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Published on the Foundation Established in Memory of Oliver Baty Cunningham of the Class of 1917, Yale College

The present volume is the ninth work published by the Yale University Press on the Oliver Baty Cunningham Memorial Publication Fund. This Foundation was established May 8, 1920, by a gift from Frank S. Cunningham, Esq., of Chicago, to Yale University, in memory of his son, Captain Oliver Baty Cunningham, 15th United States Field Artillery, who was born in Chicago, September 17, 1894, and was graduated from Yale College in the Class of 1917. As an undergraduate he was distinguished alike for high scholarship and for proved capacity in leadership among his fellows, as evidenced by his selection as Gordon Brown Prize Man from his class. He received his commission as Second Lieutenant, United States Field Artillery, at the First Officers’ Training Camp at Fort Sheridan, and in December, 1917, was detailed abroad for service, receiving subsequently the Distinguished Service Medal. He was killed while on active duty near Thiaucourt, France, on September 17, 1918, the twenty-fourth anniversary of his birth.

The history of the fur trade here presented by Doctor Innis may be regarded as an introduction to the analytic study of that industry which appears in another volume, The Fur Trade of Canada (Toronto, 1927). The two volumes together are intended to give a conspectus of the industry, showing against the historical background the social and economic significance of the fur trade, the rôle which it has played and continues to play in the general life of the country.

At the same time this volume is complete in itself. It is an interpretation of the historical record of a primary industry whose growth was a vital factor in the expansion of Canada. As such it is a contribution to the economic history of Canada. It is only through such investigations that an adequate economic history becomes possible.

Doctor Innis has made himself personally familiar with the fur trade territories of Canada, and has also gone to the original historical documents containing the record of the fur trade. The work is throughout a piece of original research animated by the spirit of interpretative scholarship.

R. M. MacIver.

An interest in this subject has followed from a study on the Canadian Pacific Railway. A sense of the incompleteness of that volume and of all volumes which have centered on that subject and on the subject of Canadian confederation is the occasion for this work. A history of the fur trade is complementary to a history of the recent industrial growth of Canada.

The work owes much to Professor R. M. MacIver, since with his encouragement it was undertaken as a special research subject. I am indebted also to Professor W. S. Wallace for much valuable advice; to Professor V. W. Bladen who read the early chapters and made numerous valuable suggestions; to Professor Louis Allen who gave me the advantage of his criticism on the chapters dealing with the French period; to Professor T. McIlwraith; and to Professor A. S. Morton, who has generously placed at my disposal information on different phases of the subject. The staff of the Dominion Archives has done much to facilitate the work, and I am under heavy obligations to the University of Toronto. Large numbers of men engaged in the fur trade especially men of the Hudson’s Bay Company and men in the Mackenzie River district have been extremely generous in giving me information, but I should be very ungrateful should I fail to mention the kindness of Capt. L. Morten of the Liard River in 1924 in making it possible for me to gain an intimate knowledge of the trade, and the coöperation of my friend, Mr. John Long, who accompanied me on an extended trip throughout that district.

H.A.I.

THE FUR TRADE IN CANADA

The Beaver

The history of Canada has been profoundly influenced by the habits of an animal which very fittingly occupies a prominent place on her coat of arms. The beaver^[1] (Castor canadensis Kuhl) was of dominant importance in the beginnings of the Canadian fur trade. It is impossible to understand the characteristic developments of the trade or of Canadian history without some knowledge of its life and habits.

Numerous descriptions of this animal are available in early French accounts and in later treatises. Le Clercq^[2] wrote “the beaver is of the bigness of a water-spaniel. Its fur is chestnut, black, and rarely white but always very soft and suitable for the making of hats.” According to Denys^[3] “they are usually dark brown leaning towards black or even red. They occur sometimes black and even white.” Early French writers agree that the color variation is largely the result of climate and that the fur becomes darker in more northerly latitudes. North of the St. Lawrence the fur was regarded as being much better and the skin much thinner than in more southerly and warmer areas. Champlain wrote in 1616: “As for the country south of this great river, it is very thickly populated, much more so than on the north side . . . but on the other hand there is not so much profit and gain in the trade in furs.”^[4] And Champlain was interested in furs. In more temperate regions the fur was described as brown in color and in the Illinois country as almost yellow or straw-colored. The age of the animal also had an effect on the color, and the young or cub beaver with dark chestnut and occasionally black fur above, and lighter fur underneath, was regarded as the most valuable. As with other animals the fur is much thinner and poorer in summer.

The fur of the beaver, like that of other animals, may be divided into two parts; the guard hair up to two inches in length, and the underhair or fur at most an inch. According to Lahontan^[5] “a beaver has two lays of hair, one is long and of a shining black color with a grain as big as that of man’s hair; the other is fine and smooth and in winter fifteen lines long. In a word, the last is the finest down in the world.” Examined through a microscope the fur has numerous small barbs. It was these barbs which made it unusually suitable for the manufacture of felt and of felt hats.^[6]

The animal weighs from thirty to sixty pounds. David Thompson states^[7] that “the average weight of a full-grown male is about fifty-five pounds. His meat is agreeable to most although fat and oily: the tail is a delicacy.” The pelt of the average adult weighs from one and one-half to one and three-quarters pounds although Lahontan^[8] gives two pounds.

The beaver is a monogamist. The young are born in May and average from two to five in number.^[9] “These animals are more prolific than our sheep in France the females bearing as many as five or six every year.” They are weaned in six weeks, but stay with the mother for one year. They mate at two, and are fully grown at two and one-half years. A beaver lodge has generally about nine animals of varying ages. It has been estimated that the beaver population increases by about 20 per cent per year, and that previous to the coming of Europeans the total beaver population of North America was ten million. In years of abundance the number varies from ten to fifty per square mile according to the country. Apparently it^[10] suffers from disease at varying intervals, and large numbers are wiped out.

The animal migrates very little and travels over land very slowly. It does not hibernate and has adapted itself with great elaboration to the seasonal changes of a northern climate. Dams are built insuring a supply of water, and lodges of twenty feet across the base and three to five feet high are made of sticks and branches cemented with mud. Within the lodges a circular chamber about two feet high and six feet across is built with its floor about four inches above water level. Two entrances from one and one-half to two feet wide and from five to ten feet long are built to this chamber, both being from two to three feet below the water on the outside. One is used for an ordinary runway, the other to bring in the supply of wood for food. Besides this lodge the beaver has burrows along the banks which have entrances under water. These are extended upward and sufficient soil is left on the top to provide ventilation. Wood is stored for the winter under water at convenient distances from the lodge. The food in winter is chiefly birch, cottonwood, poplar, willow, and the young bark and twigs of hardwoods, and in summer the roots of various water plants. Its habitat is to a large extent determined by the deciduous forest area. The range extends northerly to a line drawn northwest from the mouth of the Churchill River to the mouth of the Mackenzie River. Territory south of this boundary, which is well wooded with poplar and willow, and which abounds in small lakes and sluggish, continuous streams, is especially favorable.

The significance of the habitat of the beaver in the development of the fur trade may be suggested. Since the beaver was an amphibious animal, its fur was thick and abundant and it could be hunted in summer, although the fur was then much less valuable. The length of time required to arrive at maturity was an important factor in the destruction of the supply of fur and its non-migratory tendencies and elaborate housing facilities made destruction certain. In the language of economists, the heavy fixed capital of the beaver became a serious handicap with the improved technique of Indian hunting methods, incidental to the borrowing of iron from Europeans. Depreciation through obsolescence of the beaver’s defense equipment was so rapid as to involve the immediate and complete destruction of the animal. David Thompson has described^[11] the result.

The range extended to the northwest, following the isothermal lines, the deciduous forest area, and the Pre-Cambrian shield with its wealth of waterways, and the best fur was obtained from the more northerly portions. With destruction in the easterly part of North America came the necessity of pushing to the westward and northwestward to tap new areas of the more valuable furs. The problem of the fur trade became one of organizing the transport of supplies and furs over increasingly greater distances. In this movement the waterways of the beaver area were of primary importance and occupied a vital position in the economic development of northern North America. It is the purpose of this volume to trace the history of the trade as it spread across the continent.

Indians at Fort Simpson at the junction of the Liard and Mackenzie rivers leaving for the winter hunt 1924

1. Beginnings of the Fur Trade on the Atlantic Coast
(1497-1600)

The contact of Europeans with the Indians was essential to the development of the fur trade. In the area tributary to the St. Lawrence River this contact was in the beginning subsidiary to the fishing industry. The long return voyages from Europe to America in small sailing vessels with relatively large crews involved a dependence on trade in a commodity which brought immediate and large returns. Codfish was such a commodity available in large quantities, and having a ready market in Europe with its primitive agricultural methods and scarcity of meat. Increasing demands for improvement in handling fish led to the development of dry fishing which reduced the outlay on such commodities as salt, and economized shipping. Extension of the market to the Mediterranean and the demands of that area for the better grades of dry fish encouraged fishing along the coast for the smaller cod. Dry fishing stimulated the search for harbors suitable for drying and preferably with ample supplies of bait. With competition for the better harbors and the increasing scarcity of timber available for staging came a constant search into the remoter areas of the coast. The prosecution of whaling and the hunting of walrus as carried out by the Basques and others, the work of official explorers such as Cartier, and the probable growing importance of the fur trade were other factors contributing to the movement to the interior. On the other hand, the location of important codfish banks at an appreciable distance from the coast and at definite points on the coast line as, for example, at Ile Percée, and the existence of a serrated shore line with numerous harbors greatly retarded the growth of fishing settlements in the interior.

The early fur trade along the coast was limited. The existence of large numbers of fur-bearing animals presupposes a sparsely populated area with consequent limited development of transportation facilities and a general dependence on water transportation. Fur trade development on a large scale assumes a vast territory drained by great rivers such as characterize the north temperate climates, and a population with cultural traits peculiar to a hunting economy. The general physiographical and topographical background of the Appalachians and of the Laurentians along the Atlantic Coast and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, in what is now New England and the Maritime Provinces, precluded the existence of long rivers and limited the trade to large numbers of fishermen who frequented the harbors of the coast. The tribes of Indians in this area were limited in their movements by the short rivers, and they depended to a large extent on fishing.

Although of minor importance, the fur trade in the area tributary to the Gulf of St. Lawrence began at an early date. Cartier, in his voyage of 1534, describes the two fleets of Indian canoes (a total of forty or fifty) in the neighborhood of Chaleur Bay. The Indians, probably Micmacs,

These statements suggest that the trade was carried on in irregular fashion on the meeting of the Indians with European fishermen.^[12] Denys’ description^[13] of the later trade on this coast was probably applicable to this period:

Contact was made, however, in the fishing areas not only with the Indians of the Gulf territory but also with the Indians of the St. Lawrence River. Cartier, in his voyage of 1534, describes^[14] his meeting with more than three hundred Indians in the neighborhood of Gaspé, who had come from the vicinity of Stadacona to fish for mackerel. But these Indians belonged to tribes which grew “Indian corn like pease—which they eat in place of bread and of this they had a large quantity with them.” They were members of the Huron-Iroquois family and possessed cultural traits adapted to the forest area south and southeast of the Canadian shield. With favorable soil and climate, agriculture^[15] with the cultivation of maize, squash, and beans was important. Pottery was more strongly developed, residences were more permanent, government was more elaborate, and the general characteristics of agricultural economy were in evidence. Consequently the trade in furs was not extensive with these Indians. In 1534 Cartier writes, “the whole lot of them had not anything above the value of five sous, their canoes and fishing nets excepted.” In his account of the voyage of 1535 under the guidance of two of these Indians to Stadacona and of the voyage to Hochelaga and of his return in 1541, furs are not mentioned with any special emphasis. The wealth of the river^[16] was in fish and possibly in minerals. There is evidence indeed that these agricultural Indians imported their furs from the Saguenay country since Indians of that area gave Donnacona^[17] “three bundles of beaver and seal skins with a large copper knife from the Saguenay.”

From the standpoint of supply, therefore, the early possibilities of rapid development of the fur trade were limited. Nor was demand important. The early trade in fur was not confined to beaver since Cartier makes no specific reference to this animal. Indeed, according to Lescarbot,^[18]

The early trade was presumably concerned with fancy fur or the fur which is used with and on the pelt and which is valued because of its beauty, luster, and warmth rather than with staple fur which, because of its special barbed character, was admirably suited for felting as in the case of the beaver. With fancy fur, the development of a new marketing organization would be necessarily slow. The large numbers of small purchases of fur in a trade incidental to fishing and the intensely technical character of the commodity requiring knowledge of the characteristics of fur on the part of the purchaser, combined to retard the development of a trading organization on a large scale. Moreover, the Indians were interested primarily in beaver. The entry of furs to new ports and by new channels into Europe would call for an extension and modification of the existing fur trade organization which would develop slowly and in response to the gradually increasing supplies of fur.

The fur trade in the first half of the sixteenth century was of minor importance and incidental to fishing. By the end of the century a revolution had occurred and the agricultural Indians of the Huron-Iroquois family had been driven from the St. Lawrence valley apparently by hunting Indians. From Champlain’s descriptions the hostilities incidental to this catastrophe were still being prosecuted in 1603. The Algonquins, Montagnais, and others were at war^[19] with the Iroquois.

The causes of this revolution are difficult to determine, but certain facts deserve consideration. In the latter part of the century the fashion of wearing beaver hats spread rapidly, especially as beaver was used only in the more expensive hats. This demand was responsible for the development of the trade in beaver fur which apparently expanded from the mouth of the Saguenay, which as we have seen had been noted by Cartier as an important area in the production of beaver.^[20] Champlain^[21] in 1603, on his way from Tadoussac to Gaspé, met Indians on their way “to barter arrows and moose flesh for the beaver and marten of the other Montagnais, Etechemin, and Algonquin Indians.” The Indians of the vast area drained by the Saguenay had developed cultural traits along specific lines dependent as ever on historical background and on geographic environment. Throughout the forest areas^[22] of the Canadian shield, to which the Saguenay gave access, hunting was the predominant occupation. Small game, fish, and especially the beaver, moose,^[23] and deer were important items in the supply of food, clothing, and shelter. Generally life in these areas involved movement to fishing waters in the summer and to widely scattered hunting areas in winter. A description^[24] dated August, 1626, states:

The absence or weak development of pottery and basketry, the use of snowshoes^[25] and toboggans in winter and of the birch-bark canoe^[26] and the pack line^[27] in summer, and the skin or bark shelter were characteristic cultural features. In hunting during the winter, definite territories^[28] were assigned to specific bands or families, but government was generally weak. A thorough knowledge of the territory was a necessary part of their cultural equipment as was also a thorough knowledge of the habits of animals upon which they were dependent for livelihood. The importance of the beaver because of its fur, its size, and its abundance, as a source of supply for food and clothing had occasioned the development of elaborate and effective hunting methods for that animal.^[29] The skin of the beaver had been adapted successfully to clothing and was especially important in the colder and more northerly areas. “They wear no other clothes than a moose skin or a beaver robe, which consists of five or six beaver skins sewed together.”^[30]

The rapid development of trade with these Indians was dependent on their methods of treating the fur and on the character of the felting process. The pelts were taken by the Indians when prime and the inner side scraped and rubbed with the marrow of certain animals. After this treatment each pelt was trimmed into rectangular shape and from five to eight sewn together with moose sinews into robes which were worn by the Indians with the fur next to the body. The scraping of the inner side of the pelt loosened the deep roots of the long guard hair, and with wearing, this hair dropped out leaving the fur. With constant wearing for fifteen to eighteen months the skin became well greased, pliable, and yellow in color and the fur downy or cotonné. These furs taken in winter when prime were known later as castor gras d’hiver. It was this fur which was most valuable to the hat-making industry. The guard hairs had largely disappeared and the fur was especially suited to the felting process.

The length of time required to produce this fur necessitated a constant movement to the interior to meet new tribes of Indians and to secure new supplies. The intertribal trade organization from the Saguenay became especially important. The character of this organization is difficult to determine, but certain evidence has been made available. The trade in copper which, apparently, came from the Lake Superior district gives an important clue. Cartier notes that “a large copper knife from the Saguenay” was given^[31] to Donnacona by the Indians of that area. At Hochelaga^[32] “the captain showed them some copper—and, pointing towards the said region [the Ottawa], asked by signs if it came thence? They shook their heads to say no, showing us that it came from the Saguenay, which lies in the opposite direction.” Apparently trade with the Indians up the Ottawa at this time either in copper or in furs was slight since they were regarded as “bad people, who were armed to the teeth” and who “waged war continually.” Probably therefore the French at Tadoussac traded with the Montagnais who, in turn, traded by the Saguenay route with the Algonquins and the latter with the good Iroquois (Hurons). Champlain writes,^[33] “there is toward the north a mine of pure copper of which they showed us some bracelets obtained from the good Iroquois.” During the occupation of the St. Lawrence valley by the agricultural Indians, the fur trade was carried on through the Indians of the Saguenay. Certainly in 1603 Champlain describes^[34] the Montagnais as trading up the Saguenay and Lake St. John and its tributaries with other Indians. The route between the headwaters of the St. Maurice and the Saguenay was known. The St. Maurice “almost connects with the Saguenay river according to the report of the Indians.”^[35] Trade between the headwaters of the St. Maurice and the headwaters of the Ottawa was certainly in evidence at a later period and, doubtless, existed in the earlier period.

The development of trade^[36] into the Canadian shield by way of the Saguenay, the headwaters of the St. Maurice and the Ottawa, which was the country most productive of excellent northern beaver and in which the hunting Indians were found, gave those Indians a pronounced advantage. The penetration of European commodities by this route led to a shift in cultural traits which enabled them to make war with greater effectiveness on the agricultural Indians of the St. Lawrence valley who, because of the scarcity of furs incidental to denser population and the pursuit of agriculture, were unable to command those commodities. It is suggested that the upheaval in the St. Lawrence valley was the result of the development of the fur trade at Saguenay and the remote interior accessible by the Saguenay route.

