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Title: Comments on Russia

Date of first publication: 1945

Author: Harold Adams Innis (1894-1952)

Date first posted: Mar. 30, 2025

Date last updated: Mar. 30, 2025

Faded Page eBook #20250316

 

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Book cover

Comments on Russia

By H. A. Innis

International Journal, January 1945

 

 

In The Russian Peasant and Other Studies (London, 1945) Sir John Maynard has written in a preface: “It is inevitable that one who writes about Russia in the very crisis of the struggle now convulsing the world should have his mind focused upon the ultimate relations of the Western powers with the vast federation of peoples who form the bridge between Europe and Asia . . . Neither group must try to force its own ideas, political, economic, or social, upon the other . . . On the other hand there must be agreement upon foreign policy . . . agreement . . . upon the necessity of agreement.” Two worlds which do not understand each other are suddenly faced with the necessity of working out compromises.

It would be presumptuous of the present writer to attempt to throw light on the problem. The effects of a first experience in a plane, the speed of travel by air, lack of knowledge of the Russian language, and the first contact with the Asiatic continent and with a new power celebrating its coming-out party must leave any observer in a state of confusion. But an experienced student has said that one must spend ten days or ten years in Russia. To be trained in political economy, a subject which has its roots in the West and which has suffered from the characteristic disease of specialization, and to realize suddenly that a vast powerful organization built around the efforts of 180,000,000 people has arisen with little interest in this specialization is to find oneself compelled to search for possible contacts in the broader approach of its history.

Writings on Russia reflect the bitterness of civil war, only less bitter than religious war, whether written by those sympathetic to Trotsky or by those sympathetic to Stalin. Few individuals are interested in dispassionate discussion.

Lack of knowledge about Russia is not only a result of the intensely partisan character of writings but also of the deliberate policy of defence which has largely characterized Russian history. Strategy in countries emphasizing naval power in the West has always stressed the principle of attack. Suddenly one realizes that in a vast continental area, defence is the key to ultimate success. The strategy of defence springs forward to a position which it has not occupied since the castles of the mediaeval period before the invention of gunpowder. The success of defence in secrecy, destruction, or supervision of contacts with the outside world—a distinct railway gauge, a difficult language for Europeans, which with Marxian indoctrination was impenetrable to propaganda, concentration on a small single party, control over the press and radio—have been evident in the under-estimation of Russian strength by the Germans and by the Allies. Confusion in the Western world was in part a result of the interest in ideologies and the neglect of factors of military strength. Journalists affected by the age-old tendency of the printing industry to push to the left found themselves suddenly confronted by a powerful centralized force which was essentially right. The right which thought of Russia as left was even more confused than the left which found she was right.

The social scientists from Canada will be particularly impressed with the difficulties. The Canadian has no revolutionary tradition: the influence of the Church in Quebec is that of pre-revolutionary France, the influence of the state in Ontario and in English-speaking provinces is that of the Loyalist—the counter-revolutionary of the American revolution. This is an island of counter-revolution in a world of revolutionary traditions. In the long series of revolutions beginning with Cromwell and continuing through the American revolution, the French revolution and the Russian revolution, we occupy a unique position. Russia as the latest product of revolutionary technique is the most difficult for us to understand. The revolutionaries in Russia had made an intensive study of revolutions. The political revolution in Russia as in other countries with a revolutionary tradition has meant the spread and improvement of revolutionary technique as well as industrial techniques from the West. And Canadians have perhaps a point of approach, in that they understand the industrial revolution.

The major task of the new régime was the building up of an army. Its success scarcely needs comment. Industry and agriculture were drastically reorganized to supply men and material. The revolution, the counter-revolution, the purges, the Stalin-Hitler pact, were concentrated on the army and defence, on capital equipment and producers’ goods. In developing the resources of the Ural mountains or of other parts of Russia, building up industrial areas in Siberia, opening up routes to the Arctic from the East and the West, establishing air bases across Siberia to Alaska, the major concern was preparation for war against ultimate aggression from the West. Five-year plans, devices for speeding up production, and large-scale importations of capital equipment and technical skill were enthusiastically supported to the same end.

