicitude have made to your Excellency to be pleased to have it demolished should have been sufficient for it to have been done. As you have not achieved this in time I make no excuse for asking your Excellency, as you have in that port maritime forces competent to attain the expulsion and chastisement of those enemies, to be good enough to order such measures as your good zeal for His Majesty’s Service will prompt, so that what imports so much to the relief of those dominions may succeed before there is an increase and what can now be remedied with ease Your Excellency will not permit to become impossible later if the enemy be strengthened by the reinforcement they expect.”

The Spaniards in the vicinity of Caledonia had not been wholly inactive before its abandonment by the first expedition.

The possibility of help being given to the Scots by the Darien Indians had been a danger appreciated by the Spanish authorities.^[P] Fearful that the delays of the fleet commanders in making a strong attack by sea would enable the Scots more firmly to establish themselves in Darien, the Conde de Canillas, president of the Audiencia of Panama, and others in high command in the disturbed neighbourhood, determined upon a local attack by land against the Scots. It was recognized^[86] that although such an expedition “might not inflict becoming chastisement upon the enemies, expelling them from their fortifications, it would alarm them and let them know that in this kingdom there is force and inclination to oppose them in the very province through which they must pass, crossing it, in order to fortify themselves on the Pacific coast or to navigate the waters beyond that coast.” In a dispatch^[87] to the Crown of the 6th May, 1699, the Conde de Canillas calls attention to the added advantage of a land expedition in that “this movement of our arms would terrify the Indians, who would perceive that we have the means to punish them whenever Your Majesty may permit it, for they have been advertising that without them the Spaniards can accomplish nothing.”

More may have been expected of this attack than was realized or afterwards claimed as the troops employed were of considerable strength. General de Pez furnished five hundred men from the Windward fleet, two companies were taken from the Panama garrison, and four companies of militia were to be supplied at Tubuganti by Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli. Under the personal command of de Canillas, accompanied by General de Pez,^[88] the expedition proceeded by water to a convenient point on the Darien coast, from whence the supplies went forward in canvas and the men marched overland to Tubuganti, situated between the Scots settlement and the Pacific coast. From this place the total force, now amounting according to the report of de Canillas to about fifteen hundred men, carrying provisions for ten days, started on a difficult, and as it turned out somewhat disastrous, march towards the enemy’s settlement.

Burdened with the weight of supplies and heavy arms, picking their way along the rocky beds of small streams, struggling up mountain sides through almost impenetrable jungle, floundering through marshes, it was a half-famished, bruised, and exhausted body of troops which arrived finally within a few leagues of the enemy’s position. That the actual contact with the Scots was not more than a skirmish of scouting parties has been told in an earlier chapter.

Rains came on, provisions were gone or spoiled, and the withdrawal to Tubuganti was made with difficulty. The description of the difficulties encountered was not exaggerated. That part of the Darien terrain, particularly in the rainy season, is not greatly changed to-day. If the Conde de Canillas deserved censure it was for making the attempt which he made rather than for its failure. In his own report^[89] he justifies the expedition because the enemies now “know that Your Majesty’s arms are not dormant in this realm nor agreed to permit them to build their settlement in quietude.”

It was not until the second, or relief, expedition of the Scots was endeavouring to establish itself in Caledonia that an effective campaign against the settlement was undertaken. By the end of September and early October the Spanish commanders at Cartagena and Panama had learned of the arrival of the new expedition by a dispatch^[90] which stated that two large ships full of Scotsmen, who had come as reënforcements, had arrived at Golden Island and, with new artillery, had taken possession of the fort of San Andres. They were reported to be cleaning up the place in expectation of the arrival within a month of seven more ships. The report gave the alarming information that this time the Scots had come, not to trade, but to wage war. Active correspondence between the commanding officers at Cartagena and Portobello, the two nearest Spanish strongholds, followed the receipt of this news.^[91] Both defensive and offensive preparations were undertaken immediately, but no actual collision took place between the Spaniards and Scotsmen until six months later. The news of the sailing of the relief fleet from Scotland reached Madrid with reasonable quickness, measured by the methods of the time.^[92] At first the Council for the Indies doubted the accuracy of the report from England of the Marques de Canales, but nevertheless urged haste in the clearance of naval reinforcements for the Indies.^[93] The actual information of the arrival at Darien of the second expedition was contained in a voluminous and comprehensive report of the Conde de Canillas to the Crown, dated the 15th January,^[94] 1700, in which is given the reasons for the abandonment of the place by the Scots, and a description of the voyage to New York and elsewhere; the facts in the report are taken chiefly from the depositions of two prisoners, formerly members of the Scots Company.

Indignation and preparations in Spain, however, had little effect on the immediate events in the Caribbean. Before any influence of the great naval expedition in preparation could be felt in the New World, the Scots had been effectually dislodged.

The combined sea and land campaign against the colonists is described from the day-to-day viewpoint of the Spanish participants in the diary of the Governor of Cartagena, Don Juan Pimienta.^[95]

The distress of the colonists and the events leading to the final evacuation are described in the chapter dealing with the second expedition. This time the Spanish did not intend that lack of either adequate preparation or strength should cause failure. The vessels employed were the flagship and four smaller vessels of Peredo’s fleet, which sailed from Cartagena, taking on board artillery from the forts, and additional craft of one sort and another from Portobello and elsewhere.

The total number of men engaged on shore and at sea appears to have been between about seven hundred exclusive of the loyal Indians and other land troops which coöperated after men had been landed from the vessels at a convenient point. The fighting between the attacking forces and the Scotsmen, and the final capitulation of the latter, on terms showing a generous forbearance on the part of Pimienta, are described elsewhere. The Spanish ensign was raised on the fort the 11th April, 1700. When the last Scot had gone from the settlement Don Juan Pimienta writes that he “entered into it, dedicating as its first temple one of their warehouses, where the first mass was said, consecrating the place to Saint Charles.”

Whilst the Caledonia lay in New York news reached those on board that relief ships actually had been dispatched from Scotland to Darien. In the breasts of some a spark of renewed hope was kindled. That a portion of the proceeds of the sale of trading goods from on board the Caledonia was used to buy a sloop has been stated. Under command of Thomas Drummond, brother of Captain Robert Drummond of the Caledonia, it sailed from New York for Caledonia on the 18th September, 1699. Captain Thomas Drummond appears to have shared Paterson’s faith in the ultimate fair prospects of the colony.

If the electric telegraph had existed, much suffering would have been avoided. Because of the lack of information, an almost panic-stricken embarkation had taken place at Darien at the moment, that, unknown to the colonists, relief was on the way to the colony. Two ships, the Olive Branch, Captain William Jameson, and the Hopeful Binning of Bo’ness, Captain Alexander Stark, were well on the way with stores and three hundred additional settlers. By the middle of August, two months after the abandonment by the first expedition, and with reports of one death only on board, these two vessels arrived at Caledonia. The voyage out had required three months. The deserted settlement and forts gave small encouragement to the two commanders to remain; but it seemed expedient to wait for at least a brief period in view of the intention at home to send after them the Rising Sun and three other ships. The promptness with which the dispatch of this larger expedition was to follow the Olive Branch and Hopeful Binning made it appear improbable that news of the abandonment should have reached Scotland before the time of their sailing.

Unhappily, a few days after arrival, the Olive Branch burned with all stores on board. The one hundred men which she carried were transferred to the larger ship, not only crowding it but heavily increasing the demands upon its supplies. This misfortune, particularly the loss of the stores, made an early departure expedient, and the Hopeful Binning sailed for Jamaica, leaving behind a party of twelve volunteers who were willing and wished to await the arrival of the other ships. The good fortune which had been with the Hopeful Binning on the voyage out did not accompany her to Jamaica. It is reported that after the vessel arrived there those on board suffered much distress and illness with many deaths.

The first colonists abandoned Darien in June, 1699, and the small band of refugees on the Caledonia arrived in Scotland late in November. In August, Scotsmen at home, including the officers and directors of the Darien Company, were ignorant of the disaster which had overtaken their colony. The failure to send relief ships earlier had not been due to lack of effort. In February the company had dispatched its first supply ship, a small brigantine, well laden with provisions, which was wrecked on one of the Scottish islands almost immediately after sailing. In the middle of May the Olive Branch and Hopeful Binning had been dispatched without waiting for the rest of the relief fleet, which consisted of the Rising Sun, Captain James Gibson; Hope, Captain James Miller; Duke of Hamilton, Captain Walter Duncan; Hope of Bo’ness, Captain Richard Dalling.

Of these ships the first two were owned by the company and the last two were chartered. The Rising Sun was a large vessel mounting sixty guns. They carried a total of thirteen hundred men and were to be controlled by four Councillors whose powers were to cease upon the arrival of the vessels at Darien. After getting men and stores on board and ready to sail the fleet was delayed in port for five or six weeks by unsatisfactory weather, so that although ready for sea on the 16th August, 1699, they did not sail actually until Sunday the 24th of September.^[Q] During this delay some rumour of an uncomfortable situation at Darien had reached Scotland, and, on the 22d September, a dispatch conveyed orders to delay sailing in order that Mr. Daniel Mackay, a Councillor of the first expedition, then making a visit in Scotland, might sail with the fleet and convey new instructions to the colony. The fleet commanders, however, were fearful of further delays, and the wind being favourable, disregarded these orders and in less than twelve hours after receiving them, the fleet set sail. That the directors themselves did not put credence in the rumours and had no intention to delay the sailing more than to permit Mr. Mackay to embark is clear from the instructions prepared for Mr. Mackay to take on board. These instructions, dated the 20th September, 1699, direct the expedition to proceed as previously ordered and state “we have received information from London of a very improbable story that those of the said Colony have wholly deserted their settlement there, for fear of preparations that were making against them at Carthagena, and gone where nobody can give any account of them, so can give no manner of credit to the said story.”

The voyage out was on the whole a favourable one, although before the arrival at Caledonia one hundred and sixty persons, nearly twelve and one-half per cent of those on board, are reported to have died. On the 9th November the vessels put in at the island of Montserrat for water and fresh provision. It was here that they heard the first rumours of the evacuation of Darien by the colonists.^[96] On the 30th November, ten days after the small band of refugees had reached Scotland on the Caledonia, the relief fleet dropped anchor at Golden Island, and found the settlement of Caledonia deserted, the port demolished, and the whole place overrun with weeds. Two sloops with provisions were in the harbour, one the sloop under command of Captain Thomas Drummond, dispatched from New York, which had been in port eight days, the other a vessel sent out from New England.

Captain Drummond’s sloop is reported to have fought a four-hour engagement with a Spanish man-of-war of superior strength before entering the harbour.^[97]

The first view of the settlement confirmed the Montserrat rumours and the worst fears of the newcomers. There was great clamour amongst the new colonists to return to Scotland at once without landing. From Captain Drummond and from the master, Fulton, of the New England vessel, the Councillors obtained much information on recent happenings in Caledonia and at a joint conference of the Councillors and land and sea officers, it was voted to land and settle.^[98]

This decision was not unanimous and was largely determined by the insistence of Veitch, one of the Councillors, and the encouragement of Captain Drummond. One of the Councillors who opposed this plan, named Byres, appears to have shown more of the qualities of leadership than the others and although nominally in the minority he assumed effective command of the colony. At his direction the Council voted to send all men in excess of five hundred to Jamaica,^[99] a plan which caused much alarm and discontent. Byres appears also to have been responsible for unwarranted fears as to an early shortage of supplies on the ships. A few men deserted in a ship’s boat and a plot amongst others to seize the Councillors and to make off with two of the ships led to the sentence and execution of one of the conspirators,^[100] Alexander Campbell, on the 20th December.

Captain Drummond, who appears to have lacked neither courage nor resourcefulness, and had in mind to ward off an attack by the Spaniards by attacking Portobello himself, wrote the Council as follows:^[101] “Wheras I am sensible that one half of the men that is come from Scotland is to be sent to Jamaica, I y^rfor desire that you would allow ane hundred and fifty that would be willing to take y^r fate with me, you allowing them three weeks provision, which was condescended on to cary them off; likeways allowing arms and ammunition; and they shall not be burdensome to the Colony till it is in a condition to maintain them. The reason of my pressing that now is, that I’me invited by severall captains of y^e Indians that will raise their men, and undertake that which may be advantageous not only to the partie, but for the releife of what prisoners the Spaniards have of ours; and if yow will grant my desire, you would condescend on it speedily, and give orders for y^e reviewing of what was brought in y^e sloop; and in so doeing you’ll obleidge,”

This proposal was rejected by the Council, and the mutual antagonism of Drummond and Byres greatly increased, resulting finally in Drummond’s imprisonment on board the Duke of Hamilton for six weeks, a proceeding which resulted later in a searching enquiry by the Directors in Scotland and his complete exoneration.^[R] The same committee of enquiry reported: “And consequently it is our opinion, that the said James Byres has not only violated the trust reposed in him by the Company to an extraordinary degree, but also guilty of several unwarrantable, arbitrary, illegal, and inhumane actings and practises highly injurious to the parties concern’d, and manifestly tending to the great and irretrievable loss of the Company and Colony, and to the dishonour of the Nation; and that he ought to be prosecuted for the same.”

The condition of the settlement and defences as found by the newcomers is described in somewhat melancholy fashion by the Council’s letter^[102] to the directors at home dated the 23d December, 1699, extracts from which follow:

From all directions the Indians, friendly to the second as they had been to the first expedition, brought reports that the Spaniards were coming in force by land and by sea to attack and drive out the colonists. Byres, although professing to treat these reports lightly, appears to have preferred to leave the settlement rather than to risk their accuracy and took passage on a vessel then sailing for Jamaica on the 7th February, 1700, never again reaching the colony. Meanwhile all the misfortunes experienced by the first settlers were encountered by those of this expedition. The Reverend Alexander Shiels, one of the four clergymen “sent to the said colony for settling a Gospel Ministry and dispensing of Gospel Ordinances, and that they might instruct and edifie our countrymen and others”^[103] wrote home:^[104] “Our sickness did so increase, (above 220 at y^e same time in fevers and fluxes); and our pitiful rotten provisions were found to be so far exhausted, that we were upon the very point of leaving and losing this Colony. Orders were actually given to provide wood and water with all expedition for carrying us all off, which drove me almost to the brink of despair, and to thinking upon a resolution to stay behind with any body that would venture, among the Indians. But, in our greatest darkness, light appeared; for, first on Feb^y 4, a Brigantin from Jamaica, springing a leak, was forced into the Bay, from which we bought some provisions; then, Feb. 7, I reckon a second step of our deliverance, the departure of Mr. Byres in one of our sloups for Jamaica, the man who hath hitherto hindered our planting, and opposed all motions for making any attempt upon the Spaniards—yea, asserted and contended, that not only we were unable to make any such attempt, but that it was unlawful for Christians, under the New Testament Dispensation, to make any war; and not only so, but that justice would require that we should make reparation to the Spaniards for the injuries done to them; and because I mentioned the laufulness of war, he upbraided me to my face with nonsense, contradicting the Gospell, and tempting men to Atheism.”

By hand of Byres to Jamaica and thence by way of England to Scotland, the Council sent home further dispatches reporting^[105] the construction on shore of seventy-two small huts for settlers, fifteen somewhat larger for officers, and two storehouses of good size, as well as the progress made in the repair of the fort and batteries.

Complaint is made of bad food and spoiled provisions. In the choice of goods for sale the same stupidity had been shown as in the earlier cargoes.

Some encouragement was given by the arrival from Barbadoes on the 11th February, 1700, of a sloop commanded by Captain Alexander Campbell of Finab, appointed by the directors at home as a Councillor, bringing a supply of provisions. Campbell urged against the transfer of a portion of the settlers to Jamaica, and accordingly those already embarked and ready to sail were brought back to the shore. The rejoicing was brief, however, for two days later news came that a body of Spanish troops were within three days’ journey of the settlement. Captain Campbell volunteered to take command of an attacking party and his advice to assume an immediate offensive was taken.

With Lieutenant Turnbull, two hundred men drawn from the colonists, forty Indians and three of their chiefs, Captain Campbell led a difficult march through the jungle and over hills to the well barricaded Spanish camp near Topocante. A sharp and swift assault, Campbell personally leading, in which both guns and swords were used and in which the Indians gave great help, resulted in a victory for the colonists.^[106] Both Campbell and Turnbull were wounded, as was Pedro, one of the native chiefs, and eleven others; nine of the colonists were killed. For his bravery on this occasion Campbell on his return to Scotland was given a grant of arms and the Darien Company struck a gold medal in his honour.

The Spanish commander is reported to have been the Governor of Darien, Don Miguel Cordones, who commanded a mixed force of whites, blacks, and Indians, amounting in all, according to the letters of the Reverend Shiels, to not over three or four hundred men, of whom nine or ten were killed, some wounded and a few taken prisoners. When the news of this reported victory reached Scotland, Edinburgh went wild with joy.

This engagement is not easily identified in the Spanish reports, owing to a natural confusion of names of persons and localities. It is probable that it preceded or was a part of the operations described by the report of Melchor de Guevara to the Conde de Canillas, accompanying the dispatches of the latter to the Crown, dated 14th April, 1700.^[107] Whatever the facts, the results of the encounter were relatively unimportant.

Success in New Caledonia and rejoicing in Scotland were, however, both short-lived. Within less than a week after this engagement eleven Spanish warships, under command of the Governor of Cartagena, Don Juan Pimienta, anchored close to Golden Island in positions to block effectually the entrance to the harbour. The colonists set to work with all possible speed to mend and equip the fort and batteries. Pimienta made no haste to enter the harbour, but landed men from his ships well to the eastward of the settlement at a spot out of range of the fort.^[108] Within a few days these men were greatly reinforced by troops of Spaniards, blacks, Indians, and a few Frenchmen, many of whom had marched overland from Panama and Santa Maria.

The plight of the colonists was serious; their strength depleted by sickness, hemmed in by a strong enemy both by land and sea, the long-delayed but inevitable trial of strength with the Spaniards could not have begun under less hopeful conditions. To make matters even worse and more dispiriting to the settlers, a fire started by an accidental explosion destroyed several rows of huts.

In the prevalent sickness, which was contagious, as many as sixteen burials would take place on a single day.^[109] The Spanish ships had appeared first on the 23d February, 1700; by the 17th March, a number of men having been killed on both sides in skirmishes, the settlers were forced to withdraw from their fort protecting them from attack on the neck of land giving access to the main shore. The way was open for the Spaniards to enter the settlement. On the 16th a joint meeting of the Council^[110] and land and sea officers authorized Captain Veitch, with an interpreter, to treat with the Spanish commander for surrender. The written correspondence was made difficult by the lack of competent interpreters and one letter of the Scots urges the Spanish to write in English, French or Flemish. The correspondence is interesting.^[111] The Scots endeavoured with documentary evidence to justify legally their occupancy of Darien territory. The Spanish were deaf to these arguments, but an appeal to the Spanish sense of honour and gallantry touched their emotions and terms of capitulation of exceptional liberality were finally granted.^[112]

The Spanish terms at first were so hard that no immediate agreement was reached. An absolute and complete surrender of all the ships, stores, and ammunition belonging to the Darien Company and colonists was demanded. The conference broke up. The Spaniards continued their slow closing-in operations and within a week had cut off the settlement’s water supply, were in force within a mile of the fort and had mounted a battery commanding the weakest spot. By the 29th March the Spaniards, who were within musket shot, began firing upon the colonists from the shelter of the neighbouring trees. On the 30th the Spanish commander offered to treat again. There was little else for the Scots to do except capitulate and all were agreed to it except the redoubtable Campbell of Finab, victor of the first skirmish.

The Spanish general and the interpreter, Mr. James Main, spoke French and the negotiations were conducted in that language; at the insistence of the Spanish general, however, the actual Articles of Capitulation were drawn up in Latin and, under the circumstances, were not ungenerous. The colonists were permitted to embark on their own ships “with colours flying, and drums beating, together with all their arms and ammunition, and with all their goods and provisions.” Fourteen days were given them in which to prepare for sea and depart. Mutual exchange of all prisoners was stipulated. The agreement as to guns and ammunition provided solely enough for each man for protection on the voyage home; all else was turned over with “all guns great and small” to the Spaniards.^[113]

After a stay of four months and eleven days the surviving colonists on the 11th April, 1700, abandoned Caledonia, and with difficulty, on account of light winds, sailed from the harbour, anchoring near the Spanish fleet off Golden Island. Bad food and overcrowding, discomforts, illness, and deaths on the voyage to Jamaica added the same horrors to the withdrawal which attended that of the first expedition. The Reverend Borland^[114] described the conditions on board the Rising Sun as follows: “As they had been exercised with sore sickness and mortality while in Caledonia, so now when we were at sea, it much increased upon us, and no wonder it was; for the Poor sick men were sadly crouded together, especially aboard the Rising-Sun like so many Hogs in a sty, or sheep in a fold, so that their breath and noisome smell infected and poisoned one another: neither was there any thing suitable or comfortable to give to the sick and dying; the best was a little spoiled Oat-meal and water; and poorly were they attended in their sickness; and it was a most uncomfortable and dangerous work, for the poor ministers to go down and among them, and visit them in their sad and dying condition, their noisome stench being ready to choak and suffocate any malignant fevers and fluxes, were the most common diseases, which swept away great numbers from amongst us; from aboard of one ship the Rising-Sun they would sometimes bury in the sea eight or nine in one morning, besides what died out of the other ships; and when men were taken with these diseases, they would sometimes die, like men distracted in a very sad and fearfull like manner.”

The attempted return home was a disastrous undertaking. Of the four ships which had sailed from Scotland forming the second expedition none survived. Putting into Charleston, South Carolina, where one of the clergymen of the expedition, the Reverend Archibald Stobo, had been called to preach to the Scottish residents, the Rising Sun was dashed to pieces in a hurricane off that harbour and many were drowned.^[S] The same hurricane destroyed the Duke of Hamilton, although it is reported there was no loss of life. The Hope was wrecked on the coast of Cuba. The Hope of Bo’ness leaked so badly between Golden Island and Jamaica that she had to run before the trade wind back to the coast and put in at Cartagena, where she was sold to the Spaniards for almost nothing.

In a letter of the Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of the Admiralty, dated New York the 15th October, 1700, he reports that “Some Scotchmen are newly arrived hither from Carolina that belonged to the ship Rising Sun (the biggest ship they sent out for their Caledonia expedition) who tell me that on the third of last month a hurricane happened on that coast, as that ship lay at anchor, within less than three leagues of Charles Town in Carolina with another Scotch ship called the Duke of Hamilton and three or four others; that the ships were all shattered in peices and all the people lost, and not a man saved. The Rising Sun had 112 men on board. The Scotchmen that are come hither say that 15 of ’em went on shore before the storm to buy fresh provisions at Charles Town by which means they were saved. Two other of their ships they suppose were lost in the Gulph of Florida in the same storm.”^[115]

From Borland’s letters and his History of Darien and from other reports an approximate estimate of the losses of life during the few months that the second expedition was in being makes an appalling summary. Of the 1300 men who sailed from Scotland 160 had died on the voyage out, nine had been killed in the first engagement with the Spaniards, about 300 died in Darien, approximately 100 more, including the Reverend Alexander Shiels, in Jamaica. It is estimated that 350 either died or were drowned on the return voyage. If, as was believed, the nine men who ran away in one of the ship’s boats from Darien were lost, the total mortality was 940. Of the 360 men remaining few ever returned to Scotland. Amongst those lost, according to Borland, were three of the Councillors, two of the clergymen, Lord Mungo Murray, Sir Alexander Kinnaird, Andrew Stuart, brother to the Earl of Galloway, and eighteen other officers of the expedition.

As the question whether the location chosen by the Scots for their settlement was in fact land not properly claimed by any nation with which England was then at peace became almost immediately of serious consequence, it is desirable to consider the previous history of the Darien and neighbouring littorals.

The Spanish discoveries and explorations of the northern coast of South America began with the third voyage of Columbus, who first touched the mainland of the Southern continent at the island of Trinidad, in 1498. In the following year, Alonso de Ojeda landed at what is now Surinam, proceeding along the Venezuela coast as far west as Cape de la Vela. On this voyage he was accompanied by Amerigo Vespucci, to whom unmerited distinction was finally accorded in the naming of the three Americas. Other Spanish voyagers touched at various points; but actual colonization can be said to have begun with the voyages effected by Ojeda and, contemporaneously, Nicuesa, whose explorations farther westward became interwoven with those of Ojeda. Nicuesa, who had acquired distinction and wealth in Hispaniola, had been made Governor of Veragua, the large province in the southernmost part of Central America bordering on what is now Panama and once granted to Columbus^[T] by Isabella.

Ojeda had been made Governor of Uraba adjacent to and south of Veragua. Thus politically at this early date the territory covered by the whole coast line of Darien was included in one or the other of these two territories claimed by Spain, over which some semblance at least of government had been established. The boundary between Veragua and Uraba was so vaguely indicated that both Ojeda and Nicuesa met at Hispaniola to have a dispute upon it settled. It appears to have been through the good offices of the great navigator Juan de la Cosa that a mutually satisfactory agreement was reached by which the Darien River was fixed as the boundary between the two provinces. Uraba was to extend from that river eastward to Cape de la Vela and Veragua from the Darien River westward to Cape Gracias a Dios.

Unless, however, this wholesale appropriation of the coast line had been followed by actual settlements and colonization the decrees and grants of the King of Spain might be claimed reasonably to be an insufficient basis for a claim of sovereignty nearly two hundred years later. Ojeda landed at Cartagena at the end of 1509 and within the next few decades that place had become a powerful stronghold. Contemporaneously the well-fortified towns at the harbours of Portobello and Nombre de Dios were built. After explorations of the Darien River by Ojeda and by his lieutenant Enciso, the latter accompanied by Vasco Nuñez, the town of Santa Maria de la Antigua del Darien was founded. Although it is not easy to trace through the maze of changing names the exact territory included in these early explorations and settlements, the significant facts are clear. Portobello and its neighbouring settlements on what is now the Panama edge of Darien, and Cartagena and its neighbouring settlements on the eastern border, were large thriving fortified Spanish bases of colonization when those responsible for the direction of the Scots colonization plans selected Golden Island and the adjacent country as the place for their unfortunate undertaking. Peter Martyr, in the ninth chapter of the fifth decade of his “History of the Indies,”^[116] written about 1514, describes Darien, the towns of Sancta Maria, Acla, and Nombre de Dios. It was to Acla, the Spanish name for almost the exact spot where the Scots landed, that the revengeful Pedrarias summoned the unsuspecting Vasco Nuñes in 1517 and had him beheaded.^[U]

An examination of the map alone is enough to show how impossible it would have been, even if King William had been so inclined, for him to have given royal sanction to what was in effect an invasion of the territory of a power with which he was then, however briefly, at peace. The representations made by Spain to the King claiming unlawful invasion of Spanish territory have been recorded in the preceding chapter.

Paterson was presumably well informed on the doings of William Dampier on the Isthmus of Darien; in fact it is certain that much of Paterson’s knowledge of that country was derived from Dampier and Lionel Wafer, not only on Paterson’s early visit to Jamaica, but subsequently during the making of plans for the settlement of Darien by the Scot’s Company. In The Journal of the Proceedings of his Majesty’s Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, at a meeting^[117] held at Whitehall 30th June, 1697, is the following resolution: “Ordered that Mr. Dampier who hath lately printed a Book of his Voyages have notice to attend the Board on Fryday next; and that he give notice to Mr. Wafer (whom he names in his said Book) to attend also at the same time: In order to Enquire of them of the State of the Countrey upon the Isthmus of Darien where it hath been Signified that the Scotch East India Company have a design to make some Settlement.”

THE SPANISH MAIN

From a map published in Amsterdam about 1630

(left half)

(right half)

On the 2d July, 1697, both Dampier and Wafer attended and in answer to questions concerning Darien stated that the Spaniards on the coast bordering the South Sea (Pacific Ocean) were settled from Panama eastward to the Chipelo River,^[118] but that on the coast bordering the North Sea (Atlantic Ocean) they had no settlements eastward of Nombre de Dios and Portobello for about ten leagues, all that part of the country being possessed by Indians not subject to Spain. Lionel Wafer, by an arrangement made in London with agents of the Darien Company, shortly afterwards attended a meeting of the directors of the company in Edinburgh for the purpose of giving information. He submitted a long and full report,^[119] more extended but similar to the one made in London to the Commissioner for Trade and Plantations. It is to be observed that although Dampier and Wafer averred that on the northern or Caribbean coast there was country not occupied by the Spaniards covering the short distance of thirty miles, they made plain the fact that the opposite or south shore of the narrow isthmus was settled by the Spaniards. Dampier and Wafer had landed near Golden Island in April, 1680, and crossed the isthmus to Santa Maria and were fully informed as to the country and the character of the Spanish settlements; they wanted, and not unreasonably, the Pacific Ocean open to English trade and exploitation. It does not seem probable that Paterson and the Darien Company Directors were blind to the fact that their claim to an absurdly small section of unsettled land in a province otherwise adequately subjugated by the Spaniards would not be quietly admitted.

Nor could Paterson, with his vision of a great trade with Asia carried on through the gateway of Darien, fail to realize that Spanish coöperation, or their subjugation, would be necessary to the fulfilment of his plan. If it be assumed that the size of the rewards justified the magnitude of the risks to be taken, the equipment of the expedition in material, men, and officers needed to be on a scale beyond the capacity of the Scots Company. As it was, the preparations were inadequate in every particular.

Amongst the many causes which contributed to the failure of the Darien Colony that which bore hardest immediately upon the settlers was the determined opposition and lack of sympathy of the English colonial settlements, not only in the West Indies but even as far north as New England. It is true, as Mr. Cundall^[120] points out, that the proclamations against the Scots, put forth by the English settlements were issued on instructions from home; but those nearby had themselves good reasons to fear the effect of the Darien Colony on their own well-being. Inroads might be made on their profitable though precarious trade, and the relative calm then subsisting with the Spanish might be disturbed. It was not improbable, too, that the advertised liberality and liberty to be accorded by the Scots to settlers, combined with the rumours of gold in the Darien back country, would draw much-needed men away from the English settlements. This latter fear is expressed in a dispatch^[121] of Sir William Beeston, Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, dated 5th December, 1698, in which he says: “The stotch fleete are arived at Darien into w^ch Bay one of our sloopes saw them sayle, but we have no farther Acco of them yet if they fix there and are healthy the Noise of Gold (of w^ch there is greate Plenty in those parts) will carry away all our servants, Debtrs, and ordinary People in hopes of mending theire fortunes and thereby will very much weaken that small strength we have.”

Immediately upon receipt of the report from Captain Richard Long, in reference to the Scots at Darien,^[122] instructions were sent from London to the colonial Governors of the American and West Indian Settlements. Long’s report had been followed by another from him making a proposal to search for gold and a sunken plate ship.^[123] The proclamation issued by Sir William Beeston in Jamaica, probably the first to be issued, copies of which were at once dispatched to the other English colonies, is typical. It reads as follows:^[V]

Four days later, on 13th April, 1699, proclamation was made at Barbados, followed during the next few months by similar announcements in Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts Bay, East New Jersey, Connecticut, South Carolina, New Hampshire, New Providence, and Maryland.

The English Government may appear to have acted hastily and with undue severity; but the information in Captain Long’s report cannot have been unexpected. That Spain did not consider her claim to all of Darien debatable was well known in London, as was the fact that the Spanish Government suspected English connivance with the Scots. Although it was not until some weeks after the return to Scotland of the remnant of the first expedition that the House of Lords required the opinion^[124] of the Council of Trade and Plantations as to how consistent the Colony of Darien may be with the treaties with Spain, the purpose undoubtedly was to make an official record of views which had been already the basis of action. The opinion of the Council of Trade was delivered to the House of Lords on the 18th January, 1700, and is a formidable defence of the Spanish claims. It recites, with supporting references, the fact that the Isthmus of Darien was settled and towns built by the Spanish in the early years of the sixteenth century, and that these towns were afterwards demolished and the inhabitants moved “to other neighbouring places as they were invited by convenience or advantage.” The opinion adds “this changing of habitations is not judged a dereliction of the territorial property of the Province.” The defenders of the rights of the Scots to settle at or near Golden Island and Acla put much emphasis on the fact that the original Spanish settlements were long since abandoned. The opinion^[125] of the Council of Trade is, in accordance with the facts, that the towns of Panama, Portobello and Cartagena “which three places are the extremities that in a manner environ and comprehend the Isthmus of Darien” cannot be considered otherwise than as successor settlements in the same general territory or province. The opinion is not silent on the collateral reasons which make the Darien Colony prejudicial to the English plantations and trade in the West Indies and it may be that the zeal of the Council defending the Spanish position was stimulated by selfish considerations. The argument was, however, sound.

The situation was not without its embarrassments. The English and Scots could not view each other as foreigners or enemies. Natives of Scotland actually living in England or Ireland had been legally declared to be English within the meaning of the Acts of Trade and Navigation. Many of the merchants and shipowners of the American and West Indian colonies were quite ready to turn an honest penny in trade with the Darien settlers and looked unfavourably on regulations which outlawed such trade. Inter-colonial correspondence at this time, both official and private, gives interesting evidence of these problems and troubles. Mr. Cundall, who has carefully reviewed the correspondence of Sir William Beeston, calls attention to Beeston’s letter to the Earl of Bellomont, Governor of New York and Massachusetts Bay, of 7th June, 1699, as follows:

The letter of Governor Basse, of the New Jerseys, to the Council of Trade and Plantations is interesting, as the New Jerseys had many Scots amongst their settlers. He writes:

On one pretext or another trading did to some extent take place with Caledonia, and was the source of constant complaints. Governor Bellomont writes from New York to the Council of Trade and Plantations on 20th October, 1699:

Daniel Defoe,^[126] with a broadness of view and a singularly accurate weighing of the facts for a contemporary English writer, points out that only those shortsighted or ignorant would have conceived that the original plan for the company could do otherwise than “embark the English Government against them,” whether the business of the company was in the East India trade, in competition with the great East India Company, or in Darien. He catalogues the other cumulative causes of failure, including the occupation of disputable territory, “men and cargo perfectly unqualified for any kind of trade.” He insists, with some reason, that had the Scots Company “been furnished with money, or letters of credit, they had never wanted provisions . . . notwithstanding the proclamation of the English against correspondence.”

That the opposition of England was the chief cause of the disasters which befell the undertaking was the view generally held in Scotland. Lord Belhaven, in an eloquent speech in the Scottish Parliament on the 10th January, 1701,^[127] said:

The knowledge that in May, 1699, the English envoy to Spain had informed His Majesty of the English King’s disapproval of the Darien enterprise added fuel to the fire, as did the news of the earlier assertion of Sir William Beeston, in a letter to the Governor of Cartagena, that the English were not accomplices of the Scotsmen.^[128]

Whether or not, with other conditions favourable, the colony could have successfully overcome ostracism, from which it suffered, no such hope could have existed, save in optimistic minds, when to this was added the deplorable internal mismanagement of the affairs of the colony. The fact that the Spanish had by their behaviour alienated the Darien Indians caused the latter to aid rather than resist the settlement by the Scots; this alliance delayed attacks by the Spanish and made the really great fundamental danger to the colony the least of its troubles during the first year. An absurd and illogical system of government magnified the harm wrought by dissensions amongst the Councillors. Paterson was fully aware of the necessity for a firm and consistent administration of the affairs of the colony; but the jealousies of the Councillors, and the extra authority of those Councillors who by reason of their holding also a ship’s command would not accept domination by a Land-Councillor, caused the appointment of a weekly presidency. Extraordinary, indeed, would have been the colonial undertaking which would stand up against the evil consequences of a weekly change in executive control, each new Councillor in the chair resolved to undo the acts of his predecessor.

From the inception of the undertaking, Paterson had endeavoured to secure a more reasonable form of organization to control policy and details of management. In his report to the directors made after his return to Scotland he writes:

Whether to the hopelessly bad judgment in the form of administrative control shown by the Council was added the misfortune of greater intemperance in the use of liquor than was the fact in other colonial settlements is not certain; but that the habits of many of the Councillors were such as to intensify their incompetence cannot be doubted. Comment has already been made as to the excessive provision of strong liquors amongst the stores. The correspondence between those directing both the first and the second expedition continually emphasizes the need for large stocks of brandy.

The directors in Scotland on 10th February, 1700, write to the officers of the second expedition: “The disagreements and factious jarrings of your predecessors, who were, it seems, void of both religion and morality, will, we hope, be a beacon to you not to split upon the same rock. Unanimity in any enterprise, with the blessing of God, may do wonders. We hope, too, that we need not injoyn you to have all due regard to the orders of the Council. The constitutions of the Colony are such that severals of those who went away with the first equipage in the quality of overseers, were in a few months’ time assumed to be Councellours; and we hope that your deportment may entitle you to the like advancement in due time, after you have served but a short apprenticeship. We know that there are some among you of good birth, and related to some of the most considerable families in the kingdom, the consideration of which ought, we think, to raise in you a generous emulation to exceed each other in all acts of virtue, for the more illustrious that any one’s birth is, the more conspicuous will his failings be if he basely degenerates from these virtues of his ancestors which first distinguished their families from the vulgar. It’s a lasting disgrace to the memories of those officers who went on the first expedition, that even the meanest planters were scandalized at the vitiousness of their lives, many of them living very intemperately and vitiously for many months at the publick charge, whilest the most sober and industrious among them were vigilant in doing their duty. And the want of due care in an equal and moderate distribution of both provisions and liquors, but especially of the latter, was none of the least causes of the misery that ensued. Nor can we, upon serious reflection, wonder if an enterprise of this nature has misgiven in the hands of such as (we have too much reason to believe) neither feared God nor regarded man.”

Paterson himself was an abstainer, unusual in a Scotsman of that day. The directors cannot, however, shift all the blame for the results of their own ill-considered choice of Councillors to the viciousness of the men they themselves selected. The personal habits of nearly all of the great “empire builders” of those days were far from commendable; but there was a vast difference in the results obtained by courageous able men of loose behaviour and those obtained by weak men with the same bad habits. The standards of the time must be applied.

It had been shortly after the middle of September, 1699, and almost immediately after Councillor Mackay had arrived from Darien bringing fairly satisfactory accounts of the colony established by the first expedition, that dispatches from Governor Sir William Beeston of Jamaica to London brought the news to London of the first abandonment of Darien. In Scotland the report was not believed, and was either laughed at or declared a malicious canard.

By the 10th October, however, the facts were known to the directors of the company and they publicly admitted the facts and that the Caledonia and Unicorn were in New York. In a letter of great severity addressed to those Councillors then in New York, the directors refer to the “shameful and dishonourable abandonment of Caledonia.”

It has already been observed that the second expedition had sailed without this information, but almost at the minute of its receipt by the directors. As quickly as possible, by two vessels and by different routes, new orders and dispatches were sent out by the directors. The Speedy Return with Councillor Mackay (who was lost overboard between Jamaica and Darien) and the Margaret, Captain Robertson, with additional supplies were dispatched.

The Margaret reached Darien two months after the surrender of the colonists, and Robertson found the Spanish flag flying on the fort.

The advices home from the second expedition after it reached Caledonia were neither happy nor reassuring. The Darien undertaking was dear to the hearts of all Scotsmen. Its misfortunes spread both gloom and resentment over the country. To express doubt as to the worthiness of the venture was to court a dangerous unpopularity.

The news of the surrender of the colonists to the Spaniards, which meant the ruin of all their hopes, brought forth a popular indignation which knew no bounds. Those suffering personal grief cried aloud for revenge. The blow to the pride of the country was felt not alone by those whose money was in the venture. In talk, in letters, in pamphlets and broadsides, and in the hearts of the people the cry was for redress or indemnification by some one. The honour of Scotland sought vindication. The popular belief was that the failure was due to the unfriendly position taken by the English people and specifically to the attitude of the West Indian Governors acting under direction of their sovereign. It was now that Paterson showed the attribute of real greatness, the capacity to endure failure without flinching. Putting to one side his own personal losses, he used his capable and resourceful mind and tongue to calm the agitation and to persuade his fellow shareholders to exercise patience. With commendable fairness he exposed the fact that English opposition was only one of the causes. His explanation that lack of foresight at home and dissensions and mismanagement at Darien were amongst the main reasons for the failure were confirmed by the testimony of Captain Campbell, of Finab, who had returned home from Darien.

Having calmed somewhat the serious and fair-minded of his countrymen, Paterson turned to see what could be done to help the unfortunate shareholders. His aim was to secure indemnification. To make this possible it was desirable to obtain official recognition of the original settlement at Darien, and he asked the Parliament of Scotland to declare the settlement a legal and rightful one. The King, however, although keenly desirous to soothe his Scottish subjects, and with his plans of a Union undoubtedly in mind, considered it necessary to express through his Commissioner, the Duke of Queensberry, his regret that for invincible reasons he was unable to assert the company’s right to settle in Darien. To soften the blow he expressed sorrow for what had happened and willingness to concur in measures to aid the company and repair its losses. That King William’s sympathy was genuine and that he realized the extent to which the English merchants had participated in the original promotion of the company is shown in a letter which he wrote under date of the 29th September, 1699, to the Earl of Portland, “Though I am very glad at being now relieved from embarrassment about the affair of Darien, I pity with all my heart the poor Scotch, who have lost everything, and were by no means the promoters of this enterprise. I fear, too, that this will cause many quarrels in Scotland, from which I too may have to suffer.”^[129]

Parliament was not satisfied with the King’s message. More than words were needed to abate the feeling of resentment. Darien matters became an almost continuous subject of discussion in the Parliament of Scotland for several years. Several of the calumnious pamphlets printed were read before the House and ordered burnt. Six thousand pounds reward was offered for the apprehension of Walter Herries,^[130] a surgeon with the first expedition, who had written two tracts^[131] alleged to libel the nation.

Little progress was made towards settling the Darien matters or alleviating the discontent with England during the remainder of King William’s reign. On Queen Anne’s assumption of the crown early in 1702, she inherited the problem of healing the sore. King William had been desirous to bring about an incorporating union with Scotland and one of her first acts was to restate the late King’s appeal to that effect. The negotiations were, however, inextricably tangled with the Darien matters. It was evident that no union which did not adequately recognize the ambitions of Scotland in the way of trade would be approved by the Parliament of Scotland. Meanwhile the Darien Company in somewhat listless fashion was attempting to carry out one of the purposes of its organization,—a trade with the East.

The ship Speedwell was chartered for a voyage to China and the East Indies under command of Captain John Campbell and management of Mr. Robert Innes, Supercargo.^[132] The Content, Captain Alexander Stewart, and the Speedy Return, Captain Robert Drummond, were sent to Madagascar.^[133] Negotiations were had with the Earl of Morton^[134] to send the Morton, a ship of one hundred tons and carrying fourteen guns, to the East Indies. The venture which attracted the most attention at the time, however, was connected with ship Annandale,^[135] of two hundred and twenty tons and carrying twenty guns. Whilst this vessel was in the Thames, attempting to complete her crew, she was confiscated by the English authorities at, it was alleged, the instigation of the East India Company.^[136] Restitution was claimed by the Darien Company and denied.

The Government of Scotland was urged to retaliate on the Worcester, an English East India ship erroneously reported to belong to the East India Company. This the Government refused to do. So high was the feeling in Edinburgh, however, that individuals seized the captain and part of her crew. Those taken were charged with piracy and murder, and in March, 1705, all except one of those standing trial were condemned to death. These sentences were later annulled, save for two, who were actually executed in April.^[137]

This incident was not helpful either to the cause of the proposed union or to the affairs of the Darien Company. Englishmen believed that the executed men had been sacrificed in revenge for the bad treatment given the Darien Company by the English Government. The actual added strain in the relations of the two countries increased the need for a union which would remove causes of friction. The friends of the movement on both sides doubled their efforts and such was the gravity of the crisis that in April, 1706, the English and Scottish Commissioners met at Westminster in a conciliatory spirit.