This suggestion is open to numerous objections and since it rests chiefly on the effects of the penetration of European goods on Indian economy it is necessary at this point to describe these effects in detail. The evidence for the period prior to 1600 is lacking, but a study of the following period is suggestive. The fur trade was the line of contact between a relatively complex civilization and a much more simple civilization. The complex European culture had reached a stage industrially in which technological equipment essential to specialized production had been accumulated. Ships capable of undertaking long ocean voyages, a manufacturing system which demanded large quantities of raw material, and a distributing organization which absorbed the finished product without difficulty were typical products of European civilization. The heavy overhead cost of long voyages limited the trade to commodities which were highly valuable, to commodities demanded by the more advanced types of manufacturing processes of that period and to commodities available on a large scale. The fur of the beaver was preëminently suited to the demands of early trade.

Heavy overhead costs incidental to the conduct of trade was an important cause of its rapid growth. The trade in furs was stimulated by French traders who rapidly acquired an intimate knowledge of the Indian’s language, customs, and habits of life. The trader encouraged the best hunters, exhorted the Indians to hunt beaver, and directed their fleets of canoes to the rendezvous. Alliances were formed and wars were favored to increase the supply of fur. Goods were traded which would encourage the Indian to hunt beaver. In addition to the efforts of the local traders and of the monopoly, the marketing organization in Europe had improved, technique in manufacture of beaver hats had improved, the number of workers had increased, and the demand for beaver for the manufacture of beaver hats increased. The industries engaged in supplying European goods—hatchets, ironware, clothing materials—had also responded to the stimulus of the demand.

But important as the pressure from a more complex civilization must have been, the position of the Indian cannot be neglected. French traders were seriously limited in their trading activities among the Indians. Tribes as middlemen resented attempts to destroy their monopoly position. Monopolies^[37] attempted to control the price of beaver and to raise the prices of goods to the Indians. These factors tended to lessen the pressure of a complex civilization. Indeed, in the final analysis, the pull of a relatively simple civilization on the resources of a complex civilization may be regarded as of paramount importance. No monopoly or organization could withstand the demands of the Indian civilization of North America for European goods. The task of continuously supplying goods to the Indian tribes of North America, of maintaining the depreciation of those goods, and of replacing the goods destroyed was overwhelming. As Cartier noted^[38] of the Micmacs(?):

This demand for European goods was persistent and cumulative since penetration of European goods was relatively slow, largely because of the rapid depreciation of the goods and of the vast areas involved. In 1615 Champlain^[41] gave a hatchet to the chief of the Cheveux Relevés “who was as much pleased and delighted with it as if I had given him some rich present.” With regard to the expedition against the Iroquois, in the same year he wrote,^[42] “there were only four or five who were acquainted with the handling of arms, while in such an expedition the best are not too good in this particular.” At the time of Sagard’s visit, the Hurons were in possession of kettles and knives, although many were anxious to borrow his utensils. They had planted peas secured at Quebec. Skinning knives, awls, and axes were in use. But iron utensils were constantly wearing out because of the intense work to which they were put; they were traded to other peoples or they were destroyed at burial feasts.^[43] Once they had secured access to a source of iron supplies, more primitive implements disappeared and the methods of making them were forgotten. Guns displaced bows and arrows. They required periodic mending and ammunition was in constant demand. As old cultural traits fell gradually into disuse and old ways of getting a livelihood were forgotten, the Indian became increasingly dependent on the products of the specialized equipment of Europe and increasingly dependent upon his supply of furs. In the Jesuit Relations of 1647-48, it was written:^[44] “The Hurons, he said, did not come down last year to the French through fear of the enemies who, on the one hand threatened the country, and on the other beset all the roads. But the necessity of obtaining hatchets and other French goods compelled them to expose themselves to all those dangers.” The importance of iron to a culture dependent on bone, wood, bark, and stone can only be suggested. The cumbersome method of cooking in wooden vessels with heated stones was displaced by portable kettles. Work could be carried out with greater effectiveness with iron axes and hatchets, and sewing became much less difficult with awls than it had been with bone needles. To the Indians iron and iron manufactures were of prime importance. The French were the gens du fer.^[45] “The Hurons think that the greatest rulers of France are endowed with the greatest powers and having such great powers they can make the most difficult things such as hatchets, knives, kettles. They infer from this that the King makes the largest kettles.”^[46]

The effect of European goods may be shown among the Indians of the Gulf territory who had been among the first to acquire possession of them.^[47] Denys in his work of 1672 writes:

Some of the unfortunate effects are suggested by Biard^[48] who wrote in the Relation of 1616:

The effects of the increasing dependence on European goods and, in turn, on the beaver were far-reaching. Such cultural traits as the canoe, the pack strap, the knowledge of animal habits enabling them to hunt for food and for fur, acquaintance with plants as food and medicine, their agricultural development, and the knowledge of the country, were stressed because of their importance in enabling the Indian to cover a wider territory and to get more furs. To cite the example of the canoe, Champlain wrote^[49] of the Lachine Rapids in 1603:

Furs had to be collected, stored, packed, and carried for long distances in the spring and summer to the trader. Increasing stress was placed on the beaver, and energies were directed to the capture of that animal. Commodities were in demand which made it possible to spend more time for that purpose, guns, kettles, knives, awls, and axes. Among the agricultural Indians to the south and among those Indians in closer proximity to the French, the supply of beaver decreased rapidly and greater dependence was placed on the existing trading organization with the northern hunting Indians. Longer distances were covered and knowledge of the country was increased among the Indians. These factors hastened the decay of old cultural traits, the acquisition of new cultural traits, and general instability of life. Since the trade was carried on in the summer, agriculture was neglected or shifted to a greater extent to the care of the women. Sagard refers frequently to the work of the Huron women in grinding corn with which the men were able to go to more distant nations to trade. The nation was, consequently, increasingly exposed to the inroads of the Iroquois with larger numbers of men absent in the summers. The persistent and increasing demand for European commodities led to the more rapid extermination of the beaver, to increased hostilities, especially between Indian middlemen as the Iroquois and the Hurons, to the westward flight of the Indians, to the spread of new cultural traits, and to a further expansion of the trade. This pressure of tribes on the territory of the Indians to the interior was an additional and important cause of renewed Indian wars and destruction. Wars between tribes, which with bows and arrows had not been strenuous, conducted with guns were disastrous.

Increase in trade furthered improvements in the technique of the trade.^[50] Sagard wrote that the Hurons “expostulated against the methods of our merchants in completing the trade in an hour,” but this attitude became less evident. According to Perrot^[51]

Elaborate bargaining called for a higher development of ideas of contract and barter, for more extended development of government for the enforcement of these conceptions, and for a remarkable period of intrigue and diplomacy among Indian tribes. Indian middlemen were able to exercise greater bargaining power over more remote tribes with the use of European weapons. Consequently, they were extremely jealous of any attempt of the French or the Dutch to trade guns with these remote tribes. On the other hand, a supply of guns for more remote tribes enabled the European trader to break the monopoly of the middlemen. The net result was continuous and destructive warfare. The disastrous results of these cultural changes were shown further in the spread of European diseases, especially smallpox, and the decimation of the Indians.

This analysis of the cumulative effects of European goods on Indian economy during the period after 1600 supports the suggestion that the center of disturbances in the latter part of the sixteenth century was the Saguenay. The Indians of the Saguenay, and of the Ottawa and Georgian Bay regions, the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons who traded across the headwaters of the Ottawa, the St. Maurice, and the Saguenay demanded larger and cheaper supplies of beaver. The far-reaching changes in the cultural background, especially of the Montagnais and the Algonquins, made the demand for beaver more insistent and the struggle for control of the St. Lawrence route inevitable. With access to European goods these hunting Indians were in a position to attack with increasing effectiveness the agricultural Indians of the St. Lawrence valley, to drive them out, and to open the St. Lawrence route to the interior. With the opening of the seventeenth century Champlain found the struggle practically at an end with the Montagnais still carrying on war with Iroquois. The Hurons and Algonquins supported^[52] the Montagnais and were able to come down the Ottawa, certainly the St. Maurice, to the St. Lawrence to trade their furs with the French at Three Rivers and at Tadoussac. The kingdom of Saguenay^[53] which had been, apparently, the source of copper for St. Lawrence River agricultural Indians was at an end. The declining importance of the long and difficult Saguenay route became evident in the recommendations of Champlain^[54] in 1603 for a proposed establishment at Three Rivers, the mouth of the St. Maurice.

2. The Struggle for the Ottawa
(1600-1663)

During the preceding period, fishing had been carried on in the more remote parts of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and near the mouth of the river. Contact was made at Tadoussac with a large river draining a vast extent of territory and with peoples of a civilization dependent to a pronounced degree on hunting. Seasonally and locally fishing and whaling were carried on in the narrower waters of the St. Lawrence by both Indians and Europeans. With the Europeans fishing and whaling were more restricted and the dependence on such commodities as fur more necessary. With the Indians more dependent on hunting and on closer relations with other tribes throughout a larger territory, larger supplies of fur were available. Toward the end of the century a fur-trading organization had slowly been built up, and the demand for beaver to furnish material for the spreading fashion of beaver hats increased rapidly. A knowledge of the language and of the customs and habits of the Indians on the part of the traders, and a gradual spread of the knowledge of European commodities among the Indians, were also factors which helped to explain the rapidity of the development of the trade in the seventeenth century. The fur trade became less and less subsidiary to fishing as progress was made along the St. Lawrence, and eventually it emerged as independent. With the opening of the century, the ground had been cleared for an extension of the fur trade up the St. Lawrence and the Ottawa. The St. Lawrence valley had been opened to the Algonquins, the Hurons, and the Indians of the pays d’en haut, and furs could be brought down by the Ottawa rather than by the difficult route of the Saguenay.

The prevailing note of the first half of the seventeenth century was a continuation of the struggle between the Iroquois, and the northern Indians and the French for the Ottawa River as a route for furs. In 1613 Champlain, in passing the mouth of the Gatineau on his way up the Ottawa, noted that^[55] “sometimes these tribes go by way of this river to avoid meeting their enemies, knowing that these will not seek for them in places so difficult of access.” In 1615^[56] he noted that the Indians go up the Ottawa (not the Gatineau) “to the Saguenay to barter their furs for tobacco.” Sagard,^[57] on his return from the Huron country in 1624, stopped on the shore of Georgian Bay

At the end of Lake Nipissing he found “a number of Hurons who were going to the Saguenay country.” At the mouth of the Mattawa “which comes from Saguenay and goes to Quebec . . . the Hurons descend to here to go to the Saguenay and proceed upstream.” By the end of the period, the route was used only in cases of emergency. It may be inferred that the Hurons ceased to go to the Saguenay from the statement in the Jesuit Relations^[58] of 1647:

After the routing of the Hurons by the Iroquois in 1649-50, the Indians, according to Radisson,^[59] again came down the St. Maurice and the Saguenay.

On the whole the Ottawa and the St. Lawrence was the route generally followed throughout the period. On Champlain’s arrival in 1603 he found^[60] that the Montagnais, the Algonquins, and the Etechemins were celebrating a victory over the Iroquois on the Richelieu River. Later in the same season the Montagnais^[61] scored another victory in the same region. The route had been practically cleared, and the Algonquins knew at this time the Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and lower St. Lawrence territory. Between 1603 and 1608 the Hurons appeared on the St. Lawrence, and in 1609 Champlain^[62] met them on the river on their way to Quebec.

The problem of keeping the route open was incidental to the strength of the Iroquois position. In the opening of the Ottawa route the French had been obliged to form alliances with the hunting Indians against the Iroquois, and Champlain was engaged in helping to fight their battles. The Jesuit Relations of 1611 describes^[63] the situation:

In the fight between the Iroquois and the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons in 1609 on Lake Champlain, the importance of European goods was shown not only in the use of guns by Champlain but it is noted^[64] “they [Iroquois] began to fell trees with the poor axes which they sometimes win in war, or with stone axes.” On the other hand, the struggle was not uneven and Champlain says “they barricaded themselves well.” In 1610 the Iroquois again offered determined^[65] resistance near the mouth of the Richelieu against the Montagnais and the Algonquins aided by Champlain and the French, but were defeated through the effective use of firearms. In 1615 Champlain and the Indians were obliged^[66] to withdraw in the fight with the Iroquois south of Lake Ontario. The advantages of the Iroquois in warfare came from the existence of ample food supplies such as the Montagnais as hunters did not possess, from a greater density of population, and from close central control. With hunting Indians and with tribes allied but separated by great distances, elaborate plans were difficult to carry out. The Hurons arrived too late for the fight in 1610. These disadvantages offset to some extent the advantages incidental to a supply of European goods.

The opening of the St. Lawrence route to the Hurons facilitated the spread of European goods to the country tributary to the Ottawa and beyond. But expansion of trade to Georgian Bay and the interior necessitated the development of a technique by which trade could be carried on over long distances. An important feature of this technique was the existence of a base of supplies in the interior. The semi-agricultural activities of the Indians of the interior, and especially of the Hurons, gave them a decided advantage in the trade. The raising of corn by the Hurons and, to a less extent by the Algonquins, gave them a commodity of high food value, easily cultivated, of heavy yields, and of light weight which could be carried long distances in canoes and which, used with the fish and game taken on the journey, gave them sufficient strength to overcome the difficulties of long voyages. The importance of corn is suggested by Radisson who at the beginning of a journey from Lake Huron to the French settlement wrote,^[67] “We wanted nothing, having good store of corne and netts to catch fish, which is plentyfull in the rivers.” Sagard, in his journey to the interior in 1623, describes^[68] the difficulties of the canoe route up the Ottawa to Georgian Bay and the Huron country. Corn cooked in kettles was the staple food throughout the journey, varied with fish which the Indians could sometimes get by trolling a line behind the canoes on crossing the lakes. Fish were more important on the downstream trip and caches of corn in birch baskets were made on the way down for use on the return. Moreover, because of the position of the Hurons at the edge of the Canadian shield, they rapidly extended the trade in foodstuffs with the northern hunting Indians. Champlain in 1615 described^[69] them as “clothed in deer and beaver skins which they obtain in exchange for Indian corn and meal,” and later “their dress . . . made of the skins of wild beasts, both those which they capture themselves, and others which they get in exchange from the Algonquins, Nipissings and other tribes which are hunters, having no fixed abodes.” These hunting peoples in turn became traders. The Nipissings^[70] went up the Sturgeon River from Lake Nipissing “to barter the merchandise which we give them in exchange for their peltry, with those who live on it, and who support themselves by hunting and fishing, their country containing great quantities of animals, birds and fish.” They also went to regions north of the Huron country to trade in buffalo skins. “This journey requires forty days as well in returning as in going.”^[71] At a later date, 1623, Sagard, on his journey to the Huron country, mentions^[72] the trade of goods obtained at Quebec by the Hurons with the Nipissings at Lake Nipissing and with the Poils levés^[73] on Lake Huron and these, in turn “go by troops in many regions and countries distant more than four hundred leagues where they trade their merchandise and exchange for furs, paint, porcelain and other rubbish.” Furs were collected over wide areas to be taken down chiefly in the hands of the Hurons.

The effects of the trade up the St. Lawrence and the Ottawa and of the emergence of the Hurons as middlemen were of considerable importance to the Indians who had previously depended on the trade at Tadoussac. Their control of the trade disappeared, and they were forced to rely to an increasing extent on their own activities as hunters for their supply of food and of furs for trade. Equipped with European weapons, their supply of food as in the larger animals began to disappear. Le Jeune wrote regarding these people in 1637:

With improved hunting equipment, the beaver was rapidly worked out in the areas adjacent to the St. Lawrence, and without beaver, European goods were not available. In the Jesuit Relations^[76] of 1635 the beaver were disappearing around Three Rivers and the supply of beaver was obtained, to an increasing extent from more remote areas.

With the decline of food supply and of beaver, the position of the Montagnais and the Algonquins became more difficult. The Algonquins became jealous of the Hurons and attempted to secure larger returns by virtue of ancient rights which entitled them to a toll on traders passing through their territory.^[77] “Finally there are among the Indians certain rights to pay in the places of passage when they go on a voyage to engage in trade and when they pass through the territory of another tribe among whom they do not wish to stop.” Sagard, on his journey down the Ottawa in 1624, describes the difficulties^[78] with the Honqueronons, who forced them to trade their furs for flour and wheat. Later he met an Algonquin, who reported that^[79] the French fleet had been lost at sea, and attempted to discourage the Hurons from going to trade. At Cap de Victoire^[80] “I heard the complaints of the interpreter Bruslé and of his people who were prevented by the Montagnais and the Algonquins from going further.” The extent to which the Hurons survived this antagonism and the importance of the middlemen trade is suggested in their efforts to check French competition. The methods are suggested by a letter^[81] from Père Joseph describing the difficulty of opening communication with the Neutrals in 1626.