A war economy concerned with the production of capital equipment implies concentration on self-sufficiency and relative neglect of consumers’ goods and a high standard of living. The emphasis on consumers’ goods and the use of advertising as a device for persistently educating the consumer to a higher standard of living, characteristic of the English-speaking countries of the Western world, are necessarily absent. Emphasis on producers’ goods involves little need for advertising. Whereas an economy which emphasizes consumers’ goods is characterized by communication industries largely dependent on advertising and by constant efforts to reach the largest number of readers or listeners, an economy emphasizing producers’ goods is characterized by communication industries largely dependent on government support. As a result of this contrast a common public opinion in Russia and the West is difficult to achieve. In a consumers’ goods economy news is an important device for the sale of advertising but informed news is neglected. Inability to appraise the military strength of France and Russia was a result. The countries of the free press are characterized by underground movements. Information will be shared, provided that it is off the record and not for publication. It would be unfair to use Canada as an illustration, since even platform discussion must avoid many topics. The numerous parties in English-speaking Canada suggest that even the same language does not prevent deliberately building up differences which render a common approach impossible. In Russia, with a limited press, conversation occupies a more important place. In the countries of the West and in Russia it has become much easier for governments to proceed without regard to public opinion. Mr. Baldwin stated that he could not have won an election if he provided all the missing information. The differences in language and alphabet make an approach through a well-informed public opinion in both countries extremely difficult. Consequently a heavy task is imposed on the respective embassies and on diplomatic conferences. Rapid advances in methods of communication have meant a shift of the control of governments from the highly skilled diplomat to the relatively unskilled and inexperienced. The governing classes have been exposed on a large scale to technological unemployment. While David Hume remarked that all governments are influenced by public opinion, the influence varies with circumstances. A decline in the effectiveness of public opinion means a resort to reliance on displays of force. The tendency to rely on force is accentuated by the necessity of discussion in the simplest possible terms of the relative advantages of systems. System is a fighting word and the emotional excitement surrounding it obscures even a realization of the necessity of intelligence. There is no system in Russia or in the West, and governments are compelled to meet problems as they arise.

The disappearance of the nations of the counter-revolution, Germany and Japan, has both simplified and made more difficult the problem of agreement. Germany opposed the revolution and expelled Marx, only to find his influence hastening the revolution in Russia. Intellectual vigour has disappeared in the defeated countries and independent thought has been burned out. An indoctrinated nation can be quickly indoctrinated with new ideologies once independence has disappeared. Co-operation between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon world becomes the major problem of the West. In the language of the economist the problems of duopoly are perhaps simpler than those of oligopoly, but the simplicity has created problems of its own.

If we are to take seriously the suggestion of Sir Halford Mackinder that control of the heartland of Asia implies control of the world, the major problem of Russia for the West is in her ability to adapt a traditional defensive policy. Her imperialism differs fundamentally from the imperialism of the Anglo-Saxon world, as a continental military economy differs from a maritime naval economy. The size of Russia in itself is a tribute to the effectiveness of the imperialism of the old régime and of the new. With diverse languages, religions, races, and regions, she has developed an effective technique of government. The imperialism of continental Asia must be regarded as complementary to the imperialism of the Anglo-Saxon world.

The traditions of Anglo-Saxons differ from continental Europe as continental Europe differs from Russia. Anglo-Saxons and continental Europe have been profoundly influenced by the great contributions of the Roman Empire in law and religion. Communities that have been schooled in the traditions of Roman law and the Roman Church differ sharply from communities influenced by the traditions of Russia as they have been developed in the Byzantine Empire. The Orthodox Church emerged from the Greek rather than the Roman tradition. As a distinguished Russian scientist explained to me, Russians prefer the Gospel of St. John. The revolution destroyed the position of the Orthodox Church in Russia as earlier revolutions weakened the position of the Roman Church in the West. Law is perhaps more disciplinary than religion and the task of developing complex codes more difficult in Russia than in countries more directly influenced by the Roman law or by common law. Law assumes force and raises the question as to the place of the army and public opinion.