One of the most important questions to be decided was the future of the Darien Company. The Scots insisted that the rights of the Darien Company should continue after the union; the English were equally insistent that such continuance would be against the interest of England and of the union. To bring an agreement, however, the English Commissioners were willing to make concessions. They agreed that on the actual establishment of the union there should be paid to Scotland a substantial sum of money to compensate that country for the liability it would assume under the union towards the debts of England.

The purpose of this, it was stated in their proposal, was to enable Scotland (1) to discharge the public debt of Scotland, (2) to improve its monetary standard, (3) to repay the capital stock of the Darien Company with interest at five per cent.^[138]

Notwithstanding the concessions made by England, Scotland was on fire with opposition to the union. On the side of accepting it Paterson spoke and wrote with strong arguments in its favour. He had reason to be pleased. The shareholders in the company he had promoted, which had been a disastrous failure, were to receive their money back with five per cent interest. Events in the Caribbean Sea, as had happened before and as were to happen again, had important influence on European affairs, and the disaster at Darien had become one of the most important factors in hastening the Union of Scotland and England. In one of his letters written in October, 1706, Paterson says:^[139] “In fine, as it is plain this Company hath rather been calculated and fitted for and towards bringing a Union, than for subsisting in an ununited state; and since, if the Union had been brought about by good success in our attempt to Caledonia, we have reason to believe no good patriot would have been angry, it would certainly be strange to find any so, when even the miscarriage of that design hath contributed to the Union.”

After much debate and wrangling, the Articles of Union, including the fifteenth making provision for the Darien Company, were adopted. A special committee found that the amount due the shareholders, with interest, was £232,884-5-0⅔ sterling, and this was the amount inserted in the Act concerning the Payment of the Sums out of the Equivalent to the African Company, which became law on the 25th March, 1707, the last day upon which the Parliament of Scotland sat.^[W] On this same day a motion was adopted “to recommend Mr. William Paterson to her Majesty for his good service.” Paterson himself did not benefit by the arrangement, as he was not a holder of shares in the company, and his claims on the company had been either carelessly or intentionally omitted. For one unfortunate reason or another, it was not until 1714 in the reign of George I that an Act of the Parliament of Great Britain granted to him an indemnity of between eighteen and nineteen thousand pounds.^[X] The settling of the claims of the shareholders and creditors of the Darien Company was carried out first by the “Commissioners of the Equivalent” and then by a company formed for the purpose and called the “Equivalent Company” incorporated in 1725. This corporation existed until 1850, when it was dissolved by Act of Parliament.^[140]

APPENDIX

(King William III., Parl. I., Sess. 5.)

Edinburgh, June 26th, 1695.

Our Soveraign Lord taking into his Consideration, that by an Act past in this present Parliament, Intituled, Act for encouraging of Forraign Trade; His Majesty for Improvement thereof did with Advice and Consent of the Estates of Parliament, Statute and Declare, That Merchants more or fewer may Contract and enter into such Societies and Companies, for carrying on of Trade, as to any subject of Goods or Merchandise to whatsomever Kingdom, Countries, or parts of the World, not being in War with His Majesty, where Trade is in use to be, or may be followed, and particularly beside the Kingdoms and Countries of Europe, to the East and West Indies, the Straits, and to trade in the Mediterranean, or upon the Coast of Africa, or in the Northern parts, or else where as above: Which Societies and Companies being contracted and entered into, upon the Terms and in the usual manner, as such Companies are set up, and in use in other parts, consistent alwise with the Laws of this Kingdom: His Majesty with consent foresaid, did allow and approve, giving and granting to them and each of them, all Powers, Rights, and Priviledges, as to their Persons, Rules and Orders. That by the Laws are given to Companies allowed to be erected for Manufactories: And His Majesty for their greater encouragement, did promise to give to these Companies, and each of them his Letters patent under the great Seal, confirming to them the whole foresaid Powers and Priviledges, with what other Encouragement His Majesty should judge needful, as the foresaid Act of Parliament at more length bears. And His Majesty understanding that several Persons as well Forreigners as Natives of this Kingdom, are willing to engage themselves with great Sums of Money in an American, African and Indian Trade to be exercised in and from this Kingdom; if enabled and encouraged thereunto, by the Concessions, Powers and Priviledges needful and usual in such cases, Therefore, and in pursuance of the foresaid Act of Parliament, his Majesty, with Advice and Consent of the saids Estates of Parliament, Doth hereby make and constitute John Lord Belhaven, Adam Cockbur of Ormistoun Lord Justice Clerk, Mr. Francis Montgomery of Giffen, Sir John Maxwel of Pollock, Sir Robert Chiesly present Provost of Edinburgh, John Swintoun of that Ilk, George Clerk late Baillie of Edinburgh, Mr Robert Blackwood and James Balfour Merchants in Edinburgh, and John Corse Merchant in Glasgow, William Paterson Esquire, James Fowlis, David Nairn Esquires, Thomas Deans Esquire, James Chiesly, John Smith,^[Y] Thomas Coutes, Hugh Frazer, Joseph Cohaine, Daves Ovedo,^[Y] and Walter Stuart Merchants in London, with such others as shall joyn with them within the space of twelve Months after the first day of August next, and all others whom the foresaids persons and these joyned with them, or major part of them, being assembled, shall admit and joyn into their Joynt-stock and Trade, who shall all be Repute, as if herein originally insert to be one Body Incorporat, and a free Incorporation with perpetual Succession, by the Name of The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies: Providing always, Likeas, it is hereby in the first place provided, that of the Fond or Capital Stock that shall be agreed to be advanced and imployed by the foresaid Undertakers, and their Co-partners, the half at least shall be appointed and alloted for Scotish Men within this Kingdom, who shall enter and subscribe to the said Company, before the first day of August, one thousand six hundred and ninety six Years: And if it shall happen, that Scots Men living within this Kingdom, shall not betwixt and the foresaid Term, subscribe for and make up the equal half of the said Fond or Capital Stock, Then and in that case allenarly, it shall be, and is hereby allowed to Scots Men residing Abroad, or to Forraigners to come in, Subscribe, and be assumed for the Superplus of the said half, and no otherwise: Likeas, the Quota of every man’s part of the said Stock whereupon he shall be capable to enter into the said Company, whether he be Native or Forraigner, shall be for the least one hundred lib. Ster. and for the highest or greatest three thousand lib. Ster. and no more directly nor indirectly in any sort: with power to the said Company to have a common Seal, and to alter and renew the same at their pleasure, with Advice always of the Lyon King at Arms; as also, to Plead and Sue, and be Sued, and to Purchase, Acquire, Possess, and enjoy Lordships, Lands, Tenements, or other Estate real or personal, of whatsoever Nature or Quality, and to dispose upon, and alienat the same, or any part thereof at their pleasure, and that by Transfers and Assignment, made and entered in their Books and Records without any other Formality of Law, providing always, that such Shares as are first subscribed for by Scots Men within this Kingdom, shall not be alienable to any other than Scots Men living within this Kingdom: That the foresaid Transfers and Conveyances, as shall have Retention of their Charges and Expenses in the first place, and the Books, Records and Registers of the said Company, or Authentick Abstracts, or Extracts out of the same, are hereby declared to be good and sufficient for Evidents in all Courts of Judicature, and elsewhere. And His Majesty, with Advice foresaid, farder Statutes and Declares, that the said John Lord Belhaven, Adam Cockburn of Ormistoun Lord Justice Clerk, Mr Francis Montgomery of Giffen, Sir John Maxwel of Pollock, Sir Robert Chiesly present Provost of Edinburgh, John Swintoun of that Ilk, George Clerk late Baillie of Edinburgh, Mr Robert Blackwood, and James Balfour, Merchants in Edinburgh, and John Corse Merchant in Glasgow, William Paterson Esquire, James Fowlis, David Nairn Esquires, Thomas Deans Esquire, James Chiesly, John Smith, Thomas Coutes, Hugh Frazer, Joseph Cohaine, Daves Ovedo, and Walter Stuart Merchants in London, and others to be joined with, or assumed by them in manner above-mentioned, and their Successors, or major part of them assembled in the said Company, shall, and may, in all time coming, by the plurality of Votes, agree, make, constitute, and ordain all such other Rules, Ordinances and Constitutions, as may be needful for the better Government and Improvement of their joint Stock, or Capital Fond, in all matters and things relating thereunto: To which Rules, Ordinances and Constitutions, all persons belonging to the said Company, as well Directors as Members thereof, Governours, or other Officers, Civil or Military, or others whatsoever, shall be subject, and hereby concluded; As also, to administrat and take Oaths de fideli, and others requisit to the Management of the foresaid Stock and Company. And the said Company is hereby Impowered to Equipp, Fit, Set out, Fraught and Navigat their own, or hired Ships, in such manner as they shall think fit, and that for the space of ten years from the Date hereof, notwithstanding of the Act of Parliament one thousand six hundred and sixty one years, Intituled, Act for Encouraging of Shipping and Navigation, wherewith to Lands and other real Estate (when made of these only and apart) be perfected according to the Laws of this Kingdom anent the Conveyance of Lands and real Rights, with power likewise to the foresaid Company, by Subscriptions or otherwise, as they shall think fit, to raise a joint Stock or Capital Fond of such a Sum or Sums of Money, and under and subject unto such Rules, Conditions and Qualifications, as, by the foresaid Company, or major part of them, when assembled, shall be limited and appointed to begin, carry on and support their intended Trade of Navigation, and whatever may contribute to the Advancement thereof. And it is hereby declared, that the said joint Stock or Capital Fond, or any part thereof, or any Estate, real or personal, Ships, Goods, or other Effects of, and belonging to the said Company, shall not be lyable unto any manner of Confiscation, Seizure, Forefaulture, Attachment, Arrest or Restraint, for and by reason of any Embargo, Breach of Peace, Letters of Mark or Reprisal, Declaration of War with any Forraign Prince, Potentate or State, or upon any other account or pretence whatsomever; but shall only be transferable, assignable, or alienable in such way and manner, and in such parts and portions, and under such Restrictions, Rules and Conditions, as the said Company shall, by writing in and upon their Books, Records and Registers, direct and appoint, and these Transfers and Assignments only, and no other, shall convoy the Right and Property in and to the said joint Stock and Capital Fond, and Effects thereof above-mentioned, or any part of the same, Excepting always as is above-excepted, and that the Creditors of any particular Member of the Company may, by their real Diligence, affect the share of the profit falling and pertaining to the Debitor, without having any further Right or power of the Debitor’s part and Interest in the Stock or Capital Fond, otherways than is above-appointed, and with this express provision, that whatever Charges the Company may be put to, by the contending of any of their Members deceased, or of their Assigney, Creditors to any other persons in their Rights, the Company His Majesty, with Consent foresaid, dispenses for the same time allenarly, in favours of the said Company, and that from any of the Ports or Places within this Kingdom, or from any other parts or places in Amity, or not in Hostility with His Majesty, in Warlike or other manner to any Lands, Islands, Countreys, or places in Asia, Africa, or America, and there to plant Collonies, build Cities, Towns or Forts, in or upon the places not inhabited, or in, or upon any other place, by Consent of the Natives and Inhabitants thereof, and not possest by any European Soveraign, Potentate, Prince, or State, and to provide and furnish the foresaid Places, Cities, Towns, or Forts, with Magazines, Ordinances, Arms, Weapons, Ammunition, and Stores of War, and by Force of Arms to defend their Trade and Navigation, Collonies, Cities, Towns, Forts, and Plantations, and other their Effects whatsoever; As also, to make Reprisals, and to seek and take Reparation of Damnage done by Sea or by Land, and to make and conclude Treaties of Peace and Commerce with the Soveraigns, Princes, Estates, Rulers, Governours, or Proprietors of the foresaid Lands, Islands, Countreys, or Places in Asia, Africa or America; Providing always, Likeas, it is hereby specially provided, that all Ships imployed by them, shall return to this Kingdom with their Effects, under the pain of Confiscation, Forefaulture, and Seizure of the Ships and Goods, in case of breaking of Bulk before their Return, excepting the case of necessity, for preserving the Ship, Company, and Loadning allenarly. And His Majesty, with Consent foresaid, doth farder Statute and Ordain, that none of the Liedges of this Kingdom shall, or may Trade or Navigat to any Lands, Islands, Countries, or Places in Asia, or Africa, in any time hereafter, or in America, for and during the space of thirty one years, to be counted from the passing of this present Act, without License or Permission in writing from the said Company: Certifying all such as shall do in the contrary hereof, that they shall Forefault and Omit the third part of the Ship, or Ships, and of the Cargo, or Cargoes therein-imployed, or the Value thereof, the one half to His Majesty as Escheat, and the other half to the Use and Benefit of the said Company: For the effectual Execution whereof, it shall be Lawful to the said Company, or any imployed by them, to Seize the saids Ships and Goods in any place of Asia, or Africa, or at Sea upon the Coasts of Asia or Africa, upon the Transgression foresaid, by Force of Arms, and at their own hand, and that without the Hazard of incurring any Crime, or Delinquency whatsomever, on Account of the said Seizure, or any thing necessarly done in prosecution thereof; Excepting always, and without prejudice to any of the Subjects of this Kingdom, to Trade and Navigat, during the said space, to any part of America, where the Collonies, Plantations, or Possessions of the said Company shall not be settled. And it is furder hereby Enacted, That the said Company shall have the Free and Absolute Right and Property, only Relieving and Holding of His Majesty, and His Successors in Soveraignity, for the only Acknowledgment of their Alledgiance, and paying yearly a Hogshead of Tobacco, in Name of Blench Duty, if required allenarly, in, and to all such Lands, Islands, Collonies, Cities, Towns, Forts, and Plantations, that they shall come to establish, or possess in manner foresaid: As also, to all manner of Treasures, Wealth, Riches, Profites, Mines, Minerals, Fishings, with the whole Product and Benefite thereof, as well under as above the Ground, and as well in Rivers, and Seas, as in the Lands thereto belonging, or from, or by reason of the same in any sort, together with the Right of Government and Admirality thereof; And that the said Company may, by vertue hereof, grant and delegat such Rights, Properties, Powers, and Immunities, and permit and allow such sort of Trade, Commerce, and Navigation into their Plantations, Collonies, Cities, Towns, or Places of their Possession, as the said Company, from time to time, shall judge fit and convenient, with power to them to impose and exact such Customs, and other Duties upon and from themselves, and others Trading with, and coming to the said Plantations, Cities, Towns, Places and Ports, and Harbours thereof, as the Company shall think needful for the Maintainance and other publick Uses of the same, Holding always, and to Hold the whole Premisies of His Majesty, and His Successors, Kings of Scotland, as Soveraigns thereof, and paying only for the same, their Acknowledgment and Alledgiance with a Hogshead of Tobacco yearly, in Name of Blench Duty, if required, for all other Duty, Service, Claim, or Demand whatsomever. With Power and Liberty to the said Company to treat for, and to procure and purchase such Rights, Liberties, Priviledges, Exemptions, and other Grants, as may be convenient for supporting, promoting, and enlarging their Trade and Navigation from any Forraign Potentate or Prince whatsoever, in Amity with His Majesty; For which the General Treaties of Peace and Commerce betwixt His Majestie and such Potentates, Princes or States, shall serve for sufficient Security, Warrand and Authority; And if, contrary to the saids Rights, Liberties, Priviledges, Exemptions, Grants or Agreements, any of the Ships, Goods, Merchandise, Persons or other Effects whatsoever, belonging to the said Company, shall be stopt, detained, embazled, or away taken, or in any sort prejudged or damnified, His Majesty promises to Interpose His Authority, to have Restitution, Reparation and Satisfaction made for the Damage done, and that upon the publick Charge, which His Majesty shall cause depurse, and lay out for that Effect. And farder, it is hereby Statute, That all Ships, Vessels, Merchandise, Goods, and other Effects whatsoever, belonging to the said Company, shall be free of all manner of Restraints, or Prohibitions, and of all Customs, Taxes, Cesses, Supplies, or other Duties Imposed, or to be Imposed by Act of Parliament, or otherwise, for and during the space of twenty-one years, excepting alwise the whole Duties of Tobacco and Suggar, that are not of the Growth of the Plantations of the said Company. And farder, it is Enacted, That the said Company, by Commission under their common Seal, or otherwise, as they shall appoint, may make and constitute all and every their Directors, Governours and Commanders in Chief and other Officers Military or Civil, by Sea or by Land; As likewise, That the said Company may Inlist, Inroll and Hire, and Retain all such persons Subjects of this Kingdom, or others whatsoever, as shall be willing and consent to enter in their Service or Pay, providing always, that they Uplift or Levy none within the Kingdom to be Soldiers, without Leave or Warrand first obtained from His Majesty, or the Lords of His Privy Council, over which Directors, Governours, Commanders in Chief, or other Officers Civil or Military, or others whatsoever in their Service and Pay, the Company shall have the Power, Command and Disposition both by Sea and Land. And it is farder Statute, That no Officer Civil or Military, or other person whatsoever within this Kingdom, shall Impress, Entertain, Stop, or Detain any of the Members, Officers, Servants, or others whatsoever, of, or belonging to the said Company; And in case the said Company, their Officers or Agents, shall find or understand any of their Members, Officers, Servants, and others aforesaid, to be Impressed, Stopped, or Detained, they are hereby Authorized and Allowed to take Hold of, and Release the foresaid person Impressed, or Stopped in any part of this Kingdom, either by Land or Water, and all Magistrats, and others His Majestie’s Officers Civil and Military, and all others, are hereby Required, in their respective Stations, to be Aiding and Assisting to the said Company, under the pain of being lyable to all the Loss, Dammage and Detriment of the said Company, by reason of the foresaid persons their Neglect. And farder, That the said Company, whose Members, Officers, Servants, or others belonging thereto, shall be free both in their Persons, Estates and Goods imployed in the said Stock and Trade, from all manner of Taxes, Cesses, Supplies, Excises, Quartering of Soldiers Transient or Local, or Levying of Soldiers, or other Impositions whatsoever, and that for and during the space of twenty one years. And lastly, all persons concerned, or to be concerned in this Company, are hereby Declared to be free Denizons of this Kingdom, and that they, with all that shall settle to Inhabit, or be born in any of the foresaid Plantations, Collonies, Cities, Towns, Factories, and other places that shall be purchast and possessed by the said Company, shall be repute as Natives of this Kingdom, and have the Priviledges thereof. And generally, without prejudice of the Specialities foresaid, His Majesty, with Consent foresaid, Gives and Grants to the said Company, all Power, Rights and Priviledges, as to their Persons, Rules, Orders, Estates, Goods, and Effects whatsoever, that by the Laws are given to Companies allowed to be erected for Manufactories, or that are usually given in any other Civil Kingdom or Commonwealth, to any Company there erected for Trade and Commerce. And for the better Establishment and greater Solemnity of this Act and Gift, in favours of the said Company, His Majesty doth farder Ordain Letters Patent to be expede hereupon, containing the whole Premisses under the Great Seal of this Kingdom, for doing whereof per saltum, These Presents shall be sufficient Warrand both to the Director and Chancellor, or Keeper of the Great Seal, as use is in like Cases.

Note.—By two succeeding Acts of the Scottish Parliament—viz.,

King William III., Parl. I., Sess. 8-9, 31st January 1701, and

Queen Anne, Parl. I., Sess. 1, 16th September 1703, the powers and immunities of the African and Indian Company were confirmed.

September 2d 1698.—We weighed anchor from Madera road, the Governor having been very civil to us, the Comadore gave him 15 guns, Cap^t. Pinkerton 13, and Cap^t. Drumond 11, all which he particularly returned with two less. Wee had a fresh breese at E.N.E. and stood away W.S.W.

Sep. 10. This morning wee passed the Tropick of Cancer with a fresh and fair gale, the ships performed the usual ceremony of ducking several of the Ships Crew, who had not passed before; they were hoisted to the main yard arm, and let down 3 several times with a soss into the sea out over head and ears, their legs being tyed somewhat closs, which was pretty good sport.

Sep. 30. Moderate gales and fair weather; at 6 in the morning wee made the Islands of Antigo and Monsirat, at noon the Island of Redondo, being a small island or rather a rock like the Bass; bore S.S.E. halfe a mile distant, and the Island of Mevis N.W. and B.W. 4 leagues. It is a very pleasant like Island; the fort hoisted their flag and wee our Colours.

1. October. Moderate gales and fair weather. At 6 last night the west end of St. Christophers bore N.½E. distant 4 leagues. This day at noon the S.E. end of S^ta. Cruze bore W.½N. distant 7 leagues.

2. Yesterday the Council met on board the Comadore, whene it was resolved that Captain Pinkertoun in the Unicorn, with the Snow, and Mr. Paterson, should be imediately despatched for the Island of St. Thomas, being a free port of the Danes, in order to get pilots for the Main, and what intelligence were possible of the state of Darien. Accordingly at 6 at night they parted from us. Wee steered directly for Crab Island, which wee made in the morning bearing N.W.½ distant 5 leagues.

3d. This morning wee went ashoare and took possession of the Island in the name of the Company of Scotland Trading to Affrica, &c. Wee left some of our people ashoare all night, and stood of to sea, it looking like bad weather, much thunder, lightning, and rain.

4. In the forenoon our men came on board, and were bore away to Leeward, where is the best anchoring. About halfe an hour past 4, in Frenchman’s bay wee saw a sloop with Danish colours, with a tent on shoare with the same hoisted on the top of it. Wee imediatly stood in and anchored closs by her. The Commadore sent to know quhat she was and her business there, who answered, they were Danes with a Governour and 15 men sent by the Gouernour of St. Thomas, to assert the K. of Denmark’s right to that Island, and to protest against our having any thing to do there. This sloop was dispatched away as soon as possible after Captain Pinkertoun’s arrival there, viz. on Sunday at 2 o’clock, but we landed that morning by 8; so that wee told them they came too late. However they offered their protest, as did the Governour of St. Thomas, to Captain Pinkertoun; this they owned was matter of form, and what they were obliged to do to please the Court; but wished with all their hearts wee settled there, for then they wold have a bullwark between them and those of Portorico (a rich and large Island and very populous very near) who were very troublesome neighbouring. These 24 hours wee have had much wind with thunder, lightning, and great rain.

Oct. 5. This day Captain —— arrived with the Snow, and brought one Captain Aletson with him, who freely offered to go along with us to Golden Island. This man is one of the eldest Privateers now alive, and commanded a small ship with Cap^t. Sharp when they went into the South Sea over the Isthmus; he was likewayes at the taking of Panama, Portobello, Shagra,^[Z] and Carthagena. All the time we stayed here the St. Andrew had a tent on shoare with the Companyes Colours flying on it, and 60 men for a guard when we filled our water.

This evening came in a Sloop commanded by one Moon. Captain Aletson was concerned in her in 2000 pound. She was loaded with flower, beeffe, and other goods. Wee endeavoured to drive a bargain with him for some provisions, but his prices were too high. Much wind, with great rain, thunder, and lightning.

6 Oct^r. The weather continues very bad. The Sloop sailed in the afternoon, being bound to Corassao, and from thence was for Carthagena with slaves; he designs afterward for Portobello, and promised to call at us in passing.

7. At 4 in the morning wee weighed and got under sail, having filled our water, and got our sick men, tent, and guard off from the shoare. At 8 at night wee took our departure from the S.E. end of Portorico bearing W.½N. distant 5 leagues—squaly weather.

Oct. 28. This day fair but squales of wind and rain in the night. At 6 last night the Island Ferta^[AA] bore E.½S. distant 2 leagues. This is a low Island about a mile long, full of trees, which may be seen 7 leagues of; there is good anchoring on the South side, and very good water.

29. The weather squaly. The other day when at anchor wee tryed the current and found it set N.E. 36 miles in 24 hours.

30. Fair weather. At 6 at night the St. Andrew and Unicorn anchored in a fine sandy bay about 3 leagues to the westward of the gulfe of Darien. There came 2 Canoas with several Indians on board. They were very free and not at all shey. They spoke some few words of English and indifferent Spanish. Wee gave them victuals and drink, which they used very freely, especially the last. In their cups wee endeavoured to pump them, who told they had expected us these two years; that wee were very welcome, and that all the countrey was at warr with the Spaniard. They got drunk and lay on board all night. In the morning when they went away wee gave each an old hat, a few 2 penny glasses, and knives, with which they seemed extremely pleased. The Caledonia and Snow stood off to sea all night.

31. These 24 hours with land and see breezes. This morning we went in Boats to Carret Bay, which is about 2 leags to the westward of the place where wee anchored last in, to view the bay and endeavour to get intelligence of Golden Island; wee being at a loss, for non of us knew the Land. Here wee met our friends that were aboard, who informed that Golden Island was some few leags further to the westward. Fair weather with land and sea breezes.

Nov^r. 1. These 24 hours fair weather with land and sea breezes. In the forenoon wee anchored within halfe a mile of Golden Island. In the afternoon wee went in our boats to sound all about Golden Island, which wee did with great exactnes, but found it not convenient for our shipes, there not being room enough about the point of the main for ships of our lenth to swing in. Tis true there is room enough near the Island, but then wee might be attacked by the greatest either from Eastward or Westward, for they can come in both wayes, nor is ther a drop of water within a mile of the point. On the main and all the bay round full of mangrow and swampy ground, which is very unwholesome. As wee went to sound, wee saw a flag of truce waved in the bottom of the bay. Wee went thither and found about 20 Indians with bowes and lances, but upon our approaching they unstrung their bowes in token of friendship. Wee made one of our men swim ashoare (while we lay off upon our oars) to know their meaning. They desired us to come ashoare but we did not think it fit. Then they told us that to morrow one of their greatest Captains wold be on board of us—so we parted.

2d. This morning according to what was said, came on board one Captain Andreas with 10 or a dozen along with him. He inquired the reason of our coming hither and what wee designed. Wee answeared, our design was to settle among them if they pleased to receive us as friends, our business was trade, and that we wold supply them from time to time with such comodities as they wanted, at much more reasonable rates than either the Spaniard or any other could do. He inquired if wee were friends to the Spaniard. Wee made answear that wee had no warr with any Nation; that if the Spaniard did offer us no affront nor injury, wee had nothing to say to them; but otherwayes wee wold make open war with them. This they seem’d pleased with all, still beleeving us to be privateers, and our design upon the South Sea. He began to run out upon the praises of Captain Swain and Captain Davies, two English privateers, who he said were his particular friends, and whom he knew in the South Sea. Wee received it coldly, and assured him wee were upon no design, beleeving it to be a pump as wee found by the mens conversation. Wee gave him a hat braded with broad gold galloo, with some toyes, so wee parted for that time. He (as generally all the people are) is of a small stature. In his garb he affects the Spaniard, as also in the gravity of his Cariage. He had a loose red stuff coat on, with an old hat, a pair of white drawers, but no shoes nor stockens. Those that were with him were stark naked, only a threed tyed round their midles, to make fast another to that kept on a small peece of plate upon the end of their yards, made like the small end of an extinguisher; this is alwayes made either of silver or of a certain leafe of a tree, and all weare it above 14 years of age.

Nov^r. 3d. Yesterday in the afternoon, wee went in our boats to sound a bay about 4 miles to the eastward of Golden Island, and found it a most excellent harbour. The harbour is within a great bay lying to the westward of it, made by Golden Island and a point of land bearing from thence east about a league. From that eastmost point to the opposit one, is a random cannon shot, and in the middle of the entry lyes a rock about 3 foot above the water, on which the Sea beats furiously, when the wind is out and blowes hard. This looks terrible (when in the bay) to those who know not the place well, but in both sides of this rock is a very good and wide Channel, that to the southward being about 3 cable-lenth breadth, with 7 fathom water closs to the rocks nose, and the other to the northward near 2 cables lenth. There is a small rock under water, a litle within the points bearing off of the southermost S.S.W. and of the northermost S.S.E. and of the rock without S.E. & B.E. From these two outwardmost points, the harbour runs away east a good league, and near the midle on the right hand the land sets out, so that its not a musquet shot over, and thus farr there is not less than 6 fathom water with very good easy ground, and here you ride landlocked every way that no wind can possibly hurt you. Within this to the bottom of the harbour, till within a cables lenth of the shoare, wee have not less than 3 fathom water, nor can a hurrycane make the least sea there. The land on the left hand coming in is a peninsula, and about 3 miles long, very high and steep towards the Sea, where it will be extreamly difficult for any body to land till ye come to the Isthmus, where is a small sandy bay. Small ships may ride but this by a good ditch and fort may safely be secured. The westermost point towards the harbour is low and very fit for a battery to command the entry, which wold be excellently secured by another on the opposit shoar. The land on the Pen-Insula is extraordinary good, and full of stately trees fit for all uses, and full of pleasant birds, as is also the opposit shoare, and hath several small springs which wee hope will hold in the dryest season. But on the other side there are 4 or 5 fine rivers that never do dry. This harbour is capable of containing 1000 of the best ships in the world, and with no great trouble wharfs may be run out to which ships of the greatest burthen may lay their sides and unload. This morning Captain Andreas came on board again with his traveling wife, having in all four. Polygamy being here allowed, every one may have as many as he can maintain. He was still on the pump as to our design, but when he found our account all of a peece, he told us that the English after they had been very friendly with them, had several times caryed away their people, and that was the reason that Captain Pedro (whom he promised to bring aboard with him, when last here) wold not ventur till he were better assured of our integrity. He likewayes told us that there were some French who lived among the Indians towards the Samblous^[BB] to the westward. Fair weather. This day wee landed and took possession.

Nov^r. 4. The weather fair, with land and sea breeses. This forenoon wee weighed and got in to the harbour, but the Unicorn unhappily struck on that sunken rock within the heads, and beat of some of her sheating. There were 40 men sent from each ship to clear away and make huts for our sick men.

5. Wee sent all our sick ashoare, and sent 30 men more from each ship to clear away. The Council met and went to view the most proper place for a Fort. Fair weather.

6. Fair weather. This morning arrived a canao with one Frenchman, 2 Creolians of Martinico, and 4 Indians; as also a periager with Captain Ambrosio and Captain Pedro, who live about 16 leagues to the westward. These Frenchmen have lived 4 yearis with these Indians, and one of the most sensible of them speaks their language perfectly, who gave us the following account, viz. That the storyes of King Panco Rosa and Golden Cape, were mere fables. That indeed there was about 50 years ago, one who by his valour and conduct against the Spaniard had acquired so great a reputation that they made him comander in chieff of all their united forces; but he had no sooner got the power into his hand than he became a most barbarous tyrant, and often for his pleasure wold cut of the heads of his bravest Captains. And what yet troubled them more, he wold allow no man besides himselfe but one wife, which they by no means could endure, so they set upon in the night and murdered him; since which time they never allowed any one to be greater than his fellowes, only in time of danger the wisest and bravest among them within their several districts is chose as their Captain for the time, and those now allowed to be so are as followes. Captan Diego comands from the bottom of the gulph of Uraba on this side to Carret Bay, and has about 3000 men under his comand. He is esteemed the most powerful among them; he has been at warr with the Spaniard about 12 moneths. The occasion of it was thus. The Indians having found 3 gold mines within his Jurisdiction, 2 whereof small and a very great vein, consulted with themselves what to do, and being sensible that they did not understand to work them, concluded to discover them to the Spaniard provided they wold allow them such a share of the profit. This was agreed to and faithfully promised by the Spaniard, but no sooner had the Indians showen them, but they shut up two of them, and set strong guards upon them, and fell to work upon the third, of which the Indians demanding their share they bet and abused them, calling them their slaves, and threatened to exterminate them, which provocked them so that a litle time after, they seised upon 20 Spaniards and 3 priests, and cut them to peeces.

Next to Diego is one Captain Paussigo of Carret bay. He is one of the Indian Clergymen, and comands that part of the Coast that lyes between Carret Bay and Golden Island, he is but a small Captain, and brother in law to Andreas. The Peninsula which wee possess, and which wee found uninhabited, nor has it been ever by any heretofore that wee can hear of, lyes between him and Captain Andreas.

From Golden Island to the river Pinas, about a league to the westward of Isle of Pinas, Andreas and his brother Pedro comand; they are greater than Paussigo, but not so powerful as Diego, yet their united interest by consanguinity, together with the vicinity of their comand to our setlement, makes their friendship of greatest consequence. These people have had a good correspondence for several years past with the Spaniard, and have suffered some of them to reside among them, to give an account to Panama by land from time to time, who were upon this coast. But about two moneths before our arrival here, Captain Ambrosio, who has the adjoining comand, forced them to enter into the common confederacy and cut of 10 Spaniards who lived on the main of Golden Island. We distinguish it thus by reason that the natives call all the main opposit to the Island by the same name that it bears. About a league from the water side there is a high mountain wherein they assure us are several mines of excellent gold. The Spaniards are very sensible of that, and have from time to time taken great care (by fair or foul means) never to let them be opened, wel knowing that being so near the North Sea, that they wold have the least share of them. This Andreas has often been at Panama, the mines of S^ta. Maria, and in the South Sea. The Spaniards beleeving he might be useful to them made him a Captain, by giving him a stick tipt with silver, upon which he values him selfe above others, and that was wee are apt to beleeve endear’d him in some measure, yet the love of ones Countrey and liberty is so natural that wee have great reason to beleeve that as soon (being a sensible and cunning fellow) as he is satisfyed wee are able to protect him, he will certainly join in our interest. The French mortaly hate him for having betrayed some of their nation to the Spaniard while they were at peace with them.

From the river Pinas, Captain Ambrosio commands the rivers Bononos, Mango, and Cocost, to the Samblous. He is a man about 60, but strong and vigorous, a mortal enemy to the Spaniard with whom he has had a long warr; he is esteemed the bravest and most successful of their Comanders upon all occasions. He is of a midle sise, wel made, strongly limb’d, and of a grate and somewhat stern countenance. He has a sone in law one Pedro a brisk litle fellow. He speaks good Spanish, having been kept slave to them at Panama for several years, and who can never forget nor forgive their usage of him there. He likewayes speaks very good French, having lived sometime at Petitguavis. He has as much of the French gaity as Andreas of the Spanish gravity, and is a good friend to the French whom they are made to beleeve have a design speedily to setle near them, and wee have reason to beleeve the same if wee had not prevented them. This Pedro is highly esteemed by Ambrosio and all his people, whose daughter he has to wife as also two of his daughters by himself, which is allowed here, yet it seems they believe it a crime, since if they have any children durin the life of the mother, the children are buried alive, which is very strange that the innocent should suffer for the guilty. They pressed us very hard to come and live by them, as also jointly to make warr with the Spaniard, whom they wold engage upon the forfeiture of their heads, if wee wold but assist them but with one hundred men and as many arms, with 2000 of their own people, to drive them not only out of all the mines which are but 3 days jurney from us, but even out of Panama it selfe. We gave them fair words and promised to go to the westward with them to view the coast, and if there were any convenient harbour for our Shipping wee should be their neighbours.

The Samblous to the river Conception is comanded by one Corbet, who is altogether in the French interest, and wee have the following account of him. About 7 years ago there being aboundance of French privateers about the Samblous, this Corbet and they contracted a particular friendship, and he did them many good offices. They in return told him that if he wold go to Petitguavis, the Governour there Mons^r. Du Cass would make him amends for all his favours to them. He resolves upon it, and away he goes in a French vessel, but chanced to be taken by an English privateer and caryed to Jamaica, where he and two Indians more were sold for slaves. As soon as Monsieur Du Cass was informed of this, he sent to the Governour of Jamaica, who at his desire imediatly released them, sent them to Petitguavis, from whence they took the opportunity of a French privateer bound for the Samblous, and turned home; they were prisoners in Jamaica about 7 Moneths.

Corbet continued rambling with the privateers, and made another trip to Petitguavis, where he had not been long when Monsieur Ponti arrived, with whom he went to Carthagena. When Monsieur Ponti presented him with goods (which wee suppose were useless to him) to the value of 2000 Crowns, Monsieur Du Cass Governour of Petitguavis, who accompanied Monsieur Ponti in that expedition, gave him a Commission as general of all the French and Indian forces on the coast of Darien, to take, sink, and destroy the Spaniard or any other enemy. Notwithstanding this large Commission, both the French and more sensible Indians have no opinion of [his] capacity, courage, or constancy, for he has a correspondence under hand with the Spaniard which they do not like; but Ambrosio, who all allow to be most daring and brave, as also the most faithful to his promise, being a true friend and most inveterate enemy, keeps him within bounds.

Next to Corbet from the river Conception is one Nicola, a man who speaks Spanish as wel as any natural Spaniard, having been bred for above a dozen of years of his youth among them; he likewayes reads and writes it perfectly, and understands the state of Europe very wel, which no other of them has any notion of. He is said to be wise and brave, extreamly beloved by his people for his justice and good nature, in so much that there have been designs to cut off Ambrosio to place him in his room, for the last is of a rough military temper, and often upon slight pretences makes bold to take from them what they have. However if they do not love him they fear him, and his near alliance and strict friendship with Diego in the Gulph, a powerful and old gallant fellow, renders him secure.

This Nicola was in good terms with the Spaniard till about 12 moneths ago. A trifle made him break with them, and it was thus. He had got an excellent French fuzee from a buckaneer which he valued extreamly; it was somewhat out of order, nor did he know how to put it to rights again. A Spanish Don from Portobell being at his house told him he wold carry it with him and get it mended, which the other consenting to, with a desire that it might be returned as soon as possible, they parted.

The Done shewed it to the Governour who lik’d it extreamly, and said it was too good for a heathen who kept correspondence with the French, so he ordered an old rousty match to be sent in lieu thereof. This he took so heinously that he fell upon the Spaniards whereever he found them and cut them off, nor is he to be reconciled to them; his command reaches from the river Conception to the Spanish border. Thus wee parted with the Frenchman, whom we treated with all possible civility; they went home to Ambrosio’s and promised to return in 5 or 6 days.

Nov^r. 7^th. The weather fair, with small breeses. Our people are imployed in making of huts and clearing away ground.

8. The wind and weather as above. There hath been a great number of Indians on board ships, whom wee use very kindly, and who consume a great deal of liquor.

9. The weather as above.

10. This day Captain Andreas dined on board the Comadore with his first wife and his sister; they are generally of a small sise as wel as the men, their features are indifferent (bating their colour) only their eyes are somewhat too small. They had a single cloath wrapt about them in form of a peticoat made of cotton, with a sort of a linen mantle about their shoulders, a great many beads about their necks and arms, with large gold rings put through the gristle that divides their nostrils; they are very submissive to their husbands, who notwithstanding are very kind to them. They told there had been a skirmish between the Indians of the Gulph and the Spaniard. That the last had killed about 20 men, and had taken as many women for slaves. That they knew of our being here and were exceeding angry with them for making friendship with us. Fair weather.

11. The people ashoare are imployed in making of huts, clearing way, &c. and those on board in ordering their holds, overhauling their rigging, blocksails, &c.

12. Much rain in the night.

13. Much rain in the morning. Wee saw a ship Saturday to the westward, which wee beleeved to be Captain Lang in the Rupert prize, who wee heard was in the Gulph of Uraba.

14. Wee had sharp showers of rain with the wind round the compass.

15. It has rained very hard, and gusts of wind. This evening Captain Lang^[141] in his boat came to visit us.

16. Captain Lang dined on board the Comadore. Much rain and thunder, which hinders our work.

17. Captain Lang dined on board Captain Pinkertoun. In the evening Lang’s boat went to his Sloop which lay at the Isle of Pinas. Much thunder, lightning, and rain.

18. This morning Captain Lang and Captain Pinkertoun went for the Isle of Pinas.

19. At 8 o’clock this morning Major Cunninghame, Mr. Mackay, and Captain Pennycuik, set out to the westward, and about 4 in the afternoon got on board Captain Lang, where they with Cap^t. Pinkertoun stayed all night, it blowing hard so that our longboats could not thither till next morning. Much rain, fresh gales of wind, thunder and lightning.

20. About 8 in the morning our longboats got up, together with Captain Pedro in his periager. What others have found or may think of Lang wee know, but he appears to us to be of no great reach; he has a full and ample comission, his principal design it seems was to find out wrecks and to fish. He own’d and so did all his people that his boat had not been so much as been ashoare in any place betuixt the gulfe and the Isle of Pinas, nor had he any conversation with those people, so that he can have no pretence upon our settlement. Wee left him about 10 o’clock, he said he was bound for Jamaica. This night the Councilours lay in a litle bay about 2 leagues to the westward of the river Pinas. In the night time a fresh gale variable and some small showers.

Nov^r. 21. In the morning they weighed and sounded all along the coast, and about noon found a most excellent harbour about 4 leagues to the westward of where they lay all night, capable of containing 10,000 sail of ships. It is made by an elbow of the main to the Eastward, and a range of keys about it, 10 in number, running to the Eastward above 2 leagues. To one of those called Laurence Key the greatest ship in England may lay her side to. Here the privateers used to carreen, but the inconveniency of that place is that ships may not only come in both from the Eastward and Westward, but between several of the keyes, so that it can not be defended without a great many forts as wel as men. After they had surveyed this bay they got to the river Coco. About 4 o’clock they landed and went to Ambrosio’s house, which is a good league from the water side. It stands upon the banks of this river with about 10 or a dozen lesser houses about it. Their houses are on the sea hand inaccessible in a manner, being so advantageously situat that no stranger can come at them that way by reason of the numerous unseen shoalds, small rocks, and banks.

When they came near, Ambrosio advanced about 50 pace with 20 followers, all cloathed in white loose frocks with fringes round the bottoms, and lances in their hands. He saluted them very kindly, and gave them a calabash full of liquor almost like lambswool, which they call Mischlew, being made of Indian corn and potatoes; this they get drunk with all often. Before the house about 20 paces it was very smooth and clean; the house was about 90 foot long 35 in breadth and 30 in hight; it was curiously thatched with palmetto royal, and over that, Cajan leaves; the floor was of a firm earth like Tarras, very smooth and clean; the sides were of large canes about the bignes of a man’s leg, and near an inch asunder. In this house lived Ambrosio and Pedro with their whole familyes, in all about 40 persons. There was an old woman who was very stirring about the house, she seem’d to be near 60, but upon asking her age the Frenchman told she was about 120. They could not beleeve it, and were perswaded they were mistaken in the computation of time; he assured them not, and as an undenyable demonstration shewed the sixt generation of that womans body in the house, which indeed was very surprising. She is Pedroes grandmother; when it was assured that it was common among them to live to 150 or 160 years age, yet its observed that those of them that converse often with the Europeans and drink their strong liquor are of short life.

Nov^r. 22. In the morning they had some plantans, potatoes, and wild hog dresst for breakfast, after their fashion. Then Ambrosio and Pedro went out with their guns to kill some fowl for the strangers. Pedro returned with some partriges the largest and best ever they saw, being bigger than capons, and exceedingly sweet. They being afraid it wold be late took leave er Ambrosio returned, Pedro and the Frenchman conveying them to the water side. They lay that night at the eastermost of the keyes mentioned before. Pedro did climb high cocornut trees and threw doun a great number most delicious for the juyce and kernel. They are very big. This Pedro is incredibly dexterous at the bow and arrow, which he show’d them by shooting frequently in one place; they learn their boyes to shoot with blunt arrowes.

23. By day light they weighed and got to the Isle of Pinas with their pinaces by noon, and at night home. Captain Lang sailed the Sunday before.

24. Much wind and rain.

25. Wind and rain as above.

27. Very much rain and wind.

28. These 24 houres ther has fallen a prodigious quantity of rain.

29. Much rain with fresh gales.

30. This being St. Andrew’s day, the Councilors dined on board the Comadore, where Captain Andreas was invited, who being inquired at anent his having any correspondence with the Spaniard as was reported, he ingenuously confessed that the Spaniards had been friendly to him and had made him a Captain; that he was obliged for his safty to keep fair with them; and that they assured him wee were nothing but privateers who had no design to setle, but to plunder both Spaniard and Indians and be gone in 2 or 3 moneths time; and if that he assisted us any way, as soon as wee were gone they should destroy him and his.