The shift of the trade from the Saguenay to the St. Lawrence^[82] had significant results for the French as well as for the Indians. Navigation was seasonal and the longer distances traversed by vessels from Europe and the difficulty of sailing in uncharted and comparatively narrow waters entailed an increasing overhead expense in the conduct of the trade. Vessels were sent to Tadoussac; the goods were unloaded and forwarded in small barques to Quebec and to such rendezvous as Three Rivers, the mouth of the Richelieu, or the Lachine Rapids. The vessels were sent out to an increasing extent^[83] to engage only in the fur trade so that the trading of large quantities of furs for a return cargo was essential. Closer contact with larger numbers of Indians was a necessity. As already suggested, various devices were adopted to induce the Indians to devote more of their time to the hunting of fur. Missionaries were advised to encourage the Indians to leave their children for the winter in order to insure the return of the parents the following summer, and religious activities were regarded as important aids in the promotion of the trade. The Jesuit Relations of 1642 noted^[84] that

Young men were sent back with the Indians to spy out the land, to learn their language and customs, and to encourage them to bring down more furs. Champlain wrote^[85] in 1610:

In the same year Bouvier,^[87] a competitor, sent a youth with the Algonquins, and Champlain dispatched another young man (probably Vignau) with the Hurons. In 1613 Champlain asked^[88] the Indians “to take with them two young men in order to keep the Indians friendly, learn something of the country, and place them under the obligation of coming back to us.” In 1615 at least one French interpreter was in the Huron country with Champlain. Sagard in 1623-24 mentions^[89] the names of several Frenchmen. He writes, “One of our Frenchmen having gone to trade with an Indian on the north shore, located a copper mine about one hundred leagues from us.” French traders were among the Neutrals and the Tobacco nations. Etienne Brulé as we have seen, came down in 1624 with Indians to trade. Nicolet^[90] had penetrated to Green Bay on Lake Michigan as early as 1634. Groseilliers and Radisson were in the Lake Michigan and Lake Superior country in the decade from 1650 to 1660. Exploration was carried on with the hope of discovering new tribes. Wars were engaged in to weld the alliances. In 1615 Champlain wrote:^[91]

Sagard writes:

These devices involved, on the other hand, a further increase in the general overhead cost of the trade. They could only be effective with a united policy. Large overhead costs in this industry, as in other industries, involved severe competition in the beginning and a combination in the end. For the fur trade, competition was rendered more severe by its particular characteristics. To the rendezvous was brought down each year what is called, in the parlance of economics, an inelastic supply of furs which was to be exchanged for an inelastic supply of European commodities. It was unprofitable for either party to return with the goods brought. Under competitive conditions the supply of European goods tended to be larger, furs were obtained at greater cost, and profits disappeared. In 1608 De Monts had secured a monopoly of one year but was obliged^[93] to recognize that it was impossible to enforce it at Tadoussac because of the Basques’ opposition. In 1610 Champlain complained^[94] that he had taken the most active part in the fight with the Iroquois but that his competitors got most of the furs. In 1611 at Tadoussac^[95] the Indians “wanted to wait until several ships had arrived in order to get our wares more cheaply. Thus, those people are mistaken who think that, by coming first, they can do better business; for these Indians are now too sharp and crafty.” Considerable competition^[96] developed in the same year at the rendezvous at Lachine Rapids, and Champlain again complained of the work of bringing down the Indians to trade and the reward which went to his competitors although he appears to have profited through secret presents. In 1612, during Champlain’s absence, the situation became more serious. He summed^[97] up the whole problem:

The losses of the merchants as a result of competition eventually led to a demand for some form of monopoly control. In 1610 Champlain wrote:^[98]

Through a gradual realization of the numerous difficulties of competition, Champlain was able to arrange for monopoly control. Coöperation was apparently essential even under conditions of competition. Some of the traders^[100] joined forces with Champlain in his fight with the Iroquois in 1610. In 1611 a patache^[101] brought a supply of provisions to Lachine Rapids for all the competitors. These intangible forms of coöperation preceded the loose association of 1613 and the later monopolies.^[102] Undoubtedly the result was the first trust in North America, and the honor of being the first successful trust promoter must be given to Champlain.

The success of monopoly control in contrast to competition is shown in a description^[103] of August, 1626.

On the other hand, the succession of monopolies brought its own difficulties. Changes in control and reorganizations, the attitude of the home government, and effective enforcement of monopoly privileges involved problems absorbing the energies of the various associations concerned. As with most monopolies, lobbying with the home government was expensive. Charter privileges involved certain returns and in most cases the government insisted that settlers should be brought out. The cost of carrying out the agreements or of evading them became an important item. Enforcement of charter privileges necessitated expenditure at military posts as at Quebec and other strategic points which effectively kept out interlopers. The expense of maintaining an open route on the St. Lawrence for the Hurons and the Indians of the interior became more burdensome. Champlain wrote in 1620 regarding Quebec:^[104]

The situation became serious with the establishment of settlements by the Dutch on the Hudson River. The Iroquois had available a supply of European goods which enabled them to take the offensive. The mouth of the Hudson River was open throughout the year. Moreover, it was distant from the fishing banks, and commercial development was closely dependent on the fur trade. The immediate necessity of developing the fur trade^[105] and the shortness of the river, made necessary the penetration of the more northerly richer fur-bearing country of the St. Lawrence. Indian alliances on the part of the Dutch with tribes of an agricultural civilization marginal to the hunting civilization of the fur-bearing areas as with the Iroquois were the result. The Iroquois country was deficient in its supply of the best northern furs, and the Iroquois, through possession of an adequate food supply as agriculturalists, were obliged to engage as middlemen in the fur trade to the north. Champlain in his journey of 1615 found that the Dutch were already engaging in the development of the fur trade through the Iroquois:^[106]

The development of the fur trade to the north could only be accomplished in competition with the French and the Hurons and their allies which served to intensify the earlier struggle. Furs could be obtained by the Iroquois with penetration to the northern country through the use of firearms. Guns and ammunition were the chief items of trade between the Dutch and the Iroquois. As descriptive of this trade, a document of the latter part of the period (1664) states that^[107]

Competition of the Iroquois with the tribes allied to the French led inevitably to robbery and warfare to the point of exhaustion and annihilation and reached its conclusion in the extermination and the westward flight of the Hurons in 1649-50.

The routing of the Hurons from the country around Georgian Bay had various effects for monopoly control. It involved the disappearance of the Hurons as middlemen on whom the French had depended to bring down furs. These Indians no longer had an adequate supply of corn with which they could support themselves in the prosecution of the trade. The fur trade devolved upon the French to an increasing extent and it became increasingly expensive. French traders, as in the case of Radisson and Groseilliers, found it necessary to penetrate to the more remote regions around Lake Michigan and Lake Superior to stimulate new interest in the fur trade and to encourage the growing of corn so that the longer journeys to the colony could be undertaken. According to Radisson,^[109] “my brother stayed where he was welcome and put up a great deale of Indian corne that was given him. He intended to furnish the wild men that weare to goe downe to the French if they had not enough.”

The constant inroads of the Iroquois and the innumerable difficulties attendant upon a reorganization of the trade in the interior led to a serious interruption, the results of which were described in the Jesuit Relations^[110] of 1652-53.

The numerous portages on the Ottawa gave the Iroquois exceptional opportunities^[111] for raiding. Visits were made by the Indians at intervals by the roundabout routes of the St. Maurice and the Saguenay and under the direction of traders such as Radisson and Groseilliers, but trade was not established on a permanent basis until new efforts were made to suppress the Iroquois.

The effect of these burdens on the monopoly were shown in the slow development of the colony and in the checkered history of monopoly organization. The monopolists were interested in the fur trade and, as far as possible, evaded the tax laid down in their agreements which required them to promote settlement. In so far as agriculture benefited the trade, it was encouraged. Sagard writes^[112] that at Quebec the Company “kept a number of animals which they brought from France. They sow also every year Indian corn and peas which they trade with the Indians for furs” but later he explains that

The added expense of supporting the settlers in new territory not immediately adaptable to European agriculture, and the prospect of competition from these settlers were deterrent factors. Champlain knew the situation^[113] when he wrote in 1618:

The consequent weakness of the colony was shown in the loss of Quebec^[114] to the English from 1629 to 1632.

The energies of the colony were directed to defense against the inroads of the Iroquois and to the problem of keeping open the St. Lawrence and the Ottawa route. A fort was established at Three Rivers in 1634 and a settlement was made at Montreal in 1641-42. To protect Montreal, Fort Richelieu was built at the mouth of the Sorel River in 1642. To carry out these militaristic measures, the colony was subjected to a centralized policy in all its activities. Trade, agricultural development as in the seigniorial tenure, and even religious activities,^[115] as shown in the exclusion of the Huguenots and later control of the Jesuits, reflected the influence of centralized control. The relation of centralized policy to the fur trade was shown also in the revenue of the government. Profits and revenue were obtained from the fur trade. Monopoly profits stimulated competition from the Iroquois and necessitated further outlays in military expenditures. The vicious circle continued since heavier outlays required additional revenue and furthered competition. The dependence of the governing authorities on the fur trade for revenue gave the trade a crucial importance.

These difficulties incidental to the struggle for the St. Lawrence had a pronounced effect on the character of internal monopoly organization. Control shifted in spite of the fears of the monopoly into the hands of the local traders who were intimately acquainted with the problems of the trade. With penetration to the interior, and the increasing difficulties of the trade especially after the routing of the Hurons, the local trader became more important. The Company of New France was granted a monopoly on April 29, 1627. The capture of the Company’s fleet by the English involved a direct loss of three hundred thousand livres. With the return of Quebec to France an arrangement was made in December, 1632, in which the monopoly was leased for five years to a group of associates in return for ten thousand livres (covering the administration expenses of the colony) and one-third interest in the association. This subordinate Company which disappeared in 1637 after earning a profit of three hundred thousand livres was followed by an agreement with a new group of six of the members of the Company of New France,—Chaffault, Rozée, Berrenger, Fouquet, Castillon, Lauzon,—for four years of which Chatelets was appointed a representative at Quebec. Under this arrangement the Company of New France lost seventy thousand livres and in 1641 was obliged to subscribe 103,500 livres to carry on the trade. By 1645 the Company had realized a profit of eighty-five thousand livres but increasing difficulties with the Iroquois and jealousies regarding the profits necessitated a new arrangement and the trade was vested in the hands of the local traders, in an agreement^[116] ratified March 6, 1645, between the Company of New France and “le député des habitans de la Nouvelle France,” by which the Company relinquished its exclusive rights in the fur trade to the more powerful inhabitants (De Repentigny, Godefroy, DesChatelets, Giffard, Boulard) as a community with the right to make its own regulations. In return the community agreed to bring out twenty colonists annually, to bear the expenses of the government of the country and to pay one thousand pounds of assorted beaver skins annually to the Company. Dissatisfaction following the immediate large returns of the new Company in 1645 (three hundred and twenty thousand livres profit in that year) on the part of the colonists led to the adoption on March 27, 1647, of specific regulations^[117] in the organization of the community, by which general freedom of trade was permitted within the colony,

Complaints of the unduly heavy costs of administration on the part of representatives of the habitans led to new adjustments in the Arrest^[119] du 5 mars, 1648, with lower charges and greater freedom to trade. The increase in the scarcity of beaver after the disruption of the trade led to a decline in the annual returns from two hundred and fifty thousand livres to sixty-five thousand livres in 1652 and to further regulations. In 1653 the habitans were given permission^[120] to retain three-fourths of the beaver taken to the Magazin instead of one-half as had been the rule, the Company was released of the charge of one thousand beavers and on October 20, 1653, the district of Tadoussac was set aside to meet the general charges. In 1656 the habitans were given permission^[121] to trade for one year at Tadoussac. Continued difficulties^[122] of the monopoly were in evidence as the following statement and ordinance suggests.

Complaints^[123] were also made that laborers broke their contracts and deserted to the fishing boats at Ile Percée, paying for a return passage to France with smuggled furs. The problems of control by a monopoly became overwhelming. In 1660 the Company of the Habitans ceded the trade to the Company of Normandy for a payment of ten thousand livres to creditors and fifty thousand livres for beaver duties. Finally the Company of New France disappeared in 1663. The period witnessed the emergence of the local trader^[124] as independent from monopoly control in the internal trade.

Essential to the trade under all conditions but especially under conditions of competition was the personal relationship of the trader with the Indian. The fur trade demanded a long apprenticeship^[125] on the part of its personnel in dealing with Indians. With competition from the Iroquois it was increasingly necessary that the trade should center with the local traders and that a large monopoly with headquarters in France should become inadequate. In the St. Lawrence and especially beyond Lachine and up the Ottawa, the trade was carried on by small boats and by canoes and was consequently in the hands of local traders. Expansion in the interior and competitive conditions tended to shift the control of the trade and to break up the control of monopoly over internal trade. Another cause of the increasing importance of local traders was the introduction and extension of the use of money^[126] and the price system. With the weakening of monopoly control, and the increase in the number of traders and the amount of trade, barter was no longer adequate. The increasing use of currency stimulated individual initiative and strengthened the position of the trader as against the monopoly. Following the increase in currency came a change in the methods of collecting revenue. The conditions of the charters which insisted on the settling of the country were changed to the definite payment of a certain sum. Expenditures and revenues became items to be balanced in livres and sols. The tax-collecting mechanism was further adjusted to the transportation facilities of New France and taxes were collected on furs, deposited in the Magazin, and sent to France in large vessels over which due control could be exercised.

The period of the development of the fur trade on a large scale and as an independent industry^[127] witnessed the evolution of distinctive organizations. Typical European institutions of the period as in the monopoly were adapted and modified according to the demands of a new environment. The inherent dependence of the trade on its personnel and the increasing stress on this dependence with the exhaustion of the supply of beaver led to the development of an internal organization in which the individual traders took an increasingly important part. There was heard in this early period of the trade a cry of exultation which will be heard again during its history, Le commerce est libre. The dominance of the local trader in internal organization was not carried to the external organization for the trade between Quebec and France. A limited number of vessels necessary for the conduct of the trade and the heavy overhead costs incidental to seasonal navigation were responsible for the continuation of monopoly control in this part of the trade. On this organization was built up the control of the home government. Through this organization was registered the decline in the trade following the destructive competition of the Iroquois and with it came the necessity for active intervention which developed in the following years. This committed the French government directly to the task of repairing its revenue from the fur trade by waging war more directly and more effectively on the Iroquois and indirectly on the European allies of the Iroquois.

During the period from 1600 to 1663 the fur trade emerges independent from fishing. This growth was dependent on the opening of the St. Lawrence to the interior. The organization of the trade shifted from a state of competition to monopoly as a result of the overhead costs incidental to movement to the interior. This monopoly organization was later modified to meet the new demands of the trade.

The fur trade was a phase of a cultural disturbance incidental to the meeting of two civilizations with different cultural traits. The demand for a more efficient route to the interior, the struggle with the Iroquois, the modification of trade organization, the limited growth of the colony, and the disappearance of native peoples were phases of the catastrophe which swept over the northern fur producing areas of North America. The rapid destruction of the beaver had an important influence on the spread of the disturbance to the interior and the fur trade was fundamental in determining the lines followed but it was incidental to the driving force of the demand for European goods.

3. The Struggle for the Great Lakes and Hudson Bay
(1663-1713)

The first half of the seventeenth century was characterized by a continuous struggle for control of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa route to the interior. The period ended with the break-up of the Huron middlemen organization and the destruction of the trade. In the early part of the second half of the century the French were engaged in establishing new connections and making a successful and determined effort to defeat the Iroquois and gain firm control over the route. As a result the period after 1663 was characterized by a rapid expansion of trade.

Expansion of trade was stimulated by the dispersal^[128] of the Hurons and the tribes around Georgian Bay to the area around Lake Superior and Lake Michigan. The Ottawa tribes, which had, apparently, occupied the areas around Manitoulin Island and Michilimackinac, the Hurons of Georgian Bay, and other neighboring tribes, and the Saulteurs of the Sault were driven to the southern shores of Lake Superior, especially near Chequamegon, and to the shores of Green Bay on Lake Michigan. These scattered tribes came in contact with more remote tribes of the interior, trespassed on their lands, introduced them to European goods, and engaged with them in new wars.^[129] The Ottawas, crossing from Green Bay to the Mississippi, came in contact with the Potawatomi, the Sioux, and other tribes. Perrot wrote:^[130]

The Ottawas, settling at Chequamegon, learned from the Saulteurs of the Nipissings, who had fled to Lake Nipigon, and of the Crees to the north of Lake Superior. According to Perrot:^[131]

This demand of Indian tribes in the western territory for European goods occasioned a rapid increase in trade. The tribes of the territory adjoining Lake Michigan, which were not familiar with the canoe^[132] like the Sauks, Foxes, and Illinois, became the hunters of beaver to be traded with middlemen who were thoroughly acquainted with the Ottawa route and expert canoemen like the Ottawas and the Saulteurs^[133] (who were even better canoemen than the Hurons). The Miamis and the Sioux ceased roasting the beaver for food, and began a search for skins. Indian tribes limited to the restricted returns incidental to trade with middlemen who held a monopoly were obliged to search far afield and to war on other tribes for a supply of beaver. In the early part of the period the Ottawas were joined on their journeys to Montreal and New France by other tribes. Hurons, Algonquins, Chippewas, Beavers, Sioux, and Kishkakon accompanied Radisson on his voyage. In 1670 Saulteurs, Missisaugas, and Crees were among the Indians^[134] going to the French settlement. Du Chesneau, in his memoir on the western Indians dated November 13, 1681, suggested^[135] that at that time the Ottawas were in control. The profitable trade of the middlemen had passed from the hands of the Hurons to the Ottawas.

The reëstablishment and expansion of trade was limited by competition on two sides, from the north on Hudson Bay, and from the south by the Iroquois. The weak points of control of the fur trade in the St. Lawrence drainage basin were the low heights of land which separated the tributaries of the St. Lawrence from the rivers of the Atlantic—the Richelieu and the Hudson—and from the northern tributaries and rivers flowing into Hudson Bay—the Albany, the Moose, and Rupert rivers.

On the north the Hudson’s Bay Company was a disturbing factor. The effects of the dispersal of the Huron and allied tribes in bringing more remote Indians in contact with European goods have already been noted. The Assiniboines were mentioned by Father Gabriel Dreuillettes in the Jesuit Relations^[136] as early as 1656 as having been discovered by the early French traders. Father Allouez^[137] met Indians who had been at the mouth of the Assiniboine River in 1666. The Assiniboines, a part of the Sioux confederacy, had been pushed back by the Indians more fortunately located in relation to European goods. These Indians and other hunting Indians, such as the Crees in the neighborhood of Hudson Bay, being farthest distant from the French, possessed beaver in the greatest abundance, valued European commodities most highly, and secured the least favorable rate of exchange. They traded with the French through Indian middlemen, the Sioux, and in turn the Ottawa and the Saulteur, and because of the monopoly of these middlemen and the great distances covered, obtained restricted supplies of goods.