The problem of Russia will continue to centre around the farmer. “Every civilized community in Europe has found it necessary in one way or other to regulate the relations of landlord and tenant, and to save the latter from the capricious and ruinous rapacity of the former. In France it was effected at the Revolution, and with terrible suddenness in the autumn of 1789. In Germany, Stein and Hardenberg saw that a change was imperative after the humiliation of Jena. In Holland it was a later reform, as it was in Scandinavia. In Denmark which forty years ago was as miserable and as turbulent as Ireland, it was the benevolent work of Bishop Monrad, the enlightened minister who had to bear the brunt of the scandalously unjust Schleswig-Holstein War. In Russia it was the work of the late emperor. I do not say that in every case the reform was done in the best way, but I am assured that the reform had to be done.”[1] The Crimean War cut off the markets of Europe for wheat, raised the price of wheat in North America, and accentuated difficulties in Russia which led to the emancipation of the serf in 1861. The cumulative effect of lower costs of transportation of wheat from North America, culminating in the opening of Western Canada after 1900, is the background to the events including the assassination of the Czar which led to the Russian revolution. Trotsky reminds us that a revolution cannot succeed without control of the army. The old régime had been shaken by the demands of large-scale organization characteristic of the army in the war with Japan, and collapsed in the face of the strains of the last war. The peasant was the army and demanded recognition of the age-old traditions of the village or the commune. Political revolution facilitated the spread of the industrial revolution as a solution to the labour problem of Russian agriculture. The seasonal problem, even more acute than that of Western Canada, places a heavy load on administration if the worst effects of drought and famine are to be avoided. Increasing population accentuates the necessity of concentration on industrial growth, the installation of capital equipment on an enormous scale, and a raising of the standard of living. The Red Army may serve as a temporary solution of the problem by absorbing surplus labour and raising the standard of living, but it cannot be regarded as a permanent and satisfactory alternative.

The ability to approach a new major problem on the part of Russia and the West will be the test of civilization. The late Justice Holmes once stated that the first sign of being civilized is the questioning of one’s principles. The decision to celebrate the 220th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences is an indication of a broad statesmanlike approach to a world problem of understanding, and recognition of the possibilities of using science as a common approach—almost the only universal common basis left. Nationalism inevitably creates inefficiency and bigotry even in science, and the enormous literature in the various fields in different languages becomes a major handicap. In the social sciences, it is significant that English economic history has gained enormously from the contributions of Russian students. Both groups have much to learn from each other and probably no countries have more to learn through exchange of information than Canada and Russia.

Political economy as developed in the Western world will be compelled to broaden its range and to discuss the implications of competition between languages, religions, and cultural phenomena largely neglected by it. Russia has been a storm centre of history largely because of the instability of climate and its effects on migrations. Dependence on agriculture gives a more stable base for society but implies exposure to the effects of geography. Continental militarism and naval armament involve strains which few economies have survived. Concentration on a conscripted army has meant bureaucracy and inefficiency. In the Anglo-Saxon world the addition of a conscripted standing army to naval strength involves similar burdens. Avoidance of a standing army strengthens democratic tendencies and makes for the flexibility and efficiency of industry. Flexibility of military strength accompanies flexibility in the use of manpower and capital equipment. The West has gained from pliability of public opinion, since up to the present it has invariably shown the absolutely essential power to bring forth the particular individual necessary for a crisis. But succession involves acute difficulties in the West and not less acute difficulties in Russia. A common world view has become indispensable.

 

 

University of Toronto, November 1945.


Rogers, James Edwin Thorold, The Economic Interpretation of History (New York and London) p. 175.


TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Misspelled words and printer errors have been corrected. Where multiple spellings occur, majority use has been employed.

Punctuation has been maintained except where obvious printer errors occur.

A cover which is placed in the public domain was created for this ebook.

[The end of Comments on Russia by Harold Adams Innis]