He got all possible assurance of the contrar, which he appeared to be fully satisfyed with, and desired a Comission, and to be taken under the protection of our Government with his followers, upon which he should give all his right to this part of the Country, which relished wel enough. He went away and promised to return in 2 or 3 dayes.

December 1. Much thunder, lightning, and rain.

2. The weather continoues very bad which hinders the work much.

3. Great showers of rain with much wind. Captain Andreas came this day on board the St. Andrew where the Counciloris were. He had his Comission read to him, and expounded in Spanish, whereby the Council made him one of their Captains to comand the Natives in and about his own territories, and received him and all submitting to him into the protection of their Government, he being therby obliged with his followers to obey, assist, and defend them and all their concerns upon all occasions. To all which he heartily agreed and seemed very wel satisfyed. Then the Preses of the Council for the time, did in presence of the Councilours and several others and some of Andreas people, deliver him his Commission written on parcement, with the Colonyes Seal and very broad gold stript and flour’d ribben appended, joyning hands together he promising to be just and faithful to us and our interest. He had at that time given him a broad basket hilted sword and a pair of good pistols, with which he promised to defend us all to the last drop of his blood against our Enemyes. He presented the Council with a bow and a bunch of arrowes as a token of his kindnes and friendship. Then he and those with him got a hearty glass, and at drinking the Company at home their health, 7 guns were fired, which he took as a great favour; he stayed on board all night.

December 4. Much thunder, lightning, and rain.

5. Some wind and rain.

6. Showres of rain with squales of wind.

The sones of Captain Diego and Captain Ambrosio came and stayed with us 4 or 5 dayes. The natives come evry other day with plantans and yams; the comon people among us buy them from them and give them small trifles for them, which they are wel satisfyed with.

7. Blustering weather with some showres.

8. Wind and weather as above.

9. Wind Northerly. Sometimes most excellent fish taken here, as also Tortoises, (but very few as yet, not having time nor nets fit for them,) some of them above 2, others above 300 weight: they are the best of meat. One of them will serve 100 men of reasonable appetites.

10. There is excellent Cedar trees in great aboundance, as also Mahoggany, Yellow Sanders, Lignum vitæ, Manchinill excellent for inlaying, and many others of great use. There are hopes of finding out the Nicoragu the best of lit for Scarlet, as also Banileos is here in great quantity, an excellent perfume and much used in the finest Cocholat, as also in this Countrey excellent fruits, such as Cocoa nuts wherof Cocholat is made. Vanelias, Sugar Canes, Mayis, Oranges, Plantans, Bonanos, Yams, Manioc and several others all very good, the ground very fertile and rich.

11. This morning came on board the Commadore a French longboat, with the Lieuetenent of the Ship she belonged to, and the purser of a Dutch. The ship to which the Lievetennent belonged is named the Zantoigne of 42, (had but 32 mounted,) commanded by Monsieur Vite Thomas. The Dutch ship was one of 22 guns, a trader upon the Coast. The Frenchman reported he came out in company with those that returned the Church plate to Carthagena. She is a Merchant ship, but has the King’s Comission, and halfe the Company payed by the King; he was very lakey, so begg’d liberty to stop his lakes in our port which wee freely granted. The Dutch Ship being afraid of the Barlivento fleet kept him company, and likewayes desired our protection. She is richly loaded and has been upon the coast some time, yet has most of her cargo still on board, being bound to the coast of Carthagena. She must be here till the Barlivento fleet pass for Porto Bello.

12. This morning the French ship anchored near Golden Island, and the Dutchman came into the harbour, directly he saluted the Commadore with 7 guns who returned him 5.

In the afternoon the French Captain came on board; he told us all the newes on the Coast, That the President of Panama had given an account to the Governours of Carthagena and Porto Bello of our arrival and setlement. The Spaniards along the whole Coast are in a wonderful consternation upon the matter. He told that 18 dayes ago one Whan Bernardo (a very rich and honest man) was sent with a long boat and 37 men by the Governour of Carthagena with a Comission to know what wee were and our design here; he was told there was nothing heard of him, so the Frenchman concluded the boat was sunk, being so old and lakey that she could hardly swim. He furder said that there were 4 sail of Ships about 50 guns each newly come from Spain, whereof the Dartmouth an English man of warr of 52 guns taken by the French was one; that they beleeved our design was upon the river Meschasippi, so were gone into the gulph of Mexico to seek us. That the Barlivento fleet was now at Carthagena consisting of 3 sail, viz. the General of 56 guns, one of 36 and another of 28 guns, the Vice Admiral of 40 guns being gone with a Dutch Ship of 32 guns whom they made prize, as also 2 English Sloops, for trading upon the Coast to Veracruze.

That Mexico was all in a Confusion, for upon advice of the King of Spain’s indisposition, Count Mountezuma Vice Roy and of the race of these great Emperours, had made such an interest that it is not doubted but that he will speedily set up for himselfe. Carthagen has likewayes been in a civil warr, which is only covered, not quenched.

At Porto Bello about 700 slaves got into a body, which in a little time increased to above 1500. The Governour did all he could to suppress them, but they being supplyed with arms and ammunition from the French, English, and Dutch traders, it was not in his power to suppress them, so was forced to come to very dishonourable terms; To wit, to allow them to be a free people independent of the Spaniards, and only to be called their friends, So that hundreds of them might been [seen in] Porto Bello struting and taking the right hand of their Masters, who dared not to say it was ill done; this agreement is said to have been made about 8 moneths ago, and showes the weak condition the Spanish Empire is in, in this new world. The French have been very industrious in promoting their interests here, both with the Natives and Spaniard, which they have cultivated to a great degree, nor is it to be doubted that they will push fair for a great share of these Countreys upon the King of Spain’s death.

Dec^br. 13. In the afternoon the French ship came in, he saluted the Commadore with 9 guns who returned (he having the King’s Comission and Colours) the same number, then 3 of thanks; he had also the like return, then one, and then like to that.

14. This day Captain Lang’s boat came into the harbour and told us he sailed for Jamaica on Sunday last, that he had left 3 men and a woman with Captain Diego in the gulph, and that the Barlivento fleet consisting of several sail of great ships and aboundance of small veshels full of souldiers, were lying at the Burus taking in provisions in order to attack with all their strength in a few days. This obliges us to make all dispatches with our battery. The Council have ordered their ships in a line of battle in the mouth of the harbour. Fair weather.

15. Captain Andreas sent word that the Spaniards were marching from Panama to Porto Bello, with a great number of men in order to attack us.

16. Several other Indians came in and gave the same account. The battery is going quickly on; our men are very hearty and seem to long for a visit from Jaque, that they might have a just pretence to their gold mines not farr off.

17. There is a look out made from which ships or vessels within 10 leagues can be descryed.

18. Fair weather, the fortification near finished.

19. This morning one of the men whom Captain Lang left towards the gulfe, with a boy and two Indians, came in a canoa and told that a Spanish periager landing where they were, the Indians and they set upon them, and killed 7 of them; this was found fault with [by] us, least Lang’s men should be thought ours and so wee thought to be the first breakers of peace. It was also told here that Lang had been a dayes jurney from his ship among the Spanish Indians, on purpose to misrepresent us, calling us thieves and robbers and disbanded souldiers not ouned or protected by the King of England.

This day the battery was finished, 16 twelve pounders being mounted on it, and wee are now in such a condition as that nothing more is wished than a visit from Jaque.

20. The French ship came out and anchored by our Ship at the mouth of the harbour. Fair, and wind at N.B.E.

21. Some sharpe showres of rain and a fresh gale as above; Entrenchments are making.

22. The Frenchman warpt out a little without us. Captain Paussigo of Carret bay, who is hearty and cordial to our interest, came and among other things told, that close by about 2 miles distant only, there were several gold mines, which he promised to shew, and did let some of the Councilors see few parcels of gold which he affirmed he got from thence, which was extraordinary fine.

23. Fair weather. Captain Ambrosio being upon this place tells that the Spaniard are marching with 600 of them and 200 of the South sea Indians, (who can travel through the woods,) to attack us in the night if possible, but its feared with us they will not come, but whatever be in it, the work goes wel on, the men working with much vigour and resolution. Ambrosio has been very kindly and civily used and a present given him.

The French have strangely insinuated into the favour of the Samblous Indians, and chiefly through the means of Pedro, Ambrosio’s sone in law, who is wholly French, and was to have gone with this Ship to Petitguavis if not to the court of France. Nothing in our opinions hath hindered them from setling on this Coast er this time, but the expectation of the King of Spain’s death. But seeing us here, with which they were strangely surprised, they beleeve it high time to delay no longer; however our satisfaction is that neither Andreas nor that Pedro who are our neighbours have any manner of friendship for them. If they setle among the Samblous with the pretensions they have to the Crown of Spain, the English and Dutch must both look about them, for their trade on this coast (which is very great) will be utterly lost, and wee are apt to beleeve the first will make their enmity give way to their interest, and reither close with us than suffer so powerful and troublesome a neighbour to fix here without opposition.

This day came in a small sloop loaded with flower, beefe, &c. from Jamaica. The Comander was sent by Captain Moon who is mentioned before, the Cargo was consigned to Captain Aletson.

24. In the morning early the French ship got under sail—the Council not having ended their dispatches for Scotland which they designed by her. Captain Pennycook went in his pinnace to know whether he designed to come to an anchor at Golden Island or put directly to sea. The Captain had drunk prety hard the night before with Pedro Ambrosio and some other of the Samblous Indians, so that he was then asleep. The wind had blown hard at N^o. and there came in a great sea, and with all it fell litle wind, so that she fell away to leeward a great pace, where was nothing but an Iron shoare. She had certainly been stranded on the first point, had not Captain Pennycuik made his boat get ahead and tow her. She weathered that point not twenty fathom, then was obliged to anchor in a little bay. At the Captain’s desire, Captain Pennycuik sent for a long boat, an anchor, and cable, with all the pinnaces to row them out, but stayed himselfe to assist what was possible, and at the Captain’s earnest desire promised to stay by him as long as he kept the ship; for the sailors being all hot headed since the night before, did not mind what their Captain said to them. The ship did ride about 3 quarters of an hour after they anchored, and then her best bower cable broke, and in halfe an hour after the small bower gave way, so ashoare she went upon the rocks, where in halfe an hour she was all to peeces, no boat daring to come near her. Captain Pennycuik was as good as his promise and stayed till he saw the Captain (who could not swim) upon a raft and gone, then took his opportunity and swam ashoare, having received some small wounds and bruises from the wreck and rocks, the sea beating on them furiously. There were 22 out of 56 drowned—tis said many of them occasioned by the weight of gold and money they had about their necks (having broke up chests); others beatt to peeces upon the rocks after they had swam ashoare. The Captain had in his round house in Gold and Silver to the value of 60,000 peeces of eight, and in goods not disposed of to the value of 30,000 Crowns.

25. The French Captain and Lieuetennent went on board the Commadore, being both extreamly bruised. The men were dispersed into the several ships. Officers and men were sent to guard the wreck.

26. Fair weather and a good gale at N.B.E.

27. This morning the French Captain went with two divers belonging to the Ship to see what could be got from the wreck. He gets all possible assistance to save all that comes ashoare.

Gentlemen:

By virtue of the power and authority to us given by the Court of Directors of the Indian and African Company of Scotland, you are hereby ordered in pursuance of your voyage to make the Crab Island, and if you find it free to take possession thereof in name of the Company; and from thence you are to proceed to the Bay of Darien and make the Isle called the Golden Island, which lies close by the shore some few leagues to the leeward of the mouth of the great River of Darien, in and about eight degrees of north latitude; and there make a settlement on the mainland as well as the said island, if proper (as we believe) and unpossessed by an European nation or state in amity with his Majesty; but if otherways, you are to bear to the leeward and view the coast of the mainland towards Bocco de Toros and Bocco de Drago, and there make a settlement on some convenient place of that coast. Tho in your way you are to visit the Island of Old Providence or Sancta Catalina to know the state thereof and to take possession of the same or not as you shall find convenient, for doing whereof this shall be to you a sufficient warrant. Given under our hands at Edinburgh the twelfth day of July 1698.

To the Councellors for the time being appointed for the Government of the Indian and African Company of Scotland’s intended Colony of Caledonia in America.

His Ma^tie’s instructions were so large to me as to give me leave to go to any part of America not possess’d by Christians, to discover gold or other treasures, upon which it bred a thought in me to go for the Gulph of Darien, if I could any way contrive to make a peace with the Indians. An accident happen’d while I was in Port Morant harbour in this place, which was that an English sloop brought in a parcel of Frenchmen who had lived in the Darien Country, but it was in the east part of the Samballas, and those Darien Indians are great lovers of the French, but the Natives of Darien who live in the gulph, have had a long warr with those of Samballas and the Isle Pines, and about seven or eight months past concluded a peace. This I understand by the French: considering I had now a fitt opportunity to make peace with the Indians over all the countrey of Darien, I presently press’d one of the English seamen, telling him the service I expected from him when I brought him to the Samballas, knowing very well he could bring me to the speech of those Indians amongst whom the French had lived, which he did by kind usage and some presents. So that all along the coast of Darien the Indians came and invited me, for they had recommended me along the shoar before I could arrive at the intended place. The gulph was what I aim’d at, and design’d up the great River that runns with turnings and windings not less than 200 leagues up one branch of it; its but twelve hours travel to the South Sea, but t’was my lot to be there in the time of rains, the freshes running so rampant that I could not get up the river.

The Countrey of Darienis about 60 leagues in length. It ends about 16 or 20 leagues up the Great River, and is there separated by a River called Key Crika, that is on the west of the great River, and empties itself into it, and the countrey of the Dariens ends about the middle of the Samballas. On the east side of the gulph lives a Nation called Orabas, with some Dariens amongst them. I was amongst this people also and was courteously received, these two Nations joyning together against the Spaniard and their friends up in the countrey; a vast way up this great River lives a Nation of Indians they call Chokcows. In that countrey are rich gold mines some the Spaniards work in, and many more there are of which the Spaniards know nothing, as the Dariens inform me; but the Chokcows have warr with them and the Orabas, and come often down the River in moon light nights to surprize their enemies, their enemies serving them in the same manner.

The Dariens gave me an account what rich gold mines the Spaniard has in their countrey five days travel from whence our ship lay, called the gold mines of Cany. These wrought on the greatest 800 Negroes, and there were imployed in the lesser 100 or 200 in each; at a distance from them were two mines of gold more found, but they wrought not on them having not people enough. I judge for good reasons that the Dariens in the Gulph have a gold mine to themselves separate from what the Spaniards have, but are willing to conceal it; they are very politick but sloathfull people, telling me they would not work in a mine for the sake of gold; and that the mines of Cany had not been found above 8 or 10 years, and that the Spaniards not only pick it out of the rivers after rains, but digg it out of the hills with iron tools in lumps at many places.

I took this voyage in hand with great hopes I should do this His Ma^ties service, not knowing what might arise upon the death of the King of Spain, which common belief and report of the world suppos’d very near or otherways, and also to intercept the acquaintance of the French with the Natives, that they might be in His Ma^ties service if any occasion whatsoever should happen.

I returned from the gulph in order to proceed on my other intended voyage, and stopt at the Isle of Pines, and upon the 13th of November at night understood by the Indians and one man I had at pledge amongst them, that the Scots were arrived to settle and lay in Carret Harbour, about five or six leagues from me and about 2 leagues to the south east of Golden Island. I next day visited them, who treated me very honorably. They are govern’d by seven Councellours who appear’d to me to be men of very good understanding. About 1200 men landed ashoar as proper as ever I saw. They are very healthy, and in such a crabbed hold that it will be difficult to beat them out of it. They are seated about 24 leagues to the N.W. of the mouth of the Great River which empties itself into the gulph. The ancient Indian name of this River is Trato, but the Spaniard often calls it Sarragost. I saw the settlement and order of the Scots, which appeared modest, and they declared themselves to me that they would be no harbourers of Pirates nor invade any man’s settled land, but those that would disturb them they would grant letters of reprisal against them.

I considered upon the coast that his Ma^tie sent me out upon discoveries, and that I was upon the coast of Darien and in the Gulph before them, and perceiving that they would be upon the Pelliar of the vacant places in America, and that I heard how the French were coming out upon the same design to the Gulph and this great River aforemention’d, which lay vacant for a long way up into the Countrey, and if it was to be taken into possession by others, I thought it my duetie to his Ma^tie to take possession in his name for the use of the Crown of England. Accordingly I returned to the Gulph from the Scots with all my might and very good will unto the Indian Governour and Indians, and there to renew my acquaintance with them, and told them my design, which they lovingly gave consent to, and took possession in his Ma^ties name, leaving there the common flagg and four people to keep possession untill his Ma^ties pleasure be further known.

To acquaint your Lo^p. with it, I am no hater of the Scots nation, but a lover of them, as we are all one Island and must joyn together upon occasion against the Dragon of religion; but what I have done I thought it my duety to do for my master as they thought to do for theirs.

The Spaniards in this Countrey are in a great consternation about it and challenge it for their Countrey. The Governour of Carthagena would have raised all the force he could, and ordered the General of the Barleventa fleet to go and fight the Scots, who would not, but fell into a flatt quarrell with the Governour, telling him that he would not make warr without the King his Ma^ties order—and that the Scots had not invaded their ports; and what right they might have to it, because they had no settled ports, he could not tell.

The great people in this Island cry if the settlement go forward they are undone, the name of gold is so inticeing, and perhaps the Scots will grant Commissions, and then the Common people will run from hence, leaving them and their estates to themselves. I judge they have not spared in sending home their letters of complaint; some crying I have done wisely in cutting off the Gulph from the Scots; others say I am guilty of no less than high treason in leaving the flaggs and men to keep possession and beginning such a design. Thus they pass various verdicts upon me.

But they will not consider how plentifull the Barbadians were and is now, and how in the first settling of Jamaica it was cried out against us if it would prove prejudicial to the Kingdom because all people of the common sort would run thither; yet notwithstanding what great riches have been brought into the Kingdom through the settling of Jamaica!

I am now about to sail to the intended place I have given your Lo^p. an acco^t of, and so to the Plate wrecks. If it pleases God the disposer of the whole creation to give me success according to the probability I have thereof, I may bring a treasure of great value into the Kingdom, that his Ma^tie may be encouraged to begin those settlements; I am following of it with what diligence I can, wherever I am I shall never cease to be, &c.

The said Diego having signifyed his earnest desire to enter into an entire frindship and strict allyance with the said Council and Colony; The same is hereby agreed to and concluded in the termes following, viz.—

1. The said Council of Caledonia and the said Diego, and the people of their respective obedience, shall from henceforward be friends and confederates, and are hereby oblidged mutually to defend the persons, lands, territories, dependencies, and properties of each other by land and sea.

2. The aforesaid Council and the said Diego, their people and dependants, may freely pass and repass, and shall mutually have the liberty of comerce, correspondence, and manuring, possessing, and enjoying lands in the countrys and places of their respective obedience in all time herafter.

3. If any of the people under the obedience of the said Council, or the said Diego, shall hapen to wrong or injure one another, the person or persons injured shall make their complaint, and in such case the respective partys to this treaty, their Magistrates and people, shall take effectual care that exact and speedy justice be done, and that things of that nature extend not to the weakning of this perpetual confederation.

4. It is herby likeways agreed that Captain Corbet of Conception River, Capⁿ Ambrosio of Coco, Capⁿ Nicola of Sept, Capⁿ Pansego of Carreta, and Capⁿ Pedro of Golden Island, and their people, shall, upon aplication, be admited into this treaty.

5. If any thing in this treaty shall afterwards want explanation or enlargement the same shall be done from time to time by consent of the partys to this confederation.

Which Treaty above writen having been interpret and explained to the said Diego, the said Council, for Confirmation and the greater solemnity therof, have ordered their Secretary in their own presence to subscribe his name and afix their seal therto; and the said Diego hath put his mark to the same, at Fort St. Andrew the 24 Feb^ry 1699.

A copy in Spanish was likewise given him.

Constituted by the Indian and African Company of Scotland, for the Government and Direction of their Colonies and Settlements in the Indies.

The said Company pursuant to the Powers and Immunities granted unto them by His Majesty of Great Britain, our Soveraign Lord, with advice and consent of His Parliament, of Scotland, having granted and conceded unto us and our successors in the Government for all times hereafter, full power to equip, set out, freight, and navigate our own or hired ships, in warlike or other manner, from any ports or places in amity, or not in hostility with His Majesty; to any Lands, Islands, Countries, or Places in Asia, Africa or America; and there to plant Colonies, build Cities, Towns or Forts, in or upon the places not inhabited, or in or upon any other place by consent of the Natives or Inhabitants thereof; and not possest by an European Soveraign, Potentate, Prince or State; and to provide and furnish the aforesaid places, cities, towns or forts, with Magazines, Ordnance, Arms, Weapons, Ammunition and Stores of War; and by force of Arms to defend the same trade navigation, colonies, cities, towns, forts, plantations and other effects whatsoever; and likewise to make Reprizals, and to seek and take reparation of damage done by sea or by Land; and to make and conclude Treaties of Peace and Commerce with soveraign Princes, Estates, Rulers, Governors, or Proprietors of the aforesaid Lands, Islands, Countries or Places in Asia, Africa, or America.

And reserving to themselves five per cent, or one twentieth part of the Lands, Mines, Minerals, Stones of Value, precious woods, and fishings, have further conceded and granted unto us, the free and absolute right and property in and to all such lands, islands, colonies, towns, forts, and plantations as we shall come to establish or possess in manner aforesaid; as also all manner of Treasures, Wealth, Riches, Profits, Mines, Minerals and Fishings, with the whole product and benefit thereof, as well under as above ground, as well in Rivers and Seas as in the Lands thereto belonging; or for or by reason of the same in any port, together with the right of Government and Admiralty thereof; as likewise that all manner of persons who shall settle to inhabit, or be born in any such plantations, colonies, cities, towns, factories, or places shall be, and be reputed as Natives of the Kingdom of Scotland. And generally the said Company have communicated unto us a right of all the powers, properties, and privileges granted unto them by Act of Parliament, or otherwise howsoever, with power to grant and delegate the same, and to permit and allow such sort of trade, commerce and navigation unto the plantations, colonies, cities and places of our possession, as we shall think fit and convenient.

And the Chief Captains and Supreme Leaders of the people of Darien in compliance with former agreements, having now in most kind and obliging manner received us into their friendship and country, with promise and contract to assist and join in defence thereof against such as shall be their or our Enemies in any time to come. Which, besides its being one of the most healthful, rich and fruitful countries upon earth hath the advantage of being a narrow Isthmus, seated in the height of the World, between two vast Oceans, which renders it more convenient than any other for being the Common Storehouse of the unsearchable and immense treasures of the spacious South Seas, the door of commerce to China and Japan, and the Emporium and Staple for the trade of both Indies.

And now by virtue of the before mentioned powers to us given, we do here settle and in the name of God establish ourselves; and in Honour and for the Memory of that most Ancient and Renowned Name of our Mother-Kingdom, We do, and will from henceforward call this Country by the name of Caledonia; and ourselves, successors, and associates, by the name of Caledonians.

And suitable to the weight and greatness of the Trust reposed, and the valuable opportunity now in our hands, being firmly resolved to communicate and dispose thereof in the most just and equal manner for increasing the Dominions and Subjects of the King our Soveraign Lord, the Honour and Wealth of our Country, as well as the benefit and advantage of those who now are, or may hereafter be concerned with us; We do hereby declare, that all manner of people soever, shall from henceforward be equally free and alike capable of the said properties, privileges, protections, immunities, and rights of Government granted unto us; and the Merchants and Merchants’ ships of all nations, may freely come to and trade with us, without being liable in their persons, goods or effects, to any manner of capture, confiscation, seizure, forfeiture, attachment, arrest, restraint, or prohibition, for or by reason of any embargo, breach of the peace, letters of mark, or reprizals, declaration of war with any foreign Prince, Potentate or State, or upon any other account or pretence whatsoever.

And We do hereby not only grant and concede, and declare a general and equal freedom of government and trade to those of all nations who shall hereafter be of, or concerned with us; but also a full and free liberty of Conscience in matter of Religion, so as the same be not understood to allow, connive at, or indulge the blaspheming of God’s holy Name, or any of His Divine Attributes; or the unhallowing or profaning the Sabbath Day.

And finally, as the best and surest means to render any Government successful, durable, and happy, it shall (by the help of Almighty God) be ever our constant and chiefest care, that all our further Constitutions, Laws, and Ordinances, be consonant and agreeable to the Holy Scripture, right Reason, and the Examples of the wisest and justest nations, that from the Truth and Righteousness thereof we may reasonably hope for and expect the blessings of Prosperity and Increase.

Rules and Ordinances for the Good Government of this Colony. April 24, 1699.

The Council and Deputees Assembled in Parliament pursuant to the trust reposed, and the powers and immunities granted by his Majesty of Great Brittain, our Sovereign Lord, communicated and transmitted unto them by the Indian and African Company of Scotland, Have, for the good order and Government of this Colony, after mature deliberation, agreed and concluded upon the following rules and ordinances, as appearing most reasonable, equal, and sutable, to be from this time forward binding and obliging; and for that effect, that an ordinary Judicatur or Court of Justice be appointed, to consist of such and such number of persons as the Council shall think convenient. The which shall have power to choose their President, and to name and appoint Clerks, servants, and all other officers needfull, and to proceed upon, judge, and determin all causes, crimes, and punishments by and according to the following rules and ordinances, which wee doe hereby appoint and ordain to have the full force and effect of lawes within this Colony and its dependences by land and sea.

1. In the first place, It is hereby provided and declared, that the precepts, instructions, examples, comands, and prohibitions exprest and contain’d in the holy Scriptures, as of right they ought, shall not only be binding and obliging, and have the full force and effect of lawes within this Colony, but are, were, and of right ought to be, the standart, rule, and measure to all, the further and other constitutions, rules, and ordinances thereof.

2. He who shall blaspheme or prophane the name of Almighty God, or any of his divine attributes, or use any curse or imprecation, after public acknowledgement, shall suffer three days’ imprisonment and confinement to bread, water, and hard labour for the first offence, and, for the second offence, shall suffer the said punishment for thirty dayes, and for every other offence, shall be punished at the discretion of the Justiciary Court.

3. Whosoever shall behave himselfe disrespectfully towards the Council, or any of the Councilours, or towards his own or any other Officer of this Colony, or shall speak words tending to their or any of their hurt or dishonour, or shall know of such behaviour or words spoken, and shall not reveal the same with all convenient speed, shall be punished according to the nature of the offence, and quality and circumstances thereof, in the judgment of the Justiciary Court.

4. No man shall, upon pain of death, hold correspondence, give advice, or keep intelligence with any rebell or enemy; as also he who shall know of any such intelligence, and shall not, with all convenient speed, discover the same, and the party or parties therein concerned, to the Council, or some one of the Councilours, or to the Superior Officers, shall likewayes be liable to the same punishment.

5. He who shall intice or persuade another or others to any rebellious Act against the Council and Government of this Colony, shall incurr the pain of death, and whosoever shall know of such offences, and shall not discover the same to the Council, or to some one of the Councilours, or to his Superiour Officer, shall incurr the same punishment.

6. No man shall presume to contrive, endeavour, or cause any mutine or sedition within this Colony, upon pain of death, or such other punishment as the Justiciary Court shall think fit.

7. Whosoever shall disobey his Superiour Officer, or resist him in the execution of his Office, or shall oppose or resist any of the Magistrates or Officers of this Colony in the execution of their duty and trust, shall suffer the paines of death, or such other punishment as the Justiciary shall think fit.

8. He who shall violat any protection or safe conduct granted by the Council, and knowing the same, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as the Justiciary Court shall think just.

9. He who shall use any provocking or upbraiding words or gestures, or shall give the ly, or any manner of reproachful, scandalous, or injurious names, to another of equal quality and degree with himselfe, whether present or absent, or shall strike or threatn to strike such a one with his hand, stick, sword in the scabard, whip, stone, or any thing of like nature, shall, besides giving honourable satisfaction to the party injured upon his knees, be therfore condemned to hard labour at the publick works for the space of six moneths, from which labour he shall not desist, withdraw nor desert upon pain of death, or such other punishment as the Justiciary Court shall think meet: And if such affronts or injuries shall be given or offered to a Superiour, the party offending shall be lyable to double the said punishment at least; and if to an inferiour, the same shall be proportioned sutable to the nature of the case, and the circumstances of the parties concerned.

10. No man shall presume to fight a duel with or send a challenge to another, nor shall any one presume to accept of such a challenge or appointment to fight, upon pain of the sewrest death and highest infamy. And all seconds in duels and appointments to fight, and such as shall have known thereof, and shall not reveal the same, and the parties concerned, with all convenient speed, shall be equally lyable to the same punishment.

11. He who shall wilfully hurt or maim any other, shall, sutable to the loss and value of his time, the grief and pain thereby occasioned, as also the expence of curing, and dissability of body thereby happening, be lyable to make full satisfaction; and if the offender have not to pay, he shall become a servant, and shall so continue untill full reparation be made to the party injured, and generaly the like full reparation shall not only be made for all manner of hurts, violences, wrongs, and dammages done, or caused or offered to be done, but the offender may be further punished, if the nature of the case shall require the same.

12. It shall be death for any man presumptuously and willfully to assault another by such means and weapons as shall put him in evident hazard or danger of his life.

13. All murder or willfull killing of any person shall be punished with death.

14. He who shall force a woman to abuse her, whither she belong to an enemy or not, shall suffer death for it.

15. It shall be death to steal, or forcibly to cary or convey away from the Colony or its dependencies, any man, woman, or child.

16. House-breaking, and all sorts of robing or forcible thifts, shall be punished with loss of life, or of liberty, at the will of the Justiciary Court.

17. A Thief shall be oblidged to restore fourfold of the species or value of the thing stollen and damnage done, the one halfe to the party injured, and the other to be equaly divided between the Government of this Colony and the discoverer of the theft; and if the thiefe have not to pay, he shall be condemned to hard service and labour at the publick or other works, untill the restitution of the value of the thing stolen and damnage done be made, and shall be afterwards obliged to serve the Government of this Colony and the discoverer of the theft for the space of a whole year.

18. All robing of Indian plantations or houses, stealing or taking of provisions or other things belonging to them, without their free consent, shall be punished as theft.

19. Cuting or breaking doun, or otherwayes spoiling of plantan walks, orange, leamon, or lime trees, or other trees, or fruits of use and for support of life, and all other willful waste and spoile, shall be punished as theft.

20. Whosoever shall presume to sell, imbasle, or willfuly spoile, break, or convey away any arms, ammunition, axes, hatchets, spades, shovels, pickaxes, or other necessars, or stores of warr, or working tools belonging to the Colony, whither committed to their trust or otherwise, shall be punished as thieves.

21. All willfull and apparent breach of trust, and designed fraud and cheating, shall be punished as theft.

22. All giving and taking of bribes, in order to delay, deny, or pervert justice, shall be punished as theft.

23. Things that are found may not be concealed, but shall be restored to the owner, if known, with all convenient speed; and where the owner is not known, publick intimation thereof shall be given, otherwise the finder shall become lyable to suffer as a thiefe.

24. Benefits received, and good services done, shall alwayes be generously and thankfuly compensated, whether a prior agreement or bargain hath been made or not; and if it shall hapen to be otherwise, and the benefactor be obliged justly to complain of the ingratitude, the ungrateful shall in such case be oblidged to give threefold satisfaction at least.

25. Whosoever shall absent himself, go away from, or desert the service of this Colony, or that of any particular person to whom they are bound, besides due chastisement of whiping, shall be obliged to serve a week for every day of such their absence or desertion.

26. No man shall be confined or detained prisoner for above the space of three moneths without being brought to a lawful trial.

27. All lands, goods, debts, and other effects whatsoever and whersoever, (excepting the needful and proper working tools of a mechanick, the proper books of a student or man of reading, and the proper and absolutely necessar wearing cloaths of any person,) shall, in the most ready, easy, and absolute manner, be subject to the just and equal satisfaction of debts; but the person of a freeman shall not in any sort be lyable to arreasts, imprisonment, or other restraint whatsoever, for or by reason of debt, unless there shall be fraud or the design thereof, or willful or aparent breach of trust, missapplication, or concealment first proved upon him.

28. In all cases, criminal and capital, no judgment or determination shall pass against any man in the Justiciary Court without the consent and concurrence of a Jury, consisting of fifteen fit persons, to be nominat and chosen by the said Court in the ordinary and usual manner, out of such a number as they shall think fit.

29. Upon trials of persons or causes, the Justiciary Court shall proceed to examin upon oath; and after having heard the prisoner, the party accused, or the party concerned, whither for or against the witnesses, the Judges shall afterwards give their opinions one by one, beginning at the youngest in years, and proceeding to the eldest, and shall conclude by majority of votes; but if the votes be equal, the President shall have a casting voice; and when Judgment or sentence is to be given, the President shall pronunce it.

30. No man shall presume to sit in Court, much less to act as a Judge, or be of the Jury in the case, and during the time that any cause wherein he is party, or any way interested or concerned, shall be under examination or trial.

31. The Justiciary Court shall keep a Clerk or Clerks, who shall be sworn to make true and faithful records of all the proceedings of that Court.

32. No man shall presume to use any braving words, signs, or gesturs in any place of Council or Judicatur whilst the Council or Court is siting, upon pain of such punishment as shall be inflicted by the Court.

33. All things relating to trade and navigation, and not comprehended in or understood by these ordinances, shall be determined by the most known and practised lawes and customs of Merchants and of the sea.

34. And Lastly, Any Judge or Member of the Justiciary Court, and every one of the Jury shall take a solemn oath duly to administer justice according to these rules, ordinances, and probation taken, to the best of their understanding.

Fort St. Andrew, Aprile 24, 1699.

All the saids rules and ordinances were read and approven of, article by article, and afterwards past altogether.

Collin Campbell, I.P.P.

From a Person of Eminency and worth in Caledonia to a Friend at Boston in New-England.

Sir,

I have Received your kind Letter of the 26 December last, and Communicated it to the Gentlemen of the Council here; to whom your kind Sentiments, and Readiness were very acceptable.

Certainly the Work here begun is the most Ripened, Digested, and the best Founded, as to Priviledges, Place, Time, and other like Advantages, that ever was yet begun in any part of the Trading World. We Arrived upon this Coast the first, and took possession the third of November: Our Scituation is about Two Leagues to the Southward of Golden-Island, (by the Spaniards called Guarda) in one of the best & most defenceable Harbours perhaps in the World. The Country is Healthful to a wonder; insomuch that our own Sick, which were many when we Arrived, are now generally cured. The Country is exceeding Fertile, and the Weather Temperate: The Country where we are Settled, is dry, and rising ground, Hills but not High; and on the sides, and quite to the tops, three, four or five foot good fat mould, not a Rock or Stone to be seen. We have but Eight or Nine Leagues to a River, where Boats may go into the South Sea. The Natives for Fifty Leagues on either side are in intire friendship and Correspondence with us; and if we will be at the pains, we can gain those at the greatest distance. For our Neighbour Indians are willing to be the joyful Messengers of our Settlement, and good disposition to their Country men. As to the Innate Riches of the Countrey, upon the first information, I always believed to be very great: but now find it goes beyond all that ever I thought, or conceited in that matter.

The Spaniards, as we can understand, are very much surprized, and alarm’d, and the more that it comes as a Thunder-clap upon them; having had no notice of us, until three days after our Arrival. We have Written to the Præsident of Panama, giving him Account of our good and peaceable intentions, and to procure a good Understanding and Correspondence; And if that is not condescended to; we are ready for what else he pleases. If Merchants should once Erect Factories here, this place will soon become the best and surest Mart in all America, both for In-land and Over-land Trade. We want here Sloops and Coasting Vessels; for want of which, and by reason we have been all hands at work in fortifying and fitting our selves (which is now pretty well over) we have had but little Trade as yet: most of our Goods Unsold. We are here a Thousand one hundred Men, and expect Supplies every day. We have been exceeding unhappy in loosing two Ministers^[CC] who came with us from Scotland; and if New England could supply us in that, it would be a great and lasting Obligation.

For Apprehending Walter Herries.

William by the Grace of God, King of Great-Britain, France and Ireland, defender of the Faith, To

Macers of Our Privy Council,

Messengers at Armes, our Sheriffs in that part conjunctly and severally specially constitut Greeting: Forasmuchas, We and the Estates of Parliament, being Informed that one Walter Herries Chyrurgeon, who went with the Company Trading to Africa and the Indies, their first Ships to Darien, is the Author of a Pamphlet, Intituled, A defence of the Scots abdicating Darien, Including an Answer to the Scots Settlement there; And of another Pamphlet Intituled, A Vindication of the said former Pamphlet: And the Estates of parliament having considered the saids two pamphlets to be Blasphemous, Scandalous and Calumnious Libels, reflecting upon Religion and the honour of this Nation, Did Recommend to Us to issue forth a proclamation, with Advice of Our privy Council, appointing the said Walter Herries to be taken into Custody Therefore We with Advice of the Lords of Our privy Council, Require and command all Magistrats, Officiars of the Law, and others of our Liedges, to sease upon, and take into Custody the person of the said Walter Herries, where ever he can be apprehended within this Kingdom, and to deliver him to any Magistrat within the same; indemnifying hereby all persons from any hazard of Slaughter, Mutilation, or other violence which they may commit against the said Walter Herries, in case of resistance in apprehending of him. And for the further incouragement of all our good Subjects within this Kingdom to apprehend the person of the said Walter Herries, We with advice foresaid, do promise and assure the Sum of Six Thousand Pounds Scots for a reward to the person who shall apprehend the said Walter Herries within this Kingdom, and deliver him to any Magistrat within the same, in order to be tryed and brought to Justice; Requiring hereby the Lords Commissioners of our Thesaury to make payment of the Sum and Reward above-mentioned to the person or persons who shall perform the foresaid service OUR WILL IS HEREFORE, and We charge you strictly, and command, that incontinent, these Our Letters seen, ye pass to the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh, and to the Mercat Crosses of the haill Head Burghs of the several Shires and Stewartries within this Kingdom, and there in Our Name and Authority, by open Proclamation, make Publication of the premisses, that none pretend ignorance. And ordains these presents to be Printed.

Given under Our Signet at Edinburgh the First day of January, and of Our Reign the Twelfth Year, 1701.

Monday, 4th December 1699.

At a meeting of the Council, Land and Sea Captains, Capt. James Gibsone, Præses, the state of provisions on board y^e fleet being enquired into, according to the severall invoyces, the same were found suffic^t. to subsist, att short allowance, all the men aboard the fleet for the space of 6 moneths, save only as to the brandy, which, att the rate of one gallon to three men, were only found suffic^t. for 4 moneths; and all this depends upon the provisions answering the invoyce and ships stewarts accounts, and our purchasing the cargoe of ane English sloop presently in this bay, and receiving from Capt. Thomas Drummond what he has aboard his sloop wherein he came from New York, both these sloops cargoes being included in the above six moneths subsistence. Thereafter, some debate ariseing from the consideration of y^e insufficiency and short coming of the provisions loaded for the first expedition, whether or not without rumageing the ships, there could be any satisfaction given of the present provisions answering y^e invoyces, it was thought reasonable to call Alex^r. Hamilton, whom y^e Colony sent to Scotland, to see their provision and other goods fairly loaded, who compearing, declared that he saw none of the provision which came from Ireland, but the most pairt of the bread and flour bought in Scotland; and the reason why he saw not all the provisions was, because he was obleidged to attend the Court of Directors. Captain Thomas Drummond, one of the Councellors assumed by the Colony being present att this meeting, was interrogate anent what credentialls he brought from y^e oy^r Councellors att New York, and produced letters sealled with the Colony’s seall, and signed by tuo of the assumed Councellors, William Patersone and Captain Samuell Veitch, whereby all concerned are ordered to give the said Captain Drummond full credit; likewayes Captain William Veitch, who att the beginning was chosen a Councellor for the Colony, and came aboard this ship, produced a letter from the said Captain Samuell Veitch, dated at New York, 20th Septem^r last, which letter, w^t the above credentialls, were produced, to be copied and lye in retentis. And there being a paragraph in the forsaid letter in these words—“If you resettle the place, faill not to send by the first a bill of att least tuo thousand pounds, drawne in Thomas Winham and Stephen Delany’s name, and addressed to me, for a fund for what you may need from hence, for it is from hence yow must be supported.” And ye said Capt. Drummond, in virtue of his credentialls assureing this meeting, that bills drawne in the termes of the Act of the Court of Directors, for a credit to the Colony, would be sufficient for procureing provisions att New York; and it being alledged, on the other side, that there were not four Councellors here for drawing bills, and that albeit there were (the haill Colony haveing deserted their settlement), the same would find no credit in any place in the world. The vote was stated, whether this meeting judged ye credit above proposed valid and effectual or not, and was carryed in the negative.

There being a motion made, whether or not the said Capt. Thomas Drummond should be admitted to sitt and vote in this meeting, yea or not, it was carryed by vote in the affirmative: Capt. Veitch refuseing to vote in this matter, desired the same might be minuted, which was unanimously granted. The said Capt. Veitch also proposed, that James Byres, one of the Councellors of the Company, Capt. Thomas Drummond, and himselfe, should, as Councellors, take upon themselves the full government. To which the said James Byres answered, that the Colony for which the saids Drummond and Veitch were chosen Councellors haveing entirely deserted the settlement, he was of opinion, that none of their commissions as Councellors did subsist, or was valid, and consequently, that y^r was no Councellor here but himself, seing his commission depended not either upon the desertion or settlement of the Colony; and y^rfor, the charge being too great, he refused (albeit they were consenting, as they are not) to accept of sole Councellorship, and much more to act in commission with them; he reckoned no Councellors, and so adhered to the commission granted by the Court of Directors, in favours of Capt. Wm. Veitch, Capt. James Gibsone, Major John Lindsay, and himselfe, in respect the same was never to be voided and null otherwayes than in favours of the Councill of Caledonia, which was not found extant: and in this adherence to the forsaid commission, he, ye said James Byres, was join’d by Captain Gibsone and Major Lindsay.

It being proposed that a new settlement should be made here, and putt to the vote, the same was carryed nemine contradicente.

Thereafter, it being voted, how many should settle here in all, both of land and sea men, it was carryed that five hundred should settle; and then the Preses ordered all present to signe these minutes, with himself; and adjourned this meeting till to-morrow, att eight o’clock in the morning, when all present are desired to be here in this ship. Signed by y^e Preses, Council, Land and Sea Captains.

Tuesday, 5th Decem^r. 1699, on board y^e Riseing Sun, in Caledonia Bay, att 8 o’cloack in the morning.

Att a meeting of the Councill, Land and Sea Captains, and Representatives of Companys, Captain James Gibsone, Præses, minutes of y^e last sederunt read; the question being putt, to what place the men aboard this fleet, supernumerary to the number of five hundred who are to settle, should be carryd, it was voted, that they should be sent to Jamaica p. first on board the two hired ships, with provisions for three weeks.

Thereafter, it was putt to the vote, whether the land men who are to settle should have or’e them six captains, six livetenants and six ensigns, or eight of each? and it was carryed eight; and then y^e Præses recommended all to the members of this meeting to have their serious thoughts concerning the men fittest for staying here and goeing to Jamaica, till three o’cloack this afternoon; to which time this meeting is adjourned.

(Sic subs^r.) James Gibsone, Præses.

Capt. Ja. Gibsone, Præses, as above.

Ditto, three o’cloack in the afternoon.

Minutes of the last sederunt read; there being a motion made anent y^e nomination of the officers to be sent to Jamaica, and this meeting not agreeing y^ranent, it was voted, whether or not the said nomination should be by this meeting or y^e Council, and carryed to be by the Council, consisting of four, viz., James Byres, Capt. William Veitch, Capt. James Gibsone, and Maj. John Lindsay. Signed by the Preses.