The newly established Hudson’s Bay Company (1670) began an immediate and effective competition which was felt on the Saguenay and at Sault Ste Marie. In the Jesuit Relations, dated September, 1671, referring^[138] to the Saguenay trade, it was noted that:

In a letter dated Ste Marie du Sault, May 29, 1673, Father Nouvel wrote to Monseigneur the Governor:^[139]

The monopoly of Indian middlemen in the French trade was immediately broken by the Hudson’s Bay Company; goods were obtained on a large scale, and, with access by sea, at much more favorable rates.

The Assiniboines had apparently retreated to the area surrounding Lake Winnipeg, and in 1673 they^[140] were among the numerous tribes of Indians taking advantage of the opportunity of throwing off the monopoly control of middlemen trading with the French, by resorting to the new posts of the Hudson’s Bay Company on James Bay. Trade with the English on Hudson Bay continued, and after the establishment of Fort Nelson in 1682 grew rapidly. In 1683 French traders^[141] at Green Bay had met Indians who had traded for hatchets at the mouth of the “Assiniboie” River (Ft. Nelson). In a letter dated Quebec, November 10, 1686, it was pointed out that:^[142]

Competition from Hudson Bay tapped the sources of the best beaver^[143] of the French, and the effectiveness of competition was greatly enhanced by the location of the posts at the mouths of the rivers flowing into James Bay. James Bay and the territory north of the tree line were of strategic importance to the fur trade, since from these areas the French had drawn large quantities of the best northern furs, and the length and difficulty of the rivers of these regions gave the Hudson’s Bay Company an advantage.

Immediate steps were taken to check competition. Father Albanel was dispatched in 1671 to go to Hudson Bay by way of the Saguenay, and to attempt to win back Groseilliers^[144] and Radisson whose coöperation was so important to the English, and he was in part successful. Northwest of Lake Superior, measures were also taken. Crees adjacent to Hudson Bay posts secured commodities, especially guns, and carried on war with the neighboring Assiniboines. The Assiniboines were consequently located between the Sioux in the south who obtained European goods from the French, and the Crees on the north who obtained goods from the English. An alliance^[145] between the Assiniboines and the Crees favored the Hudson’s Bay Company. To offset the effects, Duluth^[146] in 1679 arranged a peace at the head of Lake Superior between this alliance and the Sioux, which facilitated trade in French goods. Moreover, posts were established north of Lake Superior, and in 1678 a fort was built at the entrance to Lake Nipigon.^[147] By 1681 French traders^[148] were carrying on trade to the north of Lake Superior at Lake Nipigon, Kaministiquia, and toward the head of the lake. Fort La Toruette at the mouth of the Ombabika on the north of Lake Nipigon was built^[149] in 1684, and Fort de Français near the forks of the Kenogami and the Albany in 1685. Finally the French were successful in the capturing of Forts Albany, Moose, and Rupert in 1686. Fort Nelson, however, remained in control of the English, but an attempt was made to dissuade the Assiniboines and the Crees from going to that post by trading through the Kaministiquia route. As early as 1680 traders had apparently crossed^[150] the height of land at this point to trade with these Indians. In 1688 Noyon wintered at Rainy Lake,^[151] or the Lake of the Crees, and the country to Lake Winnipeg, or the Lake of the Assiniboines, was known. This route had obvious difficulties, and attempts were made as a result to reach Fort Nelson by sea. The “Compagnie du Nord” included several Quebec merchants and was given a charter^[152] on May 20, 1682, to carry on trade in Hudson Bay, and its success was furthered through an aggressive military policy. M. de Denonville, in a memoir on the state of Canada dated November 12, 1685, wrote:^[153]

The capture of Fort Nelson^[154] in 1697 by the French led to the partial disappearance of the Kaministiquia routes. The history of the latter part of the period in Hudson Bay is one of charges and countercharges^[155] in which, on the whole, the French were most successful. Competition from Hudson Bay was largely eliminated by military aggressions.

In the south, competition from the Iroquois, the Dutch and the English provoked similar aggressive measures. The decline and continued interruptions of the fur trade with its effect on revenue^[156] and on settlement had brought an impasse which provoked the attacks of the French on the Iroquois. The raids into Iroquois territory in 1665 and 1666 were effective in securing peace and in reopening the Ottawa route. The Jesuit Relations of 1667-68^[157] notes that:

The position of the French colony was strengthened and new possibilities for the fur trade realized by the construction of Fort Frontenac at the foot of Lake Ontario in 1673. This was followed by the tentative construction of a fort at Niagara^[158] in 1679. The hauling of large bateaux up the difficult waters of the St. Lawrence impressed the Iroquois with the weakness of their^[159] position. The establishment of Fort Frontenac also opened a new route to the interior by the Great Lakes and the use of boats capable of much more efficient transportation than canoes became a reality. La Salle’s construction of four barques on Lake Ontario by 1677 and of The Griffin in 1679 at Niagara marked the beginning of Great Lakes navigation.

The temporary control over the Iroquois permitted an extensive development of the trade. The effectiveness of the Ottawa middlemen organization was enhanced by the assistance of French traders and missionaries who followed the Indians to Chequamegon and to Green Bay, to the head of Lake Superior and to the Mississippi. The French penetrated to the Sioux country and came in contact with the Miamis, the Foxes, and neighboring tribes. Jolliet and Marquette in 1673 explored^[160] the Mississippi. La Salle^[161] extended his activities along the south shore of Lake Michigan and the headwaters of the tributaries of the Mississippi. Duluth^[162] in 1679 and 1680 explored the area west of Lake Superior to the Mississippi and established posts on the north of Lake Superior, at Kaministiquia and on Lake Nipigon.

On the other hand, the scarcity of beaver in the Iroquois country, and the ever present demand for European goods necessitated constant hunting on the part of Iroquois bands in the territory north of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and constant attempts to establish trade with northern and western tribes allied to the French. This problem was recognized by the French as in the narrative of Governor de Courcelles’ voyage to Lake Ontario in 1671^[163] it was noted that:

Talon, in a memoir dated November 10, 1670, wrote:^[164]

War with the Ottawas as middlemen was, consequently, as inevitable to the Iroquois as it had been during the earlier period with the Hurons. The memoir of De la Barre, dated November 4, 1683, stated:^[165]

Moreover, there was reason to believe that, as in the case of the Hurons, peace between the Iroquois and the Ottawas was not encouraged by the French. Lahontan wrote:^[166]

The effectiveness of English and Iroquois competition was partly a result of geographic background, and partly a result of more efficient manufactures in England. Cheaper and superior English goods,^[167] and a favorable route from the Hudson^[168] to Lake Ontario were the important factors. “It is a fact that the Iroquois have more esteem and inclination for us than for the English but they are carried away by the influence of the low prices of goods they require combined with the higher rate the English pay for beaver.” The English trade was especially advantageous in guns and ammunition, in rum from the West Indies, and in clothing and blankets. The coureurs de bois were attracted by the favorable prices, as well as the Iroquois. La Barre wrote^[169] in 1683:

Smuggling^[170] was carried on by Fort Frontenac and Fort Chambly in spite of ordinances^[171] prohibiting the trade, and carrying the death penalty. Fort Frontenac was regarded as a “refuge and entrepôt for coureurs de bois scattered among all the Ottawa nations and to carry on thence a trade in beavers with the Dutch and the English.”^[172]

With the aid of cheaper goods, the Iroquois were able to compete effectively and to trade with tribes around Lake Erie and the Ohio, the Wabash, and the southern shores of Lake Michigan. The English were able to engage in intrigues with the Ottawas and the Hurons, and with the tribes of Lake Michigan. In 1686 a trading expedition^[173] was sent to Michilimackinac by “the flemins and the English of New York,” but it was summarily checked. The problems of the French in combating competition from the Iroquois and the English were extremely complicated. The French trader, for example Perrot, was a diplomatist of the first order. As competition became more severe he was obliged to engage in diplomacy^[174] to prevent the Ottawas trading with the Iroquois. His task was accomplished in part, as suggested, by encouraging hostility between these two tribes, but it was necessary also to maintain peace with the Iroquois. To maintain influence among the tribes, and to acquire a share of the profits of Indian middlemen, larger numbers of traders penetrated to the interior, and these traders incurred the jealousy of the middlemen whose profits were reduced. The monopoly of the middlemen was broken by the French who traded in guns and ammunition to more remote tribes. The Potawatomi discouraged^[175] trade by the French with the Maskoutech. The Hurons attempted^[176] to prevent trade between the French and the Sioux. The Foxes prohibited^[177] French trade with the Sioux. The Nipissings in 1666 tried^[178] to prevent trade with Montreal by spreading rumors of disease. According to La Potherie,^[179] the Ottawas were alarmed at the appearance and possibilities of La Salle’s boat, and were instrumental in its destruction. Lahontan in his letter dated Montreal, November 2, 1684, described the speech of the Iroquois during the negotiations of that year:^[180]

In addition to the problems incidental to diplomacy among the Indians, the French traders^[181] competed among themselves as at Green Bay and Chicago, and the south shores of Lake Michigan. The breakdown of diplomacy under these tremendous demands was shown in the revival of the Iroquois wars after 1684, and especially after the massacre of Lachine in 1689. It was necessarily followed and strengthened by military measures. Fort Frontenac was reëstablished in 1694 after its abandonment in 1689, Fort St. Joseph was built on the Detroit River in 1686 and supplanted by Fort Detroit in 1701.

The penetration of European goods among the western Indians, the emergence of the Ottawas as middlemen, and the long period of diplomacy and warfare had important effects on Indian life, and in turn on the organization of the fur trade. An immediate result was the settlement of Indians, who were unable to go to Montreal because of lack of experience with canoes, at points, especially near Green Bay, which gave them direct access to trade in European commodities brought by middlemen. The concentration about Green Bay is suggested in the following extract. The Potawatomi^[182] after the first visit to Montreal (1668)

Settlements were also made near French posts built to protect the Indians against the Iroquois and other enemies. At Fort St. Louis in 1683 “they established themselves to the number of 300 lodges . . . Islinois and Miamis and Chaouanons.” They also settled about Michilimackinac and Sault Ste Marie. As a result of the congregation of Indian tribes about specific points, and the entrance in the trade of French traders, control shifted from the hands of the Ottawa middlemen. As already shown the large profits of the Ottawas were incidental to the trade with newly discovered tribes who were insistent on European goods, and who possessed heavy robes of beaver skins which commanded the highest prices, and whose beaver fields were not depleted. Because of the large profits of this trade, French traders,^[183] as in the case of Radisson and Groseilliers, became interested in the western tribes. As Radisson wrote “for where that there is lucre, there are people enough to be had.” These traders furthered the work of the Ottawas and others in spreading European goods, and in stimulating the fur trade. La Potherie wrote:^[184]

As a result of the increasing importance of the French trader in the interior, of the settlement of the Indians at definite points, and of the longer journeys and the increasing costs, the trading organization suffered material changes. The rendezvous on the St. Lawrence and its successor, the annual fairs at Montreal^[185] and other points, became less important. Attempts were made to restore^[186] the trade to Montreal, Three Rivers, and Quebec as early as 1676, but without material results. Small traders, creditors, and interpreters at Montreal protested^[187] in vain against the decline of the fairs. The smaller number of Ottawas was noted in 1686. M. de Meulles wrote:^[188]

The decreasing importance of the Ottawa middlemen hastened concentration of the trade in the colony. The trade carried on in the interior involved to the merchant a heavy outlay in goods, and large interest charges incidental to the slower turnover. As a result it became concentrated in the hands of a small number of large merchants. Lahontan^[189] wrote regarding Montreal in 1685:

The heavy overhead charges incidental to the trade with France were an additional cause of concentration. Beaver skins were light, and the goods which were brought out from France bulky and heavy. “Most of the ships^[191] go laden to Canada and return light or empty.” In the Mémoire sur la ferme du Domaine d’Occident dated December 28, 1698, the net results were^[192] described.

Moreover, the effects of English competition became more conspicuous in the later part of the period. In a letter from M. de Clerambaut d’Aigremont to M. de Pontchartrain dated November 18, 1710, it was pointed out that:^[193]

The organization of the internal trade under French control was rapidly extended. Ordinarily the coureurs de bois left Montreal in the spring, or about the middle of September. Arriving at Michilimackinac^[194] they reëquipped for food and left for Lake Superior to the north or for Lake Michigan to the south. They returned to Michilimackinac the following spring about the middle of July, and left for Montreal. This journey^[195] involved an absence of at least a year, but occasionally from two to three years were required for effective prosecution of the trade in the interior. M. Du Chesneau in a letter to M. De Seignelay, dated November 13, 1681, wrote:^[196]

Traders penetrating to the interior were dependent upon an ample food supply, and on contact with a large number of Indians. Sault Ste Marie became important not only as a gateway to Lake Superior, but also, as Galinée noted in 1670, as an important supply point for whitefish.^[197]

Lahontan described^[199] it in his letter dated Missilimackinac, May 26, 1688:

Green Bay became more important as a gathering place for the agricultural and hunting Indians. Lahontan wrote:^[200]

At a later date with the increasing importance of the Great Lakes route, a similar depot was established at Detroit.^[201] In 1714 its importance was described.

The policy of concentration of posts, which developed after 1696, gave a direct stimulus to the growth of these depots.

The method of carrying on trade to the interior and to these depots, has been described by Lahontan^[202] in his letter dated Boucherville, October 2, 1685.

Local merchants supplied commodities for the trade, and received a proportion of the profits. In the earlier period, the proportion was as much as one-half, but later^[203] this share diminished. The trader was a partner directly concerned in the conduct and success of the trade.

The development of a trading organization in the interior had important effects on the colony, and on the external organization of trade. The effects on the colony were shown directly in the increasing number of men necessary for its prosecution, and for the wars incidental to the checking of competition from Hudson Bay, and from the English and the Iroquois. The trade was carried on in the summer and seriously restricted the supply of labor for agriculture. In M. Du Chesneau’s^[204] letter to M. De Seignelay, dated November 13, 1681, he complained that:

The close dependence of the colony on the fur trade was also evident in the problems which appeared following expansion to the interior, and the marked increase in the supply of furs. The difficulties of the trade at the beginning of the period were evident in the bankruptcy^[205] of the Company of the Habitans. To meet the situation the “Conseil souverain,” which had been established in April, 1663, recommended^[206] that the rights to one-fourth of the beaver and one-tenth of the orignaux, and the trade of Tadoussac should be granted for three years to the highest bidder. These rights were consequently sold^[207] after considerable competition to Aubert de la Chesnaye for 46,500 livres on October 23, 1663. The establishment of the Company of West Indies in May,^[208] 1664, made no immediate change in the arrangement, but on April 8, 1666, these rights^[209] were transferred to it. The Company began with an attempt to exercise the full rights of the charter in the control of trade, but, because of complaints from the habitans and the activity of Talon, it was unsuccessful and free trade within the colony continued to be the rule.^[210] The success of the military activities against the Iroquois, and the increase in the supply of fur which occasioned a fall in price brought serious problems to the Company of West Indies. M. de la Chesnaye^[211] wrote in 1670 that prices had fallen in five or six years from 14l. to 4l. per livre. Expenditure in the colony for fortifications increased rapidly,^[212] and the revenue secured from furs declined. It had been estimated that the right to one-fourth of the beaver and one-tenth of the orignaux would produce annually 46,900 livres, and it actually produced 34,000 livres. In 1674 the Company had accumulated a debt of 3,523,000 livres, and, as a result, disappeared.^[213] To prevent the decline in price it was planned to place the trade under a single hand and to fix the price at a certain level; probably the first valorization scheme in North America thus came into effect. The trade was sold^[214] to Nicolas Oudiette on May 24, 1675, for 350,000 livres. He was obliged to accept all beaver at 4 livres 10 sols la livre, and to sell in France at not more than 10 livres.

The payment of a fixed price for all grades of beaver encouraged the sale of grades of beaver which were beginning to come on the market as a result of exploration, especially in the south and southwest, following the activities of La Salle. The beaver was of a poorer quality than that in the northern Wisconsin district, and the Indians were not accustomed to wearing beaver robes for a great length of time and making castor gras. Larger supplies of castor sec came on the market. The guard hair was still on them and the fur lacked the downy character of castor gras, the result of long wear. Other poorer grades became more conspicuous with a fixed price. Demi-gras d’hiver, or robes which the Indians were beginning to wear, and of which the skins were beginning to turn yellow; castor gras d’été, or robes which were made of skins taken in summer with very little fur, and thick pelts; castor veule, or robes which had been scraped thin and treated, but not worn, of which the skins were white and very light; castor sec d’hiver or bardeau, or beaver skins taken in winter which had not been made into robes, because of holes and imperfections and which were, as a result, badly prepared and very coarse; castor sec d’été, or skins taken in summer; mitaines and rogneures, or small pieces used for making sleeves and mittens, were among the grades appearing on the market. A fixed price stimulated the trade in poorer grades of fur. Large quantities of castor sec seriously affected the price in the home market, since the hatmakers used only one-fourth of castor sec to mix with three-fourths of castor gras. The sale of surplus dry beaver in Holland and other markets reduced the price and prejudiced the position of le fermier. Since beaver was purchased by weight the thick skins and lighter fur of the poorer grades were sold more advantageously than the light skin and thick fur of the castor gras, which was in demand among the hatmakers. Fraudulent practices, such as keeping the beaver in damp cellars to increase the weight, were prevalent. There followed a protest from Oudiette, and a plea for a revision of prices. The arguments put forward by le fermier and the traders are shown in the following extracts^[215] from the Proces verbal touchant le prix des castors et orignaux qu’il fault examiner of Du Chesneau, dated October 20, 1676.

A compromise^[216] was reached in 1677 in which the price of castor gras was raised to 5 livres 10 sols; Muscovie veule et demi-gras remained at 4l. 10s., and castor sec ordinaire was reduced to 3l. 10s. Muscovie veule included beaver skins taken in winter without damage, which had large excellent fur and long hair, and was carefully prepared for the trade in Russia. In that country the fur was taken out and the remaining hair left on the skins for wear. This grade was placed on the same basis as castor demi-gras.

The chief problem of the valorization scheme, however, was that of controlling supply. Regulations were enacted as early as 1673 to prevent traders going to the interior. It was planned to limit trade^[217] and after the new price arrangement a fresh crop of legislation appeared. The number and frequency of the regulations were indices of their ineffectiveness. In many cases they defeated their own ends by outlawing the traders and increasing the trade with the English. The failure of prohibitions was shown^[218] in a Mémoire of M. Du Chesneau on Irregular trade in Canada, dated November 13, 1681.

Amnesties were passed, the regulations were modified, and, in general, the attempts at control broke down. The system of licenses, which permitted twenty-five canoes to go to the trade, proved inadequate. Three men were permitted to each license, giving a total of seventy-five coureurs de bois. This number increased to nearly four hundred including men going out, men in the country, men returning, and men allowed to go on special permits.^[219] The licenses became a source of political corruption, and a method of control over the trade of advantage to the ruling authorities. Prices of congés^[220] declined to 30 crowns. In 1696 in an attempt to further control supply, all congés were abolished.^[221] “We have absolutely suppressed all licenses and permissions to trade with the Indians.” The trade was restricted to certain important posts, and troops stationed to insure enforcement of the regulations. The troops^[222] and commandments became interested, and the fur trade continued.

Price and trade regulations were scarcely more effective in limiting supply. Regulations became more numerous after 1690, and took a variety of forms. In 1691 restrictions^[223] were placed on the marketing of poor beaver from pais des Illinois, and prohibitions were enacted against the falsifying of weights with oil, or by leaving the beaver in damp cellars. Certain customs^[224] had grown up protecting le fermier. Sec d’hiver or bardeau skins were accepted on the basis of une livre et demie although weighing much more. In weighing other furs 2 per cent was allowed le fermier. On May 30, 1695, the following prices and grades were established^[225] to be effective July 1, 1697:

It was also specifically stated that furs not falling within the three grades mentioned—les castors illinois ou bardeaux, ceux du bas automne ou du printems et les rogneurs—should be rejected. By the rejection of castor sec d’esté it was expected^[227] that the Indians would make the beavers into robes and wear them, thus converting them into castor gras d’été, and that they would tend to leave off hunting in summer, and consequently get only the best furs. The regulation of 1695 appears to have been enacted partly as a result of complaints against too close grading. Beaver brought down as gras was graded by the fermiers as veule, and for the habitant there was no alternative but acceptance of the low grade. Because of this uncertainty the Indians were not encouraged to make castor gras because the trade in castor sec was found to be more substantial, better regulated, and more certain. To avoid this difficulty castor gras was received at the same rate as castor veule in the arrêt of 1695. The new regulation brought its own problems. Since castor veule weighed much less than castor sec the habitant lost on weight more than he gained in price, and castor sec continued to come on the market. In 1696 a reduction^[228] appears to have been made and le gras et demi gras were quoted at 5l. 10s. la livre, and le veule at 4l. 10s. This reduction brought on the same difficulties^[229] as existed prior to 1695. In 1700 prices were again regulated—beaver received in 1699 and 1700: castor sec quitte du quart 2l. 0s. 0d. Le Moscovite et robes neuves 3l. 0s. 0d.; le gras, demi-gras et veule 3l. 18s. 9d.; Le gras d’été 1l. 19s. 4d.; and hereafter du castor sec en robes neuves qui n’auront pas été portées, le quart ôté 2l. 5s. Du Moscovite 2l. 10s.; Du gras, demi-gras, et veule 3l. 5s.; castor gras d’été and castor sec d’été were rejected.^[230] On May 28, 1701, a new regulation^[231] reduced the price of le castor sec et robes neuves to 40 sols or 2l., and raised the price of le Moscovite to 60 sols or 3 livres.

Continual price adjustments and regulations for control brought further difficulties which were especially evident in the period following 1700. During the early period every effort was made to reduce the amount of castor sec. In the period after 1700, a complete change had occurred in which every effort was made to reduce the amount of castor gras. The probable causes of this extraordinary reversal may be indicated. The difference in price between castor gras and castor sec, and the greater restriction of coureurs de bois after 1696 were important considerations. The English were unable to compete for castor gras and bought larger quantities of the other varieties. In transportation “a canoe loaded with two thousand weight of castor sec was valued at only 4,000 livres, whereas if it had been loaded with castor gras it would have been valued up to 6,500 livres.” Moreover, with fewer coureurs de bois the Indians were given more time to produce castor gras. Of greatest importance the success of the French on Hudson Bay increased the supply of this grade. In 1697 this district supplied 19,847 pounds and in 1701 approximately 40,000 pounds. The net result was the flooding of the market with castor gras.^[232] In 1706 prices were reduced, castor sec 30 sols la livre, and castor gras forbidden for six years. In 1710 the price of castor sec was raised to 34 sols la livre, and castor gras again prohibited. With the Treaty of Utrecht the demand for castor gras increased, and on October 8, 1714, it was decreed that the company^[233] of Neret and Gayot would receive castor gras at 40 sols. The agreement of 1710 was revoked, and the original agreement of 1706 restored and continued to 1717, the date of expiration of the lease.

With successful naval and military campaigns to check competition, and an increasing demand for European goods which followed, especially the discovery of new tribes with ample supplies of beaver, attempts to check supply were doomed. The average annual supply^[234] of beaver from Canada from 1675 to 1685 was 89,588 pounds, and from 1685 to 1687, 140,000 pounds whereas the consumption of beaver in France averaged forty to forty-five thousand pounds. The surplus was sent to Holland and Europe to compete with supplies from New England and Hudson Bay. In 1685 Oudiette, le fermier du droits, was obliged to transfer the control of the trade to Fauconnet. The hatmakers were loaded with furs at the beginning of Fauconnet’s régime, and the increase to 1687 necessitated the appointment of Domergue. In 1692 Pointeau was appointed. In the failure of each successive appointment of men in charge of the ferme the problem remained unsolved. It was complicated by violent fluctuations in supply largely occasioned by the wars. In 1689 and in 1693 large quantities of fur were brought down which had accumulated during the Iroquois wars. The flood of castor sec from the south continued as shown by Champigny in his Mémoire pour le castor à Québec, dated October 26, 1694.^[235]

On January 1, 1697, the fermier had on hand 850,185 livres of beaver which it was estimated could be consumed in ten years. On February 10, 1696, the following estimate was made:

An estimate of the “farm,” Feb. 10, 1696:

A comparison of the actual receipts from 1697 to 1699 shows the inadequacy of the estimate. In 1697 over 200,000 livres were received, in 1698, 103,000, and in 1699, 296,000. In four years^[236] 696,923 livres had been received, of which 373,271 livres were castor sec. The following contemporary account outlines the problems of the period:

A final experiment^[237] was inaugurated in the formation^[238] of the Company of Canada (October 15, 1701) which included among its shareholders the important merchants of New France. It was expected that regulations for control would be more effectively enforced by enlisting their support. It was arranged that the beaver already in the hands of the fermier should be taken to Lyons, Marseilles, Nantes, and Saint-Malo, manufactured in those cities, and the product sold in all countries except Holland, Sweden, Denmark, the Hanseatic towns, and the ports of the Baltic Sea, and Russia. The new company was given control of those countries and of the remaining areas of France. La Rochelle was named as the entrepôt of the trade to which the furs were to be imported, and from which they were to be exported free of duty.^[239] The company also entered into an agreement^[240] with Gayot, Bouélet, and Pasquier, a Paris firm, to sell its furs. It began with about 700,000 livres of beaver for which it had paid 470,000 livres (about 15 sols per livre), plus 456,900 livres worth of beaver left over from 1699. In five years, including 1704, it had received beaver valued at 1,020,338 livres at Quebec, and 335,870 livres from Detroit, Fort Frontenac, and Hudson Bay. The total cost was therefore 2,283,108 livres. Of this amount 889,065 livres had been sold in France, and 1,045,340 livres in Holland, making total receipts 1,934,405 livres, of which commissions, expense, and interest had absorbed 835,260 livres. Moreover, the Company had lost on its farming rights during the period.^[241] At the beginning of 1705 there were bills of exchange outstanding against the Company to the extent of 1,607,249 livres,^[242] and it was obliged to sell its right to Aubert, Neret, and Gayot, May 10, 1706—confirmed by “Arrêt du Conseil, July 24, 1706.” This company agreed^[243] to take over all the obligations and rights of the Company of Canada for twelve years, ending December 31, 1717. The trade in castor gras was forbidden during the first six years, and permitted to the extent of thirty thousand per year during the last six years at 40 sols la livre. Since the company was unable to dispose of its supply of castor gras during the first six years, a new arrangement^[244] was made May 19, 1710, by which the company was not obliged to receive castor gras during the last six years, but in compensation the price of castor sec was raised from 30 sols to 34 sols per livre. With these measures the supply was, to some extent, brought under control.

The problem of the fur trade in restricting supply was greatly complicated by changes in the home market in France and Europe. With a marked increase in the supply of poorer grades of beaver, there was a decline in demand. Denys in A Description of the Natural History of the Coasts of North America,^[245] published in 1672, noted a falling off in the demand for beaver hats. “Those skins have had formerly a great vogue when the beaver hats were popular but they are not so much at present.” Attempts had been made as early as 1634 to regulate the use of beaver in the manufacture of hats.^[246] The demi-castor was prohibited and provision made for the increasing consumption of beaver in regulations of October 13, 1664, June 21, 1666, April 15, 1673, April, 1690, October 13, 1699, August 10, 1700. These regulations were evaded in numerous ways, and in 1706 the ban against demi-castors was lifted. On February 8, 1685,^[247] an agreement, confirmed April 12, 1685, for one year was made by le fermier du Domaine d’Occident et Nouvelle France in which all beaver was sold to the “Maistres Chapeliers” of Paris, to enforce closer supervision of the manufacture. In 1697 the ferme was transferred to Guigues (representing a Paris corporation), who planned to increase demand by manufacturing woolen clothing^[248] from beaver fur. These plans were indices of the seriousness of the problems rather than remedies.

The increasing use of larger proportions of poor, dry beaver in the manufacture of hats seriously injured the trade. Changes in style, which favored smaller hats, decreased consumption. The demi-castor hat had come into favor in spite of regulations.^[249]

Substitutes became more popular and occasioned a decline. Champigny, in a letter dated September 23, 1699, wrote:^[250]

During the wars of the Spanish Succession (1700 to 1713) laine de vigogne, a wool^[251] from a species of llama in Peru, was used instead of castor gras to mix with castor sec for the manufacture of hats.

The effect of a decline in the consumption of beaver in the manufacture of beaver hats on the price of beaver was especially marked because of the high percentage of the cost of raw material to the total cost. In 1696^[252] it was estimated that the total cost of manufacture of a hat was 14 livres 10 sols, including 30 to 35 sols per hat to the workers who fashioned the hat from the felt, 20 to 25 sols to the dyers, the cost of from eight to ten ounces of beaver fur, of which five to six ounces were obtained from each pound of beaver, 5 livres per pound, or a maximum of 10 livres per hat, and the cost of cleaning the felt, removing the guard hairs, preparing the hides, shearing and sorting the fur for the felting machine, or about 4 livres 10 sols per hat. The hats were sold wholesale and retail by the master hatmakers and netted 24 livres, giving a profit of 9 livres, 10 sols per hat. Roughly one-third of the final sale price was absorbed in profits, one-third in the price of raw material, and the remainder for labor and manufacture. The pronounced fall in the price of beaver in 1700^[253] was a result of these factors.

The market suffered also from the effects of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.^[254] The position of La Rochelle, an important depot of the trade, and of France, received a severe blow. Beaver was sent from France to La Rochelle and distributed to various markets. In this city, hats of the best qualities, smooth, glossy, and à poil, were made and sold to the French. After being worn, they were returned and filled with gum making them hard and short haired and sold to Spain. They were again returned and put up in small styles, sent to Lisbon, and from thence to Brazil. Finally, worn full of holes, they were taken to the African coast by the Portuguese. The migration of skilled workmen^[255] from France was a direct loss to France, and a gain to the fur trade and the hatmaking industry of other countries. In 1701 it was found necessary to import workmen from England to make fine hats.

The foreign markets were not adequate to absorb the increasing surplus following the decline in consumption in the home market. Indeed, these foreign markets also became less profitable. Castor sec, which arrived in the autumn in France, was usually sold in the following spring, a portion to the hatmakers of France, a portion to Russia, and a portion, the heavy skins with flat hair, to Germany for the manufacture of sleeves and furs. Denys wrote:

Muscovie beaver was sold in Amsterdam or Rotterdam either directly, or on commission to Russia. This grade was sold by the skin although bought by the pound in Canada. The first vessels in April and May, and later la grande flotte in June and July, took the furs to Russia. An elaborate organization had grown up as shown in the specialization of the market. Special grades were sent to various countries, for example, white fur to England where white hats were in demand. The underneath fur of the beaver skins was used in Holland and the backs sent to Russia. Following wars with Spain, the Indies market was closed, and wars with Holland, England, and the northern countries destroyed the organization of the trade. Through competition of furs from England the sale of beaver to Russia declined from twenty-five to thirty thousand skins per year to fifteen to eighteen thousand skins. The cheaper Muscovie or Russian wool or fur, returned from Russia, entered into competition with the fur sold direct to the hatmakers of France. Holland became an important competitor, especially with the stimulus of heavy import duties in France, and the low prices of furs. England also shared in the trade with large shipments of furs.

The serious effects on the colony of the failure to control supply were accentuated through the decline in demand, and the disorganization of the trade in Europe, and were seriously complicated with the increasing trade of the English. The misfortunes of New France and France were the opportunities of the English colonies and England. As already suggested in the earlier part of the period prior to the valorization scheme of 1675 the tax of one-fourth was a direct incentive to smuggling especially with the decline in prices.^[256] The “farmers” complained of evasion of the taxes:

In the latter part of the period, with a further decline in prices, smuggling to Gaspé became more pronounced. A letter from Pontchartrain, dated Versailles, July 7, 1690, stated:^[258]

Smuggling to the English, however, was a more serious cause of complaint. The English strengthened their hold on the Indians through the sale of cheaper goods.^[259] English manufactures were improved following the migration of craftsmen from Europe to England. A decline in the supply of beaver made necessary a greater dependence of the Indian on European cloth for wearing apparel, and the growing importance of the woolen industry in England gave the English a decided advantage in the Indian trade. In 1707 a report as to the causes of the growing trade with the English made the following comment:^[260]

In a joint letter from Vaudreuil and Bégon, dated Quebec, November 15, 1713, the growing importance of English manufactures was apparent.^[262]

The Indians insisted upon un drap bleu, une raye blanche large comme le petit doigt proche de la lizière, et a l’écarlatine rouge une lizière plus noire.^[263] In 1714 écarlatines of English manufacture were sent out, and in 1715 an imitation manufactured in Languedoc. The imitation was immediately detected. “They are neither as strong nor as closely knit as those of England. They are lighter and consequently have less wool.” The Indians became as expert in judging cloth as les plus habiles negotians.^[264] The superiority of English woolen goods which was regarded as partly a result of the policy of the English government toward the industry,^[265] and the more rapid turnover of goods traded through Fort Orange, were factors which stimulated trade^[266] between Montreal and New England. This superiority was characteristic of other manufactures, and in 1716 it was held that^[267] the French were superior only in powder, but the English woolen industry was of fundamental importance to the fur trade, and eventually to the control of Canada by England.

Smuggling was further encouraged by the various changes in prices and grades. The refusal to accept castor gras after 1706 in order that the large supply of this grade on hand should be absorbed had unexpected results on the trade. The Indians formerly encouraged to secure castor gras regarded this change as an act of bad faith. Since considerable time was necessary to produce this grade, and since the announcement of its rejection required considerable time to spread to the remote interior, the Indians were left with supplies of fur which had formerly been regarded as the most valuable grade.^[268] The results are suggested in the following extract.

Clandestine trade grew up with New England, and other European countries^[269] gained a fresh supply of the best beaver fur, whereas France was obliged to consume the supplies of old beaver, much to the detriment of manufacturers.^[270]

With the exhaustion of the old supplies of beaver, and the falling off in the supply of vigogne after 1713, the hatmakers complained of the lack of castor gras and it was even found necessary to import this grade from England.

Prohibitions were enacted, dated June 25, 1707, and later July 6, 1709, against trade with English localities. In the latter ordinance jurisdiction over violations of these prohibitions was placed in the hands of the “Conseil supérieur de Québec.” Continued violations were the occasion for a regulation^[271] of May 6, 1715, giving jurisdiction only to the Intendant or his representative. It was practically impossible to dissociate smuggling from political corruption. Seizures^[272] of écarlatines and beaver traded with New England were responsible for a later ordinance^[273] of April 2, 1716, prohibiting trade with Orange, Boston, Manhattan, and other English centers. Numerous records of seizures^[274] and ordinances were indices of ineffective enforcement. New ordinances dealing with various features of smuggling were enacted on June 4, 1719,^[275] June 2, 1720,^[276] May 15, 1722,^[277] and May 22, 1724.^[278] On May 25, a regulation was put into effect requiring the registration of all bark canoes. But complaints^[279] of illicit trade continued.