(Public Records Office. Ad. 1/, 4085, p. 157, made conveniently readable by extension of abbreviations and minor corrections.)

TO THEIR EXCELLENCIES THE LORDS JUSTICES OF ENGLAND

The Humble Proposall of Richard Long

That he informed his Majesty of a Great Probability of Discovering Gold on the Coast of America, where no Europeans had yet settled, as also that he had knowledge of a Plate wreck or two that is lost and is in great hopes of finding and getting good part of the Treasure out, upon which he had begged his Majesty would be pleased to grant him a Sixth Rate to performe his intended Voyage. What Discovery of Gold should be made was to be wholly for his Majestys Service (excepting the recompense he was to have): as to the Treasure to be got out of the said wrecks, he being in contract with the Duke Schomberg’s Committee on the said wrecks, it was agreed that his Majesty should have one hundred Shares out of sixteen hundred as the said shares are divided in that Committee, and his Majesty to be at no further charge henceforward in the shares than the fitting out the above mentioned Ship as followeth:

A New Sixth Rate ready mann’d with 70 men, if she carrys a hundred cruising in the Channell.

I pray the Liberty of Choosing a Lieutenant and all the rest of the Officers may keep their stations, two boats besides the Pinnace that already belongs to her, and that I may have the contrivance of them.

Twelve thousand weight of Bread and as much flower in firm Cask to make bread, this will be of greatest Service, Pork, beef, and flower for Puddings, Oatmeal, butter, Cheese, Pease, Vinegar for 10 months, Beer for 4 months, wood 3 months. If the Ship cannot conveniently carry all these provisions, I desire to have a hundred Gallons of Oyle in the Roome and to have my stores full when I leave England.

Sheathing commonly spoils the Sailing of Ships. I would onely have the keel 3 streaks a Low sheathed with plain board, and the Stem and Stern post and bearding and back of the Rudder with Lead and the rest of the ship with Cartridge paper laid on a hoot Coat Smooth and a Coat over that to keep it fast, and tenn ream of Cartridge paper in store for Careening the ships to lye on again.

Stores and Ammunition as is usuall for a West India Voyager, 5 barrels of Small arm Powder and 6 muskets which I shall have occasion to make use of in the Country above the Common Stores.

I also told his Majesty that my Principle in Religion did not lead me to be a soldier, but in this honest Disigne I was going on if any did Stop me I would defend myself and keep the Ship in order fitt for it.

And I humbly pray that no other than a Paper might be drawn up as to my Fidelity to the King and that I will never use any designe to bring the Roman Catholick Religion or Government into England, and will Sett my hand to this upon the receiving my Commission.

I also did pray for a Power to give Commission in his Majestys name to the Chief of the Natives as I see fitt, knowing that the name of a Commission from the King of England would buoy up their fancyes to assist me on this Gold designe to their power, as also Power to any Englishman, if Occasion be to leave any there, whilst I doe goe on the Plate wrecks.

I also pray your Excellencys to Consider, if I meet any English Vessell, if I do I know it must be a small one, after sollid Gold is discovered, whether I may stop them with me, for if I lett them goe the News of this runs all the West Indies over and nott be kept from the French as also on the plate wrecks. An Example by Sir W^m Phips, a Bermudas sloop came and saw him on the wrecks, and whilst he came back home four hundred thousand pounds was fetched by settlers in America. And also upon further discovery of these rich wrecks, if I see it worth while and for fear of loosing it by the French and others, that may be considered of and that further strength may go out with me from any of ye Colonnyes where our Men of Warr are.

And I humbly Pray leave in my orders that I may go outwith the ship myself to go into the Mountains on the Discovery of Gold if I find none within the Barr of the River, and that I may use my own Judgement in proceeding in the said Discovery of Gold or Silver as to matter of rivers I see Convenient and provisions to bring me away. But first by God’s assistance I will see the Ship in a good road and leave the Lieutenant in Charge.

Because the Winter is coming on there, that little work will be done on the plate wrecks by reason of bad weather, that I may use my own discretion to goe and come between the place of the Gold and the wrecks, as I see things do answer, or go in and harbour in any of the English Colonys, and orders to the Governors to send home advice boats with all hast if I see things answer, and that they may provide me with all necessarys.

I do promise to be carefull of his Majesties Stores and so spend my Time with all Diligence in this Business.

All which is humbly submitted to your Lordships Consideration

Richard Long.

Article I. All officers, soldiers and others, who at present are in the said Fort, or belong to the said colony, may freely repair aboard their several ships by which they came hither, with colours flying, and drums beating, together with all their arms and ammunition, and with all their goods and provisions.

II. To this purpose there is granted to them, the space of 14 Days to wood and water in, and that their ships may be in readiness to sail.

III. That time being expired, so soon as the wind shall present fair, all our ships of what sort soever, with all their warlike furniture aboard, with the rest above-mentioned, shall set sail together.

IV. As much gun-powder, bullets, guns great and small, as shall be judged sufficient, shall be given to every seaman and soldier, and to their several ships for their furniture for their voyage, a defence against whatsoever evil occurrent may befal them, in their voyage from this port toward Britain.

V. All vessels, great or small, that may happen hereafter to come from Britain or elsewhere to this port, upon our account shall have liberty to wood and water, if need be, and to set sail again without any molestation from the Spanish King’s subjects, providing they commit no hostility, and that for the space of two months after the date hereof.

VI. All persons taken prisoners by either party, since his majesty of Great Britain his subjects, did first bring a colony to this place, shall be forthwith restored and delivered up.

VII. That the Indians who have been friendly to us, and conversed with us, since we came hither, shall not be molested upon that account. [It is to be marked here, that the Spanish General would by no means yield to this article about the Indians, although the Ministers petitioned him upon that head: He said the Indians were the king of Spain’s subjects, and he knew best how to treat his own subjects, and if the Indians would keep out of his way, he would not search after them. And he was angry with the reverend Mr Shields, who presented our petition to him, and gave him a short answer, of being too officious, saying to him, Cura tua Negotia, to which he replied, Curabo, and so they parted.]

VIII. That what hostages shall be required, the Spanish General shall deliver, for the more certain performance of the premises.

(Subscribed) PIMIENTA.

1. In consideration of the premises, the officers and commanders of the foresaid Fort St. Andrew, do unanimously deliver up the said Fort to the Spanish General, with all guns great and small, together with all other warlike ammunition, at present therein, and also aboard their ships, except what is expressed in the fourth article.

2. Likewise all smaller arms, excepting those which belong to the officers, and one gun, sword and dagger, to be given to every soldier, with one pistol and sword to be assigned to each seaman, shall moreover be delivered to the Spanish General.—And that the premises may be duly performed, The Commanders of the said Fort, shall within one hour, after ratification of the premises, and after hostages received, expressed in the eighth article, deliver up one gate and one rampart to the said General, to be possessed by thirty soldiers, until the Scots be all got aboard of their several ships.

2. We oblige ourselves that we shall in no wise molest any of his Catholic Majesty’s subjects, either by land or sea, while we are upon our voyage hence toward Britain, providing they do not molest or trouble us.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 160 (2529).)

Unofficial reports which reached this Council some days ago, that six Scottish vessels were clearing for America with the design of settling Aves Island (situated between Cartagena and Portobello, half a league off shore), made it necessary to consider measures it might be desirable to take to check this plan and protect those coasts. Having conferred with the zeal and attention natural in and becoming to its ministers, this Council deemed and decided that the most convenient and effective step was to issue orders to Don Juan Pimienta, governor-elect of Cartagena, and to Don Miguel Cordones, who is to be governor of Darien, and to Don Diego Peredo, commanding the ships which are crossing to patrol the Cartagena coast, to effect that all of them should exercise the care and vigilance demanded by the most important end of preventing the Scots from establishing a footing in those parts.

Later, with the royal decree of the 7th instant, your majesty deigned to hand down a letter from Don Francisco Bernardo de Quiros, in which he states that the six Scottish ships anchored at Saint Thomas Island, with more than a thousand men aboard, bound to establish a colony upon the aforesaid Aves Island, believing that the Darien Indians would help them to maintain themselves in that place.

Today the Conde de Adanero, governor of this Council, advises that last night Don Vberto Vbrek and Don Bartholome Flons, businessmen, called upon him at his residence, with a message from the French ambassador, the import of which was that a vessel arriving at Frankfurt (it cleared from Pitiguas last November), had brought advices that six Scottish ships, outfitted by a strong company formed in that realm for America, had occupied Santa Catalina Island, which is near the Mainland, and intended to fortify themselves and erect a new colony. The ambassador added that they said they awaited reinforcements, in order to cross to Darien, and make further advances, and that he furnished him this news as governor of the Council for Indies, as he would also inform your majesty through Cardinal Cordoba.

Recognizing that this agreement in such reliable reports makes it certain that the Scots have indeed begun to carry out their project, the Council must lay before your majesty the very serious inconveniences which would arise were this nation to establish themselves in those dominions.

If the Scots procure a footing and fortify themselves in the island (which they may be presumed to have done), situated so close to the Main, inasmuch as it may be justifiably feared from the unreliable character and natural perversity of the Darien Indians that they will assist the Scots in their purpose, they can readily spread thence and occupy that territory, since it is contiguous. From this would ensue irreparable damage—even graver than that experienced in regions which other nations have occupied.

Reflecting on the possible, and today imminent, danger which today menaces, the Council proposed and your majesty resolved that a fortification should be erected at Darien, to settle that country and to protect it against occupation by foreign nations. To this end Don Miguel Cordones is going over, advised that your majesty’s purpose and intention is, maintaining that region, to have its gold mines and placers developed. For, although such development was prohibited after 1688, that the bait of the wealth of these mines might not attract the nations of Europe, where report of the treasure they produce is already general, your majesty considered it useful and convenient to encourage their exploitation by Spaniards, by maintaining and defending the province, considering, further, that if it were settled and fortified it would be more difficult for foreigners to occupy, than if they found it uninhabited and abandoned.

But, these measures having not availed to thwart the prejudicial design of the Scots, because there was not time to put them into effect, believing it imperative to apply all means available under existing conditions to forestall danger from this expedition, the Council lays before your majesty’s consideration that:

Since General don Martin de Zavala went to New Spain with three ships and orders to join forces with the Windward fleet, and to command that fleet during the time required to fortify Pensacola Bay, an undertaking assigned to him, the Council supposes this work to be well advanced by now. Even if it be not so, the present contingency and the fact that this force is the most readily available, of good quality, for use against the Scots, oblige the Council to propose that your majesty deign to issue order to Zavala to proceed to Cartagena without loss of an instant’s time, in that port to unite with the ships which are about to clear for Cartagena in command of Don Diego Peredo, in order that, together, they may frustrate the plans of the Scots, and endeavour to dislodge them from the place they may have occupied, and impede their purposes; instructing Zavala that if Peredo’s vessels cannot leave without exposing the city of Cartagena, where they are to be stationed, if he find himself strong enough to attack the Scots, he do so, unsupported, although the Council believes there can be no insurmountable difficulty to prevent Peredo’s ships from coöperating, both because by the time Zavala arrives they will have discharged the merchandise and supplies they carry, and also because the action will presumably take place on the Cartagena coast itself.

To govern this engagement and concerning the manner in which the commanders shall proceed, if your majesty be pleased to agree with the Council’s opinion, suitable orders shall be issued, and the governors of the ports again instructed to exercise the requisite care and vigilance demanded by a matter pregnant with such important consequences for the greater freedom of the natives of America and of your majesty’s vassals who do business there.

Your majesty will provide for the best good of the royal service.

Madrid, February —, 1699.

Council for Indies. 12th February, 1699. Resolved this date. . . . As recommended^[FF] (Rubric). Issued 18th March. Don Martin de Sierralta.

The King

Campmaster General don Juan Pimienta, knight of the Order of Calatrava, member of my Council for War, whom I have commissioned to be my governor and captain general in the city and province of Cartagena.

By a reliable person my Council for Indies has received news that the Scots have outfitted an expedition of five large vessels, carrying many people aboard, for America; and that they have formed a company to go to the islands which are at Darien, within sight of Panama; and that on 5th October of last year, 1698, the said Scots occupied an island called La Concepción, where they have begun to build a fort, and that they intended to erect four more; and that as soon as ten vessels which were being made ready in Scotland should arrive, they would seize the other islands; and that along the water route to Panama there were various pirates.

The said my Council for Indies having deliberated with the consideration due to the gravity of this matter, I have desired to transmit this news to you, and to order and command you, as I hereby do, that immediately upon arrival in that place you be particularly alert, and watch that neither the Scots with the said expedition nor any other nation, or pirates, effect any invasion of that place, or of any others upon its coast, in view of the advisability of preventing these occurrences because of the grave detriment they involve to my dominions and vassals. You will acknowledge receipt of this dispatch, and will report to me whatever action, by virtue of it, you may take, and whatever may happen in respect to the foregoing matter. . . .^[GG]

Sent to the governor of Darien.

17th February, 1699.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-22. Condensed translation.)

Having learned privately that a squadron of six good ships was being formed by the Scots with the intention to colonize the island of Las Aves, situated between Cartagena and Portobello, half a league from land, orders to avert this danger were given as follows:

Campmaster General don Juan Pimienta, now appointed Governor of Cartagena, Don Miguel Cordones, Governor of Darien, and Don Diego de Peredo, Commander of the fleet patrolling the Cartagena coast, all were ordered to keep the vigilant watch which the importance of the matter required in order that the Scots should not land at that place. Later it was learned that six ships had stopped at the island of Saint Thomas and carried over one thousand men with whom to establish a colony at Las Aves to be aided, they expected, by the Darien Indians. The news has been repeated that, as a matter of fact, the Scots have occupied the island of Las Aves or Santa Catalina planning to settle at Darien.

Bearing in mind the serious troubles which would result if that or any other nation were allowed in this place, which for important reasons must be safeguarded, I have determined to order that immediately upon receipt of these instructions (whether the work of fortifying the bay of Pensacola be finished or not) you shall proceed to Cartagena without a moment’s loss of time with the fleet which you took out from Spain and those which have been added to your command from the Windward fleet. At Cartagena you will join the vessels there, which you should find ready to set sail under the command of Don Diego de Peredo. By the union of these forces you may be able to thwart the designs of the Scots and should try to dislodge them from the place where they may have settled and oblige them to abandon their mischievous intentions. If by chance the vessels of Peredo cannot with safety be spared from Cartagena you will conduct the operation alone. It is probable, however, that there will be no difficulty in securing the coöperation of Peredo’s ships, because when you arrive at Cartagena, they already will have been discharged of their cargoes of merchandise and ammunition and the proposed action will not be any great distance from Cartagena. Notwithstanding the gravity of the present situation and that the greatest discretion is required, your record for bravery, zeal, and wise direction, gives me certain assurance of the success of this expedition. To aid you my Viceroy of New Spain, Campmaster General don Juan Pimienta, and the President of Panama, all are advised of these instructions and are directed to help in every way necessary to accomplish the desired end.

You will inform me of your receipt of this dispatch and of whatever you may do in carrying out my instructions.

Dated in Madrid the 18th March, 1699.

I, the King

[Signature of the King, of Don Martin de Sierralta, and of members of the Council]

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33. Translated, condensed, and paraphrased.)

Having given consideration to your opinions and those of other officers and to those expressed at a Council meeting which I called at the Palace, and to the just and imperative reasons for giving the aid requested by the President of Panama to drive away Scots, and considering at the same time the King’s orders directed against any other nation attempting to set foot in these seas, I have resolved as follows: the ships of the fleet under your command, and all others which you may think convenient or necessary, shall be made ready, careened, furnished with crews, supplies, and ammunition with all possible quickness in order to execute the orders which I shall send you. These orders, unless something new changes them, will be to exterminate the Scottish pirates for the reasons which have dictated my resolution, the greatest one being to destroy the heresies which the Scots may introduce amongst the ignorant people; to this is added the danger pointed out by the officers that unless this is done it may be impossible to prevent pernicious consequences, such as the Scots taking Portobello, Panama, and passing to the South Sea [Pacific], where by the use of small vessels they can secure larger ones, of which there are many defenceless ones engaged in trade. The experiences of 1681 to 1688 when these coasts were robbed and devastated and the inhabitants ruined showed this to be possible. If this was done by 200 pirates, what may be feared from the 4000 veteran soldiers now supposed to be at Darien, although I believe their ships were incapable of transporting that number.

Neglecting for the moment my warning that these attacks may reach the ports of Perico, Guayaquil, and Paita and all southern points, and with their forces augmented by negroes and mulattoes so that they may have the intention to possess Callao and Lima, although by reason of it being difficult this may not be attempted, there yet is not a coast which they may not infest, not omitting the Philippines, Guadelajara, Acapulco, and several others, many of which are defenceless and open to unforeseen attacks; nor is there any way to prepare them, nor money to fortify them. . . . [He refers to the possibility of the Scots receiving aid from Jamaica and to the fact that their possession of the Isle of Pines gives them, according to the maps and reports of experts, a harbour capable of receiving large warships, which can be used as a base]. . . . Their ships can prevent supplies from reaching Portobello and seize vessels sent from Cartagena, Cuba, and Panama, can interrupt the traffic in the Chagres River, landing easily at many places, reaching the mines at Rancho Viejo, and descend the rivers to the South Sea, seizing the ships from Peru as did the Pirate [Morgan] in the many years he haunted this coast. . . . [He reiterates his warnings and instructions to carry out his orders in regard to preparations but directs Zavala to call a council of his officers, attendance at which shall be obligatory and at which each officer must express his opinion by voting, as it is important to have the advice of trained men, and he realizes his own inexperience; he is somewhat troubled too by the necessity to protect themselves against the French. In an additional memorandum he reviews at length the difficulties of the situation, and suggests the need to send one ship to help the garrison at Pensacola, which ship might be dispatched by way of Havana with orders.]

Attested by Marzelo Bloc as a copy of a letter sent by Don Sarmiento de Valladares, Conde Moctezuma, Viceroy, Governor and Captain-General of New Spain on the 28th March, 1699, to General don Martin de Aranguren Zavala at Veracruz.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 162.)

Sire

By letter of 15th December (forwarded with others aboard your majesty’s schooner Comboy, stationed at Portobello, which dispatches I sent as far as Havana by Commissary General don Andrés de Silva, who was there to negotiate conveyance to that court), I informed your majesty of all news acquired up to that date. From these advices your majesty will have learned of the amazing event of the Scottish settlement in the province of Darien, in the locality called Zamora Inlet, or Rancho Viejo; and of my correspondingly great anxiety.

Among other determinations reached by this royal accord for the defence of the province of Darien (so essential a portion of this realm, since by way of that province at different times pirates have crossed to the Pacific, from which incursions have followed so many hostilities against the kingdom of Peru and against this Mainland), one of the measures selected was to send to Cartagena a royal provision ordering the general commanding the Windward fleet, Don Andrés de Pez, knight of the Order of Saint James, to proceed with his fleet to the city of Portobello, to confer on the best means to check the fortification and settlement upon which the Scots were engaged, expelling them from that region.

With his fleet the general reached Portobello the 16th of last January, and a few days later crossed to this city, where he conferred with the ministers of this royal audiencia and with me, concerning the small number of vessels of which his fleet consisted. They were only four, and of unequal strength. The pilot-ship^[HH] and another were unseaworthy, because they leaked badly and needed to be careened before they could put to sea. This careening would take to the end of April, although it was begun at once, the appropriation for this kingdom meeting the expense. From these revenues also daily rations were provided the fleet monthly (which amounts to more than eight thousand pesos), for the voyage on which the general has been, has been long, since the fleet has visited all of your majesty’s dominions in these parts. It was necessary to relieve both of these necessities, inasmuch as the fleet is your majesty’s and the only defence America has.

From this fleet’s inability to put to sea and its incapacity to proceed, alone, against the Scots, already fortified in the port they had selected, the general’s zeal went on to propose that we undertake some operation by land before they could finish fortifying, and before the rainy season should set in among the mountains. He proposed to bring up a contingent of five hundred veteran soldiers from his fleet, to be incorporated with the further force of men I might be able to raise, these forces to cross through the province of Darien, to sight the enemy, and, if they were found not to have closed up their fortifications, to seek in combat some happy achievement for your majesty’s arms, and for the greater safety of this realm amidst the audacities which these enemies may attempt.

To this, the general’s opinion, I added certain arguments of ours in favour of his proposal, such as that although we might not inflict thorough chastisement upon these enemies, expelling them from their fortifications, we should alarm them and let them know that in this kingdom there was force and inclination to oppose them in the very province through which they must pass, crossing it, in order to fortify themselves on the Pacific coast or get beyond that coast to navigate these waters.

This argument was strengthened by the fact that the Indians of that province have been six months, now, in rebellion, and have done some killing, on which point I informed your majesty by the latest dispatch-boat I cleared. This movement of our arms would terrify the Indians, who would perceive that we have the means to punish them whenever your majesty may permit it, for they have been proclaiming that without them the Spaniards can accomplish nothing.

All these arguments, together, and expressed in private conferences, brought about acceptance of the general’s proposal. Duly signed by both it was embodied in the royal accord, which is that one I remit to your majesty.

The general of the fleet and its captains having come up to this city with the five hundred men, I took two companies out of this garrison, under Captains don Juan de Retes and don Felipe Betancourt. With these and four companies of militia which, by my order, during the preceding three months had been under Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli at a place called Tubuganti (which is near the range which forms the divide between the Atlantic and the Pacific), ready to counter any movement the Scots might make; and with a further lot of adventurers, whom I had been informed would follow me, I resolved to go in person with the general of the fleet upon this enterprise. Having shipped in ten large barks on 9th March, after six days’ sailing we arrived at a place in Darien province called El Escuchadero.

Foresight had arranged in advance that all the canoes on those streams should be assembled together, to transport both men and merchandise, but they were not enough fully to meet either demand. It was resolved that these canoes should carry the stores only, and that all the army should march overland from that place to Tubuganti, although we faced the impossibility of breaking through those impenetrable forests, penetrated only by some few Indians reared in that wilderness, who were our guides. We succeeded by Divine Favour, for the weather was favourable, without rains. Having reached Tubuganti and joined up with the four companies which I have above mentioned to your majesty as being in that place by my order, we held a review of the entire force, and found that we were very close on one thousand five hundred men.

The stores having now come up by the river (although with gravest difficulty) in quantity sufficient to ration the army for ten days, each man carrying his own subsistence upon his shoulders in certain baskets in that province called motetes, no other means of transporting it being available, we began the second march, to cross and pass the range.

We had first to cross a river shut in between cliffs and full of boulders. We could not avoid it, and had to march through the actual bed of the stream. It took two days and the men were much knocked up, because of the weight of the supplies with which they were burdened, to which was added that of muskets, arquebuses, and rifles, of bags of shot, and fifty balls which each soldier carried loose. The most lamentable part of it was the men fell frequently, which wet the food they carried.

We came to the end of the river, which is at the foot of the southern slope, and despite the fact that the men were much exhausted, lest the subsistence give out entirely, at dawn next day we began to ascend the range, which is extremely impenetrable, both because of the height of the mountains and also because of the precipices encountered at every step. We mastered it in that day’s march and reached a very marshy place, only two leagues’ distance from the enemy’s settlement.

Although that night various mishaps befell the army because of the hardships undergone (I myself experienced one in that I was struck speechless), we issued orders for the following morning. We had been warned that the enemy had laid ambuscades in certain narrow places. The report that we had been perceived was confirmed by the fact that all that night, from vespers on, the enemy fired his artillery at regular, timed intervals.

At midnight it began to rain so very heavily that a stream on the banks of which we were encamped, rose (the cut being very deep), so that certain shelters, made of the leaves of trees, which had been erected to protect the men from the night-damps, were carried away by the river. This rain lasted three days, during which period we were held up, and even doubted our ability to survive, for all the subsistence was wet or eaten up, and we feared that other supplies could not be brought up, by negroes, on their backs, who might be unable to advance up the first river, on the other side of the range. Our fears were justified, for, although a hundred negroes arrived on the second day with biscuit and cheese (all wet), these carriers were half drowned and had lost their lances.

All the captains and other officers having set forth the extremity of our position, unable either to advance over the intervening distance to meet the enemy or accomplish anything when we should encounter him, for all the arms and munitions were wet, it was resolved to choose the lesser of these two dangers, in order not to sacrifice this body of your majesty’s forces, and we withdrew, through as great danger, which Divine Mercy overcame. Without this Protection it would have been impossible for us to recross the range, or again pass along the rocky river. The fear lest we drown there, which all of us felt, enabled us to accomplish those two days’ march in one, and in six the army again reached Tubuganti, whence we had set out. Here we found some subsistence assembled with which we were able somewhat to fortify the exhaustion of all.

While we were recuperating from these hardships, I received advices from this royal audiencia to effect that a large squadron of English, consisting of four large ships and three small ones, was off Portobello, whither with all dispatch Licentiate don Geronimo de Cordoba, oldest judge of this court, had sent four companies, as reinforcement. This news and the arrival of certain craft which were sent to me, accelerated the movements of the general of the fleet, and my own.

We sent the men overland by the route by which they had come, and in a canoe the general and I descended the river up which the stores had been brought. Counting the windings the river makes, that distance is fifty leagues, they say, and full of dangers and discomforts. We rejoined the army at El Escuchadero, whither the craft sent from this city had already arrived, aboard which in seven days’ sailing we returned to Panama, after fifty-two days’ campaign, the army having lost not a man. Although many of them suffered ailments, none of these were serious.

The service which the general of the armada and all the men of this army have rendered your majesty should be set forth by some person whose obligations and love of that service do not inspire in him, as mine in me, all readiness to sacrifice self in your majesty’s royal service; for the topography of the province and its universal discomfort rendered us all equals in dangers and labour. I regretted only that the least of the hardships we suffered, which would have been combat with the enemy, Our Lord did not vouchsafe us, because of the obstacles His Providence interposed. Although His Power sufficed to overcome these, the shape in which the enemy was fortified made it not easy to dislodge the Scots without a delay of many days, and then with other arms than could be transported across the mountains and through the forests we traversed. But the enemy knows that your majesty’s arms are not dormant in this realm nor agreed to permit him to build his settlement in quietude.

The papers I shall remit bearing upon this matter will justify at greater length all the events I here relate. One document I forward to your majesty, signed by the general of the fleet and by myself, refers to the general’s confidential proposal which I am to report in the secret royal accord. This proposal was as follows:

In the port of Cartagena and in conformity with the peace, a vessel manned by Frenchmen joined the fleet, agreeing with the general to support him in all operations against the Scots. These Frenchmen had the support of all the northern Indians, and of those on Coco River, which is where all the French vessels rendezvous, and they undertook to burn the Scottish ships, or cut their cables, when from Darien your majesty’s army should arrive within sight of the enemy. For this service, provided they accomplished it, they were to have ten thousand pesos. The general agreed to this proposal. I so informed the royal accord, confidentially, and that council also agreed.

During the last march, which I describe to your majesty, being without subsistence, the general received a letter from the Frenchmen. They reported that they were already perishing of hunger, were unable to maintain themselves, were suffering from the heavy rains, and asked him to send them supplies. Having none ourselves, and, because of this and because of the rains, having resolved to retreat, order was sent to the French and also to the Indians, to withdraw. Further, the said French advised that they had been perceived by the Scots and would be unable to burn their ships, but would participate in the battle. These French were thirty-eight in number, and their captain died en route to this undertaking.

I also remit to your majesty minutes of the council of war held, officers present, and their opinions, on oath, that your majesty may be fully informed, pending such time as the main records of this matter (which are very lengthy) may be sent forward by this royal audiencia to your majesty.

Our Lord preserve the Catholic royal person of your majesty as Christianity has need.

El Conde de Canillas (Rubric)

Panama, 6th May, 1699.

. . . Received 19th January, 1700, on the occasion of Zavala’s arrival.

Council for Indies and Council for War in Indies.

Given the gravity of the matters to be considered and inasmuch as they cannot be kept secret (upon which secrecy depends success) if the conference on them transpire beyond the authority of the royal accord, as his majesty (whom God preserve) has provided, providing, further, that in their military aspect the measures that may be considered by the president and the general of the Windward fleet be addressed and proposed to the audiencia, this agreement was reached in conformity with the royal law, in the presence of the said president’s secretary, for the better preservation of secrecy in this matter and because of its gravity, the following points being discussed:

1. First: It having been impossible to carry into effect the resolution of the royal accord to solicit the military support of France, in accordance with the peace treaty as published in this city, this resolution having arisen out of the report that there were ten warships at Pitiguao, which report was dissipated by news the said general had from the French who, in a frigate from Pitiguao, he has attached to his fleet, the said gentlemen (president and general) were of the opinion that this measure selected should be set aside, because it cannot result in any prompt reinforcement of his majesty’s fleets nor contribute to the successful issue of this enterprise within the limited time set, since the undertaking must be carried out in the month of March, or allowing a few days in April, because at that season the rains set in which make impassable the mountains and rivers where the troops must advance which are to move in a body by land in the province of Darien.

2. The second point considered was that this war might be waged by the Windward fleet, this fleet proceeding to the locality and site where the Scottish fleet is effecting its settlement, the president marching with his men through the province of Darien to the same place and site where the enemy is, both forces uniting to close the battle by land and sea.

Against this plan the general set forth the imperative necessity of careening and overhauling the keels of his pilot-ship and the vessel called King David, armament twenty-two guns, which the general captured from the Dutch on this voyage. The president having remarked that the time required to careen these two ships would run beyond the period in which the army could march by land, before the rains set in, as above mentioned, there came up for consideration other impediments to the fleet’s action, and it was found that two hundred more men were needed to man the King David and to complete the crews of the other vessels of the fleet, which has been at sea nearly nine months upon this voyage. Men for this replacement were sought of the governor of Cartagena, Don Diego de los Rios, when the fleet was in that port, who was asked for them in various communications, sent to the president, which are incorporated in the records of this matter. The governor at Cartagena was unable to supply these men, because of the ruinous condition to which the French reduced that city when they stormed and occupied it, the city of Portobello and its forts being also very short of men because of the heavy mortality there.

Further, they considered that if the said pilot-ship and the King David were beached for careening, the fleet would be thereby too much reduced in strength to oppose the enemy, considering the number of the Scottish vessels, their large burthen and their armament of large calibre guns, for, those two vessels being out of commission for careening, the strength of the Windward fleet consists of the flagship and the frigate Guadalupe, it being out of the question to expose them alone to the danger of mishap, because of the stormy west winds which prevail in these months, the rough character of the coast, and, principally and most especially, because the strength of the two fleets would be so unequal, only the said flagship and the frigate Guadalupe being available within the necessary time limit of the month of March, as set, for without careening the other two vessels are unfit to put to sea or to undertake any action.

The danger in which the said two vessels are is imminent, and their need of careening such that even anchored in harbour they must be kept afloat with the aid of two pumps. For this reason, although this royal treasury is without funds, nor has the general any available because of the length of time that he has been at sea, the president and judges of the royal audiencia have solicited money from the burghers of this city, in order that without delay the said ships may be careened immediately.

Next was considered the measure and means chosen by the royal accord in clearing the schooner Comboy of Portobello with dispatches to his majesty (whom God preserve) by a courier who was to leave them in Trinidad, reporting this settlement by the Scots. He was further ordered with the said schooner to proceed to Veracruz with dispatches for the viceroy of New Spain, conveying to his excellency the same news concerning these enemies (that they were establishing a settlement) and request that if the vessels in command of Don Martin de Zavala were in that harbour, his excellency dispatch these with the greatest possible reinforcement to defeat and dislodge these enemies. Further, a dispatch was sent to the governor at Havana, for the said Don Martin de Zavala, if by chance he be in that harbour.

Both gentlemen weighing what immediate effect this diligence might have in case the said vessels should come on, the general said that according to the distance from Veracruz to Portobello, reckoning the time necessary to prepare and to make the voyage, they could not reach Portobello until some time in July. It was therefore considered that they could be of no assistance, for two reasons: first, the president has had repeated advices from the president of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo (which have been forwarded to his majesty), from the governor at Cartagena, and from other sources, which have been incorporated into the records, to effect that the Scots expect another fleet of six large vessels which are coming to join those which are effecting the settlement, and, inasmuch as they have been leaving behind in various of the Windward Islands printed papers inviting and welcoming to their flag the pirate and foreign squadrons and single ships which in large number are off these coasts, it is to be feared that the strength of these settlers be daily increased by this sort of people, and if the fleet of six large ships, which they expect, arrive, the Windward fleet will not suffice to oppose them, even when joined by Don Martin de Zavala’s vessels and what other reinforcement might be assembled in New Spain.

It follows that prompt action should be taken to dislodge these enemies (aside from those afforded by weather and the rainy season, already expressed), lest, as soon as the Scots find themselves strengthened by the arrival of the fleet they expect, or by any considerable number of pirates who may join them, they cross the province of Darien in accordance with the orders it is known they carry, and occupy a port on the Pacific, fortifying themselves there, without encountering in the insufficient strength of the Pacific fleet, the opposition necessary to dislodge them, as the president has represented to his majesty in the communication sent forward concerning this matter. At the same time they would leave their northern front protected with the strength of the two Scottish fleets and vessels of other nations which in all probability will join them from day to day, thus rendering more impossible our defence and their expulsion.

After the repeated conferences demanded by so grave a matter, both the said gentlemen were of the opinion that to accomplish this undertaking with fewest mishaps and greatest likelihood of success, in addition to the assurance which lies in Divine Favour, the said general should come up to this city with five hundred men of his fleet in order with this force, joined with that which the president has raised both in this city and in the province of Darien (both gentlemen having resolved to go in person), to advance with these united forces, in small craft (no others being available in this port), on the province of Darien, thence to continue both up the rivers and across the mountains, to sight the enemy and give him battle according to the state of his fortifications and their plan.

As to the operations to be carried out at the same time by sea, the president will lay before the royal accord in secret other details resolved upon by the president and the general of the Windward fleet; who signed: El Conde de Canillas.—Don Andrés de Pez.

Panama, 14th February, 1699.

Decree.

Let this proposal be laid before the royal accord.

This proposal, and the whole discussion, as referred to it by the president, having been considered, the royal accord arrived at the opinion that the emergency, the existing situation, the period in which the defeat of the Scots must be undertaken, imperatively demand that all the measures set forth in this document be executed, together with those others which the president has communicated to this accord, as expressed in it.

The accord feels that if the effort to eject them from the land is postponed until the Windward fleet can be careened, or relief arrive from New Spain, or assistance come from Europe, the Scots will have received further reinforcement, will have fortified, and, supplied with crops from their own plantings, will have won the Indians to greater friendship and confidence (if these see on our part no demonstration of intention to eject the enemy), and will either have far advanced or accomplished their plan to cross to the south, which would be the total ruin of these dominions.—Don Geronimo de Cordoba.—Don Cristóbal de Ceballos Morales y Borja.—Don Francisco Joseph de Zuñiga. . . . Panama, on the seventh day of May, one thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. . . .

In the locality and place called Gunauca Canti, in the northern part of this province of Darien, on the seventh day of the month of April, one thousand six hundred and ninety-nine, beyond the northern range and one march from the vicinity of Rancho Viejo, where the Scottish enemy has settled, and where the army has been three days detained by heavy rains and flooded rivers which have entirely prevented both its advance and also the transportation of subsistence and munitions, which can be brought up only on the backs of negroes and Indians, because of the extreme roughness of the way; which carriers have also been delayed by the flooded streams, it being two days now that the army has been without supplies, for what each man carried he consumed during the march, and water which got to it spoiled some; despite which grave difficulties that no measure could overcome, order had been given the army to advance that morning, the river upon the bank of which it was encamped having subsided slightly, although the rain had not stopped.

There being assembled in the hut of leaves or palm branches which sheltered the general of the Windward fleet, Don Andrés de Pez, knight of the Order of Santiago, and also his lordship, Conde de Canillas, president of the audiencia, governor and captain general of this kingdom; the governor of the said fleet, Don Francisco Buitron y Moxica; the campmaster of the province, Don Luis Carrizoli; and Captains don Juan de Herretes, don Diego Alarcon, don Antonio Carrion, don Felipe Betancourt, don Felipe Vertiz, and many other persons and gentlemen adventurers from the city of Panama, who came to have a part in this engagement;

All present laid before their lordships’ consideration the fact that, in view of the rigour of the weather, lack of subsistence and of possibility to bring up supplies (because the rivers were swollen in their beds which lie boxed between such rough and wooded hills that it is invariably necessary to travel along their beds), the men having eaten up the rations which each carried with him on the advance, the ailments which the hardship of the march and the dampness of the soil had brought on, and the certain knowledge that the enemy had devoured all the plantings which the Indians had in this northern region, such as maize, and other roots called yuca; to advance was knowingly to subject all the men to danger of death, as well as to other consequences under such circumstances invariably brought on by lack of food.

Further, a letter had been received the previous afternoon from Captain Juan de la Paz, Frenchman, who, by the general’s orders, with others, his companions, was observing the enemy’s movements and arranging other measures in the royal service, as will appear in the secret records of the matter, in which communication he reported that his men were perishing of hunger.

Nevertheless, despite these representations, there were summoned the naval captains, aides, and sergeants of all the companies, that they might report whether the men had any subsistence on which to continue the advance that day, to sight the enemy; and these persons, having returned from the inspection, reported that some of the men had eaten nothing for two days, because nothing could be had in that wilderness, not even wild fruits on which to sustain life.

In view of which representations and inspection made by the said captains and aides and sergeants and that, if the rain kept up, the floods might make retreat by way of the two days’ march down the river entirely impossible, there being danger lest the entire army perish by drowning or from hunger, which was already felt; there being no hope of bringing up subsistence, for the hundred negroes who had arrived had come near drowning, the river having swept away the lances they carried and wet the biscuit, which was not sufficient for one day’s rations, and to return to Tubuganti, where the supplies were assembled, would take the negroes four days and to bring these north, five more, it being quite likely that the rivers might rise meantime enough to cut off all hope of relief.

Their lordships and other members of the council resolved to retreat to Tubuganti, where the army shall halt, awaiting further news of the enemy which is being sought through friendly Indians.

And that these facts may appear to whom it may concern, their lordships ordered this written record and account of them read to the said governor, campmaster and captains, that on oath they may depose as to its entire accuracy, adding whatever they may be able to add in the matter; and they signed it.—Conde de Canillas.—Andrés de Pez.—Before me, Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

And forthwith I, his majesty’s notary, notified and read literally the foregoing writ to the governor of the royal Windward fleet, Don Francisco Buitron y Moxica, and his honour, having heard and understood it, said that, according to public report and his observations, he considers it impossible to bring up supplies by carrier, because it rains heavily day and night and the rivers have risen. As to the statement that subsistence has been lacking for two days, respondent knows this to be true and due to the rains and the rising of the said rivers, since, because of these things, after the order to march had been given, with arms in hand the men were held up, being unable to go forward into the action to which this army is addressed. Further, it is publicly reported that in the vicinity of the enemy there is no subsistence (bananas, maize, or yuca or other indigenous crops) to be had, because the enemy has consumed them. For which reason, and because the negro carriers have just come up with food supplies in such small quantity and so wet that it is not more than enough for this one day, rationing scantily, respondent believes it to be impossible for this army to proceed, or to do anything but retreat to Teguanti [Tubuganti], for otherwise logically the army must perish of hunger, any survivor being unequal to fighting.

During the two days when subsistence was lacking, moved by compassion, respondent was obliged to give what little he had for himself to the feeblest and weakest of the men of his company, in hopes to encourage them.

For which reasons and the others set forth in the foregoing writ which has been read to him, and he declares to be true and accurate, respondent believes it to be imperative for this army to retreat; and this he believes and declares to be the truth concerning events which have occurred, and so swears by God, Our Lord, and by the sign of the cross, which he made with his own hand, according to law. He is forty years old and signed it, to which I bear witness.—Don Francisco Buitron y Moxica.—Before me, Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

And forthwith I notified and read, literally, the foregoing, their lordships’ writ, to Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli in person, who is alcalde de justicia mayor y capitan a guerra of this province, to which fact I bear witness. Having heard and understood it, he stated that all its content is a true account of what has occurred and is occurring, and was set forth in the council of war just held. Despite their lordships’ great zeal, disposition and valour, respondent believes it impossible for his majesty’s army either to maintain itself in its present position or advance, or do anything but retire; to which conclusion all must come who have observed the violence of the rain and of the flooded streams, and the lack of subsistence here and in the region the enemy occupied, whither it is impossible to bring up stores. To other arguments this writ sets forth respondent also subscribes fully. This is the truth and he swears it by God, Our Lord, and the sign of the cross which he made with his right hand, to which I bear witness. He is over fifty-two years old, and signed.—Luis Carrizoli.—Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

Forthwith I, the said notary, served their lordship’s writ literally on Captain don Juan Martinez Retes de la Vega, for his majesty commanding one of the companies of the garrison of Panama city, who, having understood it, said that, basing his opinion upon his knowledge of the armies of Europe and on the experience of thirty-one years through which he has served his majesty, in course of which, in the year 1671, he found himself at the siege of Charleroi, and, in 1674, in the siege of Oudenarde, and, in 1676, in the siege of Mastrique his commanding officers on all three occasions being King William, who at present reigns in England, Conde de Marsi, Duke de Villa Hermosa, and Conde de Souches, general under the emperor; where he saw that, because of continued snowfall during the siege of Charleroi and because stores could not be brought up to the army, it became necessary for the army to retire, abandoning the siege; and during the siege of Oudenarde, in the month of October, because of excessive rainfall and also because of lack of subsistence, the said siege was raised, although the place lay open to attack and the first line of the besiegers was a hundred and fifty paces from the covered way and over two thousand explosive shells had been dropped into the place; and also the siege of Mastrique was raised after breaches had been opened in the walls, the outer ramparts taken and most of the moats filled in; and although the Count de Chambord, general of the army of France, came to the relief, nevertheless deponent heard that the withdrawal and abandonment of said siege was due to the lack of subsistence, for during two days the men had received no bread and the supply trains had been unable to come up to the army.

Considering these aforesaid examples, which respondent mentions because he witnessed them, as soldier, sergeant and ensign present at all three sieges, he recognized upon arriving in this place how impossible it was to go forward with this army, much less to bring any supplies to it, on account of the heavy rains which have fallen steadily for more than three days and three nights, respondent being unable to move from his hut to report to his superiors. Because of these rains, of the supplies brought to this camp from Tubuganti by a hundred negroes, half was lost and most of the other half wet, so that the quantity which was delivered here was enough to ration the army scantily, for only one day.

During which time a Frenchman reached this place, who reported that the country around the enemy was stripped of food stuffs, and its streams swollen; and that for many days preceding he and his company and the rest had been enduring much hardship and hunger, and he very much doubted that this army could advance to encounter the enemy. To attempt to do so would be to risk losing all or most of it. Wherefore, in view of their lordships’ proposal and the aforesaid lack of subsistence and the excessive rains, respondent believes it very advisable for the army to retire to Tubuganti, and this and the rest of its content he lays before their lordships’ high comprehension, great zeal, and devotion to the service of his majesty, who will consider himself well served thereby, since, although on this occasion their persons and army have not been able to serve him, upon another they will afford him many victories, whereas, if a contrary course were followed, not a man can make his way back to Tubuganti; and that this is his feeling and what he offers as his opinion, he declares and swears by God, Our Lord, and the sign of the cross which he made with his own right hand, according to law; and he is over forty-five years old, and signed. I bear witness.—Don Juan Martinez Retes de la Vega.—Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

And forthwith I, the said notary, served and read literally their lordships’ said writ to Captain don Diego de Alarcon y Ocaña, sea and land captain of the Windward fleet, in person, as I bear witness; and, having heard and understood it, he said that the lack of subsistence and the impossibility of bringing it up being so obvious, the continued heavy rains falling ceaselessly night and day, the streams having risen, he finds there is nothing for it but to withdraw the army to Tubuganti, for, unless this is done, the danger of its perishing both from hunger and drowning is plain, and the content of the said writ is all accurate and true, and this is his opinion, on the oath he takes by God, Our Lord, and the sign of the cross, in due form; and he is thirty-four years old and signed, to which I bear witness.—Don Diego de Alarcon y Ocaña.—Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

And forthwith I read their lordship’s said writ literally to Captain Felipe Betancourt, commanding one of the companies of the garrison of Panama city, in person, as I bear witness. Having heard and understood its content, he said that it is all true; and because he has seen and experienced the things it relates, he recognizes that it is impossible to bring up supplies; and even were this not so certain, it is nevertheless impossible to use the arms, on account of the steady continuation of the rains and the swollen streams.