The period witnessed a continuation of the effects of the insatiable demand of the western Indians for European goods. These Indians were largely unacquainted with the canoe with the result that an efficient organization of middlemen grew up, transporting the furs and trading goods over wide areas. Following expansion of the trade with increasing costs incidental to longer journeys, competition from the north and the south became more serious. Warfare and diplomacy were the most effective weapons. Increase in military expenditure, demand for larger numbers of men to carry goods and furs over longer distances, and for effective military control, and greater dependence of the colony on furs were inherent features of the fur trade. On the trade was based the life of the colony. The intense activity of the missionaries among the Indians, the violent disputes over the brandy question,^[280] the marked interest of the governmental authorities, the break-up of paternalism in the internal trade and its continuation in the external trade, the notorious lack of control over the traders, and the colony’s lack of development^[281] were essential characteristics of a community dependent on furs. The problems of the colony were coincident with the domination of the larger merchants in its regulation policy. The concentrated control of the trade enabled them to protest effectively against changes in the price level which endangered their interests.

The success of the military policy of the French had within itself the seeds of failure. The persistent demand of the newly discovered tribes of Indians especially to the south greatly increased the supply of poorer furs, and reduced prices, in the face of increasing costs incidental to longer distances to be covered in transporting commodities and furs. Moreover, the revenue which depended primarily on the fur trade declined with the fall in the price of furs while the need for revenue with new military ventures became more urgent. The inflation policies of the government were an inevitable result. Finally inflation, decline in the price of furs, and cheaper goods of the English made competition more serious, and military ventures more necessary. From the vicious circle of the fur trade the colony had no escape.

The demand of the Indians for European goods and the marked increase in the supply of furs was significant for France as well as for New France. The supply of furs fluctuated violently as new tribes were discovered or as campaigns were lost and won. The demand for the finished products, chiefly beaver hats, as a luxury, gave in the beginning a favorable market, and produced large profits. But, with the vagaries of fashion, the demand fell off and profits disappeared with disastrous results to the colony. Commodities in exchange for furs were manufactured on a larger scale, and served to stimulate the economic life of France. On the other hand fluctuations in the market for furs reacted on industrial life and affected her position. The economic and institutional life of Europe had reached a period of comparative adjustment and balance previous to the discovery of the New World. The economic and institutional life of France undoubtedly suffered material disarrangement through the importation of furs on a large scale from New France. It was the contact between the Indian civilization of North America and the European civilization, as brought by the French, which produced a disturbance disastrous to the Indian peoples and of profound importance to the French and to Europeans. The contrast between diverse cultures produced a disaster for which no remedy was adequate.

4. The Expansion of Trade to the Saskatchewan and the Northwest (1713-63)

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 deprived the French of the forts in Hudson Bay, and reopened competition with the Hudson’s Bay Company in that area, while in the south competition continued and became more effective.

The smuggling organization which had grown up with the English on the south in the earlier period, and especially during the war, persisted. Colden describes this organization as centering around the Iroquois who had deserted to the French at the instigation of the French priests. These “Praying Indians” were chiefly interested in the trade between Albany and Montreal, and the importance of the organization was shown in unsuccessful attempts of the English to further direct Indian trade, rather than indirect trade through the French. An Act passed in New York in 1720, for encouragement of the Indian trade, prohibited all trade between New York and New France for three years since it was claimed that the French had engrossed the Indian trade through English goods. The result^[282] was a marked decline in New York trade, and an increase in the number of European goods coming directly to New France.

The success of the smuggling organization was largely dependent on the cheaper and superior English goods which continued to exercise an important influence throughout the period. In the manufacture of staple goods for the fur trade the English had improved their position. La Galissonière and Bigot reported in a joint letter^[283] dated Quebec, October 20, 1748, that:

A year later in a letter dated Quebec, November 8, 1749,^[284] complaints were made as to French kettles. “They have asked for kettles of yellow copper in bales of one hundred pounds each, the one in the other, assorted by size each bale of twenty-five to thirty kettles. Those which they have sent are almost all of the same size, badly made and too heavy for the Indians.” Again protests were made in the same year, in a letter^[285] dated Quebec, October 1, 1749, as to cloth as well as kettles.

The advantage of a cheap supply of rum obtained by the English from the West Indies was a source of frequent comment in the documents of the period. The effects^[286] of English competition were serious.

The successful competition of the English became especially disastrous during the Seven Years’ War. The situation was summarized in a document^[287] discussing escarlatines, dated presumably about 1758.

The position of English trade was strengthened not only through the growing importance of a smuggling organization, and cheaper and superior goods, but also through the increasing numbers of experienced English traders. In order to develop trade in the interior by way of Lake Ontario the English found it necessary to establish posts at strategic points. The establishment of Oswego in 1722 gave access to Lake Ontario, and stimulated Indian trade. The importance of this move was recognized by the French as shown in the following extract^[288] from a letter of May 25, 1725.

The fears of the French on the establishment of this post and other posts were justified. In a letter^[289] dated May 7, 1726, it was noted that Sr. Longueuil

In 1727 it was reported that fifty-seven canoes with seven hundred and thirty-eight packs of beaver and deerskin arrived at Oswego. A letter^[290] dated Quebec, November 12, 1736, stated regarding the trade on Lake Ontario:

Following the construction of posts in the interior, English traders became thoroughly experienced in dealings with the Indians. By 1740 a letter^[291] to London noted that:

To offset the effects of competition from the English on the south, the French followed a consistent policy of erecting military posts. In 1726 a strong fort was established at Niagara to check the trade at Oswego. A letter^[292] of May 7 of that year, noted:

Detroit continued to prevent penetration to Lake Huron and Lake Michigan, and Fort Vincennes was built on the Wabash route^[293] in 1727, to check trade with the Indians of Lake Michigan, and the Mississippi. At various points this line of forts gave signs of weakening and new forts were constructed. In a letter^[294] dated Quebec, October 9, 1749, the dangers of the Toronto portage and the establishment of Fort Rouillé were described:

It was found during the same period that Lake Superior Indians were trading at Oswego, and in 1751 a post was established at Sault Ste Marie as a safeguard. The establishment of posts on the Ohio to control the Ohio route precipitated the final struggle.

On the south the French were checking Iroquois and English competition by military measures. On the north, competition from the English in Hudson Bay presented a more difficult problem. The Crees and the Assiniboines secured goods from three routes, first from Fort Nelson; second, Kaministiquia; and the third, Green Bay through the Foxes and the Sioux. With the renewal of competition from the English at Fort Nelson, after the Treaty of Utrecht, fresh attempts were necessary to regain the furs from these Indians. In 1710 the Assiniboines came to Kaministiquia when not prevented by the Crees and quelques François ont pénétré dans leur pays.^[295] The route to Lake Winnipeg was known in great detail^[296] in 1716 and Jérémie^[297] knew of the through connection from Dog Lake to Fort Bourbon during his residence at the latter point. The advantages of the route by Grand Portage are mentioned as early as 1722. In a memoir^[298] dated February 3, 1717, the possibility of discovering the Western Sea through the construction of three posts at Kaministiquia, Rainy Lake, and Lake Winnipeg was stressed, but it was noted that the expenses of these posts would be met by the profits of the trade, and also

The supply of castor gras had declined as a result of the severe restrictions on this commodity prior to 1713, but with the Treaty of Utrecht of that year, markets were rapidly opened up. The Northwest became a promising field to support recovery in this grade. Vaudreuil in a letter dated Quebec, November 4, 1720, wrote:

Moreover, the supply of furs at the southern posts was on the decline, especially as a result of the Fox wars. M. Pachot in a letter^[299] dated Quebec, October, 1722, wrote regarding the establishment of two posts at Rainy Lake and among the Sioux: “These two establishments appear to be a very great necessity for the colony of Canada in that the beaver is being all destroyed in all the other posts.” With the Sioux, and the Crees and Assiniboines at war, it was proposed that one post should be established among each, and that command should be gained over the important fur-producing area to the Northwest. La Vérendrye suggested^[300] the urgency of establishing a post among the Sioux to permit the development of trade among the Crees and the Assiniboines. The second Fox war, which lasted from 1727 to 1738, shut off the route to the Mississippi by the Fox River portage and Green Bay, and led to the establishment of a post among the Sioux (1727-37) as a source of trade west of Lake Superior, and as a war measure to withdraw support from the Foxes. It remained to establish posts among the Crees and Assiniboines, and, as already shown, there was only one route by which these Indians could be prevented from going to Hudson Bay—the route from Kaministiquia.

The first post at Kaministiquia after 1713 was established by Sr. de la Noüe in 1717,^[301] and was under his command until 1721. His successor was Sr. Deschaillons,^[302] who also commanded the post of Nipigon. His wife, according to a congé dated June 2, 1723, sent three canoes to Kaministiquia, and in the same year a canoe and five men were sent to Nipigon. In 1724 and 1725 Madame Vèrcheres sent a canoe and five men to Sr. de Vèrcheres, in command at Kaministiquia at that time. In 1727 La Vérendrye was sent to the post at Nipigon. In 1728 la dame de Varennes was given permission to send three canoes and sixteen men to Kaministiquia, and in the following year permission was given to Sr. de la Veranderie to take two canoes with six men each with no reference to destination. In the same year (1729) Sr. Vèrcheres returned to Nipigon with two canoes and ten men, and in 1730 his wife sent a canoe and six men to him. La Vérendrye wrote in his journal in 1729 that the territory between Lake Superior and Lake Winnipeg “is the country of moose and marten while beaver is so plentiful that the savages place little value on it and only collect the large skins which they send to the English.” He apparently^[303] came down to Montreal in 1730, and returned for his first trip to the interior in 1731. Arriving at Grand Portage, La Jemeraye^[304] was sent to establish Fort Saint Pierre on Rainy Lake while La Vérendrye wintered at Kaministiquia. La Jemeraye returned^[305] to Kaministiquia in 1732 and Jean Baptiste, the son of La Vérendrye, was dispatched to dispose of the furs at Michilimackinac and to return with the outfit from that point. La Vérendrye proceeded to Lake of the Woods and established Fort St. Charles. Jean Baptiste arrived with the outfit in November, 1732, after navigation had closed. In 1733 the canoes arrived with few supplies. On June 18, 1734, at the insistence of the Crees and the Assiniboines, La Vérendrye dispatched Sr. Cartier, a trading partner, and later his son Pierre, to establish Fort Maurepas near the mouth of the Red River. These men were later followed by La Jemeraye. La Vérendrye returned to Montreal in 1734 and came back in 1735. In that year he arranged to farm the posts to some merchants for three years, and dissolved his partnership with those who furnished supplies. In 1736 news arrived from Fort Maurepas and Roseaux, an outpost on Red River, of the death of La Jemeraye. Sr. Le Gras arrived with two loaded canoes at Fort St. Charles from Kaministiquia on June 17, 1736.

In 1736 the gap between Lake Superior and Lake Winnipeg had been bridged, but the representatives of the trading company were very reluctant to push trade farther west and were disposed to increase the trade at more convenient localities as at Fort Vermilion. Moreover, the organization of the trade to the Crees and the Assiniboines of Lake Winnipeg had destroyed the monopoly position of the Sioux, and not without protest, as was shown in the massacre^[306] of La Vérendrye’s son, Jean Baptiste, Father Aulneau, and nineteen voyageurs on Massacre Island, in the Lake of the Woods in 1736. It was necessary for the French to consolidate their position by a more aggressive policy. In 1737 Sr. La Marque, apparently one of the chief partners in the trading company, went in to assume direct control. In the same year La Vérendrye returned to Montreal, and secured support for further penetration to the interior in 1738. Documents show that he became indebted on May 31, 1738, to François Marie Soumande de Lorme, a trader of Montreal, for 6,693l. 12s. 6d., payable in August, 1739, and on May 27, 1738, to Louis d’Ailleboust, Sr. de Coulonges, for 2,787l. 4s. 2d., payable, contrary to custom, at Michilimackinac. On his journey from Kaministiquia in 1738 he tried to prevent war against the Sioux, and prevailed^[307] upon the Indians “to take good care of their lands, so that the French who came from so great a distance to supply their wants, should always find the road open—to continue faithful to the French—to hunt well so as to satisfy the traders.” Arriving^[308] at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers,

In October on the way up the Assiniboine he was advised^[309] to build a fort “at the portage which goes to the Lake of the Prairies for this is the road of the Assiniboines in going to the English. . . . Being here thou wilt stop everyone.” Fort La Reine was accordingly built, and he was joined by M. de la Marque with the Sr. Nolan his brother. M. de Louvière had left Fort Maurepas to come to the Forks of the Red River and the Assiniboine to build a fort for the people of Red River. In the spring of 1739 La Vérendrye sent^[310] his son to “endeavour to prevent the Indians from going to the English.”

The importance of the fur trade to La Vérendrye was constantly emphasized in his journals and was the occasion for suspicion on the part of the governmental authorities in France.^[311] Maurepas in a letter to Beauharnois dated Versailles, April 22, 1737, wrote “that the beaver trade had more to do than anything else with the Sieur de la Vérendrye’s Western Sea expedition”—a view which he continued to hold in spite of La Vérendrye’s protestations of heavy losses. La Vérendrye constantly urged the Indians to hunt for furs. In a speech to the Cree and Monsoni warriors at Fort St. Charles on May 9, 1734, he said:

Contrasting the advantages of trade with the French, who granted credit in the autumn, with the treatment of the English, he said:

The importance of castor gras was constantly urged. The traders “receive your robes after you have used them which previously were lost . . . I warn you not to kill beaver in summer for the traders will not take it.”

In the latter part of the period the district to the north of Lake Winnipeg became more important. With the end of the Fox wars, and the reëstablishment of trade by the Fox portage route, the trade to the south of Lake Winnipeg declined. Difficulties between the Sioux and the Assiniboines were constantly in evidence. Two posts^[312] built under La Vérendrye, one on Red River à cinq lieues du lac (Fort Maurepas), and the other à la fourche de la rivière des Assiniboels (Fort Rouge), had been abandoned (apparently in 1739) because of the proximity of Forts La Reine and Maurepas, the latter having been moved to the mouth of the Winnipeg River in the same year. In 1747 Pierre de la Vérendrye^[313] found Fort La Reine in ruins and Fort Maurepas burned by the Indians. In 1752 Legardeur de Saint Pierre^[314] found Fort La Reine burned and he was obliged to winter on Red River.

Meanwhile new posts were being established in the north. In 1737 the Crees urged the establishment of a fort at the end of Lake Winnipeg at the entrance of the great English river (the Nelson), since “there would be a very large trade in lynx, and marten . . . et surtout en castors gras que l’Anglois ne reçoit point.”

Fort Dauphin was built^[315] in 1741 on the northwest point of Lac des Prairies, and also Fort Bourbon, dans le fond du lac Nepigon, à la décharge de la grande rivière du Poskoyac. A license was made out to Lac Bourbon in 1745. According to Prudhomme^[316] Fort Dauphin^[317] was reoccupied and strengthened, and a small post called Fort Bourbon built at the mouth of Red Deer River on Lake Winnipegosis by Le Chevalier de la Vérendrye in 1748. A memorandum of La Vérendrye’s, dated 1749, gives Fort Bourbon as located on Rivière aux Biches close to Lake Bourbon (Cedar Lake), and another fort located at the mouth of the Saskatchewan which was abandoned in winter. The first post apparently disappeared with the later permanent occupation of the latter. In 1748 Le Chevalier built a tentative post near the forks of the Saskatchewan. A more permanent post was built in this locality in 1753 called Fort St. Louis or Nipawi. Fort Paskoyac was built at the mouth of the Carrot River on the Saskatchewan^[318] apparently after 1750. A temporary fort was built up the Saskatchewan within sight of the Rocky Mountains (Fort La Jonquière), possibly near Calgary, in 1751. Hendry^[319] in his journey in 1754 and 1755 found Fort à la Corne established as an outpost to Fort Paskoyac. In 1754 he found two Frenchmen at Paskoyac, the master and men having gone down to Montreal, and in 1755 he found the master and nine men—the complement of one canoe—the master and seven men having arrived in the fall. At Fort à la Corne he found six men. The effect which these posts had upon the trade of the Hudson’s Bay Company was vividly described by Hendry. Fort à la Corne served to supply the Indians from the North and South Saskatchewan, Fort Pasquia or Paskoyac from Cumberland Lake and Churchill River, and Fort Bourbon, the Indians from Lake Winnipegosis.

Extension of the trade to the Northwest involved an increase in the costs of transportation and greater difficulty in competing with the English. Evidence of this increase in costs of transportation, and of its effect was shown in several directions. As early as 1724 complaints^[320] were made of the expensiveness of trading in heavy and coarse skins of low value, such as bearskins. In the Northwest abundant evidence existed to show that heavy furs were sent to the English in Hudson Bay. Robson claimed that attempts were made to secure heavy goods from the English for the trade. He wrote:^[321]

And again:^[322]

The Report of 1749 contained considerable evidence^[323] to the same effect. Not only were the heavier furs brought to the Bay, but the heavier goods—guns, ammunition, hatchets, iron tools, Brazil tobacco—were imported from the English through the Indians. The French were obliged to accept only the lighter more valuable furs, otter and marten, and to rely increasingly on their influence among the Indians, on the use of brandy, and of conjury. Anthony Hendry on his journey from Hudson Bay in 1754 and 1755 obtained^[324] an accurate picture of the situation:

An increase in the supply of furs from the new areas was consequently less important through the growing inability to compete for furs because of increasing costs of transportation.

The extent of the trade to the Northwest is suggested by the number of congés.^[325] Following up the work of La Vérendrye, Ignace Gamelin, a partner of M. de la Marque, secured two congés in 1739, one for three canoes and eighteen men, under Sr. Neveu, and one for four canoes and twenty-eight men under Sr. Maugras for the poste de l’Ouest. In 1740 the same individual dispatched five canoes and thirty-two men, under Baptiste Pomainville. It is difficult to follow the relationship of La Vérendrye to the traders La Marque and Gamelin, but apparently an agreement continued after the expiration of La Vérendrye’s farming lease in 1738. On November 12, 1740, La Vérendrye contracted to pay La Marque and Gamelin seventy-five packages of beaver but it was claimed he only delivered nine. On September 9, 1742, Sr. La Marque & Company was paid fifty-six bales by Sr. Vercheres on La Vérendrye’s account and twenty-four more were sent to Sr. Le Gras on account of goods left by that Company in the west. In the same year the general policy of leasing posts was changed, and all the posts were farmed out to traders reserving a certain allowance for the officers, but apparently the farmers or traders were given little encouragement by the officers in full control. In any case La Vérendrye was not required to pay the assessment of 3,000l. on his farm in that year, and it was claimed that he was 50,500l. in debt. In 1743 Sr. Maugras for La Vérendrye secured two congés, one for two canoes and twelve men, under Joseph Laviolette, and one for six canoes and forty-six men. In 1744 La Vérendrye was replaced by Sr. Noyelles. In the same year Sr. Maugras purchased the farm of Kaministiquia for three years for 3,000 livres. In 1745 the same individual secured three congés, one to Lac Bourbon with three canoes and twenty men, under Phillippe Leduc, one to Forts Maurepas and St. Charles with three canoes and eighteen men, and one to Forts La Reine and Dauphin with five canoes and thirty men. In the same year he secured three congés with one canoe and six men each for Kaministiquia. In 1746 three congés were issued for the Mer du Ouest, one to J. Huno, a canoe and five men; one to Mathurin Laroche, a canoe and six men; and one to Sr. Maugras, four canoes and twenty men, under Pierre Primot and J. Bte. Ladouceur. The following year Sr. Noyelles was displaced by La Vérendrye and Sr. Maugras secured two congés, one for Fort Dauphin with two canoes and twelve men under Ladouceur and Boyer; one for the Mer de l’Ouest with two canoes and twelve men under Mathurin Laroche; and La Vérendrye one congé of four canoes and twenty-four men, under Beaumois and Gonneville. In 1748 La Vérendrye secured another congé for four canoes and twenty-four men under F. Sauvage, and Ignace Gamelin, for Forts La Reine and Maurepas with two canoes and fourteen men, under J. Durivage. In 1749 Ignace Gamelin sent two canoes and twelve men to Forts Maurepas and La Reine under J. B. Ladouceur, and Sr. Maugras (for La Vérendrye), four canoes and twenty-four men to Forts Dauphin and Bourbon, under J. B. Rapin. With the death of La Vérendrye on December 6, 1750, M. de Saint Pierre succeeded to the charge of the post, and in 1751 and 1752 Sr. L’Echelle sent eight canoes and forty-eight men both years. On June 2, 1745, Sr. Monière sent two canoes and twelve men to Lac la Pluie. In 1746 Pierre Royer was the farmer of the post, and sent one canoe and six men. In 1748 and 1749 Lac la Pluie and Lac du Bois were under control of Gonneville Rupalais who sent three canoes and twenty-three men the first year, and three canoes and eighteen men the second.

By the end of the French régime, posts had been established in the Lake Winnipeg district to prevent the Indians from going to Hudson Bay. The Vérendryes had systematically organized the fur trade of the Northwest in the strategic location of posts to the south, and later, to the north of Lake Winnipeg. In spite of the numerous difficulties, a chain of posts had been established across the difficult stretch between Lake Superior and Lake Winnipeg, and trade with the Crees and the Assiniboines of that locality had been established. The portages and trails had been improved; food supplies, fish, game, and wild rice, were organized to support these distant trading posts; the depots at Michilimackinac, Kaministiquia and probably Grand Portage, had been extended to facilitate the transport of goods from Montreal in the short season; and financial arrangements had been concluded by which advances could be made which would not involve a yearly settlement. The opening of this route ensured for the French an established control over the rich fur-bearing territory of the Northwest, and enabled them to compete with the English in Hudson Bay. Moreover, it relieved them from the uncertainties which had prevailed for the trade by the Fox portage to the Sioux on the upper waters of the Mississippi, and to the Assiniboines beyond. The problems incidental to wars with the Foxes, and the difficulties involved in maintaining forts among the Sioux as in the period from 1727 to 1737 were avoided. A road had been opened to the heart of the rich fur country as a check to competition from Hudson Bay and a relief from the difficulties of the south.

Total production^[326] throughout the period, in the north and in the south tended to reach comparative stability. The highest point in the number of livres of beaver received by the Company was 221,000 in 1733, and the lowest point 94,000 in 1737. Statistics for the period begin with 146,395 livres in 1717, and end with 148,998 livres in 1755. On the whole, production was not characterized by the pronounced increase of the preceding period, and greater stability was in evidence. The relative importance of different areas may be shown from varied data. The posts established in the west were responsible for an immediate increase in supply. “Ces deux nouveaux postes [Les Scioux, La Mer de l’Ouest] en ont produit cette année [1735] près de 75 milliers [625 packs], et il n’en arriva l’année dernière à Montreal^[327] que 15 à 20 milliers de ces deux postes.” Another account^[328] gave a total production from these posts in 1735 of 100 milliers and a total from all posts of 170 milliers or 1,400 packs. La Vérendrye wrote that 600 packages were secured in the west but only 400 were sent down in 1735. In 1750^[329] the two posts produced 300 to 400 packs—an indication that production from this area had remained comparatively stable or declined slightly. Of the remaining posts in 1750 Lac Alepimigon or Nipigon produced eighty to one hundred packs; Caministigoya sixty to seventy; la Pointe de Chagouamigon two hundred and fifty; Michilimackinac six hundred to seven hundred; la Baye five hundred to six hundred; Temiscamingue and Tadoussac were of decreasing importance. By rough calculation about eight hundred packs were produced in the district tributary to Lake Superior and twelve hundred packs in the district tributary to Lake Michigan. Approximately five hundred packs were taken from the area north of Lake Superior. The relative importance of the posts in the latter part of the period is shown in a statement^[330] dated Albany, 10th August, 1761, giving an estimate of the Indian trade in the French period.

The trend of production throughout the period is indicated in the number of canoes and men dispatched to various posts. In the decade from 1720 to 1730 the number of canoes sent to southern territory varied from sixteen to thirty-nine, and generally more than twenty-five canoes were sent each year, whereas in the Lake Superior and northwest areas the number varied from two to eight, and generally more than five canoes were sent. In the period from 1739 to 1752 the numbers fluctuated from twenty-five to sixty-six, and generally more than forty canoes were sent to the southern territory, whereas in the Lake Superior and northwest areas the numbers varied from eight to twenty-seven, and generally more than fifteen were sent. The number of canoes in the district tributary to Lake Superior increased rapidly throughout the period, but reached a peak in 1745. In the territory to the south the number of canoes also increased, and reached a peak in 1750. Allowing for discrepancies in the statistics the conclusion is more or less sustained that the production had reached its highest point in the period 1740 to 1745, and following the effects of the high prices of goods of the latter date declined. The northern territory was more directly affected by competition from Hudson Bay, and the south could not be expanded because of the growing importance of the English trade.

Consumption remained practically stationary throughout the period. It was estimated that in 1716 France consumed six hundred ballots (72,000 pounds) of beaver of which one-half was gras and one-half sec. Holland purchased in addition fifty ballots of gras and two hundred ballots of sec—a total of eight hundred and fifty ballots at 120 livres each or 102,000 livres. For this amount a steady market was found. A later estimate^[331] stated that France absorbed 50,000 to 60,000 livres annually. The large quantities of bad castor sec which came on the market at certain periods were generally disposed of in Holland, often under unfavorable circumstances. At the end of the period (1749) English products^[332] had made substantial inroads on the French market in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Germany. On the other hand prices of beaver had increased, and the marketing problem of the early period was not in evidence.

As a result of the tendency toward stability in the supply of beaver, the problem of restricting production, prevalent in the earlier period, was not apparent. Violent fluctuations of a short-run character were still in evidence. Indian wars incidental to the destruction of the beaver, and the westward movement of the Iroquois continued to cause marked changes in supply. During the second Fox^[333] war (1727-38) it was reported in a letter^[334] of October 13, 1735, that

Changes in the prices of furs and of goods had the usual effects. With high prices the supply of furs increased. A letter dated October 24, 1746, noted:^[335]

Prices were chiefly regulated as in the preceding period by monopoly control, and represented a compromise between the merchants who demanded high prices and the Company which was obliged to sell the furs on the European market, but the tendency toward stability of production greatly simplified the problems of price control. The early part of the period was characterized by uncertainty incidental to post-war adjustment and to the difficulties of the trade in the earlier period. The treaty with Srs. Aubert, Neret, and Gayot expired with the end of 1717. In August, 1717, the Compagnie d’Occident was^[336] given a monopoly of the beaver trade from January 1, 1718, to December 30, 1742. Opinion in the colony was not unanimously in favor of monopoly control, and various arguments were advanced in support of freedom of trade.^[337] Company control was regarded as the cause of all previous misfortunes; the directors failed to take sufficient interest in the Company’s affairs; failure of the Company involved the whole colony; loss by fire in the Company’s depot would occasion a loss for the colony. These dangers would be avoided with freedom of trade. On the other hand economy in storage, demurrage, commissions, and other expenses with a commodity particularly liable to damage, and the difficulties of the surplus being disposed of advantageously in foreign markets unless it was under the control of a single hand, were considerations favoring monopoly control. The expenses of handling beaver were important items. Freight from Canada to France was per livre of beaver, 2 sols; insurance 10 per cent, or 4 sols; packing 2 sols; commission and transportation from La Rochelle to Paris, 2 sols; a total of 10 sols la livre.^[338] The Compagnie des Indes claimed that a capital of 800,000 livres was necessary to carry on trade between Quebec and France. The net result of the arguments and complaints against Company control was the Arrest du 16 Mai, 1720, which made the trade in beaver free. The exclusive privilege of the Company was exchanged for a tax on importation to France of 9 sols per livre pezant of castor gras and 6 sols per livre pezant of castor sec. On January 23, 1721, an attempt was made to check the frauds incidental to free trade by permitting the import of furs to France through certain ports. The privilege of the Company was reëstablished on May 30, 1721, but on the protest^[339] of the merchants, was revoked again on July 20, 1721. It was reëstablished on January 28, 1722. The complications incidental to these numerous changes proved detrimental to the trade.^[340]

Following the establishment of the Company in 1718, castor gras d’été et de bas-automne seront entièrement rejetés. So too were castor sec d’été et de bas-automne chargés de chair ou de trop gros cuirs. Castors gras et demi-gras de bonne qualité only, were accepted as castor gras. Toutes les robes neuves ou celles qui n’auront été portées que du côté de la peau seront mises avec le sec. Only castor sec d’hiver et de beau poil were accepted. No distinction was made between Moscovites and castor sec. Castor gras was purchased at 3 livres la livre poids de marc in letters of exchange drawn by the Company’s agent in Quebec, for six months sight on the Company in Paris, and castor sec at 30 sols la livre in letters of exchange, one-half at six months sight, and one-half at two months sight. Beaver was delivered to the Company in bales of 120 livres pesant, 5 per cent^[341] deducted for good weight. It was urged that the price paid for castor gras was insufficient to secure a supply, especially since the Indians had ceased to produce it, and since it was claimed that three years were necessary for making this grade,^[342] but apparently without effect. In 1719 the price of castor sec was raised from 30 to 34 sols la livre to check fraud. It was also suggested that castor sec d’hyver with gros cuir should be received on the basis of 2 livres, that castor veule should be paid 40s. la livre since being gratté pour en faire du castor gras it weighed much less than castor sec,^[343] but apparently without effect. The strict attention to grades and the rejection of the poorer grades favored increased smuggling.^[344] After the period of free trade (1722), prices were regularly charged as provided in the charter of the Company: “We reserve the right to regulate, on the basis of information sent to us from the country, on the quantities of the different species of castors which this Company receives each year from the habitans of Canada, and the prices which it will be required to pay them.”

In 1722 the price of castor gras et demi-gras was 4 livres, of castor sec 2 livres; in 1725 castor sec was increased to 3 livres, and the following year^[345] more energetic steps were taken to check smuggling by accepting the lower grades. Castor gras and demi-gras were given separate prices—le gras 4 livres, le demi-gras 3 livres, le sec 2 livres, le veule 50 sols, and engraissé 2 livres. Castor d’été et bas automne tant gras que sec and le veule d’été et bas automne were received at one-half the price of castor of good quality as fixed on July 11, 1718. Castor chargé de chair of good quality was received as castor sec with a quarter reduction in weight, castor gros cuir as castor de bonne qualité. In 1726 the distinction between castor gras and demi-gras continued as a source of complaint. The bureau graded too low and in turn the trader was obliged to grade lower for the Indian. These difficulties again encouraged smuggling and the distinctions were abolished on July 21, 1727.^[346] The price of demi-gras et veule was changed to 50 sols la livre and castor engraissé 30 sols. In 1728 castor gras et demi-gras were raised to 4 francs la livre and castor veule remained unchanged. On January 1, 1730, castor gras et demi-gras were reduced to 3l. 10s., and castor veule to 48 sols.^[347] The Company complained of fraud through falsification of weight with grease and oil and also that the better grades of beaver were smuggled to the English.^[348] In turn the hatmakers complained.^[349] Following these complaints arrangements were made January 4, 1733, to receive dry summer beaver for the following year at 20 sols, and fat summer beaver at 35 sols per livre. Thereafter summer beaver was to be received at 10 sols per livre, and burnt. The industry was subsidized^[350] to that extent to prevent furs going to the English.

On December 20, 1735, castor gras esté and sec esté were ordered to be received beginning January 1, 1736, on the same basis as existed prior to the regulation of 1733.^[351] On July 11, 1738, all beaver (fat and dry of good quality) was to be received at 55 sols la livre, and all other beaver of summer and late autumn at 20 sols la livre (ordinary deduction of 5 per cent). On June 6, 1746, as a result of the war, prices of beaver were increased; fat winter beaver 55 sols to 4 livres; dry winter beaver 55 sols to 3 livres 15 sols; all other beaver, summer and late autumn, 20 sols to 30 sols la livre.^[352] Provision was made for reduction after the war to pre-war prices. In 1749 castor gras and sec of good quality were reduced after August 21 to 3 livres, 10 sols la livre, and in 1750 to 3 livres, 5 sols la livre.^[353] During these years of rapid price changes the problems of grading became more serious. A letter dated September 29, 1748, complained:^[354]

The period was characterized by the usual difficulties of controlling the supply of poorer grades of beaver. Under conditions of competition the lower grades could not be rejected, and remained as an embarrassment for the European market. But it is significant that prices at the end of the period were higher than at the beginning. According to a statement of prices of various grades sold to the hatmakers in Paris^[355] castor gras was quoted at 5 livres 10 sols in 1716, and at 7 livres 10 sols in 1751, and castor sec at 3 livres 10 sols in 1716, and 7 livres 10 sols in 1751. In England beaver increased from 5s. 5¼d. in 1739, to 7s. 6½d. in 1748. The supply of furs had apparently reached a point of stability.

The tendency toward stable production also simplified the problems of regulation of trade in the interior. Following the withdrawal of traders from the west in 1696 and attempts to concentrate trade at posts in charge of commandants, and the failure of those attempts because of Iroquois competition and wars, the colony returned to the old policy of issuing licenses. Preparatory to the inauguration of the policy an amnesty^[356] was granted in 1714. The licensing system was introduced with the issue of fifteen permits in 1715. Another amnesty^[357] was granted in March, 1716, for the benefit of those who had not taken advantage of the earlier one, and on April 28 of the same year, the licensing system was extended to twenty-five permits.^[358] The restrictions were nullified to a certain extent through articles permitting traders to proceed into the interior to carry supplies for wars among the Indians, especially against the Foxes. Traders were permitted to take merchandise for trade to pay for the expense. Regulations were difficult to enforce under conditions of competition. An additional problem followed the establishment of a separate jurisdiction in Louisiana to which traders escaped.^[359] The licensing system established in 1715 and 1716 was revoked in 1719, and no further permits were issued after 1720. Licenses were restored after 1728 and a varied system grew up which included the license, the leasing of posts, and the handling of posts directly through the King’s account. From 1728 to 1742 the licensing^[360] system was dominant. As usual an amnesty had to be granted to the coureurs de bois in 1737. On April 20, 1742, regulations were enacted to control the trade through leasing of various posts. The revenue raised by this source became a tax to the trade borne chiefly by the traders. Posts were leased to farmers giving the largest bids and again subleased. On March 26, 1743,^[361] Temiscamingue was auctioned for 5,600 livres (leased for 6,000 livres in 1724), Michipicoten 3,750 livres, Ouiatonons 3,000, and La Baye 8,100, giving a total of 20,450 livres. In the following winter^[362] Kaministiquia was farmed for three years for 3,000 livres and Miamis for 6,850 livres. The disadvantage of the leasing system became especially apparent during a period of high prices of goods. Posts which were leased or subleased were usually centers of complaint from the Indians, who were anxious to get higher prices such as competition made possible. The boundaries of the posts were not carefully limited and disputes occurred between lessees of adjoining posts. With leases for short terms (as for instance three years), the lessees sold large quantities of rum, and generally carried on the trade with reference to the largest possible profit irrespective of the welfare of the Indians. In 1747, as a result of high prices, the farmers asked to be discharged.^[363] “The farmers of all these posts have made representations to be discharged from payment of their taxes; they allege considerable losses.” In that year nine canoes were sent to Detroit, but only on condition that they should receive licenses free of charge. The returns^[364] in furs were very small and it was estimated that the Company received only 100,000 to 120,000 beaver skins. In 1749 the licensing system again became important. Temiscamingue, Nipigon, Kaministiquia, and Chagouamigon were farmed out and the remaining posts exploited by licenses.

The arrangements were in part adjusted to what the traffic would bear—licenses were issued to posts in which English competition was felt in order that prices should be reduced through competition of license holders. Under competitive conditions taxation of the posts in the interior was practically impossible. In posts in which competition was not felt, monopoly control was continued. The King’s posts as at Niagara and Frontenac were not profitable, and were subsidized to check English competition. They were apparently the subject of mismanagement. Complaints were made that the late arrival of the King’s vessels made it impossible to forward the season’s goods from Montreal to Fort Frontenac. During periods of war with heavy burdens on revenue, the leasing system was favored as more remunerative. The financial exigencies of the government were an important factor in regulation policy.