Wherefore he considers it impossible to continue this campaign in the present weather, and it is his opinion that the army return and retire to Tubuganti, where after better consideration their lordships can order as they may then determine to be for the best good of his majesty’s service. This is his opinion and he swears it by God, Our Lord, and the sign of the cross which he made with his right hand; and he signed; and he is forty years old, to which I bear witness.—Don Felipe Betancourt.—Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

And so having read their lordship’s aforesaid writ literally to Captain don Antonio de Montalvan y Carrion, of the Windward fleet under command of the said general, having heard and understood it, he said that its entire content is accurate and true, and what was set forth in the council of war; and that, because of the rains and flooded streams, lack of subsistence and impossibility of bringing it up, and because the army’s weapons are useless, it would be impossible to advance or do anything but withdraw these forces, and in the said council he advocated this withdrawal. He so swears by God, Our Lord, and the sign of the cross which he made; and he signed; and he is thirty-eight years old.—Antonio de Montalvan y Carrion.—Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary.

And so also I served the said writ on Captain don Felipe Vertiz, of his majesty’s navy; who, having heard and understood it, said that the content of the said writ is accurate and true and he refers to it in this, his opinion and deposition; and so swears in form; and he is thirty years old; and signed it; to which I bear witness.—Don Felipe Vertiz.—Juan Antonio de Naua, his majesty’s notary. . . .^[II]

This accompanies dispatch from the president of the Audiencia of Panama, of 6th May, 1699.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33, No. 12. Condensed translation.)

By the dispatches of the 18th March and 30th April, which you should have received, you have been informed of the news received here that the Scots have been establishing settlements on the island of Santa Catalina and another adjoining island, with the intention of passing into Darien. You are informed also of the orders given to dislodge them by the directions given to you to proceed to Cartagena, there to combine with the fleet of Don Diego de Peredo in order to carry out the operation.

Having now learned that the Scots were already intrenched on Golden Island, and also that four French war vessels are on their way to Pensacola, the latter must be put in a condition for defence. Having done this you must proceed without any delay to Cartagena to execute the orders given you, to dislodge the Scots. Realizing how necessary it is to do this before the Scots fortify themselves any further, making your task more difficult, the Viceroy has been advised that if Pensacola Bay is already adequately protected to order your immediate departure. At the same time he is directed that if the fleet which in 1698, under Don Juan Bautista Mascarua, went out from Spain, has not yet started on its return voyage, to detain the two ships and one patache, of which the fleet consists, with such other vessels that may arrive at Veracruz, and those that he has there in readiness, and to use them to assure Spiritu Santo Bay from danger, thus leaving you free to proceed against the Scots, as quickness is absolutely essential.

For deliberation and the greater assurance of proper direction of the undertaking, and to provide for events which cannot be foreseen from here, the Viceroy is ordered to form a council. It is desirable to inform you of all of this so that you may act accordingly, and in carrying out my orders do what is best for the royal service. Of what is done give me an exact report. Dated 13th May, 1699.

[Signed by the King and by Don Martin de Sierralta]

Communicating Message of His Britannic Majesty’s Envoy and Copy of a Letter of Governor Beeston of Jamaica

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 161 (2539).)

Sire

With decree of the 15th of the current month your majesty is pleased to hand down to the council the communication which was delivered to Don Antonio de Ubilla on behalf of the envoy extraordinary of England, relative to the presence of the Scots in the Indies, and to order the council to express its opinion, formulating it with the content of this communication in view.

The text of the envoy’s communication is, in fine, to the effect that he has orders from the king, his master, to lay before your majesty’s royal comprehension that it was without his approbation that the Scots crossed to settle on the Mainland; that, on the contrary, when he came to suspect such a purpose, and that they sought to attract the Hamburgers to their support, the British king ordered his resident at Hamburg to address notes to the senate to the end that they might not favor the Scots, because their design had not his approval. And that he took the same step in London, where the participation of English merchants had been solicited, in that he declared any English who might participate in this enterprise to be enemies of the country.

The envoy states that despite these preventive measures taken by the British king, and that he dismissed the promoters in Scotland from office, the Scots did not desist, but cleared with four vessels, which they managed to outfit secretly. He adds that upon receipt of this news the British king sent orders to the governors of the plantations he has in those parts, forbidding them all communication with the Scots, and that the intent of the English is proven by the copy of a letter which he presents, written by the governor of Jamaica, in which he informs the governor at Cartagena of the purpose of the Scots. This envoy sets forth that although this nation is subject to the British king, it is nevertheless distinct from the English and that the English are in no way their accomplices nor have any share in the design of the Scots. He declares that he will extend them no help, because he is without orders from the court of England.

The envoy’s communication closes with the consideration that if, even before he received instructions from his king, the governor at Jamaica reported this enterprise to your majesty’s governors that they might frustrate the purpose of the Scots, it is to be believed that after receiving such order he will in future execute it with greater exactitude, for the continuance of the Scots there is as prejudicial to English as to Spanish. And that although it is true that this is a delicate matter, inasmuch as the kingdom of Scotland is entirely independent of the crown of England, precisely as Aragon is from that of Castile, and must, for this reason, be handled with great prudence and circumspection, nevertheless were there any manner in which the ministers of England and Spain might communicate with each other freely, your majesty would be satisfied as to the King of England’s upright purposes, and would realize the goodwill he entertains to preserve the clear understanding and close bond of friendship which have hitherto maintained, and, in particular, suitable means might be concerted to frustrate a design which entails consequences equally pernicious to both crowns.

In view of the said communication from the English minister, and having before it the two enclosed dispatches from the Marqués de Canales, dated 13th April, (which were covered in the latest opinion, sent up on the 9th instant), the council recognizes that the note which the secretary for state of the British king handed to Canales is in tone and accord with that delivered by his minister here, and that its terms are drawn to exonerate that king from responsibility for the insult of the Scots at Darien, when the contrary is suggested by the fact that the expedition was raised by virtue of his consent, as appears from information transmitted in one of Canales’ two letters.

No matter how they may seek with plausible appearances to disguise their intentions, these are revealed in the manner and in the words with which Secretary Vernon delivered the note, for the purpose is no other than that the crown of England shall occupy new provinces in America, violating the solemn engagement of the peace treaty entered into with that crown, as has already been demonstrated in the manifest infraction of it involved in the occurrences at Darien. And although they seek to make it appear that the Scottish nation is distinct from the English, and that the latter are not accomplices nor have any share in the guilt, because the kingdom of Scotland is entirely independent of that of England, as is the kingdom of Aragon of the crown of Castile, this is unlikely and unconvincing, for when a peace treaty is negotiated it is binding upon all the kingdoms comprised under the crown, none of them being excepted from the obligation of its inviolable observance, as is true of Aragon and of all your majesty’s other kingdoms and dominions.

With respect to their having intimated to Canales’ secretary that they are pirates who have carried this operation into effect, the council is of the opinion that it would be well to give the British king to understand that if this is true, and they are proceeding contrary to his intention, he is under obligation to apply the remedy suitable to correct and punish their aggressions and drive them out of your majesty’s dominions; and that when your majesty shall see this done, and observe that he prevents relief from being sent to them, then your majesty will feel less disinclination to believe that he desires to maintain amity and good relations between the two crowns, wherefore your majesty trusts that he will make this desire manifest, and that your majesty on the other hand will take suitable measures to defend those dominions.

As to the point which Envoy Stanhope raises in his communication, that were the ministers of Spain and England to deal freely with each other, your majesty would be satisfied, the council does not enter into discussion of it, because it lies outside the council’s competence.

In this connection the council again entreats your majesty to hasten the conclusion of work on the four ships which are destined to the fleet, in order that with the royal flagship they may cross to the Mainland with the galleons, for with this reinforcement and the measures taken in the orders which go forward with the dispatch-boats, the designs of the Scots may be opposed and the enemy defeated at Darien. So also the council begs your majesty to deign to reserve the revenues which remain available in Cadiz to meet the expenses to be incurred in manning these with infantry and seamen, and in supplying subsistence, munitions and other things necessary to them, for if this be lacking all will be brought to naught, and the Scots at Darien cannot be exterminated.

Your majesty will act for the best good of the royal service.

Madrid, 16th May, 1699.

Council for Indies. 16th May, 1699. Resolved this date. . . .^[JJ] Don Martin de Sierralta.

Alexander Stanhope, envoy extraordinary of the King of Great Britain, has orders from the king, his master, by all possible means to bring to his Catholic majesty’s royal comprehension, with respect to the Scots who, it is reported, went to establish a settlement on the Mainland in the West Indies, that this scheme not only had not his Britannic majesty’s approval, but, rather, as soon as he suspected such to be their purpose, and that in Hamburg they were seeking to attract Hamburg merchants to their support in order to increase their capital, his majesty issued explicit and suitable orders to his resident in that city, instructing him in his royal name to send a note to the senate, setting forth that the design of the said Scots had not his approval, and that he would be well pleased if they would not favour it; which measure dissipated the hopes of the Scots in Hamburg. Similarly, in London, before this, when they solicited the support of English merchants, they were opposed, parliament declaring any English who entered into this enterprise to be enemies of the country.

Despite these measures and the fact that his Britannic majesty deprived of their posts two ministers, the most prominent in the kingdom of Scotland, because they had promoted this project against his royal desire, the Scots did not desist, but, finding means among themselves to equip three or four ships, put secretly to sea in the summer of last year. When his majesty learned this and that they had appeared at the island of Saint Thomas, in the Indies, immediately he dispatched royal orders to all the governors of his plantations in those parts, prohibiting all communication with the Scots and forbidding that any relief or assistance be afforded the latter, for, his majesty having been ignorant of that design, could not approve it.

The spirit of the English is plainly shown in the copy of a circular letter which the governor of Jamaica wrote to the governors of his Catholic majesty’s provinces. Even before he had as yet received the above mentioned orders, he wrote them the said dispatches of his own volition; therefore it is to be supposed he will henceforward execute his majesty’s orders with greater exactitude, for if the Scots succeed in establishing themselves in those parts it will be as prejudicial to the English as to the Spanish.

It is true that the matter is a little delicate, for the kingdom of Scotland is entirely independent of the crown of England, in the same manner that Aragon is independent of that of Castile, and for this reason it must be handled with much prudence and circumspection. Nevertheless, were it possible for the ministers of England and Spain to communicate with each other freely, his Catholic majesty would be satisfied of the upright purposes of his Britannic majesty and of the goodwill he entertains to preserve in the future the clear understanding and close bond of friendship which have hitherto prevailed, and, particularly, there might be concerted suitable means to frustrate a design which entails consequences equally pernicious to both crowns.

Paragraph from a letter written by William Beeston, governor of Jamaica, to Don Diego de Rios, governor at Cartagena, dated 31st December of the past year of 1698. [Translated into English from the Spanish text.]

This opinion of 16th May was in his majesty’s hands when that of the 19th of the same month went up; and it came down enclosed in that of the 19th, without decree, because it is covered by the latter.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 160 (2538).)

Sire

In another dispatch of this date I inform your majesty concerning this fleet’s voyage up to 16th January of the current year, when it anchored in this harbour; and I now continue with other matters bearing on the defeat of the Scots who are settled at Darien, events to which I gave commencement by writing to the president of the Audiencia of Panama as a first step to requisite action. I informed him of the condition of this fleet, that with knowledge of it he might resolve upon the best course, as your majesty will deign to have seen in the attached copy. Its condition determined that the fleet remain here.

Desiring by every possible hour to hasten discussion of the plan on which we were to act, I crossed to the city of Panama, where I conferred with the president and the judges of that royal audiencia.

It was resolved to wage the war by land because this fleet was too weak to attack by sea, inasmuch as it was necessary to have the frigate Nuestra Señora del Rosario, pilot-ship, and the Dutch hulk careened at once, for they were leaking badly; and because, furthermore, this campaign must be carried out during the dry season, since, once the rains set in, in those districts it would be impossible for the men to march overland, or to bring up subsistence and munitions. For which campaign I offered to furnish five hundred men of this fleet, as I did. Having returned to the ships, and detached this number with their arms and munitions, in all haste I led them to Panama.

We set out for Darien on 9th March, having embarked these troops and two companies from the garrison of Panama, who followed their president. He went in person into this campaign. His zeal and activity facilitated the prompt provision of ten barques, in which the men, stores, and munitions were transported. After six days we arrived at a place called El Escuchadero.

Here it was resolved to march to Tubuganti by land, the stores to proceed by canoe by way of inlets, for there were not vessels enough for both men and stores. This resolution was carried into effect, although with difficulty because of the roughness of that terrain. Further, here we were joined by the men of four companies, territorials, who, by order of the president, assembled at Tubuganti. Reviews held showed our strength to be 1500 persons.

During our halt there the supplies came up. Rations for ten days were distributed, that each man might carry his own, because the army had now to advance through very difficult country. For example, for two days we marched along a river-bed, shut in between mountains, where there were many boulders. There was no other way to cross the range. We crossed it with very great exertion, involved both because it was high and also because the men were badly knocked up by the preceding marches, on which, laden with musket, subsistence, and munitions, I assure your majesty that there was not one but fell, and some three and four times, wetting everything they were carrying for their sustenance and defence.

We managed to arrive on the north side of the range, and, having halted in a marshy place, two leagues’ distance from the enemy’s settlement, our men suffered various mishaps, occasioned by the aforesaid hardships, not the least occasion of these being that they marched, for the greater part of the distance travelled, up the river with water to the thigh. This experience not even the president of the audiencia escaped; added to the fact that he had shortly before recovered from an illness, and to his advanced age, it prostrated him speechless in such manner that I thought him dead, but God was pleased that he should recover.

Orders having been issued to proceed to advance on the enemy with the precautions inspired in us by warning we had that they had laid ambuscades for us, at midnight of that night it began to rain with such violence that a stream which was in our neighbourhood rose and carried off the huts which had been erected to protect our men. The rains continued three days, without interruption, which occurrence put us in sad plight indeed, both because our stores had been wet or consumed, and also because those wildernesses are so barren that not even wild fruits are to be found; and, most particularly, because we feared lest the aforementioned river, on the other side of the range, prevent our sending the news to Tubuganti that additional supplies might be sent up by negro carriers. This was accomplished, however, the second day after the rain ceased, when one hundred negroes arrived at the place where we were, having come in obedience to order which had been left with them. They arrived loaded with very wet biscuit, and were voluble concerning the danger of drowning which they had run. They had lost the lances they carried for their defence.

Under these circumstances, the officers set forth the army’s extremity, and that it was not possible to continue the advance, for lack of subsistence and because all the arms and munitions were wet and useless against the enemy. Their statement of the situation having been weighed with as much attention as goodwill, it was resolved to retire, inasmuch as to advance held no promise of victory, whereas by conserving this body of men such might be achieved upon another occasion, more propitious to the best good of your majesty’s service. The retreat was effected with no less hardship or fewer dangers, and after six days we returned to the place called Tubuganti, where there were some supplies which strengthened the men to press on to El Escuchadero, and thence to Panama and Portobello.

Being occupied with the last measures entailed, the president received a letter from Licentiate don Geronimo de Cordoba, oldest judge of that audiencia, in charge of the government during the Conde de Canillas’ absence, in which he reported a squadron of four large English ships and three small ones off Portobello, and that he had sent four companies from Panama as reinforcements to oppose the movements of that squadron.

This news caused me great anxiety, for I had left the vessels of this fleet with only seamen, ship’s boys, and some officers, in small number to oppose the sharp manœuvres which the malice of that enemy might undertake, anxiety augmented by the fact that I had left order for the frigate Our Lady of the Rosary, pilot-ship, and the Dutch hulk to careen. Therefore, hastening our march as much as possible, we returned with the brevity which time permitted to Panama, whence I came on to this port with some men in good condition, whom I was able to assemble. I left it to Don Francisco de Butron y Mujica [Francisco Buitron y Moxica], governor of the tercio, to gather up all the sick and the remainder of the men who, in small groups, were reappearing in Panama. These he was to conduct back to these ships.

I reached Portobello on the 8th May, and of all that has occurred since with respect to the English, in a separate dispatch I report to your majesty, whose Catholic royal person may God preserve many years, as Christianity has need.

Andrés de Pez, (Rubric)

Frigate La Santissima Trinidad, flagship, Harbour of Portobello, 10th June, 1699.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-22.)

[Translated abstracts from a letter relating to fortifying the bay of Santa Maria de Galue (Pensacola), the arrival at Veracruz of the fleet under Zavala, the preparations for an expedition to Darien, and the orders for the return of the fleet under Mascarua to Spain.]

. . . On the 18th November of the same year (1698) the ships under command of General Zavala arrived with your majesty’s orders to me. . . . I called a council meeting to decide what Zavala should do, as reported elsewhere. . . . There were considered the reports sent to me by the governors of Havana and Caracas, confirmed even more specifically by the President and Audiencia of Panama, that there were at Playon and Isla de Oro, in Darien, four Scottish ships with 4000 men with intentions of settling that place; that there were six other ships with 6000 men waiting to reinforce the enterprise, a ship having come to me with this information. . . . [There follow details of the opinions expressed at the council meeting, etc., which are repeated in a letter dated two days later (Appendix XXI).]

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33.)

[Translated condensed abstracts from a letter of the viceroy to his majesty, giving an account, with orders issued, of the steps taken to send General Zavala to exterminate the Scots at Darien.]

The governor of Caracas in a letter of the 11th November, 1698, informed me that four Scottish ships had passed along the coast, believed to be bound for, with the intention of settling, Golden Island. This news has been confirmed by letters from the governor of Havana of 14th January, this year, communicating the testimony of some seamen, that these ships went to Golden Island prepared to settle and fortify the place, carrying material and tools for the purpose. Realizing the gravity of the situation, a council meeting was called before which I laid the plans I had proposed to thwart the Scots from whose designs pernicious consequences might result. With the approval of all of the council I resolved to send the three ships under command of General Zavala, together with other and privately owned ships which were in the port of Veracruz, against the Scots. This to be done without loss of time after necessary careening and preparations.

During the execution of these orders a vessel arrived with a dispatch from the president of Panama confirming previous news and adding that there remained five Scottish ships off Rancho Viejo with 4000 men and to be followed by six other ships of great size carrying 6000 men, the purpose of the latter being to fetch needed arms, ammunition, and cattle, in order to make more certain the fulfilment of the intention of the Scots to settle and fortify Darien. The information had come from the president of Santo Domingo.

In view of this news I reiterated my instructions in order to expedite the preparations. At this time Don Andres de Arriola returned from Santa Maria de Galue [Pensacola] bringing me the news that the occupation of that place had been so successfully accomplished that three French ships and two ketches, under the Marquis de Chater Motant, which had arrived with the intention of taking possession, had departed without attempting hostilities.

Although the necessity to help exterminate the Scots had been realized by me when the news about them came from the governors of Havana and Caracas, confirmed by the president of Panama, yet the arrival of the French at Pensacola made it questionable against which the first efforts should be directed. By a majority of votes at council meetings held here and at Veracruz, the recommendation was to proceed against the French before attacking the Scots. Although not myself convinced by the reasons given, I yielded my judgment to the greater experience of the military commanders, and it was decided that the fleet should go first to reconnoitre and, if found, to drive away the French fleet, which some however thought had sailed for Mobile. To me this seemed an uncertain expedition and to delay unnecessarily the stopping of the damage which was being done by the Scots at Darien. Time would be expended uselessly which ought to be employed to effect a junction with the Windward fleet, then supposed to be off Portobello. This united force, with its combination of trained and new men could more effectively deal with the French after the Darien expedition than before.

In the meantime to determine whether the French intended to occupy any coast places, I dispatched a small vessel to reconnoitre and return with the news. By this means I hoped to avoid the risks occasioned by delays, including that if the enemy should pass to the South (i.e. the Pacific coast) ships could not be built there capable to expel them. All of these considerations made me hold fast to my own convictions, but being unwilling to take so great a risk on my single judgment, I yielded to the opinion of the greater number and postponed the campaign against the Scots, and sent orders to this effect to General Zavala. Acting alone I decided that the large merchant ships could not be adequately manned for reconnoitring the coast and that on account of the shallowness of the bays the ships could not enter them; therefore I directed that this reconnoitring should be done by the smaller vessels then in Veracruz, accompanied by the ships under General Zavala adding your majesty’s order to return to Spain by March. This plan gave me less discomfort than it had because news came from the General of the Windward fleet that instead of 4000 Scots at Darien, requiring a most powerful fleet to expel them, there were 900 only, for the driving off of which the fleet here was not needed. Thus it was proper to permit the fleet’s return to Spain and the expense here was spared. After this there came by way of Guatemala notices from the General of the Windward fleet advising me that he had been called to Portobello by the president of Panama for aid against the Scots, and that without his help and that awaited from me, he would not be able to drive them out. This added strength to my previous decision to seek further reports, which I received from ports and islands to Windward and from Jamaica. From the latter, the negro-commissioner, Don Santiago del Castillo, reported that the rumoured settling of the Scots was without patent or authority of King William and that the Captain of an English warship, which had arrived at Cartagena (said to be the detached flagship of a squadron) had confirmed this and said that his King desired to preserve good relations with your majesty, maintaining peace, and that the Scots had come without license. The English captain had stated that his orders had been that if the Scots had not settled he was to prevent it but if already settled he was to do nothing until he had reported to his King. . . . [Refers to reports on other matters.]

In view of these various advices I called another meeting of the Council in order that it might be decided what should be done for the best service of your majesty. It was decided, what personally I had always considered best, to dislodge the Scots, as the expedition against the French, who could do less irreparable harm, was not so important. I issued the orders necessary to carry out this unanimous decision, directing General Zavala to depart with the greatest speed, sending him recruits of infantry and drafts, so that without awaiting further advices from me he could sail with all the ships he should choose from amongst those in port.

He was authorized to take without limitations, supplies, ammunition, and artillery from the naval stores, and without the customary payments. All of this I had arranged previously at Veracruz so that he could not find pretexts to delay the departure of the expedition, the success of which, in my opinion, he could secure, in combination with the Windward fleet waiting for him at Portobello. According to my information the Windward fleet had 750 veteran soldiers and that 1500 men might be gathered easily in Panama, Portobello, Chagres and other places, in addition to over a thousand negro and mulatto lancers, valuable in the event of a landing for both their courage and knowledge of the country.

The most accurate news which I received from the General of the Windward fleet stated that the Scots number 900 men and three women. The ship which they sent for supplies had been lost at Cartagena, and that to get them from Scotland will require at least six months. Therefore we must trust in the mercy of God who will aid our arms, inasmuch as they are now without doubt superior enough to dislodge the enemy and seize the ships at the Isle of Pines.

The principal reason for hurrying the departure of the fleet was because if we could defeat these pirates on land and sea before the arrival of their reinforcements, which they expect, we can deal with the latter with greater certainty when they arrive, whilst if united their defeat would be more difficult . . . [refers to a report that the number of Scots had lessened, with relatively unimportant comments]. . . . I called a council meeting on the 19th May reporting the men and vessels prepared for the expedition, which was composed of three ships under General Zavala, two fire-ketches, two light pataches (well manned and armed, capable of transporting ammunition and supplies) and all other warships of 18 he should choose to take, and which by my orders were detained in port. To these would be added at Havana the registry-ship of great tonnage and carrying 56 guns . . . [discussion of Zavala’s wish to include in the expedition the large cargo-ships which were planned to return promptly to Spain, and concerning the gathering and impressment of seamen and soldiers with arguments and figures purporting to show an ample supply of men for all purposes including enough to reinforce the Windward fleet and replace those dead or deserted]. . . The officers who have had exclusive charge of the royal revenues and payments, without interference by me, for this expedition and moneys sent to garrisons by your majesty’s orders, now assured the council that they had no money with which to provide the fleet. This notwithstanding that I have turned over to them all revenues that have come in from mercury, tributes and all other tariffs . . . [a long account of regarding reasons and causes for both detaining and dispatching the fleet, the cost of preparations and particularly how much this cost has been lessened by his constant care. He relates the measures taken to secure certain reimbursements from the treasuries at Guatemala, Panama, and Cartagena. . . .]

After orders had been given to have the ships depart speedily, and whilst waiting for notice of the date of their sailing, General Zavala informed me by letter of the 31st May, that on account of the epidemic which had broken out, he lacked many men. To this I replied that there was no reason to defer his departure as he could replace what was needed from the cargo-ships, leaving them those actually essential . . . for in his hasty departure consisted the accomplishment of the undertaking. I asked him to advise me by the same post by which my letter reached him, of his departure on his voyage and concerning his ships and crew.

Whilst awaiting the last word from General Zavala I received a letter from the governor stating that Don Martin had received the sacrament; nevertheless I ordered the payments to the men to continue and all other preparations for departure to go forward. From that date until now I did not receive any letter from him, his accident having prevented it; but hearing that he was better I urged upon him prompt compliance with my orders.

Following this, I received two letters from General Zavala dated 1st July, reporting expenses incurred by the ships, expressing his desires in regard to payments, reporting on the crews and informing me what arrangements he had made with the governor to secure men for him in order to make ready to depart. In view of this, and in accord with the chief of the exchequer and the council, I resolved to thank him for his zeal in the service of your majesty, for the willingness which in spite of his misfortunes, he showed to take his departure to exterminate the Scots, the delay in which had been due to his illness and the causes which had been considered at previous council meetings, . . . [there follows an outline of the explanations and instructions which were now given him as to augmenting his crews at Havana, his junction with the Windward fleet and the expected land forces, etc., together with a definite warning that any further delay in sailing, and the consequences of such delay, will be his fault] . . . for on my part I had given him all provisions, and had aided him as far as had been possible in all that he had asked as necessary towards the desired end. Also I had sent orders for the various officers at Veracruz to deliver to him everything he might need without further requirement than sending to me receipts and records of distribution, so that there would remain no circumstance to afford a pretext longer to defer his departure.

Believing that the most effective means to avoid repeated excuses is to send the boxes and papers of your majesty to Veracruz with orders that the Chief of Dispatches accompany him to Havana, I do so to-day; this being the last dispatch with which these advices are closed.

God protect your Royal Catholic Majesty.

(Signed) Joseph Sarmiento

Mexico, 14th July, 1699

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 160.)

Sire

In my dispatch of 10th June, I reported to your majesty on the condition in which I found myself in that harbour, awaiting news from New Spain, as appears in the minutes of the council of war which I enclosed therein.

The schooner which was expected arrived with advice from Veracruz that Don Martin de Zavala’s ships were making ready to reconnoitre the north coast of the Gulf of Mexico first, and then proceed to this city to take part in the operations against the Scots. This, as was pointed out, was a matter of considerable time; and this fleet could not assist without thoroughly careening its vessels. This work could not possibly be done without funds and equipment not to be had at Portobello. In view of all which and that the president of Panama offered me only the men’s daily pay, I asked him to advance me twenty thousand pesos on which to come up to this port to take over the ships in command of Don Diego de Peredo, which were hourly expected, with them to proceed to Darien to defeat the Scots. This proposal was so timely that immediately I got news that the said ships had anchored in this port, on receipt of which and of the said money, which the president remitted, I set sail and entered this harbour on the 10th instant.

While I was engaged in preparations to clear upon this enterprise, seven Spaniards reached this city who had been prisoners of the Scots at Darien. They deposed that the enemy had abandoned the place they had occupied and fortified, and retired to New England, because of the great anxiety occasioned them during the seven full months that this fleet remained in their vicinity, making war upon them both by sea and also by land, and by its having come to this port to assemble greater force, of which they were informed. This fear, added to certain lack of subsistence they suffered and sicknesses which came upon them, moved them to the aforesaid resolution.

To make more certain, a bergantine was sent to Darien to reconnoitre that locality, during which interim I went out to reconnoitre the coast west of this port. Outside I met the said bergantine as it was returning from carrying out its mission. An officer who came aboard this flagship made the deposition, original of which accompanies this dispatch. This news determined me to withdraw to New Spain, whither I set out to-morrow, after having spent fifteen months upon this campaign.

And there remains not one of your majesty’s dominions here in America, that has not seen your majesty’s flag bringing them all succour possible. In this period my seamen and soldiers have received only the five general payments made them as they cleared from Veracruz. It has seemed to me advisable to lay these facts before your majesty’s royal consideration, that they may experience the effects of your majesty’s benignity upon opportunities which may offer for their advancement in service of your majesty, whose Catholic royal person may Our Lord preserve as Christianity has need.

Andrés Pez (Rubric)

Frigate La Santissima Trinidad, flagship, at anchor in Cartagena harbour, 26th July, 1699.

Aboard the frigate La Santissima Trinidad, flagship, at sea off the port of Cartagena, on the twenty-second of July, one thousand six hundred and ninety-nine.

There having come aboard of her Captain Juan Delgado, burgess of the city of Cartagena, in command of a bergantine cleared from said port for Rancho Viejo to examine and report if it is true that the Scots have abandoned the settlement they had made there, Don Andrés de Pez, knight of the Order of Santiago, captain general of the Windward fleet, ordered him to report upon his voyage and to give him what news he might have of service to his majesty; which he did on oath which he took by God, Our Lord, and by the sign of the Holy Cross which he made with his right hand, as follows:

He said that, having left the port of Cartagena on the 11th instant, he steered directly for Rancho Viejo, where he entered on the 15th following; and that, having gone ashore, he found upon the very site known as Rancho Viejo a fortification built of gabions and palisades, with twenty-four embrasures, five of which overlooked the entrance to the port. So also he found some balls, for eight- and for three-pounders, and remains of about a hundred huts which had been burned. He saw graves, which, according to his calculation, were about four hundred in number, two of which, within the fortification, were apparently those of officials.

After he had seen this, he sent a squad of fifteen men into the bush to try to seize persons who might give information as to what the Scots had done there. They brought him four Indians and a Scotsman, from whom he understood that some five weeks previous they had abandoned that place, withdrawing to their ships, in which they cleared for New England to take on subsistence, in order from there to proceed on their voyage to Europe; and that they did this because of the serious lack of food supplies and sicknesses they suffered; and that, in addition to these reasons, their withdrawal was brought about by the continuous patrol which the Windward fleet maintained, and news they received that it was coming from Portobello to Cartagena to join with the three ships which came from Spain in command of Don Diego de Peredo.

During the time he was there he busied himself in burning and demolishing the fortifications, and has no other news to give at present, because he learned nothing more either going or returning. He returned coasting along Saint Bernard Islands and slept last night at Baru Island, having sighted no vessel except a French schooner which is at present in view.

All of which he affirms and ratifies and declares that he is sixty-three years old. He signed, witnesses being Captains Cristóbal del Cauarria [Chaoarria] and Don Joseph de Pestaña, who are reformadoes in this fleet, and the Sargento Mayor don Sebastian de Moscoso, to which I bear witness.

Before me, Don Diego Sigler de Espinosa, clerk of the flagship. (Rubric.)

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33. Condensed translated abstract.)

Instructions and orders to be followed by the General of the guard fleet of the Indies, Don Martin de Aranguren Zavala, with the three ships under his command and others that may join him on the way or at ports where he may touch. These orders are authorized by the General Council Meeting on the 18th April of the present year (1699) because of advices received under date of 24th December, last year, from the president of Panama which stated that the Scots had fortified the bay and port of Rancho Viejo, on the mainland, twelve leagues from Portobello. This dangerous proximity of the Scots has repeatedly determined the council to strengthen the Windward fleet, which was on that coast, by the addition of the ships of General Zavala, in order to dislodge the Scots. As it is my desire that this be accomplished with all possible speed I have given all the orders which General Zavala has requested to provide him with supplies sufficient for eight months’ rations for the troops and for the proper equipment of his ships as well as for their reinforcement, needed because of the losses through illness caused by the climate of Veracruz. For this purpose there has been sent him nearly 500 infantrymen and sappers recruited in this city, Puebla, and elsewhere. Provision was made to cover the expense of careening and repairing the ships. The royal officers at Veracruz have delivered to him, by my orders, such money and ammunition from the naval stores as he required. In view of these provisions I believe the general will be ready to set sail as soon as he receives this order. During the voyage he is to observe the following instructions: . . . [first paragraph relates solely to the issuance of an order by Zavala in regard to men, guns, etc., on each ship and details of the wages to be paid]. . . . The above payments and accounts having been made, the ships shall set sail without an hour’s delay, first invoking the favour of God and of Our Lady, and also of San Bernardo, on behalf of our Holy King, Don Fernando. The course shall be directed to Havana, the flagship to regulate its speed to accommodate the slowest vessel of the fleet so that all may keep together. Upon arrival the general will present himself to the governor of Havana and deliver my dispatches to him. In these I ask for the quick departure of the fleet and state that in regard to the Register ship now there (and which I had ordered made ready to join and strengthen the fleet) that the necessity for it does not now seem so great as before, as late advices from Spain report that three ships under Captain don Diego de Peredo are on the way to Cartagena. Therefore the owner of the Registry ship shall not be forced to join the expedition unless he voluntarily wishes to render this service to his majesty, and is ready to sail without delay. . . . After clearing the port of Havana and entering the Bahama channel the fleet will proceed to Cartagena . . . [details as to lights and signals . . .] it will be possible to anchor near Boca Chica [entrance to port of Cartagena] selecting the place most available for the ships. He will inform the governor of Cartagena of his arrival, who will advise the general of the state of the Scottish fortifications at Rancho Viejo. In order to secure more troops with which to dislodge the Scots the general will ask the governor to join with the general’s fleet the ships under Captain de Peredo and any others available amongst the merchantmen in port. The Windward fleet being at Portobello, there shall be called a council of all commanding officers from the ships and the fortress . . . [details as to the suggested proceedings of the council, caution in regard to preventing aid being given the Scots by the pirates and corsairs believed to use the neighbourhood of the Isle of Pines as hiding places, and instructions as to the Windward fleet, etc.]. . . . The direction of this expedition I leave to General Zavala, as, through his great experience and ability, I have faith in his success in securing which I believe he will be aided by the favour of God, since my greatest desire is to remove from the realms of my Lord, the King, the cancer of heresy . . . [relates to the probable help to be given by the infantry from the garrisons at Panama, augmented, as he believes probable, by aid sent from the South by the Viceroy of Peru].

One must provide for the various accidents which may befall in campaigns of this kind, such as the Scots having received too large reinforcements for our expedition to be able to dislodge them, and that consequently more time than contemplated may be required. In this event if the Windward fleet is not absolutely necessary, it should be, with the approval of the president and military councils, returned to this vice-royalty, with any legitimate seizures it may have made, as there are now no warships to carry to the garrisons of Windward Islands the money needed for their sustenance . . . [gives general authority to Zavala to act in the face of altered circumstances as his judgment directs, and instructions as to the final movements of the ships]. . . .

(Signed) Joseph Sarmiento

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33. Condensed translated abstract.)

General Zavala reports that he had arrived at Veracruz the 25th November and relates in detail his communications with the viceroy in regard to proceeding to Pensacola and the calling of a council of his ship captains. Zavala’s ships were careened for refitting, soon after which he had information from the governor of Havana that the news from Jamaica was that five Scottish ships of from forty to sixty guns each, with a thousand men, tools for building houses and cultivating land, had passed that island bound for a place in Darien called Rancho Viejo and Isla de Oro.

Zavala received orders from the viceroy to join the Windward fleet and seek these ‘disturbers of the public peace.’ He had called his captains together in council and reported the facts as related by the governor of Havana, which had been confirmed by the president of Panama. Zavala reports that the captains of the merchant ships were unwilling to join him in any such expedition, nor could he get satisfactory information about crews, etc. The president of Panama had urged that help be sent before the enemy became firmly rooted and fortified, as it was reported that additional men were to follow the Scots from Saint Thomas where the latter had stopped.

He intimates that owing to delays on the part of the viceroy in giving orders, and to the occurrence of an epidemic, when the peremptory orders came from the viceroy to proceed to Darien, his fleet was so crippled that he could do nothing. However, on the 28th July, with short crews, he left Veracruz for Havana, having received a third order to hurry.

Dated at Veracruz, 28th July, 1699.

(From copy in the Collection at Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, B.W.I.)

Most Illustrious Sir,

Yesterday the sixteenth instant I had news from a Spaniard and some brothers who came from the North that two large ships of Scotsmen, who came as reinforcements, had arrived, and that they are in possession of the fort of San Andres having landed artillery, that they were cleaning up an island to build a castle and have told the Indians that within a month they expect seven more ships; that as soon as they arrive they wish to pass to the Southern Sea and penetrate these lands laying them waste, because now they are not coming to trade but to wage war. As it may be of importance I send on this news for it may arrive before I do. I am leaving here to-day in Captain Manuel’s ship. This is all I have to bring to the notice of Your Excellency whom may God preserve for the protection of this Kingdom.

Real, September the seventeenth, one thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. Most Illustrious Sir, your humble servant kisses your hand.

Luis Carrizoli

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33, No. 2. Condensed translated paraphrase.)

[Marked as received 22d March, 1700] acknowledging receipt of the orders sent by his majesty to General Zavala directing him to proceed to Cartagena, and commenting on the fact that the viceroy had been sufficiently zealous in his majesty’s service to have given such orders before those from the King were received.

Sir:

At the same moment that I sent my dispatches by Captain Sanchez, who sailed on the 6th of this month, I received by a vessel from Campeche (which arrived at Veracruz the 3d) a letter dated 18th March from Don Martin de Sierralta, Secretary of the Royal Council of the Indies, with which by your majesty’s order he sent me a copy of the orders sent at the same time to General Zavala directing the latter to proceed with all of his ships without an instant’s delay, to Cartagena. At that port he is directed to join the fleet under Don Diego de Peredo, and with these united forces to dislodge the Scots from whatever place they occupy. I am directed to facilitate this operation by furnishing all that is needed for the preparation of their ships, giving the matter preference over all other affairs, however urgent, as none can be more important than this one.

Such was my zeal in your majesty’s service that what your majesty now sees fit to order I had already directed after receiving the first news from Caracas and Havana of the Scottish intentions. I had ordered careened and repaired not only the ships of General Zavala but also those of the regular service and the merchantmen in port. I directed the officers at Veracruz to supply General Zavala with the money necessary for his purpose, as I realized the imperative necessity to thwart the harmful designs of these enemies before they had entrenched themselves on the coast . . . [describes in detail the council meetings held, votes taken, etc., all of which appear in other letters in these appendices]. . . . Having received later various advices from the General of the Windward fleet that the number of Scots were 900 only, I again called a council meeting, which, with the latest news before them, resolved to act as I had originally wished, and to send the ships to dislodge the Scots. Having in mind the presence already of a fleet off Portobello, and the lesser number of the enemy than at first reported, I determined not to disturb the convoy fleet (flota) but to allow it to return to Spain, pursuant to Your Majesty’s orders . . . [here follow the renewed instructions to General Zavala to sail, as recited elsewhere, and a statement of the aid given him in recruiting, supplies, ammunition, etc. Reference is made to the epidemic at Veracruz and to the illness of Zavala which delayed his departure] . . . I sent to General Zavala an order, of which the enclosed is a copy, to allow no pretext to delay his departure, making him responsible for any damage caused by his delay, although through my confidence in him delay was the thing which I least expected. By these means I managed to get him ready to sail and the troops paid. This was accomplished on the 28th July, he taking with him the three ships only which were under his command as he decided not to take any of those which I had detained at his request for over six months. Although I had requested him by letters of the 6th and 15th February to suggest to me the points which he considered important for me to include in my orders to him, he displayed such laziness in his reply and preparations for departure, that in order to remove all pretexts for further delays, I sent my instructions to him. A copy of these I enclose for your majesty. . . . From his failure to answer my request, I had realized that it was his desire to depart without my instructions, and becoming suspicious sent them to him on the 26th post haste, having prepared them without the help for which I had asked.

On the same day he sent me a dispatch advising me that he was prepared to sail on the next day, without commenting on these requests and the other orders which I had sent to him. Because of his sailing my instructions did not reach him in port but were carried by Don Diego Sanchez to deliver to him at Havana, where the latter will certainly overtake him . . . [refers to supplies and finances and to details of dispatches received and sent. He refers to orders of his majesty ‘which I received by the latest post arrived at Veracruz 15th August and which left Cadiz 31st May’]. . . .

Joseph Sarmiento

Mexico, 24th September, 1699

(From copy in the Collection at Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, B.W.I.)

Sir,

By a Portuguese store-ship that is leaving here direct to Lisbon I send you this which is the duplicate of the letters that Don Bartholme Garrote’s dispatch-boat, which left here on the 30th August, carries—I can only add now that the diminution of the garrison here, through death and sickness, continues. Therefore if there be provision for this garrison to be one of regular soldiers it is to the interest of your majesty’s service that recruits should come out when opportunities offer, not only of Infantry but of seamen whose business it should be to know how to navigate. The people in the ports over there who man the ships seldom give heed to this, they only attend to passengers, traders to whom they sell or grant the favour of a passage to the Indies and who go off to the places whither their interests have brought them, leaving your majesty’s ships deserted, rendering useless the expenses your majesty has incurred on them and causing the injuries to your majesty’s service that consequently follow of which your majesty is aware from past occurrences.

From Jamaica, by Don Santiago de el Castillo, I have news that one of the ships of the Scots is in that island; the others, I suppose, are distributed in these parts, therefore it would be for the good of your majesty’s service to occupy the place these people abandoned for it is feasible (having mapped it as they did during the time they inhabited it) that they may return with greater strength, especially when the measures that are taken in America to repulse any enemy are so costly and useless, as your majesty will have experienced in what happened at Panama with the Windward fleet and land forces opposed to said settlement of Scots at Darien where (besides there being matters of fact) positive proof will be given to your majesty by the protocols the commanders drew up on useless declarations of malicious person or persons incapable of advising in matters of war, as, among many, one, who states in his declaration that the mountain of El Carreto was mined, whereas the mountain is more than a musket-shot distant from the fort the Scots had, whence the least expert person in the art would infer that it was impossible that the enemy from their fort could be masters of the mines of that mountain or could handle the powder to charge it at the right time and explode it. The impossibilities are so many and are so well known, for even if it were practicable to lay a train or a fuse such a distance it, as well as the powder deposited in the mines would become so damp and wet that the whole thing would be fruitless. I submit this to your majesty as one of the minor things that in this America are wont to block important matters and cause the writing of a great lot of paper to those who direct military affairs.

By the sloop from Panama yesterday, the 2nd of October I received a letter, that I also send to your majesty, from the Marquis de Villa Rocha with the attested copy of one from Campmaster Carrizoli written from Darien in which he informs him (as your majesty will see) that two ships of Scotsmen have returned to the old spot where they had formerly fortified themselves. From the reply, a copy of which I also send, your majesty will see what I have decided in the matter. I have only to add that yesterday I dispatched the necessary orders for the same number of troops to enter this city as I withdrew, until I return from this expedition. I do not exaggerate to your majesty how difficult it is to do this for besides the trouble it costs to drag these troops to anything that looks like fighting your majesty lacks everything here.

I forward to your majesty along with the letters above referred to those I have received from the governor of Pitiguao and the answers I have given him from which your majesty will observe that the governors, and particularly this Frenchman with all his offers and all his compliments, are only seeking a way, be it under the pretext of driving away Scotsmen from Darien (though hard) or of cleaning these seas, to get into our ports loaded to the brim with merchandise.

Don Juan Pimienta

Cartagena—5th October, 1699

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 161)

Madrid, 30th October, 1699

Memorandum of the measures which his majesty has ordered taken for the ejection of the Scots from Darien, according as news has been received concerning their designs and operations.

This memorandum came before his majesty with the opinion of the council for War dated 24th November following.

On receipt of the first unofficial reports that the Scots were crossing in six vessels to settle Aves Island, or Santa Catalina, situate between Cartagena and Portobello, orders were issued to Campmaster General don Juan Pimienta, who was going out as governor of Cartagena; to Don Miguel Cordones, who was to be governor of Darien; and to Don Diego de Peredo, commanding three ships which had been assigned to cover the Cartagena coast, to exercise care and vigilance to the most important end of preventing the Scots from establishing a footing in those parts, for, although his majesty had previously resolved to erect a fortification at Darien to settle that territory and protect it against foreigners, there had not been time to carry this resolution into effect.

It having been learned later that with these six ships the Scots had called at Saint Thomas en route to Aves Island, to establish a colony and fortify themselves at Darien, orders were issued to General don Martin de Zavala, with three ships with which he went to Veracruz in 1698, and with the others constituting the Windward fleet, which he was to command, to proceed without an instant’s loss of time to Cartagena harbour, to unite forces with the vessels in command of Don Diego de Peredo, that, so united, they might block the designs of the Scots and endeavour to eject them from the place which they might have occupied. For the better execution of this purpose, the viceroy of New Spain was advised of this resolution, as was the president of the Audiencia of Panama, and Don Juan Pimienta, and they were ordered to assist General Zavala with everything he might need to carry it out. Further, the governors of ports and maritime points were advised of these plans, that they might exercise the care and vigilance advisable for the protection and safety of those coasts. All these dispatches went forward under date of March 18th.

Confirmation of later news having been received, to the effect that the Scots had occupied Aves Island and intended to settle Darien, the said orders were repeated to General Zavala, to go immediately to join with Peredo’s ships and to dislodge the Scots from the place they might be found to have occupied. The viceroy of New Spain was informed of this resolution, and he was ordered to clear Zavala at once, and to provide him with everything he might require; and, if possible, to add a ship or ships to the fleet, in order that with more robust strength it might undertake this operation. Also, the viceroy of Peru was advised and he was ordered, according as he might be informed of the development of the Scottish scheme, to apply what measures he might deem advisable. So also he was ordered to send forthwith to the Mainland five or six hundred men of good quality, to be at the order of the captain general there, who was to consult the naval officers whether it would be better to use them to strengthen the ships or to send them by the Pacific to Darien. The president of Panama also was advised, and ordered to assist General Zavala as he might require; and he was further ordered to stir up the people of that jurisdiction and of Portobello, that, some by land and others by sea, might coöperate in this campaign. The president of the Audiencia of Santa Fé was ordered in this emergency to send to Cartagena the greatest assistance he might be able to contribute, and, similarly, the other governors were again charged as they had been before, to look to the safety of their respective places.

Presently, on receipt of news that the Scots had made a footing at Darien, new orders were issued to General Zavala and other officers and governors, again charging and urging them to dislodge the enemy from that locality before he could strengthen himself in it.

Because at this time news was received that the French, with four warships, were seeking to settle Pensacola Bay, to fortify which Don Martin de Zavala went over from Spain, the viceroy of New Spain was ordered if Zavala were still engaged in this operation, to order him to finish it before proceeding to Cartagena to join Peredo’s ships; but, if this bay were already occupied by our people and so protected against the French, the viceroy was to have Zavala proceed to Cartagena without delay. In case this bay were not yet fortified, the viceroy was told to assign to this enterprise the two ships and one patache of Don Juan Bautista Mascarua’s fleet, together with any other vessels he might find available at Veracruz, in order that Zavala might be left free to proceed forthwith to Cartagena.

Presuming that the forces which were ordered sent from Peru might suffer some delay because of the great distance intervening, the president of the Audiencia of Guatemala was ordered to raise in that province as large a force as he could, since, because of his nearness and its good quality, this would assure the success of the undertaking; and he was ordered to send these men to Panama with all possible dispatch, and with as many arms and munitions as possible.

The president of the Audiencia of Quito was ordered to support the president of Panama and the governor of Cartagena in this emergency with means at hand, reserving none. And other measures were taken to attract to our support the negro stockades [unattached or fugitive negroes] and Indian chieftains within the province of Darien itself. These are they who have aided the Scots to make this settlement. Moreover, orders have been issued to the presidents and governors in the vicinity of Darien to mobilize as many territorials as possible within their respective jurisdictions, for the defence of the capital places of Panama, Cartagena and Portobello.

All of these orders, so far mentioned, were sent forward in the two dispatch-boats cleared for the Main and New Spain on June 15. Afterwards the duplicates corresponding to New Spain went in the fleet that cleared in July, and those for Peru went in the dispatch-boat which, as is stated below, sailed for the Main on 25th August.

After these measures had been taken, further news was received confirming reports that five large ships and a schooner, carrying Scots, Irish, and Danes, had reached the Mainland coast and Gold Island, that these people had settled and fortified on the Gulf of Darien at a place called Rancho Viejo which is twelve leagues to windward of Portobello, between that city and Cartagena, and that they expected that other vessels from Europe, and that Jamaica would supply them with subsistence and relief.

It was held that to eject the Scots from the place they had occupied, the forces which had been assigned to it and the measures aforesaid, were not sufficient; that it was advisable to augment them with the greatest possible effort which circumstances allowed, in such form as to assure a happy outcome, the certain punishment, and complete dislodgment of the Scots from the site they might have occupied, to which end his majesty deigned to emit and hand down the following decree:

That there should be raised and equipped a strong squadron, to consist of the royal flagship of the Atlantic fleet, four ships of the said fleet which were in Cantabria, and a patache; and two galleons then at Pasajes which were built to be flagship and vice-admiral [ship] of the Indies fleet, any other vessels available to be added to this squadron.

This squadron to be well manned and supplied with everything it might need; in addition to the usual complement of seamen and soldiers, a body of as many as two thousand men to ship aboard, or as many as possible, to constitute a landing force, if required.

This squadron to go forward in command of Admiral General don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete, under whose orders all other naval officers in the Indies were to be.

Until such time as this squadron could be equipped and cleared, his majesty further resolved that a vessel be made ready, to leave at once for the Main with reinforcements of two companies of infantry, a hundred men each, including in this number up to fifty reformadoes, of the ranks of ensign and sergeant, to the end that these might be transferred as required to officer other companies.

Further, that fifty grenadiers and two military engineers be sent, and that Don Jaime Franc, military engineer of New Spain, who is in that kingdom, go also to take part in this operation.

Moreover, that there be shipped in this vessel five hundred flintlocks with their complement of flints, a thousand hundred-weights of powder, two hundred of match, two hundred chuzos [pikes], twenty thousand grenades, and two mortars with a thousand bombs for same, the powder to go forward in a separate vessel, sailing with the ship, in order not to expose the rest of the stores to the danger involved in transportation of powder.

Also, his majesty resolved to authorize the Biscayans to arm privateers for the seas and coasts of both Americas, against the pirate enemies which infest them.

The viceroy, Conde de Monclova, was advised of these measures by dispatch of 15th July of the current year, and the entire enterprise was confided to him in words and phrases expressive of the highest esteem, favour and confidence, which stressed to him the magnitude of the undertaking and promised him full reward for what he might accomplish in course of it. That he might more promptly give himself to this operation he was charged and ordered, upon receipt of the said dispatch to go down to Panama in order from that place, or, as his judgment might prefer, approaching nearer to the more immediate vicinity of Darien, he might issue the most suitable orders to the military to whom he might entrust the operations he might decide upon.

That this campaign might be better carried out and its important outcome assured, considering that it might contribute toward this if those natives were to feel that the count was permanent in his offices, his majesty resolved to extend his commissions for another three years. Corresponding dispatches were sent him, in order that the activity and interest of his military subalterns and subordinate ministers might not grow tepid in assisting and supporting him in that region to which no doubt was entertained but that he would carry with him a great number of people, both volunteers and also relief troops.

And in order that from Lima and other provinces he might be supported with all that he might require for this campaign, he was sent a blank dispatch that he might fill it in with the name of the person he preferred, as most suitable and satisfactory to him, to be governor and captain general of the provinces of Peru until such time as the count should return to that kingdom and resume those offices; and he was empowered to remove this substitute at will, in case circumstances which might arise should make it seem to him wise to replace him.

Considering that for this campaign the count needed military subordinates of rank to assist him in the enterprise, with the same dispatch he was sent three blank patents, one being a commission of campmaster general, another of general of artillery, and the other of field sargento mayor, that he might fill them out if necessary, otherwise not, electing persons of his choice for these three posts; in which election he was charged to bear in mind General don Martin de Zavala, who in his person combined the services and merit of which the count was reminded.

In the same dispatch the count was instructed that all the forces, both sea and land, which might be raised for this operation, were to be under his command and at his order to be used as he might consider desirable. He was told that, as for the naval forces, Admiral don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete would go forward commissioned to command them, under whom, for the duration of the campaign, were to be all the other naval officers in the Indies who should join his squadron, both those of the Windward fleet and others, notwithstanding that these officers might have commissions as generals of the fleet of the guard of the Indies route. In order that in this connection there might be no argument nor any man be lacking in obedience, due orders were opportunely issued, any of which the count, with this understanding in view, might deliver to parties concerned whenever he might consider the contingency to require it.

The viceroy of New Spain was advised of this resolution and charged to furnish the count everything he might demand, without excuse or argument, and with the greatest celerity possible to him.

The presidents of the audiencias and those courts at Santa Fé, Panama, Quito, and Guatemala (although this latter falls within the viceroyalty of New Spain), were instructed to obey the orders given by the count as though they had themselves received them direct from his majesty in person, and, similarly, circulars were issued to the presidents of audiencias and those courts in that kingdom, to obey and fulfil the orders they might receive from him directed toward the successful conduct of this campaign and relating to measures he might deem to be contributory to it.

The president of the Audiencia of Panama was ordered to protect and fortify the castle of Chepo, which is on the south side of the province of Darien, and is the vicinity where on other occasions pirates have entered the Pacific to carry on hostilities, in order to prevent them from entering now to seize vessels frequenting the port of Perico. The count was so advised that, for his part, he might press the execution of this order as issued to the president of Panama.

In addition to the five or six hundred men he had been ordered to send immediately to the Main, and the two thousand to be sent from Spain with the squadron, he was asked to take in his immediate following five or six hundred more, of good quality, since, for the landing which was to be effected, it would be well to have as large a number of troops as possible.

The count was advised that, to judge by the activity and application which were being displayed in the most prompt raising of this relief, it might be expected that this squadron would put to sea in October or early November; that he might anticipate this, for his guidance; and that, if he felt assured that without waiting for it he could defeat the Scots with the forces he might have assembled there, to do so, acting in this respect and all others as his judgment might direct.

As to funds needed both for this campaign and also for the maintenance of the fleet which was to be sent from Spain and of the other naval forces which were to be assembled until such time as the Scots might have been expelled from Darien, and that place fortified along with other points which it might be found desirable to fortify, to avoid in the future other such prejudicial attempts and pernicious molestations, he was vested and empowered with ample authority, according to developments in this very important matter to make use of all revenues which his great prudence and activity might judge most promptly available and appropriate for the defence of Religion and of those vast dominions, exercising this authority without reservation of any fund whatsoever, no matter how privileged it might be, since in a contingency such as this present no exceptions should be made of any, especially when the imminent danger menaced Religion.

Finally, in the said dispatch of 15th July the count was told that for the better carrying out of this campaign, in order that the successful issue which was hoped for might be attained, to his command were confided all measures and resolutions it might be necessary to take, to his discretion being left the manner and form of its conduct, these to be determined according to the condition of things, the terraine, the strength of the Scots, and developments which might occur, since both because of the distance and also because time alters situations, it was not feasible to subject him to positive orders; and even had it been so, these would have been left to his control and decision because of the very high opinion his majesty entertains of his judgment and wise conduct of affairs.

The said dispatch of 15th July, together with all the others therein mentioned and announced, went forward in first original aboard the dispatch-boat which cleared for the Main on 25th August, except that to the viceroy of New Spain which had already gone with the fleet under date of 30th June, wherein, as regards the military engineer, Don Jaime Franc, it was ordered that on receipt of it, he issue suitable order that without any delay Franc should proceed from wherever he might be to Panama, there to engage and assist in the operations which might be undertaken at Darien.

And, providing for the possibility of the count’s death, since it might have occurred by the time these orders arrived, another dispatch was issued, addressed to the viceroy, governor and captain general of the province of Peru, covering that addressed to the count with all these other orders and dispatches, bidding the viceroy open it and carry them out, proceeding with this undertaking absolutely as though it had been addressed to him, with the same authority and liberty which were conceded to the count, without difference or limitation, on the understanding that the viceroy of New Spain had been so advised, and the naval officers who were to take part in it, and presidents and governors of Peru, ordered to recognize him, in case the count should have died.

In separate dispatch of the same date of 15th July, the count was charged to make use of the three aforesaid patents (commissions of campmaster general, general of artillery, and field sargento mayor) only in case of necessity, as advised, and not otherwise, avoiding to make these appointments unless it were imperatively necessary, and returning to his majesty’s hands these three patents, or any of them he might not use; concerning which he was very especially charged, since reliance was placed in his zeal, that, if he found it possible to avoid commissioning officers of these ranks and so to save the royal treasury these salaries, he should not use these dispatches.

In another of the same date precedence in command was determined for military and naval officers who are to participate in this enterprise. It was resolved that, with respect to the naval officers, under Admiral General don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete are to be all other naval officers who are or may be in the Indies, both those of the Windward fleet and also all others whosoever, even though they possess commissions as generals of the Indies route; all these naval forces to be at the order and disposal of the viceroy, Conde de la Monclova, as captain general and commanding officer of this enterprise; or, in case of his death, under the person upon whom may devolve the government of that kingdom, by virtue of the dispatches drawn to cover these contingencies. The dispatch embodying this regulation was sent to the count, and another is ordered for delivery to Navarrete.

For the transportation of the relief which, in the principal dispatch of 15th July, the Conde de la Monclova was informed would go forward promptly while the squadron was being made ready, the ship Nuestra Señora de la Almudena and San Cayetano was bought, along with the patache Castilla, belonging to the fleet, which latter was assigned to carry the powder. These put to sea the 16th of the present month of October carrying all the stores of arms, munitions, and equipment above mentioned, as well as the two infantry companies and another made up of the grenadiers.

Don Melchor Velez de Guevara went, with the rank of campmaster and title of chief engineer of Darien; and the Conde de la Monclova was advised that, inasmuch as it was resolved that Chief Engineer don Jaime Franc should engage in this enterprise also, he should seek to reconcile the two in such manner that they work together amicably, without occasioning disputes or controversies likely to embarrass the king’s service.

In addition to what was ordered to go forward with this ship, there were sent with it two officers who understand fireworks. Chief Engineer don Melchor Velez de Guevara had examined and approved them in Cadiz.

There also went forward in this ship the six mortars which it had previously been resolved to send for Cartagena, including the two which are to be used at Darien and returned to that place after the engagement; to which were also sent other arms, munitions, and equipment which had been ordered in view of the incursion of the French and could not be sent over with Peredo’s squadron.

Of what was ordered to go with this ship, only a few of the reformadoes failed to clear, because enough to complete the total of fifty were not to be found in this court or in Andalucia.

Of the clearance of this ship and patache (both of which went in command of Admiral don Francisco Salmon) advices were sent, in dispatches which the Almudena herself carried, to the viceroy of Peru and governors of Cartagena and Panama, instructing them to exercise care in receiving the arms and equipment, and all were told that all interest and effort were being devoted to clearing the squadron.

This ship also carried duplicates of all the dispatches which, as has been said, went in first originals aboard the dispatch-boat that left on August 25; the triplicates remain, to follow in another dispatch-boat which is being made ready for the Main.

After the above described provision had been made with respect to the viceroy who might act temporarily in Peru (in case of Monclova’s decease, in his stead setting forth upon this expedition, all dispatches addressed to Monclova to read as though addressed to him), in view of the opinion expressed by the council for War on 23d August, in order that there might be at its head an officer of all his standing, valour, and military experience, who, in case the count were already lacking or should presently lack, might continue in command when the reinforcement of the squadron should arrive there, his majesty resolved that Admiral General don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete should be named on this side, to whom, if he saw fit, Monclova might entrust the expedition in the event of his decease. If this should have occurred before he received the dispatches, the enterprise was to continue in charge of Admiral Navarrete. The aforesaid opinion set forth the form and manner in which, in sealed dispatches, the orders were to be sent, that this measure might be carried out with becoming secrecy and precaution. The dispatch is ready which, in virtue of his majesty’s decree, was issued through the council for War, and Navarrete is to carry it, sealed; it names him military commander of that expedition in case that he find Monclova dead when he arrive at Portobello.

In view of another opinion (of the council for Indies, dated last 19th September and emitted because of news reported by the Marqués de Canales on 31st August, that on the 19th a convoy of five ships had cleared, carrying relief to the Scots) and inasmuch as the fleet commanded by Don Manuel de Velasco is at present in New Spain, which, what with warships and merchantmen, consists of twenty-two vessels, as is also Zavala’s squadron, unless it has gone to Darien as ordered, his majesty resolved that the viceroy of New Spain be ordered in conformity with news he may have of the state of our arms to form of these a squadron in the opinion of a council of naval officers sufficient and such as can be manned with seamen and soldiers, and sent it with all possible dispatch to Darien, to this end applying without reserve what revenues may be available in his majesty’s treasury in that kingdom.

The council for War in Indies is mindful of resolutions taken with respect to the manner of recruiting both infantry and seamen for the squadron; and that, although it was considered that more than four thousand uniforms would be needed for the infantry and landing troops, after the surprise afforded by the inspection of the Cantabrian vessels, only two thousand five hundred uniforms were ordered, which are to be made in Cadiz, to which effect order was sent to the Marqués de Narros.

Further, orders have been issued to build at Cartagena two galiots or long barques for the use of the squadron, to which end the necessary nails and bolts went forward aboard the Almudena, but the masts for these vessels could not be sent, for they were too large for that vessel or the patache to carry. In addition to this two other long barques are to go with the squadron. Nanos [Narros] and Navarrete have advised that the purchase of one is already arranged.

So also it is ordered that a pink be bought in which to send forward the masts which may be considered necessary as spares for the vessels of the squadron, in view of Navarrete’s representation of the danger of dismasting along those coasts of Darien, where ships are so hard-pressed by squawls and tempests that they will need extra main masts.

Similarly, it is ordered that a thousand hundred-weight of powder be bought for the squadron, pending calculation of the definite amount of this munition it will require. In this connection the secretariate considers that it should call attention to the fact that so far nothing further has been ordered of the arms, munitions, and equipment which should go with this squadron, both for its regular complement of men and also for the landing of the forces which are to go ashore, except the item of the uniforms already mentioned; nor any subsistence.

The funds which his majesty has applied so far in Spain to the expenditure involved in all these measures is solely one hundred thousand pesos which were taken from the balance remaining of the latest loan made by business interests in Seville, and the three hundred thousand which the same interests offered to meet this emergency, one hundred thousand in cash and the other two hundred thousand payable when the seamen and infantry of the squadron should be paid. Both the first mentioned one hundred thousand and the second hundred thousand which the business interests proffered, cash down, having been placed with the Marqués de Narros, both sums have now been expended, except a balance of twenty-six thousand pesos plus, according to advices contained in the marqués’ letter of the 25th instant, received by special post, which is yet to be considered by the council for War when it takes up the matter of the order to him to deliver twenty-five thousand pesos to Navarrete on which to begin expenditures to recruit infantry. The marqués brings up other matters which have arisen for which necessary provision of money must be made.

As to the expenditures to which this expedition must give rise in the Indies, there is allotted to them the subsidy of a million ducats which his holiness conceded against the ecclesiastical estate in those kingdoms, dispatches bearing on which have not been sent because they await the nomination which the nuncio is charged to make for this exaction on archbishops and bishops.

Madrid, 30th October, 1699.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Mexico, 61-6-33, No. 15. Condensed translation.)

From Veracruz I reported to your majesty the execution which had been given your majesty’s orders up to that time and the accident which had deferred, most of which occurred in the service of your majesty, the preparations and departure for Darien. Pursuant to my report, I sailed from Veracruz the 28th July and arrived at Havana on the 26th August (where I received the orders of your majesty of the 18th March, to leave Pensacola and proceed to Darien) and I received the news (which the governor had gained through the declarations of Benjamin Spencer, a Jew, one of the deserters from Darien) that the Scots had abandoned their settlements and fortifications at Darien. Although this information had no basis except that of Spencer’s testimony it was not the less credible. During the few days during which I took on board water and refitted a new mizzen-mast yard to the San Ignacio, which had been broken by lightning, the report was confirmed by two ships which arrived from Cartagena, bringing a letter from the officer commanding the Windward fleet, and a little later by a letter from the governor of Cartagena to the governor of Havana . . . [Then follows explanations as to the movements of the Windward fleet, a statement as to his own anxiety to carry out the wishes of his majesty, a statement of the unfortunate condition of his fleet, and a repetition of the story of his stay at Veracruz. He concludes with a list of his ships, etc. and a statement that he is carrying five Scots from Darien as prisoners, delivered to him by the governor of Havana, and that he sailed from Havana the 12th October, 1699.]

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 164.)

Sire

Yesterday, the 14th, by Captain don Estazio de Messa [Eustaquio de Mesa], I reported to your majesty the news which I had acquired concerning the new settlement of the Scots in the place called Rancho Viejo, which is where these enemies’ first squadron fortified; and to-day, the 15th, at twelve noon, Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli, stationed in Darien Province, having been by me advised of this news and instructed what he was to do with the Indians in his command and those whom he might attract to your majesty’s devotion and service, sent me two Scotsmen, in charge of a sergeant and four Indians.

These Scots had sought to cross the range which divides the north from the south, and, having encountered certain peaceful Indians (of those who followed me upon the march north which I made), asked them—the Scots asked the Indians—where they could find gold. Rather astutely, with this bait, the Indians led them along, deceived, until they met Sergeant Antonio Joseph de Arena, who, by order of the campmaster, was proceeding north to reconnoitre our new enemies. He brought them, along with the Indians, as far as the campmaster’s house, at Camp Santa Maria, which is on the border of the province, to the south; and the campmaster sent them to me.

With the aid of an interpreter I proceeded to take their depositions immediately, which are those I remit to your majesty, forwarding them to Portobello this same night that they may overtake Captain don Eustaquio, who carries those of the nine who deserted in the Scottish flagship’s launch to Portobello, in order that, from both sets of depositions, your majesty may discern what are probably these enemies’ designs and their strength.

I remain, sire, with the larger anxiety lest, the advice which the governor of Cartagena cleared with Don Bartolome Garrote having gone forward, and, they tell me, having at Havana joined the ships under General don Martin de Zavala which left for Spain in mid-October, by which your majesty was informed of the evacuation the Scots effected, abandoning their settlement and fortification, the careful measures cease, of which your majesty deigns to inform me in the dispatches brought by Admiral don Francisco Salmon, dated 2d October, last year, signed by Don Martin de Sierralta, secretary of that royal council for Indies, wherein your majesty orders me advised that the fleet under Don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete was being made ready to proceed to the extermination of these Scots; and lest, lacking definite objective, your majesty be obliged to suspend this fleet’s clearance. With these considerations in mind I have begun to press Don Juan Pimienta to strengthen and make ready the three ships commanded by Don Diego de Peredo, for the reasons I express to him in the copies of my letter to him, which I enclosed yesterday in separate dispatch to your majesty, that they might go to Cartagena with Captain don Eustaquio, for I greatly fear what developments Time may bring forth, and lest, having received no chastisement, these Scots remain, and, imitating them, other nations display similar boldness, relying upon the weakness of your majesty’s arms here in America.

Our Lord preserve the Catholic royal person of your majesty as Christianity has need.

Count de Canillas (Rubric)

Panama, 15th January, 1700.

In the city of Panama, on the fifteenth day of January, in the year one thousand seven hundred, the very illustrious Don Pedro Luis Enriquez, knight of the Order of Calatrava, Conde de Canillas and de Forneros, of his majesty’s council, and member of his royal and supreme council for Indies, president of the royal audiencia of this city, governor and captain general of this kingdom of the Main and province of Veragua, stated that:

Inasmuch as today, said date, Don Luis Carrizoli Masfaraz, campmaster, alcayde, justicia mayor y capitan á guerra of the province of Darien, sent his lordship two men who claim to be Scots, who were taken prisoners in the said province, its northern part, by the Indians native there;

In order to learn of what nationality they are, whence they came to said province, and if there are others of their nationality or any other there, in what part, in what number, and why, by whose order, and with what motive or design they were brought over, in whose command and to what end, how long ago; whether they have any fortification or settlement, in what form disposed, how composed, what artillery, vessels, munitions, and war materials they have, of what calibre, what number of pieces, where placed; what subsistence, and, in case they lack it, whence they expect to be supplied with same; whether they expect more people of their nationality or any other to aid them, whence they expect them, in what number, when;

And also to learn where the two aforesaid Scots were taken, and to what end they had left the place where they were sheltered;

That with clarity and precision and in detail these things may be known as well as anything more which may be asked them in examination and cross-examination, his lordship ordered that of each of the said Scots, separately, his deposition be received, on said points, and any others which may seem necessary.

These depositions to be received forthwith, immediately, his lordship and Captains don Felipe de Betancourt y Villa Real, for his majesty alcayde ordinario of this said city, and don Juan Roman de Villavicencio, commanding the companies of this garrison, to be present;

And, inasmuch as his lordship is informed that the said Scots do not know how to speak or reply in the Spanish language, he ordered that they be examined through an interpreter, who is to be duly sworn to fidelity in his task;

And he so ordered and signed: El Conde de Canillas.

Before me, Nicolas Agustin Sandino, his majesty’s notary.

And forthwith, on the said day, fifteenth of January, of the said year one thousand and seven hundred, his lordship, the very illustrious Conde de Canillas, president, governor, and captain general of this kingdom, had brought before him one of the aforesaid two Scotsmen;

And in the presence and with the countenance of the said Captains don Felipe de Betancourt y Villa Real and don Juan Roman de Villavicencio, by God and by the cross, in due form, he swore Michael de Burques[?], Irish by nationality, soldier in service aboard the long barques, coastguards on this Pacific, who acted as interpreter; whom, when he had sworn and promised to tell the truth and to fulfill said office well and faithfully, as a good Catholic and faithful Christian, his lordship accordingly charged to bid the said Scotsman swear after the manner and according to the religion he professes, to speak the truth according to the matters concerning which he is to be examined.

He promised, and being interrogated according to the tenor of the foregoing writ, deposed as follows:

Asked his name, and place of birth, age and calling, he said that he is named John Jadin, is twenty-five years old, a labourer, Scottish by nationality, native of Monté, vassal of King William, and this he answers.

Asked whence he came to the said province of Darien, on what occasion, and if there are others there of his nationality or of any other, where they are, in what number, why, by whose order, or with what motive or design they were carried thither, under whose command, to what purpose, and how long ago, he said that:

The said Scotsman left the port of Lis [Leith], one of the ports of Scotland, in a ship called the Caledonia, Thomas Drummond, captain, in company with four other vessels, all five in command and at the order of David Macaes, which fleet reached the province of Darien in its northern part, and they landed in a port which is on the coast, of which he does not know the name;

That in said vessels came as many as a thousand men, and it is a year and a half since the said squadron cleared from Scotland;

That among the said Scots who came on this occasion were Frenchmen, Dutch and English, all sent with license of the King of England, granted on petition of the business interests of Scotland, to settle in the said province and establish trade and commerce with the Spaniards, if they could. He so replies.

Asked whether in the said port or place they have any fortification and settlement, in what form it is disposed, of what it consists; what artillery, ships, munitions, and war materials they have, of what calibre, what number of pieces, and where planted; what subsistence they have and, in case of need of this, whence they are to be relieved with same; whether they expect more of their nationals or others to aid them, from what part they expect them, in what number, and when, he said that:

As soon as they landed they erected a fortification which they built close to the harbour where their vessels were anchored. It was built of a double row of wooden stakes with earth packed between rows; and around said fortification, on the landward, they opened a moat five varas wide and three varas deep, so that at high tide the said fort is isolated. That at the present moment it is not in as perfect shape as it was, because there are two breaches open, one on the seaward through which they removed the artillery; and the rest of the fort was protected with planks with iron spikes turned outward. As soon as the Scots left and abandoned the place, the Indians of the said province went to the said fort and burned these planks. The said fort’s batteries consisted of forty iron pieces of artillery, thirty mounted on their carriages, and the other ten on the ground. Calibres, eighteen, twelve and ten; and the other war materials were powder, match, balls, matchlocks, and many grenades.

The stores they had on which to subsist were flour, meat, and codfish, and from Jamaica they received such stores, until order came from their king not to furnish them relief from any part of his dominions. He so replies.

Asked for what reason or motive, being already fortified, they abandoned this place and departed, leaving the said settlement and fort deserted; where they went, and if deponent went in their company, he said that:

Because of the severe lack of subsistence and because many persons had died and fallen ill, they came to fear lest they be reduced to too few people to man the ships to take them out of said port for their conveyance;

And having left said port for New England in the same five vessels in which they came to the said settlement, two of them reached New England, which were the vice-admiral [ship] and the patache. The flagship put in at Jamaica, where it remained for lack of crew, and there El Penecuco [Pennicook?], the commander, died. Of the other two ships, one was lost on the Cartagena coast and the other sank in the Gulf.

Deponent shipped in the vice-admiral, and, a month and a half after they reached New England, there came news that four ships and two schooners had come out of Scotland, and one of the said schooners left New England and the other from the port of Saint Thomas.

Because of this news, a schooner was cleared from New England, in which deponent returned, and seventeen men and the captain, to relieve them with food supplies. He arrived at El Playon, after a month and a half of sailing, and two days after the said schooner reached New Caledonia the said four ships and two schooners came in.

The flagship’s armament is sixty pieces of artillery, calibres twenty-four and fifteen. The other vessel carries thirty guns, calibre sixteen; and the remaining two are merchantmen, without artillery. Cargoes, subsistence. And he so replies.

Asked what number of people were carried aboard the said ships and schooner, what design they entertain, whether they have fortified, whether they have conveyed any artillery into the fort, what forces they have ashore, and what sort of fortification, he said that:

The number of people who came in the said ships was one thousand two hundred and seventy, of whom one thousand are ashore in the fortification, under twelve captains of infantry. He does not know the commanding officer’s name except that he is called Veas [not easily identified, probably Veitch].

At the present time they are engaged in settling and have not begun work on the fort, nor landed artillery.

Among these people there are seven or eight women, and they expect relief in five ships from Scotland. What is certain is that at present they are hourly expecting a large ship and that the intention is, unless they run short of subsistence or relief, to maintain themselves in that place. He so replies.

Asked in what place he was taken prisoner, whether alone, or by whom accompanied, and to what end he was leaving the place where he was sheltered, he said that:

Deponent was not taken prisoner. The fact of the matter is that, being hungry, because of the lack of subsistence in said settlement, each man receiving only two small biscuits and a little codfish once a day, he planned to desert with his comrade, to come to where the Spaniards were; and because they were unacquainted with the country, they made use of the Indians, to whom they paid four varas of linen to guide them. These Indians brought deponent and his comrade and delivered them to Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli, who sent them to this city. In addition to what he has said he asserts as certain and true that the said Scots are very short of subsistence. And so he answers.

At this point his lordship, the said Conde de Canillas, ordered this examination suspended, to be continued whenever it may be desirable; and the said interpreter stated on the oath he took that all the foregoing is the truth and a true version of what the said Scot said to him. He did not sign because he said that he does not know how. Neither does deponent know how to write.

His lordship signed, together with the said Captains don Felipe de Betancourt and don Juan Roman, who signed. To all which I bear witness.

Before me, Nicholas Agustin Sandino, his majesty’s notary.

And forthwith, on the said day, month and year aforesaid, his lordship the very illustrious Conde de Canillas, president, governor and captain general of this realm, had brought before him one of the two aforesaid Scotsmen;

And in the presence and with the countenance of Captains don Felipe Betancourt y Villa Real and don Juan Roman de Villavicencio, by God and by the cross, in legal form, he swore Michael de Burques, [?] Irish by nationality, soldier in service aboard the long barques, coastguards on this Pacific, who acted as interpreter; whom, when he had sworn to tell the truth and to fulfill said office well and faithfully like a Catholic Christian, his lordship accordingly charged to bid the said Scotsmen swear after the manner and according to the religion which he professes, to speak the truth in the matters concerning which he is to be examined.

He promised and, being interrogated according to the tenor of the foregoing writ, deposed as follows:

Asked his name, place of birth, age and calling, he said that he is called William [Strachan], is thirty-four years old, tailor by trade, Scottish by nationality, a native of Fitsit. He so replies.

Asked whence he came to the province of Darien, if there are others there of his nationality or any other, in what number, why, by whose order, with what motive or design he was carried thither, to what end and how long ago, he said that:

About a year and a half ago he came from Scotland in a squadron of five ships, the flagship being the Saint Andrew. The vessel aboard which deponent shipped was called the Caledonia and the commanding officer of all this squadron was called Thomas Drummond. He does not know precisely how many people sailed with these vessels. What he does know certainly is that there were twelve companies, consisting of forty-five men each, and he knows it because he was a soldier in one of the said twelve companies.

The said squadron came with the license of the King of England, granted on petition of the business interests of Scotland, to settle in the Indies in whatever place they should select, with the sole object of bartering and trading with the Spaniards; and with this purpose in view they brought the said ships over laden with merchandise. He so replies.

Asked if there they built any settlement or fortification, in what form it is disposed, or was disposed; what artillery, munitions, and other war materials they have, he said that:

As soon as they reached Darien province, in the port they considered most suitable and in a place they named New Caledonia, they began to make a settlement and to fortify themselves, and to build, as they did build, living houses and a fort to lodge a thousand men with a boxed [encajonado] wall and its palisades, and a moat five varas wide and three deep, which surrounded the said fort on the landward, so that when the tide came in the fort was isolated. The batteries for its defense consisted of twenty-one iron cannons, calibres eighteen, fourteen and ten, and a great number of matchlocks, grenades and other war materials, to supply both the artillery and the hand arms. So he replies.

Asked what stores they had, and in case they should lack these, whence they were to be supplied with them, and if they expected more people of their nationality or any other to aid them, in what number and when, he said that:

They had few supplies in the said fort. Although some were brought from Jamaica, when an order came from the King of England not to supply them with anything, Jamaica ceased to supply them; and recognizing the shortage and being without hope of getting anything from elsewhere, and because people were dying and falling sick, fearing lest they be so reduced that they could not sail the ships to get out of the port, they resolved to withdraw, as they did withdraw, on the last day of June, in the same five ships in which they had come to the said settlement. And he so replies.

Asked where they went when they abandoned the said settlement and in which of the said ships deponent embarked, and if these cleared all together, he said that:

All four ships left together, for one sent forward as a dispatch-boat had previously wrecked and grounded on the coast of Jamaica, I mean Cartagena. Of the said four, the flagship with General Pennicook aboard put in at Jamaica, where the said general died. The ship remained in that port for lack of men to navigate it. Another ship sank in the Gulf and the vice-admiral [ship] went to Scotland and the patache stayed in New England, aboard which deponent shipped. He so replies.

Asked with what purpose, on what occasion he returned again to Darien and New Caledonia, with what squadron, in what vessel, with what object, he said that:

A month and a half after he arrived in New England, having heard that another squadron was coming from Scotland to Darien, the captain of the said patache bought a schooner and, having laded it with subsistence, again returned to Darien; and after a month and a half spent on the voyage, two days after he entered the port of Darien, the second squadron arrived from Scotland, which is the squadron which is at present in the port.

It consists of four ships and two schooners. The flagship’s armament is sixty pieces of artillery; the second ship carries thirty, and the other two are merchantmen, without armament, laden only with subsistence, as are the schooners. He so replies.

Asked with what purpose this second squadron has come, whence it cleared, what forces it carries, what fortification they have in addition to that they found, which the others had left, he said that:

The second expedition comes from Scotland with the intention to settle and establish trade in clothing and other goods. There are twelve captains and a thousand infantry, five women and a hundred and fifty seamen. He does not know the precise total at the present moment, for every day many desert. Nine men fled in the boat. The reason for these desertions is that the work is heavy and the food scanty. They say they are expecting a ship with food supplies. Up to the present they have not mounted any artillery ashore, their whole effort being to build houses to shelter them. The old fortification is in bad shape, without gates. They have posted lookouts on the high hill. The commanding officer is called Master Baez [Byres?] and captain. The flagship is named The Rising Sun. He so replies.

Asked why he crossed the northern range, and if he was taken prisoner, in what place, and by whom, he said that:

Because of the hard work, as aforesaid, and hunger he was suffering, deponent deserted with his comrade, John Jadin. They gave an Indian four varas of linen to lead them to Spaniards, and deponent was not taken prisoner, but came in voluntarily to the camp at Santa Maria, whence he was brought by sea to this city. He so replies.

At this point his lordship, the said Conde de Canillas, ordered this examination suspended, to be resumed whenever desirable; and the said interpreter stated, on the oath he took, that its content is what deponent replied to the said questions and cross-questions which his lordship put to him. Said interpreter and deponent did not sign because they said they do not know how to write. His lordship and the said Captains don Felipe de Betancourt and don Juan de Villavicencio signed; and the Sargento mayor and other captains were not present at this examination because they are sick with the prevailing epidemic.

Before me, Nicholas Agustin Sandino, his majesty’s notary. . . .^[KK]

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 164 (2566).)

Diary of the voyage which I made in the San Juan Bautista, flagship of Governor don Diego Peredo’s squadron, with four other smaller vessels, which are the dispatch-boat which is about to clear for the kingdoms of Spain, Salvador de Benegas, captain; his majesty’s schooner which came from Portobello, Don Anastasio de Mesa, captain; another schooner, and his majesty’s large launch, which I ordered arms, with them to make a voyage to the province of Darien to defeat the Scots who lately have settled the place called Rincon de Zamora; beginning 12th February, 1700, when I ordered the anchor weighed from the anchorage and bay of the said city of Cartagena.

The twelfth. This flagship having weighed anchor for Boca Chica, in which place the artillery was ready which I had ordered put aboard launches to be received aboard as we sailed, together with its carriages, for field use, this flagship arrived off the lime pit immediately beside the castle, and grounded on a shoal to leeward in the channel of the said port. Immediately work began to get her off the shoal, which accident delayed the loading of the artillery. When the said flagship had been warped off and floated and the launches with the artillery had moored alongside her and all the pieces had been brought aboard, with the night breeze the anchor dragged and the ship touched again on the edge of the same shoal; and although efforts to get her off continued, this could not be done that night, because of the strong wind.

The thirteenth. This day the flagship got into the channel. Before making sail I summoned to council the said governor and captains and pilots of the aforesaid vessels, and in council resolved to proceed to Baru Islands, sending the vessels of lesser burthen ahead to reconnoitre those vicinities, to see if there were any foreign craft, with order to hail their captains and bring them aboard this flagship; to which duty were detached the dispatch-boat, the Portobello schooner and the large launch. The other schooner was to remain with this flagship.

The fourteenth. This day, having ordered the squadron to weigh, and having cleared from Boca Chica at six in the morning, I ordered the course set for Baru Islands. In accordance with my orders the other vessels went to reconnoitre the said islands. They were lost from sight when they entered the channels.

About four in the afternoon, two vessels were sighted to windward of this flagship, which did not approach. Being some three leagues off, they made land without being identified, for they showed no flag nor could their burthen be determined, because of the distance. Having set a course to intercept them, this flagship’s topmast which was weak at the foot gave way before the heavy wind. Having for this reason drawn up to the said islands, she anchored there to repair the said mast and also to tar the cordage.

The fifteenth. Being this day engaged on said repairs, by Palma Island a little craft was sighted which with the land breeze came on to windward of this flagship, somewhat more than a cannon shot off. The Portobello schooner and this flagship’s launch and boat gave her chase, manned with infantry in command of Aide don Carlos Carauallo, who is on the payroll of the Cartagena garrison, and of Captain Jorge Joseph Corezat, whom I ordered to accompany the said schooner, and, having come near, they demanded to see her flag. She showed Spanish colours and was ordered to come alongside this flagship, which she did.

The captain of the said little craft came aboard. I asked him whence he had cleared and what vessels he had met. To which he replied that he had cleared from Portobello for Cartagena and had seen only two vessels, anchored at the mouth of Palma Island channel. When he was anchored in the shelter of that island they weighed anchor and came toward him. He moved toward them and saw them come to anchor in the same place where he was, without other demonstration. Since they broke out no colours he could only see by their bulk that one was of a burthen to carry forty pieces of artillery and the other, twenty more or less. Later, he met another vessel, apparently a medium-sized pink, six or eight guns, which had been chasing him since the 14th, which vessel was now to be seen to lee. This and another small vessel were presumed to be the dispatch-boat and the large launch which had emerged by the islands channel, but because night fell this presumption was not confirmed.

For which reason I ordered twenty infantry aboard the little craft to man it, who went in this flagship’s launch in command of Don Richardo Guillen, aide to Governor don Diego Peredo. In said launch went also Aide don Carlos Carauallo with ten infantrymen, who leaving the others aboard the little craft with order to follow this flagship, were to proceed to reconnoitre the said sail.

The sixteenth. This day Aide don Carlos returned aboard with report that the said vessels were the dispatch-boat and the large launch.

The work on the topmast and tarring the cordage being finished, the captain of the dispatch-boat came aboard and told me that in the place where the captain of the little craft had indicated, he had seen two vessels which, to judge by their burthen, were the same he described.

Believing them to be foreigners, traders reported to have cleared from Baru when Captain don Manuel de Toca with the frigate San Francisco in his command and El Florizant cleared from Cartagena, and seeing them at said island, he gave chase, but they escaped by out-sailing him, though he took one of lesser burthen which was with them—a Frenchman. This vessel he manned with a crew from his own, and, since the weather prevented him from entering Cartagena, he took it with him upon the voyage upon which by my order he had set out.

In council held with the said Governor don Diego Peredo, and captains of the dispatch-boat and schooner, pilots, and guides of the coast, I determined to continue the voyage to Fuerte Island, passing by the place where he had left the said two vessels, the smaller vessels of this squadron to proceed to said island.

At the same time the small schooner, Captain Geronimo de Ontiueros, was ordered to proceed to Tolu with a letter for Captain don Manuel de Toca, informing him, in case he were there, of the place to which he was to come to rejoin this flagship; for, according to the orders which I had sent him to Portobello, I expected him to await me as far up this coast as weather might permit. He was to carry also a dispatch to the capitan á guerra of Tolu, Don Diego de Herrera, in which I ordered him without delay to send all the troops of that district which he could assemble.

And this day the dispatch-boat’s maintopmast and the little craft’s foretopmast gave way before the wind. Repairs were made and subsistence provided as required.

Because this flagship needed water, for that taken on at Cartagena is of such poor quality and the men were beginning to sicken, since none could be taken in at Fuerte Island, I resolved, in accordance with the opinion of the said Governor don Diego de Peredo, pilots and guides, to come up to Signu River, to take in water, which could be done in one or two trips of the launch and boat. This flagship having lain to for this purpose, before dark, at nine o’clock at night, the pilot sounded and since he found twelve fathoms, it was necessary to anchor in order not to drift.

The seventeenth. Because of the strong breeze this day we did not weigh until three in the afternoon, when it abated and we steered for the mouth of the said river, losing sight of the two small vessels which were bound for Fuerte Island.

In the inlet were seen a schooner and, further off, another small vessel. We steered for her, crowding on sail, as did the Portobello schooner and this flagship’s launch and boat, demanding to see her colours. She raised the Spanish, and when we came within hailing distance she was found to be the small schooner aboard which was Captain Geronimo de Ontiueros, returning from Tolu, with reply to the order he carried to the capitan á guerra there. He brought with him twenty-six men from that district, who were received aboard this flagship.

He reported having found anchored at Palmas Island the two ships which the other vessels had seen. These fired at him twice, with ball, and sent a boat or launch after him, which did not overhaul him.

Immediately, before nightfall, I sent said schooner with Captain Outiueros, to Signu River, with him Joseph Christobal, captain of that district, who had shipped aboard this flagship, issuing him written order to assemble the forces of his jurisdiction without loss of an instant’s time and convey them to Fuerte Island, where he would find this flagship. At the same time the launch and boat set out to fetch water.

The eighteenth. This day our large launch came up. This was the vessel we sighted the preceding day at a great distance.

At noon the launch and boat returned with water, and, desiring to weigh, to proceed on our course for Fuerte Island, I could not because we had a head wind and it is impossible to tack in this inlet.

The nineteenth. This day, before dawn, I ordered the anchor weighed and we made sail at sunrise for Fuerte Island. At two in the afternoon the wind dropped so that it was necessary to anchor. The Portobello schooner continued toward Fuerte Island and, the wind having sprung up after nightfall, we weighed; but again it failed, and, finding ourselves in fifteen fathoms, it was necessary to drop anchor a little after midnight, for we recognized that the currents were carrying us toward land.

The twentieth. This day, when it had become light, we discovered that the currents had brought us near to Point Vanaos. Because it was calm we did not weigh until eleven, when the wind came from the south-southwest, which was the direction in which we must set our bow. We steered our course north-northwest and at four in the afternoon, the wind having freshened we steered for said island, passing it on the windward at three in the night. We showed lights and fired a few guns, that the smaller vessels which we supposed to be there might weigh and follow this flagship on her course for Rancho Viejo.

The twenty-first. This day, as we proceeded on that course, at four in the afternoon two ships and a schooner were sighted, which, when they drew near we recognized to be the dispatch-boat, the small vessel from Portobello and Don Estacio’s schooner. They rejoined this flagship.

The twenty-second. This day the small craft from Portobello approached this flagship, reporting that she was without subsistence; which I ordered furnished her. When she had taken on the stores, she was ordered to proceed to the Isle of Pines to discover whether the vessels commanded by Captain don Manuel de Toca were there, and the others which were expected from Portobello. This flagship steered for that place, tacking, for the wind was scant. A muster was held late in the day of all seamen and sailors.

The twenty-third. This day, inasmuch as the little vessel did not appear, it was concluded that in the heavy sea and wind of the preceding night she had sprung her foremast which was known to be in bad shape. This flagship, continuing her course toward land, in company with the dispatch-boat and the schooner, sighted Rancho Viejo before sunset. We lay to with the wind in the west, with a view to standing off the mouth of the harbour which the Scots occupied, to discover what vessels might be inside. It was not feasible to attempt this with this flagship, because the wind was scant and the numerous currents carried her to leeward of the place where the pilots and guides judged the port to be.

Fearing lest these said currents drive us on the reefs on which the sea was seen to break immediately, we steered further out to sea, summoning the Portobello schooner and ordering Juan Augustin, one of the pilots, aboard her, to steer toward the said port and make every effort to carry out this reconnaissance, and, observing our course, to try to bring us what information he might acquire. We advised him that, weather permitting, we would proceed to the Isle of Pines where, if he lost us from sight, as it happened that he did, he would find us again.

The twenty-fourth. This day at dawn, sailing toward land with the wind west, we found ourselves somewhat further to leeward than the day preceding. Inasmuch as the schooner did not appear, and with this flagship we could not make a reconnaissance of the port, which I so greatly desired, I summoned the dispatch-boat and sent Captain Jorge Joseph Corezat to her in the boat, along with another pilot of this coast, named Andrés Bernal, said boat being well manned with seamen and supplied with infantry, in order that, if they could not carry out the order I gave them with the said petache, they might take to the smallboat and, drawing near land, or, if necessary, going ashore, acquire full information concerning conditions in said port, on which mission they set out, and this flagship steered out to sea.

The twenty-fifth. Daybreak found us within sight of land at the same inlet. Observing that on short tacks we gained nothing, we steered to sea all day and night, until dawn, when we changed our course.

The twenty-sixth. This day, when it became light, some three leagues to leeward we sighted a ship which was thought to be the dispatch-boat. This galleon kept on a course west-southwest and shortly we lost her, without sighting land during this time. For which reason at ten o’clock in the morning we put about to the north, and again steered toward land, when, because of the heavy sea and little wind, this flagship’s maintopsail stay gave way. While it was being repaired we stood stern to the sea, for which reason we drifted a good deal.

The twenty-seventh. This day before dawn we steered to sea and at sun-up discovered a ship which was approaching from the opposite direction. We went to her, arms in hand. As we came near she broke out the Spanish colours and we found she was the dispatch-boat. Her captain, the pilot and Captain Jorge came aboard this flagship and told me that neither ship nor boat had been able to get near enough to reconnoitre the Scottish port, for when they left us to do so they were much further to lee than the pilot had supposed, and could only reconnoitre the vicinity called San Bartolome. For this reason, steering to sea, they had sought to get out to meet the breeze with which better to sail for the Isle of Pines.

The twenty-eighth. This day, having steered for the land, we sighted it, and, having drawn near to reconnoitre it, at four in the afternoon the pilots said this was the Scottish port. Because of the high sea and wind we could not make to windward of it and so steered north, to see if on the other tack we could make the Isle of Pines.

March first. This dawn found us on a course for land and a few hours later with a fresh wind in the northeast and heavy seas the mainsail tack and the maintopmast back stay gave way, for which reason we drifted somewhat, and at seven in the morning sighted the Isle of Pines, for which port we steered with the intention of anchoring there. This was not done, for, having observed whitish water a league’s distance from land, we sounded and found thirty-five fathoms where we were.

At this time I sent the large launch to land with the dispatch-boat to discover whether there were any of the vessels of our convoy there, and to bring them to this flagship. To this end I ordered Captain Jorge Corezat to embark in the large launch because this vessel had to be beached to stop a leak it had sprung. We lay to, and as soon as it left from alongside, I ordered this flagship’s launch to go to land to sound at the point of the island and at its entrance; and a little later we again sounded and got fifteen fathoms, for which reason we steered further out.

The second. This day, having turned toward land at one in the night, at seven in the morning we were one league off the Isle of Pines. At noon we steered out and at four in the afternoon, having again come in toward land, we once more steered for the sea, with bow to the northeast.

At nine at night the dispatch-boat fired a few guns. Having come within hail of her we found the reason to be that the large launch had come alongside her for shelter from the heavy swells. This launch, having reached the flagship, brought a Curazao Indian and five others, one an old man named Santiago, who, according to those who recognized him, has been no friend to Spaniards who have by any mishap been driven to land on this coast. The four others, boys, were travelling in a canoe from the place where the Scots are to the place called El Coco. The large launch having captured them, left their canoe beached on the Isle of Pines and brought them aboard that they might give information concerning events in the Scottish settlement, as the said Indian did.

He stated that the principal warship, called The Sun, is in the harbour, armament about fifty pieces; also a little frigate with six guns, and two small pinks, eight or ten guns. Ashore they have built fortifications of palisades and fascine, with batteries; and the settlement consists of as many as seven hundred, good and bad quality, of whom he thinks perhaps as many as four hundred are capable of bearing arms. Many are sick and every day more fall ill, because of the hard work, poor food, and the want of subsistence from which they are suffering. They expect relief.

On February 24th, acting on information some Indians, neighbours of theirs, had given them two days previous, as many as two hundred soldiers, fifty Indians among them, went out and having met the forces which were advancing from Darien by land to dislodge these enemies, had an encounter with them in which, according to what he learned, they killed three Spaniards, with a loss of ten Scots.

He does not know who commanded nor what number of troops were coming up. He only heard when the Scots retreated, that there were a thousand or more Spaniards.

Some days before he was captured, two schooners, one large and the other small, which also they have, had left in pursuit of a Spanish schooner which had appeared off the harbour mouth.

The third. This day, having steered for land at two in the morning, at dawn we were two leagues off Golden Island and saw three schooners, which were making for the Scottish port. I had the large launch manned and ordered it with the dispatch-boat to give chase, boarding whichever might seem easiest, to bring her to this flagship. As soon as the large launch came up with the dispatch-boat they steered for the mouth of the port in pursuit of said vessels. Having come near to land they saw that two of the schooners had gone into the bay, for which reason they turned on the other, and, chasing her, recognized that she was a very large launch. Ours pursued, as the dispatch-boat could not, without risk, and saw how this large launch drove on the reefs of the coast and there went to pieces. It was impossible for ours, without wrecking also, to get near enough to take prisoners any of those who so escaped. Our men came back to us, as we sailed out to sea; they came aboard this flagship and reported as above.

The fourth. This day, having steered toward land with heavy sea and fine weather, the maintopsail sheet gave way, which was repaired. Because of the distance we had drifted during this work of repair, we were at dawn a league to lee of Golden Island, so that at seven in the morning we steered for the sea and continued on that tack until ten at night when, the wind having shifted to the north, we altered our course for land until three in the morning, when, since it again blew northwest, we once more steered for the sea.

The fifth. This day at three in the morning, another maintopsail sheet gave way, because of which mishap we continued on that course. Seeing no land, when it grew light, we steered for the open sea, lest we be carried to leeward; and at six in the afternoon we turned back toward land.

The sixth. This day found us on a course toward land and at seven in the morning we saw five vessels, four of them under topsails, and a schooner. We steered for them, and, observing that one of these vessels had crowded on all sail, fleeing from the others, we gave chase. Because the wind was fair and the sea heavy, the motion was so great that our maintopmast gave way above the masthead. It was necessary to strike the maintopsail and turn stern on to the sea to avoid greater damage, and while this was being repaired we lost sight of said ship. When her pursuers drew near, from their colours we recognized them immediately. They came within hail, the first to approach being the schooner in which was Captain Ontiueros, from the Signu River, with fifty-six men of that district, who informed us that the other three ships were the Florizant, the patache from, Castile, and a prize taken at Portobello.

He said that Admiral don Francisco Salmon with his ship the Almudena, San Francisco Xavier, a vessel from Campeche, and the schooner which Captain don Manuel de Toca captured, were anchored at Golden Island, and with them the bergantine which I had left at Cartagena in command of Captain don Juan Felix Moreno for the transportation of stores. In view of this news, seeing we could not make the said island, we steered for the sea, having taken on board a pilot whom Admiral Salmon sent me to bring this flagship into the anchorage where he was. We kept on our said course until ten at night, when we again steered toward land.

The seventh. This day we came up off Golden Island and, steering for it, entered its harbour where the said vessels were, whose captains and officers came aboard this flagship immediately. They informed me of what they had learned during the time they had been in that place from two Frenchmen who the day before had been aboard Admiral don Francisco Salmon’s ship. This information agreed with what the captured Indian told me.

I summoned a council of war attended by the captains and officers of the vessels and Campmaster don Melchor Ladron de Guevara, chief engineer of this province. These being assembled in council, I proposed that, our forces being now all together, it was advisable first to discuss the terrain as we discovered it to be and the information the pilots could give us, who, also, were summoned to said council, in order to resolve without an instant’s loss of time how to proceed to make a landing in a place where the artillery could most readily be brought ashore under the protection of the infantry.

All agreed that it was necessary both for this undertaking and to learn definitely where the Scots had their batteries placed, to send the smaller vessels accompanied by a schooner under a naval officer, who was Captain Ontiueros, to tack off the harbour where the Scots were, and stand guard that night to see if he could determine their strength.

And also I sent a Frenchman, one of the above mentioned, named Echivr Chiluer [?], with a letter to the commander of the Darien forces, advising him of my arrival in this place, in order that, so informed, he should advise what day he could appear in this vicinity with what troops he might have.

This afternoon two Indians came aboard. I ordered that they be entertained well.

The eighth. This day the patrol launches returned and reported that they had learned nothing during the preceding night; and that, having sounded the channel, they found twelve and thirteen fathoms but a strong sea.

At three in the afternoon Ontiueros’ schooner came up. He reported that, having come close to the battery which the enemy had at the harbour mouth, he saw that there would be great difficulty in getting near enough to effect a landing because of the heavy breakers there.

In view of this I ordered the said schooner to clear and also the prize frigate from Portobello, Captain Joseph Bernal commanding, to coast along the southeast shore of the harbour where the Scots were, to discover the best place to land men and artillery. This was done.

This day there came aboard an Indian they call Captain Brandy, whom the guide Cardenas recognized, as did others. They gave me to understand that he is hard on Spaniards, and although for this reason I might have suspected him to be a spy, nevertheless, to avoid worse consequences, I had him entertained as the others had been.

That night I stationed two vessels as patrols at the harbour mouth.

The ninth. This day after day-break the vessels I had set to watch returned and reported nothing new. At three in the afternoon the frigate and schooner came up, which had gone out the preceding day.

They reported having found a place called Carreto where, though with some difficulty, the landing might be effected. The schooner brought three Scotsmen whom it captured at Carreto.

They declared that they had deserted from the town six weeks before because of want and hunger there; that the enemy had five hundred regulars, not counting the crews.

In view of this news I summoned a council, in which I resolved to send Campmaster don Melchor de Guevara with two hundred foot in three companies, which were those under Captains don Zeledon de Zarauz, don Manuel de Angulo and don Francisco Unguito. With these troops I ordered to go also Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera Sotomayor, chief engineer of the Cartagena fortifications, whom I had brought in my company upon this enterprise that, having overseen the landing and inspected the situation, he should set up the infantry camp ashore and entrench it as he might consider to be most desirable.

At twelve at night they embarked in the schooner, the large launch and smaller boats, with order that next day Don Juan de Herrera should come to report the progress of these operations.

The tenth. This day, the patrol launches reporting no news, I ordered them all alongside this flagship to tranship gun-carriages, canons, timbers and mortars for bombs, which are aboard her and others of the ships, to the bergantine for conveyance with other war materials to the said place of Carreto.

At nine in the morning fire broke out aboard the Campeachy vessel, around the maintopmast, and the maintopsail burned, with its mast and tackle. Prompt action prevented the fire from spreading.

Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera, nor any news, having come concerning events ashore, I ordered eighty infantrymen and others of all sorts aboard the dispatch-boat, to go to said place of Carreto, both to reinforce the troops already there and also to labour on the works which were presumed to be begun on land. When they had gone aboard, she weighed for the said place.

This day some Indians came aboard and with them one called Coruete, who was known to be friendly to Spaniards. He offered to bring up some of his band and I ordered them all entertained.

The eleventh. This day, at eleven in the morning, having received aboard the last of all the equipment and munitions, the bergantine made sail, and I stood ready to go the moment I should receive the news that I awaited from land. The bergantine carried also sixty men for the work of landing.

At about five in the afternoon Don Joseph Cano, who had commanded the first landing party, came aboard to report that, having found the vicinity of Carreto to be unsuitable to land the artillery, the party was marching along the coast to another place, a league and a half nearer us.

Immediately the Frenchman, who had been sent to Darien, arrived with a letter from Juan Antonio Cortés, whom the Governor don Miguel Cordones had left at Tubuganti to obtain news of the enemy. He wrote that as soon as he learned of my arrival he had dispatched a messenger to the camp at Santa Maria, where the said governor was, since his recent skirmish with the Scots, to which he expected a reply, with which, and what men he could bring, he would come up. This pleased me, for so I knew that the land forces were aware of the presence of the sea forces at this anchorage.

The twelfth. This day at seven in the morning the Portobello schooner came alongside this flagship with dispatches from the president, Conde de Canillas, for me and for Admiral don Francisco Salmon, enclosing copies of those he had received from Governor don Miguel Cordones and Campmaster don Luis de Carrizoli, with the diary of the events of their march, engagement with the Scots, and retreat to the camp at Santa Maria, which proffered little hope of their having troops with which to come to join us. Immediately I cleared the schooner with letters and news of us.

At two in the afternoon Ontiueros’ schooner arrived from the Carreto coast with letters from the captain of the bergantine Don Juan Felix Moreno, and news as sad as confused, and with three wounded men. One was the ensign reformado of Don Zeledon de Zarauz’ company. These men were in the first skirmishes, from which they retired, leaving our troops in the fight, of the outcome of which they knew nothing.

In view of this news I summoned to council all the captains and officers of the ships present in the port, before whom I laid the fact (shown by inspection of the rosters) that the number of effectives now aboard is seven hundred, seamen, and infantry. Of these forces I thought it desirable to detach four hundred to go in one of the small vessels and the said schooner, to set me ashore where the artillery which the bergantine carried could be landed, there to fortify and discover the whereabouts of the other three hundred men who are ashore. This would leave these vessels with three hundred men for their defence, in case any with reinforcements for the enemy should come up.

Admiral don Francisco Salmon expressed it as his opinion that four hundred men must remain with the ships, the landing force to be three hundred. Governor don Diego de Peredo voted that only one hundred and fifty be detached, in order that these vessels might be left better manned, although when I reminded him of the importance of having the largest possible force on shore where the engagement was imminent and the necessity evident, he agreed with me on these points. Captain don Manuel de Toca and others of the smaller vessels, who voted to land twenty men, agreed, as did also the said Governor don Diego de Peredo, that three hundred should be detached to land, it having been proposed that as soon as the artillery, equipment, and subsistence for fifteen days could be landed, to carriage and transporting of which they were detailed, these seamen should return to their ships. Having issued orders to the officers to draw the men who were this night to embark, as well as those to be observed during my absence, charging them to maintain concord and amity which I expect of their great seal in the service of the king, our master, which orders are as follows:

Orders to be observed by Admiral don Francisco Salmon and Squadron Governor don Diego de Peredo, commanding this fleet until such time as I may send others from the port of Carreto, for which I am setting out:

The ships will remain at anchor with the few men left on board, none to leave on any account, unless it be agreed to send some patache to sea to reconnoitre some sail, in which case the said patache shall not go further than one or two leagues away; on no pretext is any ship to depart without advising me of events, to which end in whatever bottom they may consider suitable they will send to the said port of Carreto, among themselves maintaining the good relations and conformity to be anticipated from their great zeal in the king’s service.

The Indians who may come aboard these ships they will detain, or, if they desire to join me, they will send to my port. They will treat these Indians well and in such manner that they shall not resent their detention, seeking pretexts to keep them aboard; especially if they come aboard with their bands they will send them to me with the first vessel going to Carreto, assuring these Indians always of our friendship.

Don Juan Pimienta

Done aboard the galleon San Juan Bautista, 12th March, 1700.

The thirteenth. During the preceding night, the three hundred men having transhipped from the vessels where they were to the frigate El Florizant and the schooner from Portobello, I embarked at dawn and ordered the anchor weighed for the port where were the other vessels which carried the first party. On the way I met the king’s bergantine, from which Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera boarded the Florizant. An eye-witness, he told me all that had occurred ashore.

He said that, the first landing party having arrived at Carreto, they landed without encountering any opposition, and, reconnoitring the terrain, found it impossible for the debarkation and operation of the artillery, because of the roughness of the mountains and the rivers which surrounded the place. Therefore, Campmaster don Melchor de Guevara having met in council with the captains and said Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera, in view of news which certain natives of that country gave them to effect that two leagues distance from that place and one [and a half] from Caledonia there was an inlet suitable for landing the artillery, subsistence and other stores, they resolved next day to ration the men for eight days and set out to discover said inlet, to see if they could fortify themselves there.

They put this resolution into effect, setting out next morning, and, having marched, with the annoyance of having to cross a river with water to the waist many times, after a league across a hilly thicket they came to the foot of a rough high mountain and the first few steps of its ascent brought them upon four of the enemy’s sentinels who, becoming aware of our advance, fled without firing. Continuing to ascend, our troops came to the summit; and, having descended halfway, found an Indian who told them that the Scots were a little further down.

At this news they began to form our field for action, felling many trees to clear the ground and trimming away branches which obstructed the view. Having waited a long time to see whether the enemy was coming on or not, since he did not appear, we took up our march, with an ensign reformado and fifteen men in advance under order not to go further than a gunshot ahead of our main body.

Having descended the slope and travelled along it a quarter of a league, our advance guard discovered that of the enemy, in an open place near a beach. Shots having been exchanged, our advance guard fell back to the main body, firing so many rounds that the Scots, incommoded by our heavy firing, retired to the slope of a rough, thickly wooded mountain, sheltering themselves behind the tree trunks.

There they reformed with reinforcements and a second time attacked our troops, who, with greater valour, drove them back to the same place, from which a third time, they sought to try their luck. But ours obliged them to turn back, abandoning their stand and many arms and other munitions, which our people made use of.

They also left seventeen dead whom our men found, not reckoning those lying undiscovered in the bush. Of ours, only thirteen were wounded; thanks to treatment and care, none are in danger.

Considering it impossible for them to maintain themselves in that place, for they had used up their ammunition, and part of the stores had got wet in crossing the rivers, our officers decided to withdraw in good shape, carrying the wounded more comfortably than that situation promised. This resolution they carried out, crossing the mountain which they had climbed that afternoon, on the skirt of which they halted, because of the intense darkness of the night; and the next day arrived at Matanzas River, at Carreto, where they entrenched themselves, and shipped the wounded with Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera in his majesty’s bergantine.

Having arrived at the port of Carreto, I disembarked with all the troops, ordering the schooner which accompanied me to return, the landing having been effected, to Rancho Viejo with the letters I had written to the commanders of Don Francisco Salmon’s and Don Diego de Peredo’s fleet, and, having delivered these, to proceed to Portobello with another for Conde de Canillas, informing them of our situation, and advising of our need of reinforcements.

While I was taking measures for the fortification of the camp, I received word that the bergantine had returned to the port, having been unable to make Rancho Viejo for lack of wind. The wounded being still on board, I ordered that they remain there, under the necessary care, and that they be supplied with daily food and medicines, the captain of the bergantine to disembark the stores and materials he had aboard, according as he might be ordered to do.

The fourteenth. This day, the enemy having made no demonstration whatever during the preceding night, I continued the work of entrenchment, laying out the form of this fortification and issuing orders which the said campmaster and other officers were to observe, both as to the watch and ward of the camp and also in the distribution of the subsistence, arms and munitions. During this time various Indians came with news that the enemy was approaching.

For this reason I put the camp into battle array and only two were seen. They crawled up through a canebrake and our sentries fired on them. Having spied out the lie of our trenches, these two withdrew, retiring to where their main body waited in a wood, a cannonshot from our camp.

The fifteenth. This day I sent a drummer to the officers in command of the Scots, with the following letter:

Having arrived with the naval fleet which I anchored at Rancho [Viejo] and with the land forces of infantry having come to camp at Matanzas River, the generosity with which the king, my master, wages war, constrains me to say to the gentlemen commanding the Scots who are settled in the vicinity called Zamora, that it is time they made their representations, now, before I am obliged to order the naval fleet to force that port, and these land forces to storm their trenches. I shall regret having to do this because, under such circumstances, it would not be possible to give quarter, and also because, on account of the winds which prevail on this coast, my ships would be unable to emerge from that port after the engagement to go about the business in which I may need them.

Don Juan Pimienta

From Camp Matanzas, 15th March, 1700.

The sixteenth. This day the drummer returned with reply to the foregoing, which, translated into our language, reads as follows:

Sir: The lack of a good interpreter prevents us from understanding clearly the content of the letter, but according to what we gather you threaten us with your forces both by land and also by sea, and also desire to know what right we have to this land.

As to the first matter, such a threat can have no effect on men of honour. As to the second, we believe our right to be good and with the favour of the Almighty mean to defend it.

In any other matter we are, sir, your very obedient servants.

From Fort Saint Andrew, 15th March, 1700.

The seventeenth. This day a Scottish deserter came into our camp, who told me that the enemy had certain advanced posts out, which he believed could be cut off easily; and what he said of the place was in entire accord with the Indian’s statement.

The eighteenth. This day I ordered the Portobello frigate to clear for Cartagena for supplies, under order not to linger more than forty-eight hours in that harbour; and she departed accordingly.

The nineteenth. This day I ordered a troop of Indians accompanied by some Spaniards out to reconnoitre the enemy’s outposts, and to try to capture a prisoner. They went out but accomplished nothing.

The twentieth. This day the party retired which had been gone out the day before.

The twenty-first. This day nothing of moment occurred.

The twenty-second. This day Captain Juan Antonio Cortés arrived in my camp from Tubuganti with certain Pacific coast Indians and word that Governor don Miguel Cordones was preparing to come to this place.

The twenty-third and -fourth. This day and the twenty-fourth nothing of moment occurred. We were occupied in maintenance and oversight of the garrison in the trenches.

The twenty-fifth. This day, as soon as it was light, I ordered Captain Juan Antonio Cortés with his Indians and a militia captain with his men to proceed, under cover of the bush and endeavouring to bear to the left as much as they could and the terrain would permit, to advance steadily until they should have come as near as possible to the enemy’s force. At the same time I ordered Captain don Manuel de Puga to march with a body of sixty men along the main road; and, if he observed skirmishing on the left, to seek to support the party under Captain Juan Antonio, and continuing to advance as far as the mountain slope which our men had occupied at the time of the first engagement.

At noon I received report from Captain Juan Antonio that with his party he had occupied a high mountain from which they could see Caledonia; but that they were too few to hold a post so advanced. Presumably they had cut off some of the enemy’s outposts and in order to withdraw needed reinforcement.

On hearing this, I ordered Captain don Martin de Zeuallos with a body of one hundred and fifty men to march to join Captain Juan Antonio Cortés. He was to follow the same route Captain Juan Antonio had taken, and I ordered them, having joined forces, to come down to the right as far as the main road and return by it toward our camp, firing upon any enemy outposts he might discover. I sent Captain don Manuel de Puga order to continue his march along the main road, and, if he heard firing, to harass the enemy from the rear.

The twenty-sixth. This day I sent Captain don Manuel de Puga order, from the slope where he was to ascend the mountain, in order to draw nearer to the enemy. I sent subsistence to him and also to Captain don Martin de Zeuallos.

Further I ordered Captain don Juan Felix Moreno to go with two launches along the coast and to enter the inlet behind Tiger Island to see if there were any port there suitable for debarkation. He set out in said launches for the said place, and, returning at nightfall, told me that he had found a port suitable not only for the landing of men but also of artillery; but he could not reconnoitre the terrain because of heavy fire from a body of the enemy, to which his firelocks and perriers replied.

The twenty-seventh. This day I ordered the said Captain don Juan Felix to go out again with the launches to the same inlet, as he did, with order to remain there all day and seek to divert the enemy while our men who were marching by land cut off their retreat. At five in the afternoon one of the two launches in which he had gone returned, and aboard it he sent me a Scotsman who had surrendered, and news that he had been bickering with the enemy all day, until three in the afternoon, when the Scots retired from the inlet, having become aware of the party in the bush and fearing lest they be cut off.

At vespers the said Don Juan Felix arrived with his launch, and informed me that as soon as the enemy withdrew he landed, but could not make the reconnaissance for more than a quarter of a league around the beach, which his men inspected, and that he thought the terrain suitable for the use of artillery.

Between Tiger Island and the port of Carreto on a beach he saw a launch aground which he sought to inspect but was unable to do because of certain reefs which prevented.

This same afternoon I received letters from Campmaster don Luis de Carrizoli and Governor don Miguel Cordones, in which they informed me that the next day they would set out to join our forces. This news put me into high good humour.

The twenty-eighth. This day I ordered Captain don Juan Felix Moreno out with the same two launches which had gone the preceding two days, and the large launch with subsistence and munitions, to go to the said inlet. I also ordered Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera to embark in said launches, in order that, upon landing, he should join the party which had advanced by land, and, looking over the terrain, lay out the camp, fortifying it with the trenches necessary for its defence.

At night the launches returned and in them the said Sargento mayor who reported that, having put in at Tiger Island to take shelter from a heavy downpour of rain which fell while they were en route there, to shelter the arms which had been wet, while they were throwing together a hut to protect the food supplies which had been wet, they heard musketry vollies fired on land. Whereupon, reëmbarking, the whole troop proceeded to the inlet and there landed, and marched about a quarter of a league inland, to join our troops. They told him they had arrived at the site of the first day’s engagement, where they had encountered a post of the enemy’s, whom they sent flying. The Scots left upon the field some dead, flintlocks and other arms, and a prisoner, whom he brought to me. Our people had advanced to occupy a mountain as high as it was precipitous. They occupied it and found a hut with certain spoils of the enemy, who, although he made various attempts to return to take it, and made various advances, had been unable to do so, because of the resistance our men put up.

During this time our troops who had remained on guard there, began to fortify themselves on the beach where, he said, Don Juan Herrera had left the plan perfectly laid down and the trenches in fair state of defence.

The twenty-ninth. This day, in view of the news I had received on the preceding, I ordered all the men who were in camp, the munitions and stores, to proceed to embark aboard the bergantine and the Portobello frigate (which had returned from Cartagena with subsistence on the 26th), to be transported to the said inlet. Having myself embarked at two in the afternoon, because the wind failed, we delayed the voyage until the next morning.

At vespers a launch came with a drummer of the enemy’s whom, when he had come to where our people were, they sent to me with the following letter:

Most illustrious sir: When we replied to the letter which you sent us a short time ago, we said that for lack of a competent interpreter we could not perfectly understand its meaning; later, when we came to understand it, we find that you bade us leave this neighbourhood.

Considering the grave detriment which may follow if the friendship which today prevails between the King of Great Britain and the Catholic King should be broken on our account, we have thought well to send these lines to inquire the conditions you offer us. We await your reply and meanwhile, are, most illustrious sir, very devotedly,

Fort Saint Andrew, 28th March, 1700.

The thirtieth. This day at dawn we weighed and, the wind failing, were unable to make the inlet until three in the afternoon. Having landed, I sent the drummer with the following reply:

What I wrote your honours by my drummer some days ago was that the generosity with which the king, my master, makes war, obliged me to say to your honours that it was time to speak, before my ships should enter that port, and my land forces those trenches, because, otherwise it would be difficult for me to grant quarter. Moreover, I would regret to have things come to this pass, because of the difficulty with which vessels of the burthen of mine which enter that port would have in getting out of it in two months, for business in which I shall need them.

Your honours’ drummer having arrived with your honours’ letter in which you say that, having come to understand my said communication better, you desire to know what terms I am ready to grant, mentioning to me the friendship which the king, my master, entertains for the King of Great Britain, and the evil consequences it will bring upon both crowns for matters to come to the extreme of my ships and land forces entering into that place, I must reply positively that if this occur, the blame rests on your honours, for on your honours it depends whether this occur or not; and the king, my master, will in this matter have right and justice upon his side, as is usual in all disputes in which his crown engages, especially since your honours cannot doubt that, both crowns being on good terms, as everybody knows, you shall receive the consideration and treatment due to vassals of an allied monarch. If, out of obstinacy, inopportunely disregarding your present situation, your honours do not surrender, especially when your honours are not unaware that, your honours’ commission being that of a trading company, I cannot employ with your honours the formalities of written agreements or capitulations, as I would were your honours of sufficient rank, instead of being minor officers only in the army of the King of Great Britain.

Our Lord preserve your honours as I desire.

Don Juan Pimienta

From aboard the frigate San Antonio, 29th March, 1700.

To the gentlemen commanding the Scots who are settled in the place called Zamora.

This same day I landed two field-pieces with their carriages and all equipment necessary for their transportation, conveying them to the place where our troops were encamped, whom I found entrenched to my satisfaction.

The thirty-first. This day, as soon as it was light, I went up to look over the mountain which our men occupied. It was almost inaccessible to human foot.

When I had returned to the camp a drummer arrived, who was brought in from a post I had sent out that morning to advance to certain trenches which ours had discovered a cannonshot from our camp. He brought me a letter as follows:

Sir: In our two preceding letters we have confessed our misfortune not to be able to understand fully the meaning of your first communication, for lack of an interpreter who can translate it; and we are today in the same difficulty, but we gather that you wish to know what we demand and also by what right we have taken possession and established ourselves in this place.

This paragraph, as well as some others, not having been made entirely clear to us, we have thought best again to send the bearer with the enclosed, entreating you to have the goodness to order some person skilled in languages to translate it into English, French or Flemish; after which you shall have an immediate and very full reply.

Also we send herewith an act of parliament which his Britannic majesty authorized for our establishment in America or elsewhere. Afterwards, before we sailed from Scotland, a conference was held in London on our right to this place, his majesty being present as well as his Catholic majesty’s ambassador. If there had been any impediment they would have hindered our proceeding, in which case we should have had to obey. Did we not fear to weary you we would have enclosed also the minutes of said council, his majesty being present.

We are, sir, your humble servants.

To which, having read it, I replied as follows:

I have understood very well your honours’ three communications (the first in English, the second translated into Latin, the third in French), but I recognize by the replies which your honours make to me that you have not understood mine. I have not inquired into the reasons why your honours occupy that place; much less do I desire to know on what conditions you are willing to leave it. As for the grounds your honours may have for being in possession there, I am informed in the matter. I have my orders and I know the understanding the king, my master, has with the King of Great Britain.

What I wrote to say to your honours in reply to your latest is that if out of whim you await the final extremity of this encounter at arms, and, as your honours represented to me, there should follow misunderstandings, misfortunes, and rupture between the two crowns, the fault will be your honours’ and not mine, for on your honours it depends to surrender in time, and not, especially when consideration of the aforesaid good understanding between our masters assures your honours that you would be treated as vassals of a friendly allied king, without the formality of capitulations which should not be made with the dependents of a merchant company merely tolerated by the king, their master.

This is all I have to say in the matter. If your honours do not understand it, you may send any officer you choose, under protection of my word, that, being informed of my intentions and determination, your honours may take the course you may consider best, and I mine.

In the meantime, I am your honours’ servant.

Don Juan Pimienta

As soon as I had dispatched the said drummer, leaving some garrison here to receive and protect the stores, I marched to a place which I had ordered Don Manuel de Puga to occupy with a body of one hundred and fifty men, about half a league distance from the camp. I took with me the battery of two field-pieces.

Arrived there, I ordered Don Manuel de Angulo to advance with one hundred men a cannonshot from our camp, which I found formed of very strong trenches, there planting the two guns to command two ways by which the enemy might approach.

This night, at mid-night, the alarm was sounded in our camp, which kept the men under arms a long time, without the cause being discoverable.

April 1. This day, at eight in the morning, there came to our camp a drummer accompanied by an engineer captain and an interpreter. They were halted by the first outpost, who advised me of it, and I went out to parley with him.

When I inquired of him if he brought authorization from his superiors to deliver the place to me, he answered no, that he came only to ask a cessation of hostilities until two the next afternoon; that in the morning there would come to this camp one of the superior officers vested with absolute authority. Further, he asked a mutual exchange of hostages, to all which I acceded, sending as my hostages Don Antonio Paredes and Don Pedro Sibaute, who, on this campaign, have been serving at my side. After they had taken their leave of me, immediately upon arriving in their camp, they sent me two captains of highest standing among them, whom I ordered quartered in the said advanced post, all pleasant treatment and entertainment possible, to be afforded them.

The second. This day, at seven in the morning, there arrived at the said advanced post, certain Scottish officers, among them one of the commanders. As soon as I was informed, I went to parley with him. He told me that they were ready to evacuate the place they occupied, provided I would permit them to withdraw all their artillery, ships, and stores, together with their personal property, leaving the bare place.

Having heard this, comprehending that it was not a proposal worthy my consideration, I bade them return to their camp, taking their hostages with them, and to return me mine. They withdrew, leaving the two captains who had come the day before until such time as mine appeared, when these returned to their camp.

Meantime, seeing that the enemy would not cease work on his fortifications, I ordered Don Manuel de Puga to advance with his troop to the place where Don Manuel de Angulo was; and I ordered the latter to advance with his men to where the enemy had his outposts, and to try to fortify himself there, as he did. Observing this, the Scots sent to inquire why, during a suspension of hostilities, I permitted military work to proceed. I replied that I was ignorant of the matter, that it must be some captain who had advanced and sought to entrench himself.

So, also, as soon as my hostages had arrived, I ordered Don Martin de Zeuallos with a body of one hundred and fifty men to advance to occupy a high mountain on the range of which was an enemy post, and, driving him out, to draw as near to the settlement as possible; which he did; and at five in the afternoon I received report that this body had encountered a party of the enemy on the summit who, when fired upon, at a single shot, abandoned the place, throwing themselves down the slope, leaving two or three dead on the field, and a lot of flintlocks, which our men made use of. I ordered subsistence and munitions sent to them.

The third. This day, in the morning, arrived Campmaster don Luis de Carrizoli with one hundred and twenty Indians from the Pacific side, who did nothing but devour stores. For what little they brought for our men they got a good price.

The fourth. This day, at nine, I began the march, leaving Don Luis de Carrizoli in that place with his Indians to bring up the stores, and I addressed myself to the mountain which Don Martin de Zeuallos occupied, the height and roughness of which seemed insurmountable, for it was all dense wilderness, without roads or trails, and nearly perpendicular. With the aid of God, we arrived at the top where I found the said Don Martin de Zeuallos entrenched. Without halting I went on until we arrived where the mountain began to slope down, and there, in a short time, felling trees and lopping branches, I made the camp and entrenched, and ordered a party of twenty-five men to descend to where a certain prostrate trunk, a gunshot from our trenches, afforded them sufficient protection.

The fifth. This day I ordered a party of one hundred and fifty men out to advance to occupy a hill a quarter of a league distant from our camp, and from there to send a squad forward to reconnoitre an enemy lookout, and also an inlet a musketshot from the settlement, to see if launches could come in there with the artillery.

In the afternoon I received report that they had made the said reconnaissance, but those who made it disagreed whether or not the inlet was suitable for the debarkation.

That night the enemy fired on our sentries, and two shots came into camp, without doing any damage; and at midnight we heard heavy firing in the bay.

The sixth. This day at nine I moved the camp forward to the hill which Don Martin de Zeuallos occupied with one hundred and fifty men, from where I sent a party of twenty-five men again to inspect the said inlet and lookout. They encountered an enemy outpost, who fled without hesitation, offering no resistance. Returning in the afternoon, they told me they had burned the hut which sheltered said lookout and inspected the inlet, which was very suitable for laden launches to enter.

Therefore I ordered Captains don Manuel de Puga, don Francisco Unguito and don Martin de Zeuallos to occupy it with their three parties, comprising three hundred men in all, and sent with them Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor, in order that, arriving at the inlet, they might entrench themselves there, as near the place as possible, entrenching themselves with all precaution and vigilance. The said Sargento mayor returned that night, reporting to me that the camp was laid out half a gunshot from the enemy’s palisades.

The seventh. This day, at seven, Governor don Miguel Cordones arrived in camp with one hundred and twenty-five men from the encampments at Santa Maria and Cana, and at —— o’clock I removed the camp to the said inlet where, having inspected the terrain, I found the trenches very much to my satisfaction.

The eighth. This day in the morning I ordered certain approaches to advance, and at eleven the flagship’s launch came into the inlet. The enemy fired hotly on it and on our camp, playing artillery on it, and firing on us with musketry, bombs, and some artillery, to which our muskets replied. The firing continued on both sides all day.

The launch brought us news that the firing we heard the night of the fifth were our two launches driving off an enemy schooner which, armed as a fireboat, sought to come in among our vessels, to set fire to them.

At eight at night the said launch cleared with order that, the following night, the commanders of our fleet should send me all the launches with the artillery, gun-carriages, mortars, timbers, bombs and other war materials needed for the batteries.

The ninth. This day, as soon as it dawned, the firing resumed and continued on both sides nearly all day.

At nine at night seven launches and boats arrived at our inlet with the materials mentioned. We worked all night disembarking and mounting the artillery and mortars, and at the same time I ordered Sargento mayor don Juan de Herrera to build a cannon-proof battery on a salient a pistolshot from the enemy, which point commanded all his place. He was busied in this all night.

The tenth. This dawn found us still working on the battery and the enemy firing upon it with flintlocks and artillery, as well as upon our camp; to which our musketry replied.

Considering that most of my men were ill because of the continuous marches through mountains never trodden by human foot before, over which they had to pack all the subsistence and munitions, in many places water as well, and because the rains threatened and the wet season was now beginning, I determined for the last time to send a drummer to the enemy’s camp to learn his decision, as I did, with a letter as follows:

With continued consideration to the amity and alliance which the king, my master, maintains with his Britannic majesty, I send this drummer to ask your honours whether, finally, in the situation in which I see that you are, and that in which your honours see that I am, you desire to surrender on the honourable conditions which I have proposed, or whether you stubbornly purpose to stand to the last assault by sea and by land, which I think your honours are not able to withstand, nor I to prevent your total destruction.

I await your honour’s choice, and remain, your servant.

Don Juan Pimienta

Having ordered our men to cease firing, as the enemy also stopped, the drummer returned shortly with the reply which was lost while being translated from the French, in which it was written, but was in substance as follows:

Sir: Having seen your letter in which you offer us terms of capitulation, which in all good will we were inclined to consider, we reply that those you offer are unworthy acceptance by men of honour, so shameful that to comply with them would so stigmatize us that we could never return to Scotland nor show ourselves in any of her ports.

Wherefore we consider it better to die honourably than to live without honour.

On seeing which I ordered Campmaster don Melchor de Guevara to advance to their fort with a drummer to summon them and to say to them on my behalf that it was not my desire to deprive any man of honour, nor would my obligations permit me to do so, especially when I held them to be honourable men, who had defended themselves as such; and, that they might realize this to be the truth, to bid one of their commanding officers return with him, under the protection of my word, to parley with me. Having understood my message, the Scots asked a cessation of hostilities until the next day at eight, during which time to determine among themselves what to propose to me next day. I agreed to this.

This day, our fleet having sighted a frigate and a schooner which were trying to make the port, the Campeachy vessel, the Castile frigate and the King’s bergantine gave chase, and followed them around Cape Tiburon.

In our camp we continued work on the battery.

The eleventh. This day, at seven, one of the commanders came, accompanied by certain of his officers. When I was informed I went to my advance posts to talk with them. They repeated the proposals they made on April 1st and I answered that I would permit them to evacuate with all military honours, with all their chattels and vessels, excepting the warship The Rising Sun. At this they asked permission to return to their fort to deliberate with the other commanding officers who were there, and they requested further that the suspension of hostilities might continue two hours, or until ten o’clock, when they would return with the reply. I conceded this.

They returned at the time said and after a long discussion we agreed to the attached terms of capitulation. As soon as these were signed they were to deliver to me one of their gates and a bastion of their fort.

At four in the afternoon I ordered Captains don Manuel de Puga, don Francisco Unguito and don Martin de Zeuallos to approach the place with three hundred men. To assemble these it was necessary to strip the sick soldiers of their uniforms, dressed in which many seamen marched (both from the bergantine and from the other vessels). Having entered the place in the manner usual under such circumstances, I took possession of the said bastion, and retired to my camp, where remained only invalids, negroes and mulattoes, leaving Campmaster don Melchor Ladron de Guevara in command of the infantry within the fortress.

The twelfth. This day, I was advised that the night before a little frigate had thrown herself into the port where the Scots were. This was the one our vessels had chased until they lost her from sight and returned the day before, to their station. The campmaster had not advised me of this. I sent to inquire why he had permitted the vessel to enter, bidding him put a guard aboard, that there might be no communication with the people ashore, or aboard the ships. To which he replied that he had not been aware of the said frigate’s entrance nor saw his way to get a guard aboard. In view of this reply I went to the place and told him that if he did not know how to command, to withdraw to camp, that I would put in his stead somebody who did; that this and also various complaints against him, from the infantry, which had reached my ears, had annoyed me considerably.

The thirteenth. This day I sent the Florizant to Portobello with news of the victory and fall of the place, having in the morning of the day before dispatched the bergantine to Cartagena with the same tidings.

The Scots began to embark their clothing and men.

The fourteenth. Nothing noteworthy occurred this day, and the enemy continued to embark.

The fifteenth-eighteenth. These days nothing more notable occurred than that the enemy continued to embark.

The nineteenth. This day, passing from our inlet in a launch to the Scottish port, I found an Indian canoe tied to their ships, which was delivering some subsistence to them. I had these Indians brought to my launch and sent them prisoners to camp.

The twentieth. This day, the infantry’s complaints against the said campmaster continuing (in addition to the not very good opinion I had of him), I ordered Captain don Zeledon de Zarauz to come ashore and the said campmaster to retire to the Almudena, aboard which he had come from Portobello, leaving the said Captain don Zeledon in his place.

The twenty-first. This day nothing of note occurred, only the Scots continued to embark.

The twenty-second. This day, the Scots having totally evacuated the place, I entered into it, dedicating as its first temple one of their warehouses, where the first mass was said, consecrating the place to Saint Charles.

In the afternoon of this day I went aboard my flagship, ordering the launches to go next day to help warp the Scottish ships out. For lack of this assistance they had been unable to clear in the morning.

The twenty-third. This day, for lack of wind, the Scots did not clear. Our fleet’s launches went to their port in order to help the said ships to get away the next morning.

The twenty-fourth. This day, at dawn, aided by our launches, all the vessels of the Scots came out from their port, leaving behind some anchors they lost in weighing. Having got out, they lay to, and came aboard this flagship to ask me for their passport, which I gave them, as per attached. Having received it, they returned to their ships and made sail.

The twenty-fifth. This day, at dawn, the Scottish ships were seen, proceeding north and steering for sea. At noon, when we had lost them from view, the King’s bergantine entered, which I had sent to Cartagena with supplies.

The twenty-sixth and -seventh. These days nothing occurred beyond our preparations to return to Cartagena.

The twenty-eighth. This day the schooner arrived which had gone with the bergantine to Cartagena for supplies.

Having had various complaints from the infantry concerning his insufferable character, I ordered Governor don Miguel Cordones, who was at the time aboard the flagship, to go ashore and replacing Don Zeledon de Zarauz, himself to govern until such time as the Conde de Canillas should provide a governor for that place, where, in addition to what the enemy left there in accordance with the terms of capitulation, I added everything necessary for the celebration of mass, a canoe, a tortoise-net, and a small drag net of his majesty’s.

The twenty-ninth. This day, as soon as it was light, I ordered a gun fired in signal to weigh, and the foretopsail reefed. At noon I ordered a second signal fired, and weighed with this flagship, the San Francisco, the bergantine, the dispatch-boat, and a schooner. Having got to sea we sighted a sail which, when it came up, we found to be the Florizant with replies to the letters I had sent to the Conde de Canillas. This vessel joined us on our return to Cartagena.

The thirtieth. This day we continued our voyage until the 8th, when with all good fortune we entered this port.

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 164.)

Sir

I report to your lordship that my forces are in Caledonia (God be thanked!). Campmaster don Antonio Joseph de Paredes will recount to your lordship the circumstances of the capitulations and all the rest.

Summarizing the instructions which your lordship communicated to me when I arrived here with respect to the maintenance of this place, the occasion having arisen I beg to report to your lordship that it can be held as long as your lordship may desire. Don Miguel Cordones wishes to remain in this place, in command as governor of the province; and so does Campmaster Melchor de Guevara. I leave the choice to your lordship, for I wish the selection to be whichever your lordship find more suitable and to your lordship’s taste, which shall guide my actions upon every occasion in which your lordship may command me.

If your lordship should wish to write to Spain, he may do so by this vessel, which I am clearing as a dispatch-boat.

On this occasion Captain don Estacio de Messa goes to fulfil the orders your lordship gave me.

Since Don Antonio de Paredes is to proceed to Lima as fast as he can, I entreat your lordship to facilitate his journey inasmuch as it is for the good of the King’s service to inform the viceroy of the state of this region, that he may contribute what he can, as I hope your lordship will, for your lordship’s part.

Our Lord preserve your lordship the many years that I desire.

Your lordship’s greatest servant kisses your lordship’s hand.

Caledonia, 12th April, 1700.

Don Juan Pimienta (Rubric)

Conde de Canillas.

[Refer to Appendix XII for articles of capitulation of which a copy in Spanish accompanied this dispatch.]

(Archives of the Indies, Seville, Audiencia de Panamá, L. 164.)

Sire

On this occasion and with Campmaster don Diego de Avila y Pacheco who goes to that kingdom, I remit to your majesty acknowledgment of the royal dispatches brought by the two dispatch-boats which (within a month) were received in this realm, and my obedience to your majesty’s royal mandates to resume this presidency. I send also attested copies of the depositions made by the Scots who came into this city of Portobello to surrender, and of those of two others they took prisoners in the province of Darien and sent to me; and evidence of the prompt measures I took, because of this news and with these incentives, for the extermination of the Scots, who had settled in the same place as the first, making use of their fortifications.

For immediately I sent letters to Cartagena, which I wrote to Don Juan Pimienta before Admiral don Francisco de Salmon arrived in this port, and after the news of his arrival; and I wrote to him, all of which your majesty will order seen in the copies I remit.

Since he was present in this city, basing it upon his careful observations, Don Diego Davila can give another report in all matters concerning which your majesty may deign to have him questioned. And because it is highly important that these advices reach your majesty, I have charged him to hasten his voyage with all possible speed and to go by the routes he may consider to be shortest.

For, your majesty having been pleased to have me informed that with all energy a squadron was being raised, in command of Admiral General don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete, I much desire to have Don Diego Davila arrive, that, with definite news of what Don Juan Pimienta and I are accomplishing against these Scots, for their dislodgment, your majesty may avoid the heavy expenses which are being incurred in outfitting the squadron under Don Pedro Fernandez Navarrete. Or, in case these expenditures have been made for some other operation, it may contribute to the good of your majesty’s service and prove less costly than those undertaken in this America, where there is no source or revenue to maintain more forces than the regulars assigned this kingdom, in itself so sterile in agricultural products and live stock, and sustained on the tardy provisions made by Peru. The zealous efforts of no minister suffice to meet these obligations, which are all enough to eat heavily into your majesty’s treasury because of the very high price of everything, especially if fidelity keep not a hand on them.

Having heard in reply from Don Juan Pimienta and of his readiness to undertake this expedition, although worried by the absence from his port of two of the three ships of Don Diego de Peredo’s command, I resolved to go to Portobello on 6th February, with five hundred men selected from this garrison, militia, and eighty seamen, for whom Don Francisco Salmon asked me, to man his ships with both infantry and seamen.

Two days before I began the march, I had letters from the two captains of Don Diego de Peredo’s squadron, informing me that they had gone out to patrol the coast and had put in to this port because they must overhaul their ships. I reached Portobello on the 10th, having lost not an hour of time.

Indeed, I had gained it by my orders to Lieutenant General don Marcos de Montoya, sending him what flour there was in Panama, that he might be making biscuit with it and with what more his assiduous zeal obtained from certain vessels belonging to the slave trade concession. I sent also as many arrobas of meat and vegetables[?] as could be had, and everything needed for a general outfitting for an important campaign of indeterminate duration.

With the favour of God we accomplished our task in twelve days, and the twenty-fourth after I arrived in this city, which was on the 10th, well manned with land and sea forces, there cleared from this port Admiral don Francisco Salmon’s flagship; his patache; the two from Cartagena; another I made ready and armed with twenty-two pieces of artillery, Captain don Antonio de Echeuerz (it had just arrived from the Campeachy ways); and a prize that was in this port, held under embargo by Lieutenant General don Marcos de Montoya.

These six vessels carried one thousand and seventy men, four field pieces to be landed, two bombing mortars, and a large quantity of grenades, all which your majesty sent. In this number of troops were included three companies which Don Francisco Salmon brought. He had left ninety-five of their men in Cartagena as he was required by Don Juan Pimienta’s orders. These one thousand and seventy men were supplied for thirty-four days, and among them went Chief Engineer don Melchor Ladron de Guevara whom your majesty sent for the Darien operations.

Don Juan Pimienta left Cartagena with the large ship San Juan Bautista, Don Diego Peredo, and the dispatch-boat for Spain (which he detained and carried with him), and a bergantine with supplies. Unfortunately, although at this season of westerly wind the voyage should have required twenty-four hours to the place where the Scots are fortified, he beat about for twenty-six days.

Don Francisco Salmon had been out nine with his ships, and had made various efforts to find Don Juan Pimienta when Our Lord was pleased that, having anchored within sight of the Scots, he should chance to send out two vessels to reconnoitre one that was seeking to enter the enemy port, and, chasing her, these came upon Don Juan Pimienta and led him to where Don Francisco Salmon was.

The first engagement on land your majesty will find in the letter I enclose from Engineer don Melchor de Guevara, who was charged to write. I send the original, although he has thrown in other homely matters none of which should be concealed from your majesty.

Information concerning Don Juan Pimienta’s other operations your majesty will order seen in the latest letters which I have just received from him, from Don Francisco Salmon, from Don Diego Peredo, and from Capitan de mar y guerra don Manuel de Toca y Velasco, which show developments to the date of said letters. These are the latest advices I have had up to the date, 14th April, on which I write this letter.

Before I left Panama I sent requisite orders to Don Miguel Cordones, governor of Darien, and to Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli, the first to march with the three militia companies of that province and as many more men as he could raise, and Don Luis Carrizoli with the friendly Indians who have maintained their allegiance. I specified the manner in which they were to march, the scouts they were to keep well in advance, to watch the sea on the north for your majesty’s fleet, the signals they were to make, prearranged with Don Juan Pimienta, that they might be intelligible to both. Don Miguel Cordones set out, and on the range met a body of Scots and Indians who compelled him to retire, with loss, he says, of three men.

Considering the need the army might have of this body of men, not so much on account of their number as in order that the enemy might see your majesty’s arms in motion everywhere in this kingdom, orders were repeated to them to reform and carry out the march in the form specified, without fear of encountering parties of the enemy, since, finding themselves besieged by sea and land, they would not weaken their strength by sending them out from the fortified area. I send your majesty the camp lieutenant’s letter written to Don Geronimo de Cordoba at Panama, in which he gives news of the second march which Don Miguel Cordones and Carrizoli undertook. Reckoning the time, I judge they joined our forces in camp four or six days ago.

In addition to the first provision made for the six vessels, which left this port supplied for thirty-four days, I later sent three more ships with supplies (including the one which goes to-morrow, by which I write to Don Juan Pimienta in reply to his three letters, which reply I enclose herewith), despite the fact that with the preceding shipments all the people for whom I am responsible were supplied until the 6th or 8th of May, without the ten thousand rations I now send forward. And in one vessel, eighty of the paid regulars of these garrisons, reinforcements that the ships may have the greater strength for their operations.

How it has been possible to carry out these measures, in the barrenness of this kingdom, I cannot explain to your majesty, for to Our Lord alone are the thanks due, in Whom I trust to afford your majesty’s Catholic zeal the consolation of preventing heresy from treading the soil of these lands, to contaminate the purity of our Holy Faith, to preserve which is your majesty’s first and supreme concern; and to me remains the honour of having your majesty’s graciousness use my obedience as an instrument in these operations.

For the past seventy days I have been in this city of Portobello with the reinforcement necessary for its defence, and Captains don Juan de Retes and don Felipe Betancourt, whose zeal I have always elected to have present with me. Although in such grave danger to my life, in this intemperate climate, I shall remain here until this business is brought to an end and Don Francisco Salmon return with his ships.

Our Lord preserve the Catholic royal person of your majesty as Christianity has need.

El Conde de Canillas (Rubric)

Your honour will leave for Rancho Viejo the instant weather permits, and will endeavour to have them clear you promptly from there.

Your honour will report by word of mouth that I have three hundred men fortified on a hill; and on the beach the vessels that your honour will observe in passing, to see if they can find a way from that height to said beach, in order to remove the rest of my camp.

God preserve your honour many years.

Pimienta

Matanzas, 21st March, 1700.

Your honour will report also that a deserter, a sergeant, has arrived, who says about the same thing the other did, who came in three days ago.

To the captain of the Portobello schooner.

Dear sir: The day that I landed in this camp I reported to your lordship on events here to that date, to which I can add only that I sent a drummer last Monday to these Scots, bidding them surrender. They replied to me that they intended to defend themselves, maintaining their honour and their enterprise, as they hoped in God to be able to do.

Not a deserter has come in to this camp nor have we succeeded in taking any prisoner, although I have endeavoured, and much wished to do so, in order to acquire news of their strength and stores. Judging by what I have learned, it seems most probable that they have at present subsistence for three or four weeks, and that their number is as many as eight hundred.

I am well fortified in this camp and daily expect the arrival of Campmaster Carrizoli and the men your lordship may be able to send me.

As to your lordship’s latest, of the 15th instant, I can only say to your lordship that in execution of all of your lordship’s wise instructions, I have ordered Royal Official don Bernardo de Zuñiga to accompany me to take charge of whatever your lordship may send, in the same manner that he receives what comes from Cartagena, from where, although we wasted twenty-six days on a voyage which with favouring winds should have taken twenty-four hours (which has altered my plans with respect to food supplies), there have arrived from there two vessels laden with subsistence and on the 16th I cleared two more for the same purpose.

Don Francisco Salmon has sent me the letters which your lordship writes him. In this connection I can only say to your lordship that, since your lordship was unable (as I positively believe) to come in person to command the forces of this province by sea or land, as I hoped, I think it well, while I command them, that none should fast while watching others eat; but that, on an equality, the men of that province and of Cartagena should be supplied, without distinction. Later, that province’s officials and those of Cartagena, according to their enrollments and expenditures, can adjust accounts and settle up as the reckoning may show the balance to lie. Unless your lordship’s superior judgment provide otherwise, to which in this and any other matter I shall always with great pleasure conform.

I send your lordship that paper in the best shape I am able, from here, with the latest letter I have received from his excellency, the Conde de la Monclova, that your lordship may please shortly to remit the fifty thousand pesos mentioned, to Portobello, out of that amount meeting the cost of transportation from Panama to Portobello, where your lordship can leave it arranged that this money be delivered to my order, for I believe it best to have it there at hand, to be shipped aboard these vessels for its greater safety, once this enterprise be accomplished, as I trust in God that it will be.

From Rancho Viejo on this same occasion they will send your lordship by my order the copy of my letter and the reply of these Scots which is all of which I have to advise your lordship at present.

Our Lord preserve your lordship the many years that I desire.

From this Camp Matanzas, 21st March, 1700.

Your lordship’s greatest servant kisses your lordship’s hand.

Don Juan Pimienta (Rubric)

To the Conde de Canillas.

Dear sir: After I had written to your lordship, a Scotch deserter arrived this morning at nine, who says he is a gentleman and looks like a subordinate officer. I have examined him insofar as I thought it desirable.

As for stores, he says they have enough to last three months on the short rations they give. That dysentery augments. That there are not more than three hundred veteran troops. That eight or nine days ago a schooner left with news of them for Jamaica and that the officers keep them up on high hope of relief.

That in the place where my detachment had the encounter they have a post under a captain with more than a hundred men, and with raw hide cannons, and that it is the only avenue by which they suppose I can approach them. That most of their vessels are armed as fireships, that every night one of them goes out to reconnoitre ours, and he believes they mean to try to burn them. That although the stores are, in quantity, as he has said, in quality they are of the worst; as is borne out by what I have seen and a biscuit he carries.

In view of all which I have taken the corresponding measures and with the aid of God lose not an atom of hope that we shall bring them to surrender, especially if your lordship can send me reinforcements with which to advance under the cannons of their place, closing up all these approaches where their posts are, of which, without this deserter, I have positive information.

Our Lord preserve your lordship many years.

From this Camp on Matanzas River, 22d March, 1700.

Your lordship’s greatest servant kisses your lordship’s hand.

Don Juan Pimienta (Rubric)

To the Conde de Canillas.

Dear sir: By the date of my letters which your lordship will receive on this occasion, your lordship will observe that this schooner should have left that port of Rancho Viejo for Portobello two days ago. The reason it did not do so was that word has been sent me that another schooner is being careened ashore and this must be the one to return to Rancho Viejo and from there carry these dispatches on.

In reply to those which your lordship has been pleased to write to me, I can only say that until I have your lordship’s answer to those herewith enclosed, I shall be preparing to send your lordship Don Estazio, as your lordship commands, and to execute with greatest pleasure all that your lordship may desire.

I have sent some troops out from this camp with the intention to shut this enemy into his place and cut off certain of his advanced posts, from which I hope in God for the victory, and may He preserve your lordship the years that I desire.

Your lordship’s greatest servant kisses your lordship’s hand.

Don Juan Pimienta (Rubric)

Very illustrious Sir

I find myself with two letters from your lordship, 15th and 19th instant. Both assure me of your lordship’s good health, which I pray Our Lord to extend through happy years, my own being as wholly at your lordship’s order as is to be presumed from my great obligation, which can never fail while my uselessness continue to merit orders at your lordship’s pleasure which shall accredit this truth.

In the letters which Don Juan writes your lordship I see that he recounts all that is occurring in that camp; and because I know with what pleasure and satisfaction your lordship awaits good news, I cannot refrain from reporting same, advising your lordship how, on the 24th instant, my ensign came from Port Carreto, with whom from our camp of Matanzas, Don Juan sent us a deserter who had come in of his own accord, an intelligent man, one of the many traders they brought over. He was asked many questions.

First, he was asked what forces the enemy has; and he says that he has as many as seven hundred men, of whom four hundred and fifty are effectives.

Asked what food supplies they have, he said enough for six months at half a pound of bread in flour and half a pound of meat, but this latter inedible because it has gone bad. That drink (the sort of thing most appreciated by this canaille) was scarce or lacking, and that the people were little pleased by this drouth.

Questioned concerning their fortifications, he says they have ashore thirty pieces of artillery, 24-, 18- and 12-, most of them trained toward the sea, including among these two bound in raw hide. All are mounted, most on trucks. Given their skill, he has no doubt they have put these pieces into working order. He further says that the large ship carries thirty pieces on one side, and, on the other, stone to ballast the ship, and midship hawsers, which we see from here.

The enemy has also three fireships—a pink and two schooners. This deserter charges us earnestly to observe every precaution at night, because the enemy intends to fire our vessels.

Asked also why, in view of the superiority of our forces, nobody deserts to us, he says the officers circulated the report that the Spaniards gave no quarter, and on Scotland’s behalf promise that they will be rewarded. Not all believe this nonsense, to which the officers gave currency, and says they would desert to us were they not prevented by the good watch kept on them. We gather that this is true from what another deserter tells us, who arrived in his majesty’s schooner on the 28th.

This is a sergeant in active service who confirms everything the other says except the matter of the six months’ supplies. He says they haven’t more than enough for two months, and that when we come up closer many will desert to our camp, facilitating which will assure the success of the land operations. This man deserted on the 25th from the enemy’s most advanced position, which is their lookout.

He was also asked what the Scottish leaders say of these ships not entering the port, and he says they say that unless they receive relief it is hunger which will compel them to surrender.

This deserter says that the day he came over he heard firing, and doubtless he did, according to what Don Juan writes that he has detached the larger portion of troops from our camp and addressed them to the lookout, first line of the enemy’s fortifications. He writes very pleased and cheerful and says he hopes in God to be able to report the outcome of the happy day.

From what we can see, heavy damage can be inflicted on them from land, and on that day we will all do our part, as in duty bound to the church and to our monarch, since to this end both Majesties have disposed to keep your lordship in continual turmoil, on whom it depends to support these forces and keep them in good temper. Experience shows us that all of us, generally, must thank your lordship repeatedly and in the name of the King, our lord. I hope to do this in person.

The presitta del vino[?] put in at Cartagena. It brought some supply of wine, which is of little or no use; can’t be drunk. Captain Bernal went to Cartagena and has returned to Carreto. He also brings some subsistence.

As soon as Don Juan landed he sent an embassy to the enemy, informing them that he had arrived here with these sea and land forces and that the king, our master, with his great benignity, bade him make war on persons occupying in his dominions the place called Zamora, but before he began war on them, for them to state what right they had; and they answered that they had[?] our forces, and for lack of an interpreter could not reply to all of his letter, but that, having grasped the substance of it, they must defend their honour to the last extremity.

This is the news which I am at present able to lay before your lordship’s great comprehension. I will report on later developments as well as ask Our Lord to preserve the most illustrious person of your lordship the years He is able and I have need.

Anchored off the beach of Rancho Viejo, 29th March, 1700.

Most illustrious sir, your lordship’s devoted subject and faithful servant.

Don Manuel de Toca y Velasco (Rubric)

To the Most Illustrious Conde de Canillas.

Most Illustrious Sir

My dear sir: The last schooner which left here for that port carried no letter of mine, for it was sent off with malicious intention to leave my letters behind. Now this one is going with dispatches for your lordship from General don Juan Pimienta.

I am inconsolable that this campaign, which when we left that port we expected to be an easy matter, has not come to an end. Yet I hope in God that the conclusion, which has cost your lordship so much exertion, may yet be achieved.

I send some sick men who are shipped because they cannot be cared for here and are of no further use in this campaign.

From the attached memorandum which I send to your lordship, your lordship will see what stores have been distributed to the men in your lordship’s command who are ashore, and what I have remaining aboard this galleon and the other ships of your lordship’s command.

I also enclose the letter I have this day received from Campmaster don Melchor de Guavara in view of which we should ponder the state and condition of things on land, a matter which I regret keenly although I can remedy nothing.

The fifty hogsheads of wine and six of brandy, and the fifty pessos de Belas [sails or candles?] which the said don Juan Pimienta sends, and the rest, is being distributed among our ships and his. Your lordship will afford me pleasure by sending me nothing, since everything only occasions misunderstandings and a shower of papers. All there is seems little to them and they do not consider that the Cartagena squadron is not in your lordship’s command.

As to the two thousand pesos, from the enclosed papers your lordship will see what is happening. I shall deliver them for I do not wish to listen to this gentleman. Your lordship has a recourse.

I was about to send Captain Anastasio to confer with your lordship concerning certain matters. I was sending said captain in order not to trust them to writing. I will say only this: This dispatch-boat is here to the end that it may go to Spain as soon as this engagement is over, and in it, I understand, will go no dispatches but Don Juan Pimienta’s. But it will be easy to arrange that your lordship’s arrive many days in advance. I reserve this matter for another occasion.

Your lordship will understand perfectly what mood I am in without a real, bound to eat biscuit and jerked beef like any ship’s boy on this vessel. I beg your lordship, on account of my salary now due, or any other way your lordship like, to send me something. I remit to your lordship the news received to-day from the field, which is the same the first one furnished, with little difference.

Also I send the deposition of the first, which was taken aboard the flagship.

I have made certain suggestions to Don Juan Pimienta and to them he answered me that he will do as he sees fit, as your lordship will observe from the letter received to-day.

I charge your lordship to send the schooner back promptly, for we need it here badly.

My son and I remain at your lordship’s orders with entire subservience, whom God preserve many years.

Most illustrious sir,

Don Francisco Salmon (Rubric)

I have your honours’ letters and note all the good measures taken.

As for Don Francisco Salmon’s, in view of the letter I wrote Royal Official don Bernardo de Zuñiga, it occurs to me to answer that, by the letter I write the Conde de Canillas, he must have understood that, as I wrote to your honours in my preceding letter, these troops are to be maintained without any distinction whatever; the officers in whose charge is the management of these matters to adjust their accounts later. This is no affair of Don Francisco Salmon’s, much less to advise this royal official whether he can or cannot deliver to him the two thousand patacones which the Conde de Canillas sent; and less yet to inform him whether it is time or not to spend those two thousand patacones on food supplies. Certainly it is not usual for him to have the distribution of this money, rather than the royal officials whom his majesty has here for such purposes.

The Castile launch is needed here and it is advisable to send me your honours’, manning her with good seamen.

In the other matters concerning which your honours write, I shall proceed as I deem to be best.

Meanwhile, I repeat to your honours that, your ships being properly supplied, you will send me the remaining subsistence, war materials and other things intended for the use of these troops, to this place, to be delivered against receipt, to the said Royal Official don Bernardo de Zuñiga.

The schooner returns, as your honours’ request.

I am hourly expecting favourable news, which I hope in Our Lord to receive from a considerable party I have out. As best your honours may be able you will this night watch the landing place this side Coco lookout, sending some craft for news, which I hope in God to be able to furnish of a happy sort.

With nothing more to add to your honours, whose lives may God preserve many years.

Don Juan Pimienta

Most Illustrious Sir

My dear sir: I shall be most delighted should this find your illustrious lordship in the perfection of health, both because of your illustrious lordship’s great deserts as also because of the true regard I profess for your illustrious lordship.

The latest letters I have from Don Juan Pimienta I remit to your illustrious lordship accompanied by other private letters.

Although I think that in them your illustrious lordship will find detailed news, I cannot refrain from advising that I am highly, ardently desirous to see the end of this campaign. The son of obedience, however, places this virtue (as being of major importance) before everything which zeal may incite or valour promise.

Yesterday Don Juan Pimienta sent me a Scotsman who fled from the Scottish camp to ours. As soon as he arrived aboard this flagship I took his deposition, which I sent to Don Juan Pimienta, and to your illustrious lordship I send the same (though in military form), and the letter which the said gentlemen wrote to the Scots, and translation of their reply. Given your illustrious lordship’s great intelligence, your illustrious lordship will infer what remains to be done after these occurrences, and in order not to fall into the weakness of, as they say, telling merry tales, or into the unhappiness of saddening your illustrious lordship, I call the halt here, referring to what will have been written to your illustrious lordship and to the weather, which is of such importance in this matter. The season has begun sooner than we, although it is not too late, if our fortune is good.

And I must say to your illustrious lordship with the sincerity becoming to my obligations that the best that may befall us will be due to the great foresight, zeal, and care with which your illustrious lordship has provided in this case, as always; for, otherwise, it would be impossible to remain at this anchorage so long a time. For my part, I render to your illustrious lordship a thousand thanks, for, in addition to wishing your illustrious lordship all ease, because of the veneration and esteem I feel for your illustrious lordship, as one so interested in the success of this enterprise, also I must make it manifest to your illustrious lordship, who I trust will include me among those whom your illustrious lordship favours, granting me the honour of your illustrious lordship’s protection, and believing me to be he who most earnestly desires to be busied in your illustrious lordship’s service, whose most illustrious person God preserve many and happy years as I desire and need.

Most illustrious sir

Don Diego de Peredo (Rubric)

His Excellency don Juan Diaz Pimienta, etc., having this date sent us a Scotsman who deserted from those who are settled at Zamora in the province of Darien, and ordered us to make the most of the news he furnishes of the design entertained by the aforesaid Scots, Governor don Diego de Peredo, commanding the squadron of warships detailed to guard the Mainland coast, ordered me, notary del gobierno [of the pilot-ship?] San Juan Bautista, flagship of said squadron, to take the said Scottish deserter’s deposition according to the tenor of the questionnaire:

Having learned his name, age, and birthplace, to have him state why he deserted, what day, and tell what forces the said Scots have, what relief they expect and whence;

What artillery, calibre of the guns they have in their fortifications on the seafront, whether mounted on carriages;

For what length of time he thinks they have subsistence and munitions;

Of what burden is the ship they have, and the other vessels; what number of seamen and how distributed; what artillery they have landed from said ship; what pieces it has mounted, and the other vessels;

And what is their design and plan of campaign.

In conformity with the said Governor don Diego de Peredo’s orders, this date I, Domingo Dominguez, notary of the aforesaid gobierno San Juan Bautista, flagship of this squadron, received the deposition and oath in legal form, of John Frazier[?] in the presence of Governor don Diego de Peredo and the interpreter, Don Eduardo [Edward Monihan?], chaplain of said ship. Deponent promised to speak the truth on the oath he took, and, being interrogated, said:

In reply to the first question, that his name is John Frazier[?] that he is about twenty-two years old, native of the city of Aberdeen, in the north of the kingdom of Scotland.

Asked why he deserted from the Scots who are settled in the said place in Darien, he says he deserted because of the very hard work and scanty food they gave him on which to sustain himself; that he fled on the 21st of the current month.

Asked what the Scottish forces are at the present time in the said place of Darien, what relief they expect, and whence, he answers that there are about six or seven hundred men, of whom about four hundred and fifty are effectives; that they expect relief from Jamaica; and, from Scotland, four warships with reinforcements, subsistence, and munitions, to come shortly. This was public report among his people.

Asked what artillery they have trained toward the sea in their fortifications, what calibre, whether mounted on carriages or rollers, he answers that they have thirty or thirty-one cannons, eight of these being twenty-four, and the rest eighteen- and eight-pounders, all mounted on carriages which they brought from Scotland, except one, which is on rollers.

Asked for how long they are supplied, he answers for six or seven months, on half a pound in flour and a quarter pound of salt meat, which is the ration they give, in addition to which they have what fish they catch and some little fruit the Indians bring them; and that they have sufficient powder and cannonballs, although they are somewhat short of balls for the flintlocks. That they have fourteen or fifteen light brass cannons covered with very thick leather, which are exceedingly manageable; and these are mounted and trained inland.

Asked the burthen of the ship in their port, and the other vessels; what seamen they have, how distributed; what artillery they have landed from said ship’s armament, what of it is mounted; and from aboard the other vessels; and what design and plan for war they have, he answers that:

The big ship’s armament is sixty-two guns, eighteen-pounders in the lower tier, and ten- in the upper, those of the quarter-deck and forecastle being smaller; and that the other vessels are two pinks, a little frigate and two schooners. That one pink carries fourteen pieces and is armed as a fireship, at the mouth of the port. The other carries sixteen; the frigate, four, also armed as a fireship; and one schooner, four pieces, also armed as a fireship; and the second schooner, two cannons and some perriers. Their complement is two hundred and fifty seamen, included in the total of six or seven hundred men. That the armament of the said ships is as he has stated, distributed as he has said. They have landed none of the ship’s artillery; on the contrary, one of the engineers has carried out a scheme whereby the vessel can use all of its artillery from one side, which is that toward the port.

He says that their plan is to see if they can succeed in using one of their fireships against this flagship, and that to this end the said fireship came out from the port, but because she was met by the armed launches which nightly go out from this squadron to stand guard at the harbour mouth, they failed in the attempt, but have not abandoned the intention.

He says that these are the plans and designs of the said Scots and that all that he has spoken is the truth and what he knows to be true; and that being himself now among Spaniards he would say naught to damage them. And because it is so, he signed.

Aboard this flagship.

As did the said Governor don Diego de Peredo, the Licentiate don Eduardo [illegible] and Don Juan Antonio Valdez.

In witness [here the notarial sign] of the truth.

Notary, Domingo Dominguez (Rubric)

At Rancho Viejo, 25th March, 1700.

[Copy of Pimienta’s message to the Scots, Matanzas, 15th March; and of their reply of even date, omitted. See Appendix XXXI for these.]

Most Illustrious Sir

My dear sir: I have just received from Captain don Francisco de Tobar a letter from your illustrious lordship, dated the 15th instant, by which I see that your illustrious lordship is in enjoyment of the good health which my regard desires him, news at which I rejoice in proportion to my loyalty. Here, my own being good, I again place it at your illustrious lordship’s service, to whom I give due thanks for the continuance of his favours.

The last time the schooner came I had not the fortune to learn of your illustrious lordship’s health, because Don Juan Pimienta had ordered me to land on this beach with two hundred men and to fortify myself here, that he might later come in person with the rest of the men and materials for artillery and mortars, believing, as he had been assured, that they could debark here and proceed overland to the enemy’s fortification.

I discovered this to be impracticable; but of the Indians and a Frenchman (one of those at El Coco) having learned that near the enemy there was a river navigable for the launches and suitable for debarkation (although they pointed out to me the difficulty that because this river was the only source from which the Scots got water, they would oppose our entrance with all their strength), I resolved to send a launch by sea with ten men and an officer, and an Indian guide to show them the entrance to the river, whither I marched with the rest of the troops, with the intention of occupying it and fortifying myself there.

I came to the ascent of Carreto mountain, where I encountered an enemy outpost, who sounded to arms. Nevertheless I continued the march to the summit, where I had a second brush with another enemy outpost whom I found behind some tree trunks thrown across the road. I compelled them to retire, as I had the first, and continued to advance until, descending the said mountain, I met certain Indians who told me that the enemy was very near and coming to meet me. At this news I disposed my men and pressed forward.

I found the enemy fortified this side the said river and when the first line began the fight with them I ordered Captain don Zeledon to support them with his party until the rest could come up. The way was very narrow and rough and they could advance in single file only. The captain of grenadiers having come up with his men and Don Manuel de Angulo, infantry captain from Cartagena, with others, because of the enemy’s heavy firing and without waiting for the rest, I attacked with these two parties, ordering the drummers to beat the charge, in order that those behind should come on, as they did. God was pleased that we should drive the enemy from the post; and three times we repulsed them when they attempted to expel us from it, during the hour this combat lasted. We pursued until they took cover in a dense wood and we remained on the beach which is behind their fort.

I would have fortified myself there had I not run out of ammunition. It was impossible to send me any by sea, for this is all inaccessible coast; and there was no potable water. For these reasons I resolved to withdraw in good order with all the wounded (they were fourteen), leaving nothing behind.

I arrived at ten at night on the other side of the mountain and, continuing the march, on the 12th re-entered this camp.

On the 13th Don Juan Pimienta arrived. On being informed of all this, he approved, and resolved that we should camp here to await Carrizoli and his Indians, in order to learn of them or from others through them, if there is a nearer place or easier way over which to transport the subsistence and equipment, to get at the enemy by land.

What I can say of the Scots is that those we met were regulars. I recognize them in that they wanted no quarter and came back into fire three times. Their dead, that we saw, some estimate at twenty, and I think they had as many more wounded. Our people conducted themselves with great courage, for which I have thanked them.

I trust your illustrious lordship will have offered up the same to God, Our Lord, for all of us, not doubting that your illustrious lordship’s prayers and the zeal with which your illustrious lordship ordered His Divine Majesty exposed in this realm, furnished us so good a day [Thursday, on which the Church, generally, celebrates].

We can say that we . . . [illegible] . . . those who came with Don Miguel Cordones. May God continue events favourable to them and grant me the grace of shortly giving your illustrious lordship news of the surrender of this place, as I desire.

Don Francisco de Tobar, captain of the company of quadroons, having returned to that city ill, finding myself with no one to command that company upon this occasion, I requested Don Juan Pimienta to give its captaincy to Ensign don Domingo de Rueda, and he comported himself very well the day of the engagement. Captain don Francisco de Tobar having returned, the other continues to serve as a reformado, which I trust your illustrious lordship will approve; as also that, the Cruzes company, which is without a captain, having landed, I had this vacancy filled by Ensign don Gregorio de Castañeda, who was one of those who advanced in the lead, and was shot through the thigh.

One of my aides (Bartolomé Ronquete, who was with me the day of the fight, the other having remained behind, ill) finds that the sergeants of the Cartagena infantry can take no orders from him because he has never been an ensign of infantry. Inasmuch as those who had that rank in Spain were made captains, if it be possible, I beg your illustrious lordship to do me the honour to confer that rank upon him in that city or here, in the infantry which shipped aboard the Almudena and is ashore, this promotion to affect his title only. It is enough to enroll him there with this rank for a day, and let him after that continue his duties as aide. Otherwise the labour is very heavy and it is impossible for one man to stand it. With his great comprehension, your illustrious lordship will dispose as he may please.

Captain don Zeledon and the captain of grenadiers were wounded, the first through the left arm and the second, a splinter in the head which is not serious. I got another in the leg, which is nothing. But my servant, who carried my shield, and the one who carried Don Zeledon’s and the one who carried Don Manuel Angulo’s, were all three shot through, and two ensigns reformadoes and the ensign of the half-breeds; the rest, up to fourteen, soldiers, and all are out of danger except my servant and one other man, though I hope in God they will recover.

The surgeon of the Almudena says that in that city he was given neither medicines nor bandages, so I gave him the last shirt left to me by my men, who asked for mine for the first dressing, which was done by the surgeon of the dispatch-boat which goes to Spain, he being the handiest; then Don Juan Pimienta gave his, for your illustrious lordship’s servant who is now ashore has used up all the linen he had. Although order has been sent to Cartagena for more I wished to inform your illustrious lordship that he may say whether or not medicines were provided the Almudena.

As to what your illustrious lordship tells me as to Don Juan Pimienta’s clearing the dispatch-boat to Spain without waiting for your illustrious lordship to write by the same boat, I cannot bring myself to credit it; and if he were to do so, he could not fail himself to write of how much your illustrious lordship has done. I am in duty bound to do the same. Therefore, even had your illustrious lordship not in Spain the credit corresponding to your illustrious lordship’s birth, he might expect his majesty to bestow upon him very special thanks for the zeal with which your illustrious lordship has served in this business.

Whose life God preserve many and happy years as He can, and I entreat.

Camp Matanzas, 25th March, 1700.

Don Martin de Zeuallos, who is here, duly appreciates your illustrious lordship’s remembrances and heartily reciprocates.

Most illustrious sir,

Your illustrious lordship’s greatest and most humble servant kisses your illustrious lordship’s hand.

Melchor de Guevara (Rubric)

To the Most Illustrious Conde de Canillas.

I received your lordship’s of the 23rd instant and observe the encouragement given us all that we shall achieve the victory, of which I advised all the residents in these parts, immediately, although here we are not less hopeful, for in the letter my governor had from General don Juan Diaz Pimienta he informed him that he had the Scots under siege, and to make the assault awaited only for this reinforcement to come up by land.

As soon as my governor received this letter he sent dispatches in all urgency to Cano and to the lower mines, summoning men, and left here on the 25th with one hundred and fifty to join General Pimienta. Campmaster don Luis Carrizoli had left two days before with twenty Spaniards and two hundred Indians. They have had some delay in getting off because they were so badly defeated the last time.

Here the Indians have told us that our people have clashed with the enemy three times, in which encounters they suffered some loss, but the general says nothing of that in the two letters he has written, only proffering us all good hope of success. God concede us as much and preserve your lordship happy years.

Your lordship’s subject who kisses your lordship’s hand.

Gabriel Bordones (Rubric)

Dear sir: To the letters with which your excellency favoured me by his majesty’s schooner, which are three, I will reply in their order. From all I am pleased to see—my first interest—that your excellency is well, for those bad climates worry me, and the hardships of those rough roads. I also am quite upset and have taken a purge, but remain entirely at your excellency’s orders and service.

In the letter of the 21st ultimo your excellency is pleased to inform me (enclosing copies of both papers) of what your excellency wrote by a drummer to the commanders for Scotland and of their reply. Their defense must be strong, since they answered so boldly, but your excellency’s operations will humble them low. If the happy result we expect be achieved, then will be time to reply to this paper.

Your excellency tells me that, since I could not go in person on this campaign, as your excellency anticipated, your excellency finds it inadvisable that some troops should fast and others not, but, instead, that without distinction those from Cartagena province and those from here should be supplied, the respective royal officials to adjust the expenditures of both, afterwards.

As to the first point, my not having gone, I have much regretted it, that your excellency might have one more soldier to command. However, this audiencia’s royal accord prohibited and, even more than that mandate, necessity forbade.

When I resumed this presidency there were only two hundred pesos in the treasury; yet the heavy expenditures involved in maintaining this kingdom and sending out that squadron were met by the grace of God and my solicitude and loans which I have procured, on no other guarantee than that inherent in a man of good intentions. Had I been absent from this kingdom there would have remained none to fill the posts in which one serves the king most, that is, in finding him what he lacks and in feeding that body of people for him out of so barren a kingdom as this. The four relief expeditions of subsistence which I have sent out, including this, and the supplying of the squadron which cleared with food stuffs for thirty-four days, were—each of them—a miracle. With your excellency at the head of the military operations, my slight experience was not required; and what I have done in the matter of support in relief, perhaps another man might not have accomplished.

In addition to which, since, last year, Admiral Bembo’s squadron, then in Jamaica, appeared off this port as soon as he learned that I had gone to Darien, I could not leave this place unprotected, for it is the key to this kingdom, and his majesty orders me to protect and fortify it, as being of first importance, while the war is being waged against the Scots.

Considering the abundance which prevails in Cartagena and your excellency’s great foresight, I could not imagine that troops which your excellency brought with him could be short of food supplies, nor did I know it, until your excellency tells me that some eat while others look on. Therefore I send with that King’s schooner all the biscuit that could be made during the days it has been here, and the meat available, both of which might be of better quality.

Since the fleet and the land forces are in your excellency’s command, your excellency will issue the orders he deem best, according to the enclosed memorandum from the purveyor general. There are two ovens here, only, and both are working without respite, making biscuit.

In this same letter of the 21st ultimo your excellency sends me authorization to receive the fifty thousand pesos which the viceroy sends to your excellency for Cartagena. Instantly I ordered the royal officials of Panama to send same to this treasury, and the money should arrive in the course of the next week. Your excellency will find it ready whenever he may choose to send for it. The viceroy’s letter will serve as a warrant and sufficient receipt as far as the royal officials of this realm are concerned, and so I retain it, that everything may be closed up.

With letters of the 22nd and 26th of March, which are your excellency’s latest, I have received from Governor don Diego de Peredo the deposition made by the Scottish deserter, the news he gives that they have subsistence for three months, of the dysentery which besets them, and that the veteran troops are about three hundred; the news they sent to Jamaica in a schooner, and their high hopes of relief; the advanced post with leather cannons on the only avenue by which they suppose your excellency can advance, and the vessels armed as fireships. Your excellency’s activity in the field not abating, no other measures could be taken in view of this news, for as time passes it is to be feared lest relief may reach them, or the rains begin to embarrass your excellency’s operations, or their stores be not so quickly exhausted, since they have enough for three months. The vessels armed as fireboats are at present our least concern, since both Admirals don Diego de Peredo and don Francisco Salmon are so vigilant. With the reinforcements which will by now have come up from Darien, according to what they write me from Panama, I hope your excellency’s fervour will have brought nearer what we all await and need.

Only my considerate regard entreats your excellency to reflect that this is not a country in which to do what according to military regulations should be done, since this is precisely what cannot be done; and to ponder how necessary it is to alter the plan of those general lines along which in Europe one advances and fights, for conditions in this realm are not such that one can succeed by use of means which there are successful.

The news which your excellency furnished the schooner’s captain that three hundred of your excellency’s men were fortified on a hill, to find whether from that height a way can be discovered to the beach, to remove all the camp, is great tidings, and greater, if this can be done, or the enemy’s first line be cut off, though I suppose this will be difficult, for it must be within range of their fortification’s protection.

Here, constant prayers to Our Lord continue for the outcome, which God grant your excellency, as the monarchy has need; and may He preserve your excellency many years as I desire.

El Conde de Canillas (Rubric)

Portobello, 11th April, 1700.

Sire

The four enclosed letters from the Conde de Canillas, Portobello, dates 14th, 24th and 26th of last April, treating of relief furnished for the expulsion of the Scots, which by Divine Mercy has been accomplished, having been read to-day in the Council, it was resolved to lay them at once in your majesty’s royal hands that with the greatest promptitude your majesty might be informed of certain circumstances. If your majesty order them returned the Council will express to your majesty its opinion on their content.

Your majesty will order as your majesty may please.

For brevity’s sake the Council resolved that this go up with my mark.

(A rubric)

Madrid, 3d September, 1700.

. . . Council for Indies. Madrid, 3rd September, 1700. Seen this date. . . . Don Domingo Lopez de Calo.

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A small number of minor typographic errors were corrected.

The footnotes fell into two groups, those indicated by number being references to original sources, and those by symbols being additional commentary. The symbols have been replaced with letters. Both of these groups have been renumbered or relettered consecutively throughout the entire eBook.

[The end of The Disaster of Darien--The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of its Failure 1699-1701 by Francis Russell Hart]