The general situation in the latter part of the period was described as follows:^[365]

Revenue from the fur trade was shown in part in the prices paid for various farms in the latter part of the period. Leases expiring 1758 were purchased for Chagouamigon 8,000 livres, La Baye 9,000, Nipigon 3,000, Kaministiquia 4,000, La Mer d’Ouest 8,000.

The period from 1713 to 1763 witnessed the expansion of the fur trade from Montreal in northern North America beyond the St. Lawrence drainage basin, and into the heart of the Hudson Bay drainage basin on the Saskatchewan. With this expansion the limits of the fur trade from a geographic point of view under prevailing technique had been practically reached. Competition from Hudson Bay became more effective, costs of transportation increased, and profits declined in spite of a rise in price. Competition from the English from the south also became more effective. The effects of these developments on the colony, and their importance as factors in the downfall of the French régime in Canada have been in part suggested and may be summarized.

European goods were in greater demand among the Indians as old cultural traits disappeared. The beaver disappeared as a result of persistent trapping to meet this demand. Peter Kalm at the end of the period noted^[366] the ever prevalent manner in which European goods had become a part of Indian economy.

The fur trade demanded larger quantities of bulkier goods as the Indians became more dependent on European goods, and the trade was less profitable to the French.

With reduced profits it was necessary to pay greater attention to new and cheaper supplies of fur. Exploration and penetration to new areas were results. In turn this involved higher costs of transportation, slower rate of turnover, and heavier interest charges. With longer distances, primitive methods of transportation confined to the waterways, and the essentially more expensive costs of transportation of commodities up the rivers, the effectiveness of competition from adjoining drainage basins increased. The Mississippi River became a more important highway competing for furs along its heights of land with the St. Lawrence. The Hudson Bay drainage basin had appreciable advantages. Resort to new tribes with cheaper supplies of fur became less remunerative. Wars with intervening Indian middlemen were a result and these wars became increasingly expensive, as in the case of the wars^[367] with the Fox Indians. The vicious circle, in which cheaper English goods and more efficient English traders in the south, necessitated greater expenditure on military measures to check competition, and the burden of increasing expenditures falling chiefly on the fur trade reduced the prices offered by the French to the Indians and encouraged further competition, has already been noted. Trade with France was interrupted and the Indians became more dependent on cheaper English goods. Increasing trade in furs on the part of the English seriously weakened the French position in the European market. The dependence of the colony of New France on Europe occasioned by the characteristics of the fur trade seriously weakened its position in time of war. The military organization which had grown up because of the exigencies of the fur trade, though long effective, eventually collapsed. The institutional organization of the colony adapted to the characteristics of the trade failed to adjust itself with sufficient rapidity to the demands of a diversified economic growth essential to independent survival.

At the end of the period a trading organization had been built up which because of its efficiency did much to offset the results of English competition. The equipment had improved materially. In the licenses of 1680 references were made to the canoe and three men. With extension to the interior the size of the canoe steadily increased, and at the end of the period the licenses referred to canoes with seven or eight men. Supplies of provisions had been organized with greater effectiveness. Detroit became an important agricultural depot supplying corn to Michilimackinac as a provision post. Lead mining^[368] was carried on in the west, and the products of the country utilized to an increasing extent. Depots for the supplying of provisions had apparently been established in the Northwest, but to a very limited extent. The establishment of Fort La Jonquière was an indication that arrangements had been made for a more elaborate organization for supplying provisions in the interior. On the whole, however, it was the rule for French posts tributary to Lake Winnipeg to send men to Grand Portage or Michilimackinac to meet men from Montreal. The evidence is not conclusive but guides mentioned in the congés at Montreal for Mer d’Ouest are mentioned in succeeding years and it is scarcely probable that men went to the Northwest and returned in the same season. J. Bte. Ladouceur and Mathurin Laroche are mentioned as guides in 1746 and in 1747, and Jos. Durivage in 1748 and 1749. Posts had been established on the Saskatchewan, large numbers of men and guides knew the route to the Northwest, an organization had been built up and connections had been made with the Indians. The trail had been adequately blazed for the development in the Northwest under the English in the later period. The foundations had been laid by the French.

As has been shown, with constant penetration to the interior, the trade became increasingly dependent on the individual trader. Furs were collected over wide areas and the ability of the trader in dealing with Indians was of dominant importance. With increasing distances and heavier commodities large numbers of voyageurs were essential to the trade, heavy expenditure was involved in wages and supplies, in the purchase of goods in France for the trade, and in the increasing slowness of the turnover. The element of distance necessitated the residence of traders in the interior who prosecuted the trade and communicated its demands to merchants in Montreal. At the end of the period a stable organization had grown up in which traders in Quebec and in Montreal were represented by correspondents at Detroit and other points. These traders purchased the necessary commodities in Europe for the trade in the interior. The result was essentially a type of organization in which profit sharing or partnership developed between the trader in the interior and the Montreal merchant. Devices giving the trader the greatest possible responsibility and offering the largest possible rewards were necessary to secure whole-hearted coöperation between the trader and the merchant, since the trader was far removed from surveillance. Under monopoly conditions the result of the farming of various posts, control tended to shift to the hands of the merchants and the necessity for individual initiative in the trader was not so great. Under competitive conditions such as developed under the licensing system and followed the inroads of the English, control tended to shift to the hands of the trader. With monopoly the trader became more of a manager hired by the merchant, whereas with competition the merchant became a creditor. But even with monopoly conditions as shown in the farms and sub-farms of posts the trader was of crucial importance.

In the shipping of furs from New France to Europe the organization was designed from the standpoint of control of the home government. Fixed prices were paid and adjusted to the merchants and traders for the furs, and the overhead and expense of handling shifted to this organization. The difficulties of the organization with the traders were indicated in the charges and countercharges which illuminated documents of the French period and in numerous failures of organizations concerned. Discontent with prices, oversupply of furs, inadequate marketing facilities, smuggling to the English, and fraud, were among the complaints registered.

Through this organization, built around the characteristics of the trade, control of the home government became effective. The difficulties of the trade were brought before the home government immediately. A decline in revenue through English competition brought direct results in the fortification of new posts, in new appointments of colonial officers, and in military measures. The ever present character of this competition necessitated an ample military organization for the colony, and the development of institutions of militaristic importance.

Through these organizations—the trading organization of the interior and the monopoly organization of external trade—there developed in the colony a highly centralized system of administration. This centralization was shown in agriculture, in industry, in the church, and in colonial government. The tendency toward centralization was responsible for the development of paternalistic government. But this tendency was most conspicuous in external control. In the internal trade it tended to disappear especially as the possibilities of competition increased as was shown in the ineffectual legislation against trading with the English, and in the charges of participation in the trade brought against the colonial officers. As the trade extended to the interior and the supply of beaver was exhausted such control became more effective, but on the other hand the individual trader became of more vital importance. On the side of the trader was the growth of individual responsibility among the people against which the colonial officers found occasion to complain. Individual responsibility has been regarded as incompatible with paternalism, but its growth largely explains the manner in which the French people embraced and extended responsible government in the later period. Externally, the fur trade fostered paternalism, but internally the drift was undeniably in the opposite direction.

These institutions enabled the fur trade to continue long after its geographic limitations had been reached, although these limitations were eventually decisive. The advantages of the St. Lawrence drainage basin were sufficient to promote the growth of institutions and organizations which effectively checked competition from other drainage basins. When these advantages had disappeared through the exhaustion of the supply of beaver, these institutions continued effective. From the standpoint of the trader, long experience in dealing with native populations, knowledge of Indian economy and Indian life were of crucial importance in checking outside competition. From the standpoint of centralized monopoly, a highly developed militaristic organization in erecting fortified posts and in carrying on effective campaigns was able to supplement the influence of the trader.

The breakdown of these institutions was inevitable. Increasing competition from outside stressed the necessity of increasing dependence on these institutions. Greater distances to be covered rendered the trade increasingly expensive. Military organization played a more important part and became to a larger extent more expensive. Heavier drains^[369] were made on the resources of the home government, and more especially on the resources of the colony. The French power in New France collapsed of its own weight. Institutional development characteristic of the fur trade was not adequate to the new economic conditions.

The effects of war on the fur trade were singularly disastrous. In the interior, native wars were responsible for the decimation of the Indians and for the unusual fluctuations in the supply of furs during war years. External wars were even more destructive. The fur trade was necessarily carried on through the production of manufactured commodities in Europe and the transportation of those commodities to native populations who demanded them to an increasing extent as older cultural traits disappeared. Areas dependent primarily on the fur trade were dependent on the regular transportation of manufactured products from Europe. This was especially evident in a country which adhered to the mercantile policy. Numerous statements of this policy are available, and the following extract^[370] from a letter of October 20, 1726, may be cited:

Industrial development within the colony even as related to the fur trade^[371] was rigidly scrutinized and prohibited and control over manufactures, if not over internal trade, was effective through the centralization of authority which the fur trade encouraged. Interference with transportation and a failure in manufactured goods, therefore, had immediate and serious results for the trade. The capture of a season’s shipload of furs, or of goods, was disastrous to the colony. Immediately the French were unsuccessful in war with the English, attempts were made to supply commodities from adjoining areas, and the routes by the Hudson River and by Hudson Bay became of increasing importance.

For the colony of New France, essentially dependent as it was on the fur trade, war was of further consequence. A decline in the supply of fur immediately affected the revenue which was drawn primarily from the most important commodity. Revenue^[372] derived from import duties on goods used in the trade was reduced as well as revenue derived directly from the furs. War, on the other hand, involved increased expenses. The direct relation between the fur trade and the colonial administration as carried out from France, or in the colony, was unique. The paternalism of the French régime was characteristic of a colony dependent on the fur trade.

On the other hand, in the internal trade in which the furs were obtained to an increasing extent from more distant areas, the control of the administration inevitably broke down. The trade stressed individual initiative, resource, and general freedom from restraint. With greater cost of transportation involved in the extension of the trade to more distant areas, with falling prices incidental to trade expansion, and an increased burden of taxation to support militaristic ventures, the colony was more vitally affected by fluctuations in the trade, control was more difficult, and the tendency toward an increase in trade with other areas more pronounced. Dependence on the fur trade and a military organization was not compatible with agricultural and industrial development and large external trade.^[373] It was recognized in many quarters and at an early date that the fur trade had very serious effects on the economic life of the colony but it is significant that despite attempts^[374] to stimulate other activities, the fur trade continued as a dominant factor.

La Potherie described^[375] the general effects of war in the preceding period:

During the war which ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 the supply of French goods was practically cut off, with serious effects on the trade. In a letter^[376] of June 19, 1745, the high cost of merchandise and its results were noted.

In the following year a letter^[377] of October 22, 1746, described a more serious situation:

The wars of the period seriously weakened the position of the French in the fur trade and contributed to the downfall of the French régime in Canada.

The effects of the fur trade on the home government were important in other ways. A marked increase in the supply of beaver fur necessitated a pronounced improvement in the manufacturing organization and in the marketing organization for the finished product. The increase in supply assumed also an increase in the production of commodities suitable for exchange with the natives. The rapid growth of this new trade called for realignment of European economic organization. New markets were essential to absorb the increased production of the finished product. The increased production of commodities^[379] for the trade still further complicated the problem, and called for an increase or a redistribution of energy for these new tasks. In the new world the characteristics of the fur trade which were of significance to economic development were the dependence on native population, the distinct cultural differences of the Indians and the Europeans, the geographic background with especial emphasis on seasonal variations and on numerous waterways, and the rapid exhaustion of beaver incidental to these factors. The native population and the French community were increasingly absorbed in the task of bringing furs, and of taking commodities for exchange from and to more distant areas.

The fur trade through its dominant importance weakened the position of the colony and of the mother country. It stressed dependence on such geographic factors as a northerly location and the forest areas of the Pre-Cambrian shield with their native hunting populations. The fur trade was prosecuted most successfully in areas not suitable to agricultural and industrial development, and eventually colonies dependent on the fur trade were destined to take a subordinate position to those geographic areas which gave a more diversified economic development. But the organization of the fur trade adapted to its specific geographic areas persisted with unusual tenacity. The fur trade was vitally dependent on manufactured goods from Europe. The organization never took an independent position from the old world such as an organization with diversified economic growth could afford. Canada remained in the first instance subordinate to France and in the second place subordinate to Great Britain chiefly through the importance of the fur trade and its weak economic development.^[380] It was significant that La Vérendrye had laid down the boundary of Canada in the search for the better beaver of the northern areas.

5. A Century of Trade on Hudson Bay (1670-1770)

Trade on Hudson Bay^[381] began with the establishment of Charles Fort on the Nemisco or Rupert’s River in 1668. Groseilliers and Radisson, experienced French traders, had been responsible for the venture of English capital, and Groseilliers was of special importance in securing the favorable returns which arrived in England in 1669. On May 2, 1670, a charter was granted to the Company and a new voyage undertaken with Radisson and Groseilliers. Voyages were made along the coast to the mouths of Moose River^[382] and of Albany River during the summer to carry on trade. The chief post on the Bay was removed from the east to the west side, on the transfer from Rupert’s House to Albany, in 1683. Posts were established at Port Nelson in 1682, and at the mouth of the Churchill in 1688. Within fifteen years^[383] from the founding of the Company, forts had been established at Albany River, Rupert’s River, Moose River, Port Nelson, and New Severn. In 1676 merchandise^[384] exported to the Bay was valued at £650 and furs imported at £19,000. In 1679 the returns^[385] of furs included 10,500 beaver, 1,100 marten, 200 otter, 700 elk, and smaller furs. Rupert and Moose were supplying about 5,000 beaver each, and Albany 3,500. As a result of this expansion the Company was in a position to declare its first dividend^[386] of 50 per cent in 1684, its second dividend of 50 per cent in 1688, and a third of 25 per cent in the following year; to treble its capital in 1690, and to declare in the same year a dividend of 25 per cent on the new capital.

The effects of this expansion on the French trade have already been described. In 1686 a French expedition was successful in capturing Rupert, Moose, and Albany forts, and holding them until 1693. But the trade at Fort Nelson and New Severn continued to increase, and it was estimated^[387] in 1690 “that our returns this year (by God’s blessing) are modestly expected to be worth 20,000 l.” Limited to Fort Nelson the Hudson’s Bay Company attempted to develop trade in the interior to offset the losses incidental to French control of the posts in James Bay. In 1688 attempts were made to develop the trade to the north, and orders^[388] were given that Henry Kelsey should be sent to Churchill River, and on June 17, 1689, he^[389] left with the Hopewell shallop to proceed along the coast. Because of slow progress he left the boat and went by land finding only the difficult tundra country. He returned to Fort Churchill to find that it had been burned, and leaving this point, arrived at Fort Nelson on August 8.

With little success in the direction of Fort Churchill, Kelsey^[390] was sent into the Assiniboine country in 1690, “to call, encourage and invite the remoter Indians to a trade with us.” He left on June 12, and after traveling six hundred miles and crossing thirty-three portages reached a point which he called Deering’s Point. In 1691 he sent a letter^[391] by the Indians to George Geyer, in charge of York Fort, who, in turn, sent by these Indians a new commission and necessary instructions including a request that he should return in 1692, and apparently that he should keep a journal. Kelsey had reported “that the Indians are continually at war within land, but have promised to get what Beaver they can against next year, others not before the next Summer come Twelve-months when they promise to come down.” Kelsey received his instructions^[392] from the Governor and left Deering’s Point on July 15, 1691. He traveled forty-three miles by canoe to reach the Saskatchewan, and twenty miles on that river before caching his supplies preparatory to going to the interior. After traveling 147 miles he came in contact with the buffalo. An additional 174 miles brought him to the edge of the spruce country and forty miles farther to the edge of the woods. Altogether he apparently traveled 542 miles to reach the Naywatamee Poets.^[393] He found the usual disturbances, following the introduction of European goods and especially guns, and incidental to war on the part of the middlemen (the Crees and the Assiniboines accustomed to canoes), against the more remote and less fortunate Indians of the Plains. Kelsey’s task was to check the wars between tribes of the interior in order that they might hunt more beaver. On September 6, 1691, he wrote^[394] that he had advised the Indians,

Eventually reaching the Naywatamee Poets on September 12, he persuaded the Chief to go down to the Fort, but during the course of the winter new trouble broke out in which the Crees killed two of them, and prevented them going down. These Indians (Crees) were no more anxious in Kelsey’s period than in the later journey of Hendry to give up their position as middlemen. Whether or not the Naywatamee Poets of Kelsey were the same as the Archithinue of Hendry, in each case the problem of getting them to come to Hudson Bay was the same and practically insoluble.

In 1692 “Henry Kelsey came down with a good fleet of Indians.” The London authorities in a letter dated 17 June, 1693, wrote:^[395]

In 1690 the French captured Fort Severn, and in 1694 Fort Nelson. The latter was lost in 1696 to the English, but regained in the following year, and held to 1714. The English were restricted during this period to Fort Albany and Moose Factory on James Bay. In these posts they attempted to stimulate trade, but they were in direct competition with the French to the south as at Temiscamingue and Nipigon.

During the period prior to the Treaty of Utrecht, the English were seriously interrupted by the naval and military ventures of the French, but they had built up an important trading organization. In the establishment of this organization French experience which had been gained in a long apprenticeship on the St. Lawrence was of fundamental importance. The knowledge of French deserters was drawn upon with the greatest possible advantage to the English. Although the location of posts on James Bay was determined in the first instance by the knowledge of the country gained in earlier explorations,^[396] a knowledge of the requirements of the trade was scarcely less important, and in this the services of Radisson and Groseilliers were invaluable. The minutes of a committee meeting of the Hudson’s Bay Company for November 12, 1671, are illuminating^[397] in this connection: